Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-25811 April 3, 1968
THE CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO, represented by its BARRIO CAPTAIN, HONORIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CITY TREASURER, MAXIMO ASISTIDO, THE HON. CITY COUNCIL, THE HON. CITY AUDITOR, ATTY. FELIX PEPITO and the HON. CITY MAYOR, CARMELO PORRAS, respondents-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732 declaring as officially and legally existing, pursuant to Republic Act 2370, the several barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion. Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was created under Section 27 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, asked from Davao City for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio, as provided in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however, refused to release the share for said barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining to said barrio, in relation to those of barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be
determined, because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law.
Stated otherwise, Davao City's stand was that the amount covering the 10% share of these three barrios combined has been allocated, but it cannot be determined how much thereof pertains to each of said barrios, because their boundaries not having been fixed as regards each other, it could not be determined how much of the taxes were collected from real properties located in each of the three aforesaid barrios, taken separately.
On September 3, 1964, however, the Secretary of Finance, acting on the request of the same barrio Central or Poblacion for release of its 10% share in real property taxes, stated that barrios Agdao and Bucana were created only in 1963 in violation of Republic Act 2370 that prohibited creation of barrios out of chartered cities, so that said barrios are not recognized under Republic Act 3590 providing for the
abovementioned share of 10% in realty taxes. Accordingly, he ruled that the allocated 10% share of taxes for barrios Agdao, Bucana and Central should accrue and be given to barrio Central only, after all conditions therefor are met.
On December 2, 1964, barrio Central filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao, thru its barrio captain, a petition for declaratory relief with mandamus, against Davao City's Treasurer, Council, Auditor and Mayor, alleging the facts mentioned earlier in
732 of Davao City's Council creating barrios Agdao and Bucana; the actuations of the Auditor in passing in audit an alleged expenditure of P50,000 out of the 10% fund; and the failure of the council to delimit the territorial boundaries of the three barrios concerned. And it prayed that the court order payment to petitioner by respondents of its 10% share in realty taxes as provided by Republic Act 3590, declare illegal the creation of barrios Agdao and Bucana, and prohibit the Auditor from approving expenditures out of its 10% share.
Respondents moved to dismiss but their motion was denied. On January 29, 1965, respondents answered, stating among other averments, that barrio Central is inexistent or not a part of Davao City; that there are other barrios claiming the 10% share in real property taxes corresponding to the territory claimed by petitioner; that Republic Act 3590 providing for the 10% share applies only to barrios in
municipalities and municipal districts, not to those in cities; and that the alleged expenditure in question was legal and not taken from the 10% share allocated for barrios.
After issues were thus joined the case was set for trial. On August 2, 1965, however, the Court, upon motion of the Fiscal, dismissed the case without prejudice, on the ground that the issues were rendered academic by the passage of Republic Act 4354, on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of Davao City. Petitioner, having failed in its motion for reconsideration, took the present appeal.
At issue is the legal question of the propriety or correctness of the dismissal order.1äwphï1.ñët
Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. Petitioner barrio Central or Poblacion was not mentioned therein.
Accordingly, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished barrio Central as part of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo had sufficient and tenable reason to dismiss the suit in the face of said law, for being academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not situated in Davao City, cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under Republic Act 3590. Said law must be presumed, until squarely challenged and declared by the courts to be otherwise, as constitutional, especially because the power to create or abolish municipal corporations resides in Congress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-17803, June 30, 1962). Petitioner may of course assail the constitutionality of said new law. The present suit, however, is not for that purpose. Nothing in the pleadings questions said law's validity, for the reason that said law came after the pleadings were joined. Neither was there amendment to said pleadings. The court a quo, therefore, rightly dismissed the present suit, without prejudice, that is, not thereby precluding the filing of a suit to assail the validity of Republic Act 4354.
ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165547. January 24, 2007.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, RENE C. VILLA, petitioner, vs. SARANGANI AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., ACIL CORPORATION, NICASIO ALCANTARA and TOMAS
ALCANTARA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J p:
This is a petition for review 1by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) seeking the reversal of the Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and September 24, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79899, entitled "Sarangani Agricultural Co, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Manuel Domingo, et al."
Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been reclassified from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal zoning ordinance, and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel.
The antecedents are as follows:
The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on March 16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities, namely, Alabel, Glan, Maasin, Maitum, Malapatan, Malungon and Kiamba which were segregated from the Province of South Cotabato. Under said Act, the Municipality of Alabel was made the capital of the new province where the capitol building and all other national and provincial offices shall be established. 2
On February 14, 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 97-08 or "Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2005) of the Municipality of Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance for Adoption and Approval of the Provincial Governor, Honorable Priscilla L. Chiongbian, Thru The Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province."
of 1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses. 3
On March 2, 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018 or the "Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use
Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel." A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) commercial farms deferment scheme. 4
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents' properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel. 5
On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI) filed an application for land use conversion of the following parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,005 hectares:
Registered Owner TCT No. Lot No. Area Area Applied (Ha.) (Ha.) SACI T-7207 1-C 52.4365 52.4365 SACI T-48807 2 181.3353 181.3353 (T-4807) SAC I T-48808 3 281.0874 281.0874 (T-4808) SACI T-48809 4 241.7880 241.7880 (T-4809) SACI T-48810 5 40.6738 40.6738 (T-4810) SACI T-48811 6 137.0340 137.0340 (T-4811) SACI T-48812 7 12.3265 12.3265 (T-4812) Nicasio Alcantara T-(10885) 10 20.9149 20.9149 T-44538 SACI T-9210 2 12.1425 12.1425
(T-1185)
Nicasio Alcantara Untitled 53 5.0672 5.0672
ACIL Corporation T-(41758) 806 3.3115 3.3115 (T-4150)
SACI Untitled 807 6.7871 6.7871
Accompanying SACI's application for conversion were the documents required under the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997. 6
Subsequently, a Site Inspection Report was prepared by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional Office (Region XI) and was indorsed to DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr.
On March 16, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Land Use Technical Committee (PLUTC) 7 conducted an inspection of the subject properties. In a Memorandum dated July 9, 1999, the PLUTC recommended that SACI's application be made subject to the following conditions: 1) presentation by SACI of its development plan; 2) submission of the lacking documents; 3) re-survey and segregation of the property according to use or project in coordination with the DAR Regional Office; and, 4) submission of the resulting map indicating the technical description of the area per actual use/project attested by the Regional Director.
Meanwhile, on March 22, 1999, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary opposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, an "Urgent Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of Banana Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI and was received by the PARC Secretariat on July 14, 1999.
In the March 30, 2000 deliberation of the PLUTC, the committee agreed to recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares that had been planted with bananas and coconuts. The committee noted that said portion of the property was still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with
opposition from SARBAI. It likewise recommended that the decision as to the rest of the area applied for conversion shall be deferred subject to the submission of the following within a period of thirty (30) days: 1) a five-year comprehensive development plan; 2) a survey plan signed by the Regional Technical Director of Land Management Service and noted by the DAR Regional Director (Region XI); 3) SACI's proof of undertaking, which will contain the package of benefits it intends to
the concurrence of all the workers who would be affected by the proposed
conversion, which concurrence should be noted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) and acknowledged by a notary public.
On its part, SACI contended that 1) its projects were aligned to address the current and anticipated commercial and residential needs of Sarangani province, and the removal of any portion of its property included in its comprehensive
development plan will affect the viability of the plan; 2) the banana plantations will be transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made available to the displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 3) the company will construct and install power generation facilities in the entire area; 4) at the time the application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular because the same may be issued only after the final resolution of the application for land use conversion; and 5) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a legal barrier to the filing of an application for land use conversion.
On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI's application for land use conversion. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
. . . The proponent also submitted another DA certification stating that 12 parcels of land (Lot Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 807, 53, 10, 39 and 806) with an area of 816.7401 hectares, located at Maribulan, Alabel, Sarangani are part of expansion for urbanizing areas. Though discussed on several meetings, no decision was made on the application since the applicant was not able to comply with the documentary requirements and clarify the issues raised by the Committee. DCESaI
[I]n [the] 30 March 2000 Meeting of the PLUTC, the Committee deliberated again [on] the subject application and agreed to recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares area planted to banana[s] and coconuts. The Committee noted that said portion of the property is still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage and with protest or opposition from SARBAI. The Committee also agreed to request the DAR to determine the metes and bounds of the area planted to banana[s] and coconuts vis-à-vis areas devoted to other enterprises. Relative to the rest of the area applied for conversion, the committee deferred its decision subject to the submission of a 5-year
comprehensive development plan, showing among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots involved and the corresponding proposed use.
. . . The Committee acceded to the request of SACI and deferred its
recommendation to deny conversion of that portion of the property planted to banana[s] and coconut[s] pending submission of a manifesto or SACI's proof
among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots involved and the corresponding proposed use [of] the conversion, concurred by the workers/oppositors, noted by the MARO and duly notarized. The Committee also requested SACI to submit details of the pomelo farm in Malandag being offered as a replacement farm for the relocation of the farm workers. SACI was given a 30-day period to submit these documents. SACI, however, failed to submit the oath of undertaking to pay disturbance compensation to affected workers being required by the Committee and as provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1999. Instead, SACI submitted an undertaking executed by the affected workers stating that they are amenable to the package of benefits offered by the company. Nevertheless, those who executed the deed of undertaking did not represent the majority of the farm workers. Out of the 95 regular banana workers only 45 and eight (8) supervisors including four (4) workers who were not included in the workers' master list of SACI executed a deed of undertaking. As regards the 105-hectare pomelo farm, SACI failed to affirm whether they are going to pursue their offer. Likewise, DAR Region XI reported that coverage of the same area is on-going, and a different group of potential beneficiaries have already been identified. Therefore, it could no longer be offered as a relocation site. Foregoing considered, the Committee, during its 18 August 2000 Meeting, sustained its earlier recommendation to deny the conversion of that portion of the property planted to bananas and coconuts. With regard to the rest. of the area, the Committee deferred its decision subject to the delineation by the SACI of the total area that they can develop within the allowed fiveyear period. Likewise, the PLUTC is requesting the SACI to submit a revised five-year development plan that will show the schedule of development by phase, by year, and the proposed use for each parcel of land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that:
1. The application filed by the Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI), represented by Cynthia Adao-Prat, involving parcels of land planted to banana[s] and coconut[s] and with Notice of Coverage identified as TCT Nos. T-10885 (20.9149 ha.), T-14359 (10.9390 ha.), T-41718 (3.3115 ha.), OCT No. V-19574 or T-9210 (12.1425 ha.), Lot 807 (6.7871 ha.) and portion of P-V-125 (95.00 ha.) and [an] area covered by Lot 53 (5.0672 ha.) with an aggregate area of 154.622 [actually it is 154.1622] hectares is hereby DENIED. The Dar Regional Office of Region XI is hereby instructed to determine the metes and bounds of the area subject for distribution to the qualified FWBs.
for conversion is DEFERRED pending submission by the applicant of a revised five-year development plan indicating the specific use of each parcel of land.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, dated September 24, 2004. Their Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order having been denied, respondents appealed to the Office of the President (O.P. Case No. 02-1-47.4, alleging that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform committed serious errors in 1) finding that a notice of coverage had been issued for the banana area of the land holdings; 2) giving undue significance to the protest or opposition by SARBAI; 3) requiring a deed of undertaking even after applicant-appellant's written commitment to pay whatever lawful obligation SACI may incur as a consequence of the conversion; 4) holding that farms with commercial farm deferment cannot be applied for
conversion; 5) ruling that irrigated lands suitable for agriculture were disqualified for conversion; and 6) ruling that applicant-appellant had not submitted a five-year development plan. 9
In a Decision dated June 30, 2003, the Office of the President through
Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied, 10 so they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the same issues.
On July 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Consequently, the assailed Decision and Order dated June 30, 2003 and September 12, 2003, respectively, of the Office of the President, as well as the Orders dated November 9, 2000 and August 28, 2002 of the DAR Secretary are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the DAR directs the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage. The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to issue a conversion order covering the aforesaid area under the terms and conditions as provided in pertinent guidelines of the department. As to the rest of the area applied for conversion, action on which has been deferred, the DAR Regional Office (DAR Region No. XI) is hereby
DIRECTED to expedite the processing and evaluation of petitioners' land use conversion application in accordance with the provisions of DAR AO No. 7,
issuance are made applicable to those applications filed before its effectivity. The DAR Secretary and all officers and employees acting on his behalf are hereby enjoined from proceeding with the distribution of petitioners' lands under compulsory acquisition provided in Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6657. Whatever actions already taken in pursuance of the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage under CARP are hereby nullified for DAR's failure to observe due process therein.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 11
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred: I
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE JUNE 16, 1998 NOTICE OF COVERAGE WAS ILLEGAL AS DAR ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
II
WHEN IT RULED THAT DAR SHOULD USE THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLANS AND ACCOMPANYING ORDINANCE OF THE LOCAL
SANGGUNIAN AS PRIMARY REFERENCE SO AS NOT TO DEFEAT THE VERY PURPOSE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT (LGU) CONCERNED IN RECLASSIFYING CERTAIN AREAS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC BENEFITS IN PURSUANCE TO ITS MANDATE TOWARDS THE GENERAL WELFARE.
III
WHEN IT FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE BASIC
PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE REQUIREMENTS OR PRECONDITIONS FOR LAND
CLASSIFICATION/CONVERSION AND THE BASIC MANDATE OF THE CARP.
With regard to the first issue on due process, this Court holds that, under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period 12under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998. The pertinent provision of the law states:
agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetables and cut-flower farms, cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. [xiii]13 In the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall thereafter manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries. (AS amended by R.A. 7881; Rules and regulations on the acquisition, valuation
compensation and distribution of deferred commercial farms — DAR AO No. 09, s. 1998)
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, 14 on the Rules and Regulations on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of Deferred Commercial Farms applies to all commercial farms as defined under Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657: 15
SEC. 2. Statement of Policies. — The acquisition, valuation, compensation, distribution, operation and management of deferred commercial farms shall be governed by the following policies:
(a) All commercial farms whose deferment expired as of June 15, 1998 shall be subject to immediate acquisition and distribution under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Those whose deferments have yet to expire will be acquired and distributed only upon expiration of their respective deferment period as originally determined by the Department of Agrarian reform (DAR), or earlier if the DAR determines that the purpose for which it was deferred no longer exists and revokes its deferment; The process of acquisition of these commercial farms by DAR is specifically provided under Article III, Section 9 of the above administrative order, to wit:
SEC. 9. Procedure for Acquisition. — The acquisition of deferred commercial farms shall be governed by the following procedures: (a) Voluntary Offer to Sell/Compulsory Acquisition
1) The Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall serve, upon expiration of the deferment period of the subject commercial farm, as the Notice of Coverage, 16supported by the Compliance Work Program and Summary of Exceptions (Form A) originally submitted with the approved deferment application. However, for record purposes, the
which shall contain a reminder of his right of retention, should he wish to exercise the same;
2) In general, the procedure for acquisition shall follow DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, entitled "Revised Rules and Procedures governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands subject of Voluntary offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657," subject to certain modifications intended to expedite the process as provided herein.
Clearly, it was unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage to respondents in order to place the properties in question under CARP coverage. Hence, the contention by respondents that due process was not duly observed by petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the application for conversion must be upheld.
As regards the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or the Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion:
VI. POLICIES AND GUIDELINES A. . . .
B. General Guidelines
xxx xxx xxx
b) Conversion may be allowed if at the time of the application, the lands are reclassified as commercial, industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the new or revised town plans promulgated by the local government unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988, in accordance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, as implemented by MC No. 54, and Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993 17of the Office of the President. In connection with the afore-stated administrative order, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands:
through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the Sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%), and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%); Provided further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The local government units shall in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted though zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657. 18
Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses" issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the
agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of the province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993, thus:
SECTION 4. Use of the comprehensive land use plans 19 and ordinances as primary reference documents in land use conversions. — Pursuant to RA 6657 and EO 129-A, actions on applications for land use conversions on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference documents the
comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinance passed upon and approved by the LGUs concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion that while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance with the requirements and limitations under existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion under the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR's power in such cases may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as primary references in evaluating applications for land use conversion filed by individual
landowners. In this case, petitioners have already complied with the standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules and regulations of the DAR. . . . 20
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. 21 In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that DAR's scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limited to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the local government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the
comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local government for non-agricultural uses. SCaIcA
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is present here is that a portion of respondents' property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts, are covered by CARL's ten-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents' properties are located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657." Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. 22
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the third issue presented in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the issue on due process is concerned. In connection with this, the denial by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of respondents' application for conversion with regard to the 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares, the deferment period of which has already expired, is AFFIRMED; and the Orders of the DAR dated November 9, 2000 and August 28, 2002, directing the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage, are REINSTATED. The Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and
79899, are hereby MODIFIED accordingly. No costs.
LEAGUE OF CITIES
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. ―The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.‖
―The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the ―just share‖ of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.” (League of Cities of
the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote. April 28, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress’ deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities
by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. ―Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities
of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling
already became final and executory and was recorded in the SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. ―Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision,‖ the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that ―no city…shall be created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.‖ It stressed that while all
the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. ―The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,‖ the Court held.
The Court further held that ―limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.‖ (GR No.
176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008. April 12, 2011Ruling
Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. ―We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,‖ the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
―The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express
exemptions being embodied in the exemption
clauses.”(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/0414110
1.php)
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. ―While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.‖ (GR No. 176951, League of City of the
Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)
NAVARRO vs ERMIITA
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands’ population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?
Suggested Answer:
February 10, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of
802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. ―There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law,‖ held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v.
Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12,
2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, ―The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,‖ is declared VALID.
According to the SC, ―with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.‖
―But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.‖
xxx ―There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.‖
xxx―Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.‖
xxx ―What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.‖ (Navarro
vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011)
NAVARRO v ERMITA
Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area
requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?
Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision relating to creation of provinces), such was
incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true legislative intent.
Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly assail the order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to to seek the review of said interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105120. September 4, 1992.]
SIMPLICIO C. GRIÑO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, EVELYN C. JIZ AND PERLA ZULUETA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ILOILO
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, Respondents. Jiz, Jiz, Andrada & Gellada and Santos B. Aguadera, for Petitioners.
Juanito M. Acanto for himself and for other intervenors. Leonardo E. Lozano for petitioner-in-intervention.
R E S O L U T I O N
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the act of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of disallowing the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras, to vote for the governor, vice-governor of the province of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the second district of the province, in the recently conducted May 11, 1992 local and national elections.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
This petition was filed by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a duly registered and accredited political party, through its Iloilo Provincial Chairman,
co-petitioner, Simplicio Griño. Griño was also the official candidate of the party for the position of governor of Iloilo. The other co-petitioner, Arturo Gadian, claimed to be a registered voter of the municipality of Buenavista, sub-province of Guimaras, Iloilo.
The sub-province of Guimaras is composed of three municipalities, namely, Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia, with a combined voting population of fifty thousand (50,000), more or less. These three municipalities also constitute a part of the second district of Iloilo, with the municipalities of Pavia, Leganes, Sta. Barbara, New Lucena, Zarraga, Alimodian, Leon and San Miguel
composing the remaining municipalities constituting the entire second district. In the previous elections, the voters from the municipalities comprising the sub-province of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of the entire province of Iloilo.
On January 1, 1992, the 1991 Local Government Code came into effect (Sec. 536, R.A. 7160). Section 462 thereof called for the conversion of existing subprovinces into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected by such conversion. Said section likewise directed the holding of the said plebiscite simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of R.A. 7160.
The first national elections conducted after the effectivity of R.A. 7160 was the recently concluded May 11, 1992 elections which was also held simultaneously with the local elections. Pursuant to Section 462 of R.A. 7160, the Comelec conducted a plebiscite for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections.
On April 15, 1992, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 2410 providing for the rules and regulations governing the plebiscite to decide the question on the conversion of the sub-province of Guimaras into a regular province. Section 3 thereof provided that all registered voters of Iloilo, except Iloilo City, and in the sub-province of Guimaras, who are qualified to vote for the provincial officials thereof in the May 11, 1992 elections, were qualified to vote in the plebiscite. The ballots used for the three (3) municipalities of the sub-province of Guimaras and the entire province of Iloilo were provided with appropriate spaces at the bottom for this question:chanrobles law library : red
PLEBISCITE QUESTION
Do you vote for the approval of the conversion of the sub-province pursuant to Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
It was however, observed by the herein petitioners, that the ballots distributed by the Comelec for use in the three (3) municipalities of Guimaras did not contain any space or provision for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo, of which the sub-province of Guimaras was a part.
On May 13, 1992, or two (2) days after the election was conducted, herein petitioners filed the instant petition far certiorari. Petitioners alleged in substance that respondent Comelec acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the governor and vice governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed providing specifically for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a full-fledged
province, it do not specifically provide that the voters of the subprovince shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who, in case of a vote against its conversion into a regular province, would continue to represent said sub-province. Furthermore, respondent Commission on Elections failed to inform the candidates and the voters of such disenfranchisement.
On May 14, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Commission on Elections and the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo City to cease and desist from canvassing and proclaiming the results of the election for the office of the governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo. We also ordered the public respondents to file their comments.
On May 29, 1992, public respondents filed their comment through the Office of the Solicitor General. On June 9, 1992, the petitioners filed their reply to public respondent’s comment.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On June 17, 1992, We lifted the temporary restraining order.
On June 22, 1992, Perla S. Zulueta, who claimed to be the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of the governor of the Province of Iloilo and who allegedly ranked number two behind the frontrunner Arthur Defensor, filed a motion for leave to intervene and for admission of her petition in intervention which was attached to the motion. Zulueta alleged the same allegations as those presented in the main petition and claimed that she has an interest in the matter of the main petition because the same is crucial and determinative of whether or
not she would win for the office of governor. We admit herein the said petition for intervention and resolve the issue she raised therein in this decision
considering that it is the same issue raised in the main petition.
Still another motion for intervention dated June 25, 1992 was filed by Rodolfo Legaspi and Richard Garin, Juanito Acanto and Alberto Javellana, Grace Fernandez and Pablito Araneta, and Nerio Salcedo and Antonio Teodeco, candidates for members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the first, third, fourth and fifth districts of Iloilo, respectively. Apparently, unaware of the lifting of the restraining order, they alleged in their motion that they were unduly prejudiced by the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 14, 1992 because the issue presented in the main petition had no direct effect on them or their election and they prayed for the lifting of the said restraining order. On July 9, 1992, We issued a resolution denying the motion for intervention filed by Legaspi, Garin, Acanto, Javellana, Fernandez, Araneta, Salcedo and Tedoco because We had previously lifted the temporary restraining order and considering that they were not directly affected by the principal issue in the main petition (p. 126, Rollo) which involved only the positions of governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.
On July 8, 1992, the petitioners filed another motion to admit Amended Petition with the Amended Petition attached thereto. The original petition was amended to include as petitioners, Evelyn C. Jiz another candidate for member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.
The pertinent provision affecting the principal issue in this case is Section 462 of the 1991 Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). It provides in
full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 462. Existing Subprovinces. — Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Comelec
simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this Code. "The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by the duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new provinces or districts were created until their own representatives shall have been elected in the next regular
"The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy
occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the next regular local elections and qualified.
"All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of their conversion into regular provinces shall
continue in office in accordance with the civil service law, rules and regulations."cralaw virtua1aw library
We have carefully examined this section of the 1991 Local Government Code and We observed its incompleteness and inadequacy to govern all or any eventuality. It should be remembered that the law should take into consideration the decision of the populace to be affected by a change in its political set-up. As it is worded, Section 462 completely addresses an eventuality where the people of both the original district and the people of the new district to be created agree to the proposed creation of the latter. The law provides that, "After the effectivity of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through appointment, if none has yet been appointed to the same (as hereinafter provided), and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library But suppose the proposed-conversion of a subprovince is rejected by those affected by such conversion, what does the law say? The law states only the following in case of a negative vote: "The incumbent elected officials of said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. . . ." Whatever incumbent elective positions exist under the present set-up, it appears that in case of a negative vote, these sub-provincial positions shall be filled by appointment of the President. The makers of the law however,
failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails naturally, the sub-province shall continue to be a part of the original sub-province and continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the original province. The law is silent or whether the voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regular province shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the election held simultaneously with the plebiscite. If the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo and the "Yes" vote in the plebiscite prevailed, these votes shall not be considered. If however, the "No" vote prevailed and the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, their votes shall be taken into consideration. The Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the plebiscite decided not to let the voters of Guimaras vote for the provincial officials. The Commission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the 1991 Local Government Code, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras.chanrobles law library However, it would serve no useful purpose if We undo all that the Commission on Elections had done in that plebiscite. It is more relevant to deal with the facts actually obtaining in the instant case. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the subprovince of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. The total "Yes" votes was 283,224 as against 42,524 "No" votes (p. 34, Rollo). In this event, the President shall appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to newspaper reports, the governor for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member of the sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-province of Guimaras is now a regular sub-province, politically independent from the province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a special election for the municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia for the purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
