THE COURTS HAVE NO POWER TO DO AS REQUESTED

Because of the separation of powers, the general rule of mandamus is

that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.

Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

PRECEDENT:

1.) Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros

The Attorney-General reached the conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts."

-the case relied on

Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord and Sutherland vs. Governor

In the State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States it was held that "The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the Executive Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.”

In Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan Judge Cooley, in part, said:

". . . Our government is one whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective spheres of action equally independent.

Neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the others, and that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if power is usurped

or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is its equal.

No court can compel the Legislature to make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. (how preposterous!!!)

Further, in French vs. Senate of the State of California the court held that under their form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the

constitution.."

(note: the following has got to be the craziest reasoning of the court I‘ve heard…)

The court mentions some of the criticisms of the previous principles herein mentioned ―so as to be fair to the petitioner‖ however, it says that it is too late for these criticisms to be raised since the court can no longer go back and revise previous decisions and overturn them. This, it says, is not only only impracticable but also impossible since at least two decisions of the United States Supreme Court are controlling.

These criticisms are:

That the three departments of government are independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate province and perform the duties that the law requires; yet it has never been held that the executive was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary.

The court says : NO COURT HAS EVER HELD AND WE APPREHEND THAT NO COURT WILL EVER HOLD THAT IT POSSESSES THE POWER TO DIRECT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR THE LEGISLATURE OR A BRANCH THEREOF TO TAKE ANY PARTICULAR ACTION

Neither does it have the authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate.

The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to who it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.

On the merits of the controversy:

The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and

representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. (Alejandrino is an appointed Senator)

Senate and the House of Representatives on the other hand have the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House

Is the power to expel the same as the power to suspend? NO.

Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded

any means by which to fill the vacancy. Suspension is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.

It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law.

HOWEVERThe Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of the government, takes no affirmative action.

Osmena v. Pendatun Ponente:

Facts:

1. On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President. The House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a special committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President. It summoned Osmeña to appear before it to substantiate his charges.

2. On July 14, 1960, Osmeña filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Osmeña alleged: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House

3. Aware of the petition, the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Osmena a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

4. Thereafter, Osmeña took the additional position that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

5. On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld House Resolution No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.

Issue:

1. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary immunity for words spoken in the House

2. WON the Speech of Osmeña constituted unruly behavior for which he could be punished

3. WON Osmeña can be held to answer for or be censured by the House, given that other business had intervened after gave the speech in question

4. WON the House has the power to suspend its members Held/Ratio:

1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, wherein the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.

- Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the

Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)

3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.

Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure."

4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

Decision Petition DISMISSED.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan Ponente:

Facts:

Three Criminal Cases were filed against the petitioner Criminal Case #1 (filed in the Sandiganbayan)

A group of Employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint against petitioner Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago for the legalization of the stay of 32 aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of the said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified.

Criminal Case #2 (filed in Manila RTC) Violation of PD No. 46

Criminal Case #3 (filed in Manila RTC) Libel

For the case filed in Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed several cases in the attempt to enjoin Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the said case and to dismiss the 32 criminal informations. All three motions were repeatedly denied, along with respective petitions for certiorari.

Meanwhile, while the court was resolving the criminal case on the 32 criminal informations that were filed, the prosecution filed on July 31, 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending