I. Classification of Property
A. Immovable and Movable
1.Article 414
. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation areconsidered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or (2) Movable or personal property.
Parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property.
Standard Oil Company v. Jaramillo Building was mortgaged to SOC. SOC sought to compel Jaramillo, register of deeds, to register a CHATTEL mortgage issued in SOC’s favor. The objects of the document were the leasehold rights over a certain property and the house constructed over the same property.
Jaramillo refused to register the document because the objects did not appear to be personal property under the Chattel Mortgage Law. SOC filed for mandamus.
HELD: The document should be registered. It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property. The register’s duty is MINISTERIAL, he can not determine the nature of the document sought to be registered.
2.
Article 415. The following are immovable
property:(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object (incorporation);
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings, or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in
buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals
the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements (destination);
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works (destination);
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included (destination);
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land; (8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the
matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant; (9) Docks and structures which, thought
floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.
Does not define, only enumerates.
Academic Classification of Immovables (NIDA) 1. Nature (trees and plants, land)
2. Incorporation (buildings)
3. Destination or purpose (machinery placed by owner on tenement for direct use of industry or works to be carried on therein)
4. Analogy (like the right of usufruct, public works, servitudes)
---If a building is not adhered to the soil and there is no intent of permanency, it is personal property.
---(4) 1. movable property must be placed in an immovable property
2. by the owner of the immovable 3. the intention must be to attach it permanently (destination)
---Provision in lease that improvements made shall belong to the lessor upon termination of the lease – air-conditioner installed by lessee. Will AC be turned over to the lessor? Yes. Lessee acted as an agent of the lessor.
---(5) Requisites
A. Placed by the owner;
B. Intended for an industry or works carried on in building or land; C. Machines must tend to directly meet
the needs of the industry; D. Machines must be essential and
principal elements in the industry; not mere incidentals.
Ex. Sewing machines placed in own house intended to be used as a garments factory. Immovable? Yes. Machines placed by owner; for industry…; tend directly to meet…;
essential…
If other person’s house, immovable
Effect of separation: If temporarily taken away, still immovable.
---Sale of real property in the CM Registry cannot bind third persons in good faith.
Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Agricola purchased rice-cleaning machinery from Strong and executed a chattel mortgage over the machinery and the building in which it was installed. Agricola defaulted and Strong purchased the building at auction. The
mortgage and sale were registered in the CM registry.
Agricola later sold the land to Strong, the sale being in an unregistered public document. It turns out that the building was also REM to Leung Yee to secure payment of a
construction contract. When Agricola
defaulted, Leung Yee purchased the building at a sheriff’s sale (this sale took place after the building was bought by Strong).
Leung Yee brought suit to recover possession of the building.
HELD: Strong has a better right over the building. This is true only because Leung Yee knew of the chattel mortgage to Strong when he purchased the building; he was a buyer in
bad faith. The sale of the building cannot bind third persons in good faith because it was the sale of real property registered not in the Registry of Real Property but the CM Registry.
A building may be validly mortgaged separately from the land upon which it is built.
Prudential Bank v. Judge Panis Owners of a building on leased land obtained 2 loan from the bank, the loans secured by REMs over the building. The owners defaulted, prompting the foreclosure of the mortgage. The respondent court ruled that the REMs were void, holding that a building may not be mortgaged separately from the land on which it is built.
HELD: The 1st REM, executed before title of
land was transferred to the mortgagor, is valid. Article 415 mentions ‘buildings’ separate from land; this means that the building by itself is an immovable and may be the subject of a REM.
The 2nd REM, executed after title was
transferred, is void for being violative of the Public Land Act.
To be considered as real property by destination, the machinery etc. must be (1) essential and principal elements of the industry and (2) the industry must be carried out in a building or piece of land
Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor The City Assessor sought to impose realty tax on certain MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
EQUIPMENT of MBC.
MBC opposed, contending that the items were not real property; the items in question are movable.
HELD: The items are personal property. They are not immobilized by destination or purpose as contended by the City Assessor. To be considered as real property by destination, they must be (1) essential and principal elements of the industry and (2) the industry must be carried out in a building or piece of land.
In this case, the items are only incidentals to the transport business and the business is
carried on not in a building or piece of land but around the streets of Mindanao.
A stipulation in the lease agreement to treat the real property as personal is binding upon the parties. The parties are estopped from claiming otherwise.
Serg’s Products v. PCI Leasing PCI filed a complaint for a sum of money and an application for a writ of replevin on the chocolate manufacturing equipment of Serg’s. Serg’s claims property is real and not subject to a writ of seizure.
HELD: The property is real under Article 415 BUT it was stipulated in the lease agreement that they would be treated as personal. Serg’s is ESTOPPED from claiming that they are real in character.
Steel electric towers are personal property provided they can be removed without substantial breakage or
deterioration.
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Meralco The City Assessor sought to impose realty tax on steel towers of MERALCO. The taxes were paid under protest, MERALCO contending that the towers were exempt from taxation and that they were personal and not real property. HELD: The towers are personal property. They are not buildings adhered to the soil (415-1); they are not attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner and they can be separated without substantial damage or deterioration (3) and they are not
machineries intended for works on the land (5).
3.
Article 416. The following things are
deemed to be personal property: (1) Those movables susceptible ofappropriation which are not included in the preceding article;
(2) Real property which by any special
provision of law is considered as personalty; (3) Forces of nature which are brought under
control by science; and
(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real property to which they are fixed.
For purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the nature of personal property and may be attached and executed upon.
Sibal v. Valdez
Sibal’s sugarcane crops were attached and sold to Valdez in order to satisfy a judgment debt. The lot on which the crops were located had been previously attached and sold to another creditor, Macondray. Valdez later purchased the land from Macondray. Sibal sought to redeem the sugarcane from Valdez on the assumption that it was real property (growing fruits attached to the land). Plaintiff contends that the sugarcane is
personal property and not subject to redemption.
HELD: Although the sugarcane may be considered as growing fruits and is ordinarily real property, for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, the crops must be regarded as personal property. This is because the right to the growing crops given to the defendant mobilized the crops by anticipation. It is as if there was a gathering in advance rendering the crop movable.
Electricity may be appropriated; it can be the object of theft.
US v. Carlos
Accused was convicted for the theft of electric current by means of a jumper. Accused contends that electricity is intangible and cannot be the object of theft.
HELD: Accused is guilty of theft. The Revised Penal Code provides that personal property is the subject of theft. Electricity is a valuable article of merchandise and can be bought and sold like any other personal property.
The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
Article 417. The following are also
considered as personal property: (1) Obligations and actions which have fortheir object movables or demandable sums; and
(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial, and industrial entities, although they may have real estate.
(1) Examples are: the right to recover stolen property and promissory notes as these involve movables or
demandable sums
(2) Even if the sole property of the
corporation is real property, a share in such corporation is personal property. In fact, all shares in all juridical persons are considered personal.
The property right of shares of stock can only be enforced or exercised where the corporation is organized or has its place of business.
(3) Money is always personal property. Money is not merchandise when in domestic circulation; it becomes merchandise when it is exported or taken out of domestic circulation.
Article 418. Movable property is either
consumable or non-consumable.
To the first class belong those movables which cannot be used in a manner appropriate to their nature without their being consumed; to the second class belong all others. Classifications of movable property
(1) According to NATURE:
a. Consumable – cannot be used according to its nature without being consumed
b. Non-consumable – any other kind of movable property (2) According to INTENTION:
a. Fungible – Mutuum - borrowed for consumption and equivalent property will be returned b. Nonfungible – Commodatum
-exact same property will be returned.
B. Property in Relation to the Person to whom it Belongs
4.
Article 419. Property is either of public
dominion or of private ownership.Article 420. The following things are
property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Public dominion (def.):
a) ownership by the State in that the State has control and administration; or b) ownership by the public in general. Three Kinds Of Property Of Public Dominion:
1) For public use – roads, canals for use by everyone
2) For public service – government buildings and vehicles for use by authorized persons
3) For the development of national wealth – natural resources.
Canals constructed by private persons within private lands are of private ownership.
Santos v. Moreno
The Ayala’s originally constructed the canals to facilitate the operations of their nipa plantation.
The Ayala’s later transformed their nipa plantation into several fishponds by
constructing dams or dikes to block the flow of water in canals located in the plantation. This property was later sold to Santos, who further developed the property for
aquaculture.
Local residents sought the destruction of the dikes stating that their construction prevented them from using the canals for transportation, caused flooding, and deprived them of fishing grounds.
ISSUE: whether the canals are of public dominion or private ownership.
HELD: The canals are private; their destruction may not be ordered.
Article 420 states that canals constructed by the State are of public ownership; conversely, canals constructed by private persons within private lands are of private ownership.
Art. 421. All other property of the State,
which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property. (340a)
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)Conversion of a property’s character from public to patrimonial requires a formal declaration of abandonment of the public character.
Laurel v. Garcia
The government sought to sell a property located in Japan which it acquired through a reparation agreement with the Japanese government. The property in question was given with the intention of its being the site of the Philippine Embassy; it was given with the understanding that it would be used for the government sector.
ISSUE: Whether the property is public or patrimonial.
Respondents claim that the property is governed not by the Civil Code but by Japanese law and assuming that the CC were applicable, the government has implicitly abandoned the public use of the property and caused it to become patrimonial by
transferring the embassy to another location and other executive acts.
HELD: The property is public – its ownership is collective and resides in the sovereign people. It is outside the commerce of man. The property is of public dominion and intended for public service under Article 420 of the Civil Code.
This is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the
corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. Being so, it cannot be alienated.
Contrary to respondents’ claim, conversion of a property’s character from public to
patrimonial requires a formal declaration of abandonment of the public character.
*Even if the property were patrimonial, there
could be no sale as there is no law authorizing the same.
Public plazas and streets are of public character and may not be leased out by the municipality.
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas The municipal council of Cavite withdrew from public use and leased to Rojas a portion of the town plaza. The provincial fiscal later filed a complaint alleging that the property leased was of public character and therefore the contract was null and void.
HELD: The contract of lease is ultra vires and null and void, the municipality never having had authority to exclude it from public use and lease it out.
Property belonging to the public domain is outside the commerce of man and cannot be the object of any contract.
The defendant must return the land and the municipality must reimburse rentals paid. *The book says that Rojas received no benefit but the facts show that occupation was enjoyed and a house was built. Compare to Sanchez v. Asingan.
Property owned by the State which is not intended for public use or public service is patrimonial.
There is no reimbursement if lessee derived substantial benefit from the use of said property.
Sanchez v. Mun. of Asingan Petitioner occupied a parcel of land owned by the municipality, with the implied consent of the latter, and built buildings of light
materials – rent was paid.
When a new set of officials took over, the council gave notice to petitioner to vacate the land within 5 months.
Petitioner refused and filed for prohibition stating that the land belonged to the province and the municipality had no standing to seek their ejectment and in case they should be ejected, prayed for reimbursement, citing the Rojas case.
ISSUE: Whether the land is public or patrimonial.
HELD: The land is patrimonial property of the municipality. It was not for public use not was it for public service.
There is to be no reimbursement. Unlike the Rojas case, the land here is not of public character. The implied lease agreement is therefore valid and may be terminated upon notice.
Assuming that the property is public, there can still be no reimbursement as petitioner derived substantial benefit from the use of said property.
INSERT REPUBLIC V. CA HERE 5.
Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities,
and municipalities is divided into propertyfor public use and patrimonial property.
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the
provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets,municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws.
Where now do properties for public service and properties for the development of national wealth fall?
Public service – depends on who pays for the service. If paid for by the political subdivision, public; if for profit, patrimonial.
National wealth – still property for public use under the regalian doctrine.
Property of a political subdivision is public only if it is devoted to public use.
Examples of property for public use being streets, promenades, fountains, etc.
City of Cebu v. NAWASA
The City of Cebu obtained a loan which was to be paid with its own funds. Part of the
proceeds of this loan was used to fund the construction of the City’s sewage system. NAWASA sought to expropriate the sewage system. This was opposed with the arguments that there was no payment of just
compensation; NAWASA offered unliquidated assets and liabilities.
NAWASA averred, as an alternative course of action, that the property is one for public use and under the control of the legislature. ISSUE: Whether the property is patrimonial property of the city or property for public use. HELD: The property is patrimonial and not subject to legislative control. It is property of the city, purchased with private funds and not devoted to public use (it is for profit). It is therefore patrimonial under the Civil Code. Nor can the system be considered “public works for public service” under Article 424 because such classification is qualified by
ejusdem generis; it must be of the same
character as the preceding items. What if a courthouse is constructed with municipal funds?
clarify
City constructs public market patrimonial Cemetery public use
Under the Law of Municipal Corporations, it is enough that the property be devoted for governmental purposes for it to be classified as public.
Province of Zamboanga v. City of Zamboanga
Zamboanga City ceased to become the provincial capital and a law was passed declaring the province’s property located within the city to be transferred to the city free of charge. The properties were the capital site, hospitals, playgrounds, and schools.
ISSUE: Whether Congress can transfer the properties to the City without compensating the province.
HELD: Yes; the properties are public and subject to the absolute control of Congress. If the province owns the properties in it public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
The character of the property depends on the use to which it is devoted. The
problem is which applies, Civil Code or
Law of Municipal Corporations?
Under the CC, a property is public if it is for the free and indiscriminate use of everyone.
Under municipal law, it is sufficient that the property be devoted to governmental purposes.
In this case, applying the CC, the properties are not for public use but merely for public service.
However, Municipal law applies because the controversy is more municipal than civil and the properties are needed for the
performance of governmental functions. The
LMC provides that a property is public if it is devoted to public use.
If the CC classification is used, consequences are dire (acquisition through adverse
possession).
Also the LMC is a special law. The CC itself provides that its provisions apply without
prejudice to special laws.
The buildings on the lots are also public because accessory follows the principal. How do we resolve what determines character? Salas v. Jarencio: How the property was
purchased public/private funds Or
Civil code: What use the property is devoted to free and indiscriminate use of everyone or otherwise
Or
LMC: Property is public if it is exclusively devoted to public service.
--Public properties are exempt from execution because of their necessity for governmental functions.
Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
Iloilo was sentenced to pay Tan Toco compensation for properties taken from her and used for street-widening. Because Iloilo had no money, Tan Toco caused a writ of execution to be issued against municipal property: street sprinkling trucks, police cars, police stations, and markets.
Iloilo’s defense is that the properties are public and exempt from execution.
HELD: The properties are public and exempt from execution.
The vehicles and the police station all serve governmental functions. The market, though not purely public is also exempt because it would allow a third party to the franchise agreement to assume control without the approval of the administration.
A town plaza loses its public character when the town ceases using it as such and subjects it to patrimonial use.
Municipality of Oas v. Roa
The Municipality of Oas sought to recover land from Roa claiming it was part of the town’s public square. Roa claims he is the owner of the property. He had erected a substantial building on the property without opposition from the municipality.
HELD: The land belongs to the municipality as shown by several town resolutions signed by Roa himself. It is patrimonial because the
town had long since ceased using it as a plaza and had started using it as storage space.
Although the property is now patrimonial and susceptible of ownership, Roa has failed to show any of the modes of acquiring ownership.
Since both parties are in bad faith (Roa’s construction despite knowledge; tolerance by the municipality), they shall be treated as though they are both in good faith.
The town may sell the land to Roa or Roa may sell the improvements to Roa.
Art. 425. Property of private ownership,
besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively. (345a)Art. 426. Whenever by provision of the law,
or an individual declaration, the expression "immovable things or property," or"movable things or property," is used, it shall be deemed to include, respectively, the things enumerated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Whenever the word "muebles," or "furniture," is used alone, it shall not be deemed to include money, credits, commercial securities, stocks and bonds, jewelry, scientific or artistic collections, books, medals, arms, clothing, horses or carriages and their accessories, grains, liquids and merchandise, or other things which do not have as their principal object the furnishing or ornamenting of a building, except where from the context of the law, or the
individual declaration, the contrary clearly appears. (346a)
II. Ownership
A. In General
6.Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over
things or rights.Ownership (def.) – Ownership is the independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in his possession, enjoyment, disposition, and recovery, subject to no restrictions except those imposed by the state or private persons, without prejudice to the provisions of the law.
Independent – stands by itself and gives you the right to control the property
General - possession, enjoyment, disposition, and recovery
Kinds of Ownership (not discussed)
(a) Full ownership – this includes all the rights of an owner.
(b) Naked ownership – this is ownership where the right to use and the fruits has been denied.
i. Naked ownership plus usufruct equals full ownership.
ii. Usufruct equals full ownership minus naked ownership.
iii. Naked ownership equals full ownership minus usufruct.
(c) Sole ownership – where the ownership is vested in only one person.
(d) Co-ownership (or Tenancy in Common) – when the
ownership is vested in two or more owners.
Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action againstthe holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
The rights of an owner: 1. Right to Enjoy
a. Right to Possess
i. The right to hold a thing or to enjoy a right. It means that the thing or right is subject to control of my will. b. Right to Use
i. The right to exclude any person, as a rule, from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. 1. Reasonable force may be used to prevent or repel physical invasion. 2. But to recover, no
force, but legal means must be used.
c. Right to the Fruits i. What 2. Right to Dispose
a. Right to Consume, Destroy, or Abuse
3. Right to Recover
Actions to Recover Property: 1. Recovery of Personal Property
a. Replevin
2. Recovery of Real Property a. Forcible Entry (MTC)
i. WHAT? This is a
summary action to recover
physical possession of real
property when a person originally in possession was deprived thereof by FISTS (force, intimidation, stealth, threats, strategy)
Possession is unlawful from the beginning.
ii. WHEN? Must be brought within one year from dispossession; but in case of strategy or stealth, the period should be counted from discovery.
iii. ISSUE? The issue involved is mere physical possession and not juridical possession nor ownership. b. Unlawful Detainer (MTC)
i. WHAT? This is the action that must be brought when
possession by a landlord,
vendor, vendee or other person of any land or building is being unlawfully
withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract.
Possession is lawful form the beginning.
ii. WHEN? Must be brought within one year from the time the possession becomes unlawful.
1. One year from expiration of lease; or
2. If the reason is non-payment of rent,
one year from demand to vacate. iii. ISSUE? The issue
involved is mere physical possession and not juridical possession nor ownership.
**Difference between unlawful detainer and forcible entry: UD possession of other is initially lawful; FE possession is unlawful from the outset
c. Accion Publiciana (plenary action)
i. WHAT? This is the action for the recovery of the better right to possess. ii. WHEN? Must be brought
within ten years. iii. ISSUE? The issue
involved is who has a better right to posses; de jure and not de facto possession is the issue here.
d. Accion Reivindicatoria
i. WHAT? This is an action to recover ownership over real property.
ii. WHEN? This must be brought within 10/30 years depending on whether the other party seeks to obtain ownership through
ordinary/extraordinary prescription.
iii. ISSUE? The issue involved is one of ownership.
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence
his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a third person.Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right
to prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and thethreatened damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
7.
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.Art. 434. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.Requisites In An Action To Recover: 1. Property must be identified
a. WHY? Burden of proof lies on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.
The description should be so definite that an officer of the court might ho to the locality where the land is situated and definitely locate it.
Is a technical description required or will a statement of boundaries suffice?
If in a developed area, land will be sufficiently subdivided.
2. Reliance on title of the plaintiff and not on the weakness of the defense’s claim.
a. Best proof is a Torrens certificate. b. Tax receipts, tax declarations are
only prima facie evidence of ownership; it is rebuttable.
Acquisitive prescription: (1) GOOD FAITH 10 years with just title and adverse possession; (2) BAD FAITH 30 years in adverse possession.
Heirs of Miranda v. CA (skipped) In 1957, the son of Miranda, acting as administrator of the estate, sold the property in issue to private respondent, Agerico. The property was titled in the name of Agerico’s daughter, Charito; Agerico has been in possession and cultivation since then. In 1991, the heirs of Miranda entered the property and prevented Agerico from
cultivating it; an action for forcible entry was brought and the heirs of Miranda were ordered to vacate the land.
The heirs filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the title.
ISSUE: Whether the property belongs to Agerico/Charito or to the heirs of Miranda. HELD: The property belongs to
Agerico/Charito. The action of the heirs has been barred by prescription.
Ownership over real property is acquired by acquisitive prescription through adverse possession with title and in good faith for ten years.
Without need of title or of good faith, ownership and other real rights over
immovables is acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.
In this case, not only could the private respondents claim acquisitive prescription in good faith (they had title and possessed the property in good faith for well over ten years), they could also claim ownership through extraordinary prescription by possessing the property in the concept of owner for thirty years.
It is a well settled rule that a title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and notorious possession.
Heirs of Vencilao v. CA (skipped) The heirs of Vencilao claim that they (and prior to them, their father) have been in adverse possession of the property in issue for over thirty years. They present tax
receipts and CARP documents to support their claim.
The Gepalagos (private respondents) claim ownership of the land based on the TCT. They claim to have acquired the land in a public bidding following its foreclosure by PNB. ISSUE: Who has a better right to the land: a claimant by acquisitive prescription or a claimant by deed of sale recorded in the TCT of the vendor/mortgagee as highest bidder in a foreclosure sale?
HELD: The titled owner has a better right. It is a well settled rule that a title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and notorious possession. When the TCT is in the name of the seller when the land is sold, the buyer has a right to rely on what appears on the face of the document. If there is nothing that indicates any irregularity, as is the case here, he in not expected to make further investigations or inquiries.
The only exception is when an irregularity appears and the buyer chooses to ignore the same; in this case, they are no longer innocent purchasers for value.
On the other hand, the heirs of Vencilao are estopped from claiming ownership to the land due to their silence (1) when the property was mortgaged; (2) foreclosed; and (3) sold.
Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner in his possession.
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. Art. 437. * The owner of a parcel of land is
the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Surface Right of a Land Owner is subject to:
1. Servitudes or easements; 2. Special Laws (mining law); 3. ordinances;
4. reasonable requirements of aerial navigation;
5. Principles on human relations and the prevention of injury to the rights of third persons (unnecessary obstruction of the light and view of a neighbor).
Art. 438. * Hidden treasure belongs to the
owner of the land, building, or other property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure. If the things found be of interest to science or
the arts, the State may acquire them at their just price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated.
Art. 439. *(technical description) By
treasure is understood, for legal purposes,any hidden and unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not appear.
Requisites:
1. Hidden and unknown deposit (finding it must be a discovery;
2. Consists of money, jewelry, or other precious objects;
3. Their lawful ownership does not appear. Meaning of other precious objects:
1. Restricted by ejusdem generis to mean objects of the same class as money and jewelry.
2. How about money found in a book loaned from the library; who owns the money? School.
Finding in others’ property; requisites: 1. It must be by chance
a. What does by chance mean? SC/Paras – by chance means by good luck.
2. Finder must not be a trespasser.
Article 440. The ownership of property
gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. [OPRAE-PIANA] *What is accession?
It is the right of a property owner to everything which is:
a) produced thereby (accession discreta); or
b) incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially (accession
continua).
What are the classifications of accession? A. Accession to the fruits (discreta)
a. Natural fruits b. Industrial fruits c. Civil fruits B. Accession by attachment or incorporation (continua) a. Real property i. Accession industrial 1. building 2. planting 3. sowing ii. Accession natural
1. alluvium 2. avulsion 3. change of course of rivers 4. formation of islands b. Personal property i. Adjunction or conjunction 1. engrafment 2. attachment 3. weaving 4. painting 5. writing ii. mixture (confusion –
liquids; commixtion – solids)
iii. specification Is accession a mode of acquiring ownership?
No, the only modes of acquiring ownership are: [STOPID-Love]
a) succession
b) tradition as a consequence of certain contracts c) occupation d) prescription e) intellectual creation f) donation g) law
*What are the reasons behind accession? a) As to the fruits, justice, pure and
simple, because the one who owns the thing should own its fruits.
b) As to incorporation and attachment, the owner of the principal should own the attachment; and economic
convenience (better to have one owner than two)
Article 441. To the owner belongs:
(1)The natural fruits;(2)The industrial fruits; (3)The civil fruits.
Article 442. Natural fruits are the
spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other products of animals.Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of building, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income. [SPS-YOPA, PLAK-CL, RB-PLLOP-PLAOSI]
*When does the owner of the land NOT own the fruits? [PAUL]
a) P ossessor of the land receives the fruits in good faith;
b) A ntichresis, where the creditor gets the fruits.
c) U sufructuary (right to enjoy the fruits); d) L essee gets the natural and industrial
fruits (owner gets civil fruits);
*To whom does the offspring of an animal belong when the male and female belong to different owners?
The offspring belongs to the mother because, (1) the paternity is uncertain and (2) during pregnancy, the female is useless and her owner bears the expenses.
But if the female is leased, the lessee owns the offspring, because the lease is onerous (if it were commodatum, the offspring would belong to the owner of the female).
A bonus received as compensation for the risk taken by a mortgagor who received no value from the loan is not considered a civil fruit.
Bachrach Motor Co. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Company.
Talisay obtained a loan from PNB with a REM provided by one of its planters, Ledesma. To compensate Ledesma for the accommodation, Talisay granted him a bonus whose value was computed as a percentage of the balance of the loan.
Bachrach, as a creditor of Ledesma, laid a claim to the bonus received by the latter. On the other hand, PNB claims that it owns the fruits, because under Article 2127, the mortgage extends to the civil fruits of the property.
ISSUE: Whether the bonus is a civil fruit, thereby giving PNB a preferential right over it. HELD: The bonus is not a civil fruit. Civil fruits are the rents of the buildings, leases of lands, and income from life annuities, or other
similar sources of income.
Though it is possible to consider the bonus as income, it is not similar income to the items in the preceding enumeration. The common denominator, which is absent in the bonus, is derivation of the income from the land itself. In this case, the bonus is not based on the value of the land but rather on the amount of the outstanding obligation of Talisay. It is clearly meant to be
compensation for the risk assumed by the owner, Ledesma.
Article 443. He who receives the fruits has
the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third person in their production,gathering, and preservation. He who receives the fruits is…? … the owner of the land.
To whom does this provision apply? Article 443 applies only to a planter/possessor
in bad faith. The rule is that if the planter is in
good faith, he is entitled to the fruits already received.
If the fruits have not yet been gathered? Article 448 applies if the planter or sower is in good faith, Article 449 if he is in bad faith. What are the kinds of expenses subject to reimbursement?
a. They must be for production, gathering, or preservation. Improvements are not included. b. They must be necessary, and not
excessive. They must be those normally required by the crop. What if the expenses exceed the value of the product, is the planter in bad faith still entitled to reimbursement?
Only if the owner still requires delivery of the fruits.
Article 444. Only such as are manifest or
born are considered as natural or industrial fruits.*When can we say that the fruit is in existence?
It depends on the type of fruit:
a. Annual (must be planted every year/must re-plant after harvest; rice, wheat, corn) – deemed
manifest the moment their seedlings appear. SOWING.
b. Perennial (only planted once and bear fruit for several seasons; mango and coconut trees) –
deemed to exist only when they actually appear. PLANTING.
*When are animal young considered as existing?
They are considered existing even if still in the maternal womb. They should be considered existing only at the commencement of the maximum ordinary period for gestation. *When are civil fruits deemed to exist; how about natural fruits?
a. Civil fruits accrue daily and are considered personal property and may be pro-rated.
b. Natural and industrial fruits, while still growing, are considered as real property; ordinarily, they cannot be pro-rated.
Ex. House rented for 30,000/month. Apply now the principle that civil fruits accrue daily.
Every day, the property produces 1,000 If B owned the property from 1-5 and B owned the property from 16-30, A is entitled to 15K and B is entitled to 15K. If A is paid 30K at the beginning of the month, he should deliver half of that to B. This is because civil fruits accrue DAILY.
Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or
sown on the land of another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles. * What are the basic principles ofaccession continua (accession industrial)? a. Accessory follows the principal b. With certain exceptions, it should
be impossible to separate the principal and accessory without causing substantial damage.
c. He who is in good faith may be held responsible but not penalized. d. He who is in bad faith may be
penalized.
e. When both are in bad faith, they shall be treated as if they were in good faith.
f. No one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
Article 446. All works, sowing, and planting
are presumed made by the owner and at his expense, unless the contrary is proved. What are the presumptions of Article 446?a. That all works, sowing and planting are made by the owner;
b. At his own expense.
Article 447. The owner of the land who
makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a right to be reimbursed for damages.When is the builder/landowner in good faith/ bad faith?
When he believed the materials were his own/knew the materials belonged to another. When is the owner of the materials in good faith/bad faith?
When he does not know that his materials were being used/when he knows and does not object. Ex. A built house with B’s materials. Both were in good faith. What are the rights of the parties? Who calls the shots?
B. B is entitled to remove the materials
provided no damage is caused. If this cannot be done or if B doesn’t want to remove the
materials, A may be compelled to pay for the materials.
If A is in bad faith, B can remove the materials, regardless of damage caused or demand payment, with damages in either case. If B is in bad faith, A may keep the materials. There is no indemnity and A may seek for damages because the materials may be inferior in quality.
If both are in bad faith, they will be treated as if they were in good faith.
Article 448. The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown orplanted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerable more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
What are the rules on good faith in Article 448?
Both must be in good faith.
Who is given the choice and why? What are the choices?
The owner must be given the choice because the accessory follows the principal:
a) He may appropriate what has been built, planted, or sown.
b) He may compel the builder or planter to buy the land and the sower to pay rents.
These are the only choices he has. He cannot compel removal of the improvement. However, if he opts to sell the portion to the builder and the builder fails to pay, he may demolish the structure.
What are the indemnities to be given to the builder in good faith?
1. Necessary expenses a. Those made for the
preservation of the thing b. those without which the thing
would deteriorate or be lost c. those incurred for cultivation,
production, and upkeep d. Repairs required by the wear
and tear due to the natural use of the thing.
2. Useful expenses
a. Those that augment the income of the thing upon which they
are spent or add value to the property.
3. Luxurious expenses
a. These are reimbursable only if the landowner decides to appropriate them. Can the owner of the land choose to appropriate and then later change his mind?
No, the choice is irrevocable. Once the choice has been made, in case it is the option to purchase the improvement, the duty is monetary and the landowner’s properties may be levied to satisfy the debt.
What if the owner refuses to make a choice?
There are no remedies except those provided by the law in Article 448.
In this case, I THINK that the builder in good faith should ask the court to determine a reasonable amount of rent and deposit the same regularly with the court.
What if the owner chooses to appropriate the building, what is his obligation? The landowner must now indemnify the builder for the value of the building.
What if after choosing to appropriate the building, the landowner fails to pay? The builder has the right to occupy the building up to the date of payment. He has the right of retention until payment is made.
What if the owner above allows the builder to remain but charges rentals for
possession of the land?
No rentals may be charged. The landowner is not the owner of the property until
indemnification is made.
If the landowner chooses to compel the builder to buy the land, can the builder be obliged to purchase the land?
Generally, yes, unless the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the building. However if the value of the land is not considerably more, the builder may be
compelled.
If this is the case, they can agree on terms of lease, and in case of disagreement, the courts shall fix the same.
If the builder is the son of the landowner and permission is granted, the builder is in good faith.
If the land is co-owned, and the land is partitioned, with part of one house encroaching on the other’s partition. In this case, Article 448 applies. Even though the construction wasn’t on the land of another, the subsequent partition caused 448 to apply (Del Ocampo v. Abesia). What should the landowner choose? Sell the small portion of the land because what will be the use of a portion of a building?
When the structures built in good faith on the land of another are of a temporary character, Article 448 applies, but only as to indemnity. The landowner is not compelled to choose between
appropriating the property and selling the land.
Alviola v. CA
Alviola occupied Tinagan’s land and built a copra drier and put up a store where they engaged in copra trade; this was done in bad faith but with the tolerance of Tinagan. Several years later, the heirs of Tinagan filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Alviola. Alviola claims that the copra dryer and store are permanent structures (hollow-block walls and cement floor) and that 448 should apply.
ISSUE: Whether 448 should apply. HELD: 448 should apply.
Since both parties were in bad faith, they will be treated as if they were in good faith for purposes of indemnity and Article 448 will apply: the builder of the structures will pay
rent until the structures are dismantled.
However, the dryer and store are temporary structures. They to not have a permanent character and were not attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity.
Since the structures are merely temporary, the landowner does not have to choose between buying the structures and selling the property.
In computing the amount to be paid to a builder in good faith, the FMV of the structure should be used. The right of retention enjoyed by the builder allows him to possess the property and its fruits until he is fully indemnified; he cannot be made to pay rents.
Pecson v. CA
Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built an apartment building. The lot was sold at public auction because of his failure to pay realty taxes. Private respondents, Nuguids, are now the owners of the lot.
When Pecson challenged the auction, it was held that the apartment building was not
included in the execution because the
certificate of sale was silent on the issue of the building.
However, in separate suit for recovery of possession, the owners of the lot caused judgment to be rendered ordering Pecson to transfer the building for the original cost of construction, 53K.
Pecson was also ordered to pay rentals of 21K per month (the income of the building from its tenants) until he vacates the premises. ISSUE: Whether the construction value of the building should be paid; whether Pecson should pay rent.
HELD: The fair market value of the building should be paid. Pecson is entitled to the right of retention; he enjoys ownership until he is fully compensated.
The objective of Article 546 is to administer justice between the parties; in this case, this can be accomplished by giving Pecson the present value of the building.
Article 546 also provides that a possessor in good faith, as Pecson is, may retain the thing until he is reimbursed for it. It follows that if Pecson is allowed to retain possession of the thing, he is also allowed to retain the income generated by the building and not pay rent.
Good faith is presumed; good faith on the part of the builder passes on to his
successor.
The builder’s right of retention exists only when the landowner opts to purchase the property; if the choice is compulsory sale, the builder must pay rent until transfer of ownership.
Tecnogas v. CA
Tecnogas’s property encroached on Uy’s property. The CA held that, though Tecnogas purchased the property with improvements already constructed, it was in bad faith because an owner of a property is supposed to know its metes and bounds.
ISSUE: Whether Article 448 applies.
HELD: Yes. Good faith is presumed and since there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the original builder, the character of possession passes on to the current possessor.
Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his title.
Article 448 provides that a property owner on whose property there has been built a
structure by another, in good faith, shall have the option to appropriate said structure upon payment of indemnity or sell the portion encroached upon to the other.
Uy must choose between the two options in Article 448. Tecnogas should pay rent on the land until the time Uy communicates his choice. If the choice is compulsory sale, Tecnogas should continue paying rent until transfer of ownership.
The rule: a purchaser need not go beyond the title. The exception: where there are facts that would induce a reasonably prudent man to make further inquiries.
State Investment House v. CA Sps. Oreta purchased a house and lot from SOLID. Before a deed of sale could be executed, SOLID mortgaged the property to SIH; it was foreclosed.
ISSUE: Whether the Oretas have a better right over the property, despite the absence
of a deed of sale (unregistered sale v. registered mortgage).
HELD: Yes. SOLID no longer had ownership and free disposal when it mortgaged the property; it had no authority to do so. Though the rule is that a purchaser need not go beyond the four corners of the title, the exception is where the purchases has knowledge of facts to induce a prudent man to inquire into the status of the property. SIH, knowing the trade of SOLID, should have made sure there was no adverse claim on the property before accepting it as a mortgage; it was not a purchaser in good faith. This negligence takes the place of registration of the rights of the Oretas.
Article 448 does not apply to co-owners; but when the property is partitioned and the circumstances covered by 448 are present, it may be applied.
Del Ocampo v. Abesia
Del OCampo and Abeisa are co-owners of the subject property; 2/3 and 1/3, respectively. An action for partition was filed and the partition showed that the house of Abesia occupied 5 sqm. of the property of Del Ocampo.
ISSUE: Whether Article 448 can apply to this case considering the parties are co-owners. HELD: Article 448 cannot apply to co-ownership situations. However, because the property was partitioned, Article 448 now applies.
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.Art. 450. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to paythe price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding
articles, the landowner is entitled todamages from the builder, planter or sower.
Art. 452. The builder, planter or sower in
bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of preservation of the land.
Does Article 449 refer to both standing and gathered crops?
No, Article 449 applies only to standing crops, not to gathered crops which are governed by Article 443 (the planter/sower is entitled to reimbursement for expenses in their gathering, production, and preservation).
If B builds, in bad faith, a house on A’s land (A being in good faith), what are the alternative rights of A?
1. A may get the house without paying indemnity.
2. A may demand demolition of the house, at B’s expense.
3. A may compel B to buy the land,
whether or not the value is considerably more than that of the house.
A IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES IN EACH CASE.
B IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR NECESSARY EXPENSES FOR PRESERVATION OF THE LAND
What is the rule on reimbursement of a builder in bad faith?
He must be reimbursed the necessary expenses for the preservation of the land because the true owner would have borne such expenses anyway.
Land taxes, though not technically necessary expenses, are reimbursable.
A buyer of land under litigation, with knowledge of the same, is a buyer in bad faith.
A builder/planter in bad faith is not entitled to reimbursement for improvements.
Lumungo v. Usman
Datu Idiris sold the property in question to Mrs. Usman; there was partial payment. Subsequently, both parties expressed their
desire to resolve the contract but Datu Idiris never returned the money he received. Mrs. Usman then sold the lots to Angeles, who planted 3000 coconut trees; Angeles knew of the ongoing dispute between Idiris and Usman.
Datu Idiris filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the land, which Usman did not
contest. Idiris was adjudged to be owner after
which he sold the land to Lumungo. It has been settled that Lumungo has a better right to the property and the only question is…
ISSUE: Whether Angeles is entitled to reimbursement for the trees planted. HELD: Angeles is NOT entitled to reimbursement
Article 449 provides that he who plants in bad faith on the land of another loses the right to indemnity. Article 452, on the other hand, provides that the planter in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses for preservation of the land.
In this case, the planter, Angeles, knew of the dispute over the land when he purchased the same.
While Article 449 applies, Article 452 does not, because trees are not necessary expenses for the preservation of the land; they are IMPROVEMENTS.
Lumungo may appropriate (for free) the trees, compel Angeles to pay for the land, or order their demolition at the expense of Angeles, with damages in either case.
A successor-in-interest is bound by the judgment (and summons) against his predecessors. Construction on the litigated land after such
judgment/summons is construction in bad faith.
Santos v. Mojica The lot in question was partitioned and Santos’s parents were ordered to pay rents for the portion they were occupying.
They failed to pay and a writ of execution was issued ordering them to vacate the lot. Leonardo, who was not a party to the suit, owned a house on the lot – this house was reconstructed into a bigger one after his
parents were summoned in the above
mentioned case.
The judge, Mojica, ordered the house demolished.
ISSUE: Whether Leonardo Santos is in good faith, thereby entitling him to the benefits of Article 448.
HELD: No, Santos is in BAD FAITH, the house should be demolished. As such, any
improvements he made are lost in favor of the landowners (3 options).
Though not a party to the suit in which his parents were ordered to vacate the lot, he was bound by the judgment because his claim was under that of his parents; he is their successor in interest.
A prospective lessee who builds on the land of a prospective lessor despite the absence of a valid contract and the presence of objections to the construction is clearly in bad faith.
Bugatti v. CA
Bugatti approached Sps. Baguilat and inquired into the lease of their land; they agreed provided that the contract would contain certain terms and conditions. In a meeting, the spouses laid down their terms and conditions: the lease would be for 9 years at 500 per month; and a building not exceeding 40k would be constructed by Bugatti with the cost of the building offsetting the lease. Even before preparing the lease, Bugatti occupied the property and began
construction.
ISSUE: Whether Bugatti is a builder in good faith?
HELD: No, Bugatti is a builder in BAD faith. The determination of Bugatti’s good or bad faith rests on whether there was a valid contract between the parties giving him the right to occupy and build upon the land – there was none.
It is obvious that the essential element of consent was absent. There was no meeting of the minds between the parties.
There is bad faith on Bugatti’s part because he had no right to occupy the property, much less construct a building thereupon. Neither can Bugatti claim bad faith on the Baguilats
part because they repeatedly gave him verbal and written orders to cease his construction. Articles 449-451 apply; the Baguilat’s have the option to: (1) take possession of the building without payment of indemnity; (2) demand the destruction of the building at Bugatti’s expense; or (3) compel Bugatti to purchase the land whether or not its value considerably exceeds the value of the improvement. They are also entitled to damages equivalent to rentals beginning from the time of occupation until eventual eviction.
Art. 453
. If there was bad faith, not onlyon the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
What is the definition of bad faith? 1. Landowner
a. When the act
(building/planting/sowing) was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. b. When he buys land knowing that
there has been construction by a person other than the owner and who pays only for the land. 2. Builder
a. When building / planting / sowing is knowingly done on land belonging to another.
Art. 454
. When the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower proceeded in good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall apply.If B, in good faith, builds on A’s land, A being in bad faith, B may:
1. Compel A to pay for the house + damages; or
2. Remove or destroy the house + damages.
Art. 455
. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person who has not acted in bad faith, the owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily for their value and only in the event that the one who made use of them has no property with which to pay. This provision shall not apply if the ownermakes use of the right granted by article 450.
If the owner of the materials, plants or seeds has been paid by the builder, planter or sower, the latter may demand from the landowner the value of the materials and labor.
How many parties are involved in this provision?
Three:
1. The owner of the materials; 2. The builder;
a. Primarily liable for the cost of the materials.
3. The landowner.
a. Subsidiarily liable for the cost of the materials, IF he makes use
of the materials (appropriates
the improvement).
b. Must reimburse the builder who has paid for the materials IF he
makes use of the materials
(appropriates the improvement).
c. Not liable if he chooses to compel the builder to purchase the land (this is the right granted by Article 450). A, in bad faith, uses the materials of B, who is also in bad faith, to build on X’s land. What are their rights and
obligations?
(a) A and B shall be treated as if they were both in good faith, as far as rights between them are concerned. A must reimburse B for the cost of the materials.
(b) In case A cannot pay for the materials, X is NOT subsidiarily liable because B is in bad faith as to him.
(c) X is entitled to damages from A and B and may:
a. Appropriate the improvement; b. Compel A to purchase the land,
regardless of cost; or
c. Demolish the structure at A’s expense.
Art. 456
. In the cases regulated in the preceding articles, good faith does not necessarily exclude negligence, which gives right to damages under article 2176. What is the liability for negligence? The negligent party must pay for the damage done.Art. 457
. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. What is accretion?Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited.
The soil is alluvium.
What are the forms of accretion? 1. Allluvium
2. Avulsion
3. Change of course of rivers 4. Formation of islands What is alluvium?
Alluvium is the soil deposited or added to the lands adjoining the banks of rivers, and
gradually received as an effect of the current of the waters.
What are the essential elements of alluvium? [CREIG]
(a) The deposit should be gradual and imperceptible (as a process);
(b) Cause is the current of the river and not artificial;
(c) Current must be that of a river (if lake, Spanish Law of Waters applies; if sea, deposit belongs to the state);
(d) The river must continue to exist; if not, Article 461 applies;
(e) The increase must be comparatively little and not such that would increase he area of the riparian land by 150%.
