What should plaintiff do so that judgment be made against defendant?
1. Plaintiff files a motion to declare defendant Samaco in default. 2. Court hears motion and issues an order of default on Samaco.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/july2007/144568.htm
FIRST DIVISION
GUILLERMA S. SABLAS, G.R. No. 144568
joined by her husband, PASCUAL LUMANAS, Petitioners, Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* - v e r s u s - CORONA, AZCUNA and GARCIA, JJ. ESTERLITA S. SABLAS and
RODULFO S. SABLAS, Respondents. Promulgated: July 3, 2007 x - - - x D E C I S I O N CORONA, J.:
This case traces its roots to a complaint for judicial partition, inventory and accounting filed by respondents Esterlita S. Sablas and Rodulfo S. Sablas against petitioner spouses Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma S. Sablas in the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14* on October 1, 1999.*
Petitioner spouses were served with summons and a copy of the complaint on October 6, 1999. On October 21, 1999, they filed a motion for extension of time requesting an additional period of 15 days, or until November 5, 1999, to file their answer. However, they were able to file it only on November 8, 1999. While the
** On Leave.
Presided by Judge Cristina T. Pontejos.
trial court observed that the answer was filed out of time, it admitted the pleading because no motion to declare petitioner spouses in default was filed.*
The following day, November 9, 1999, respondents filed a motion to declare petitioner spouses in default.* It was denied by the trial court in an order dated December 6, 1999.* Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.* Thereafter, they challenged the December 6, 1999 order in the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari* alleging that the admission of the answer by the trial court was contrary to the rules of procedure and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In a decision dated July 17, 2000,* the appellate court ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion because, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the trial court had no recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file their answer on or before November 5, 1999. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, vacated the December 6, 1999 order and remanded the case to the trial court for reception of plaintiffs evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioner spouses (defendants in the trial court) now assail the July 17, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in this petition for review on certiorari.*
Petitioner spouses contend that the Court of Appeals decision was not in accord with the rules of procedure as it misconstrued Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and was in contravention of jurisprudence.
We agree.
Order dated November 9, 1999. Rollo, p. 52.
The answer was served on respondents counsel by registered mail and respondents alleged that they were
unaware that petitioner spouses already answered the complaint.
Rollo, p. 24.
Resolution dated January 11, 2000. Id., pp. 25-26.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57397.
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Quirino D.
Abad-Santos, Jr. (retired) and Romeo A. Brawner (retired) of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 63-67.
WHERE THERE IS NO MOTION, THERE CAN BE NO DECLARATION OF DEFAULT
The elements of a valid declaration of default are:
1. the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defending party either by service of summons or voluntary appearance;*
2. the defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed therefor and
3. a motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed by the claiming party with notice to the defending party.
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party.* It can be properly issued against the defending party who failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to the defending party.
In this connection, Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 3. Default: Declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules of Court.*
The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the reglementary period.* The trial court cannot motu proprio
Laus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101256, 08 March 1993, 219 SCRA 688.
Mediserv, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 140755, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 616. De los Santos v. Carpio, G.R. No. 153696, 11 September 2006, 501 SCRA 390 .
declare a defendant in default* as the rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the claiming party.
WHERE THERE IS NO
DECLARATION OF DEFAULT, ANSWER MAY BE ADMITTED EVEN IF FILED OUT OF TIME
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires.* The Rules of Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period.*
Thus, the appellate court erred when it ruled that the trial court had no recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file their answer on or before November 5, 1999.
The rule is that the defendants answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff.* Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted.*
Viacrusis v. Estenzo, 115 Phil. 556 (1962); Trajano v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-47070, 29 December 1977, 80
SCRA 712.
De Dios v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80491, 12 August 1992, 212 SCRA 519.
Regalado, Florenz, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, vol. I, 6th Revised edition; Section 11, Rule 11,
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 11. Extension of time to plead. Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules.
Trajano v. Cruz, supra.
Therefore, the trial court correctly admitted the answer of petitioner spouses even if it was filed out of time because, at the time of its filing, they were not yet declared in default nor was a motion to declare them in default ever filed. Neither was there a showing that petitioner spouses intended to delay the case.
WHERE ANSWER HAS BEEN FILED, THERE CAN BE NO DECLARATION OF DEFAULT ANYMORE
Since the trial court already admitted the answer, it was correct in denying the subsequent motion of respondents to declare petitioner spouses in default.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.,* the Court ruled that it was error to declare the defending party in default after the answer was filed. The Court was in fact even more emphatic in Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education:* it was grave abuse of discretion to declare a defending party in default despite the latters filing of an answer.
The policy of the law is to have every litigants case tried on the merits as much as possible. Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon.* A case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the demands of due process are subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 17, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the December 6, 1999 order of the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14 is REINSTATED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Id.
G.R. No. 139371, 04 April 2001, 356 SCRA 367. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr., supra.
Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson (On Leave)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/170943.htm
FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., G.R. No. 170943
Petitioner, Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, - v e r s u s - CORONA, AZCUNA and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Respondent. Promulgated: September 23, 2008 x - - - x D E C I S I O N CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review* of the September 22, 2005 decision* and December 29, 2005 resolution* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 69262, sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10 representing petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan* advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate* and an affidavit of service of respondents employee* to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated September 11, 2003.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada (retired) and concurred by Associate Justices Roberto
A. Barrios (deceased) and Mario L. Guaria III of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 20-25.
Id., p. 27.
The car loan was originally for P966,000 which was used to procure a Honda CRV for petitioner. The said
loan was evidenced by a promissory note and further secured by a chattel mortgage on the vehicle. One of the conditions of the promissory note was that, in case of separation from the service, any unpaid balance shall immediately be paid in full. (See May 19, 2004 Regional Trial Court decision, rollo, pp. 82-83.)
Allan Paul A. Plaza. Vincent Panganiban.
Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondents evidence ex parte be stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted.
Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on service by publication. Moreover, pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.
In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes, particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity and justice.
During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit.*
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision* sustaining the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied reconsideration.* Thus, this petition.
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely, lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the September 11, 2003 order and preference for technicality rather than justice and equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not respondents messenger.
The petition lacks merit.
P R O P R I E T Y O F
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
See May 19, 2004 Regional Trial Court decision, rollo, pp. 82-83. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the said decision remains pending.
Supra note 2. Supra note 3.
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable.* Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.*
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.*
The predecessor of this provision was Section 16, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure which provided:
SEC. 16. Service upon an unknown defendant. Whenever the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever the address of a defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.
Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. v. Breva, G.R. No. L-82811, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 519;
Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 536 (1998); Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 96 (1996).
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19,* Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:
an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
The provision states:
SEC. 19. Proof of service by publication. If the service has been made by publication, service may be proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached, and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer.* This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
E N T I T L E M E N T T O NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial court allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte on account of petitioners failure to file his answer within the prescribed period. Petitioner assails this action on the part of the trial court as well as the said courts failure to furnish him with copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings.
The effects of a defendants failure to file an answer within the time allowed therefor are governed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
Herrera, supra note 12 citing Europa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72827, 18 July 1989, 175
SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (emphasis supplied)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to file his answer on time. That was in fact why he had to file an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. But respondent moved only for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the trial court stated:
The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that despite and notwithstanding service of summons by publication, no answer has been filed with the Court within the required period and/or forthcoming.[] Effectively[,] that was a finding that the defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in default for failure to file an answer or any responsive pleading within the period fixed in the publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be found and for which reason, service of summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of the summons. In other words, it was reasonable to expect that the defendant will not receive any notice or order in his last known address. Hence, [it was] impractical to send any notice or order to him. Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear out that a copy of
the order of September 11, 2003 was mailed to the defendant at his last known address but it was not claimed. (emphasis supplied)
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to permitting respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an order of default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party.* Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have been issued.
To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be done.* Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.* Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.*
Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in default, he could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his last known address but it was unclaimed.
C O R R E C T N E S S O F
NON-ADMISSION OF ANSWER
Mediserv, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation, 408 Phil. 745 (2001). Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 407 Phil. 618 (2001). Id.
Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the admission of his answer had he filed it on time. Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission.
Petitioners plea for equity must fail in the face of the clear and express language of the rules of procedure and of the September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement.* Equity may be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice W E C O N C U R: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
Heirs of Spouses de la Cruz v. Heirs of Quintos, Sr., 434 Phil. 708 (2002) citing Tupas v. Court of Appeals,
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION EUGENIO BASBAS, TEOFILO
ARAS, RUFINO ARAS,
GERVACIO BASBAS, ISMAEL ARAS, EUGENIO ARAS,
SIMFRONIO ARAS,
FELICIANO ARAS, ROSITA ARAS, EUGENIO BASBAS, JR. and SPOUSES PABLITO
BASARTE and MARCELINA BASBAS BASARTE, G.R. No. 172660 Present: CORONA, C. J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,⃰
DEL CASTILLO, and
Petitioners, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
versus -BEATA SAYSON and ROBERTO SAYSON, JR.,
Promulgated:
Respondents. August 24, 2011
x -- -- -- -- -- x
D E C I S I O N DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioners seek to prevent the revival of a judgment rendered in favor of the respondents more than two decades back.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the February 17, 2004 Decision*of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 72385 which denied the appeal filed before it and affirmed in toto the May 21, 2001 Order* of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35. Also assailed is the April 19, 2006 Resolution* denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 2, 1976, respondent Beata Sayson (Beata) and her husband Roberto Sayson, Sr. (Roberto Sr.) filed a Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in Cagbatang, Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte docketed as Land Registration Case No. 0-177. The said application was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines and herein petitioners Eugenio Basbas (Eugenio Sr.), Teofilo Aras (Teofilo) and Rufino Aras (Rufino). On March 22, 1979, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Leyte, Branch V (Ormoc City) rendered a Decision adjudicating to the spouses Sayson said agricultural land and approving its registration under their names.*
CA rollo, pp. 102-109; penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and concurred in by Associate Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a Member of this Court).
Records, pp. 440-442; penned by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona. CA rollo, p. 121.
The oppositors filed their appeal to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. No. 66541. In a Decision* dated July 24, 1985, the appellate court affirmed in toto the Decision of the CFI. This CA Decision became final and executory on August 21, 1985* and, accordingly, a Writ of Possession was issued on November 21, 1985, which was never implemented.
The following year or on September 17, 1986, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2496* was issued to the spouses Sayson pursuant to the March 22, 1979 CFI Decision. An Alias Writ of Possession was issued on April 6, 1989 but this could also not be implemented in view of the refusal of Eugenio Sr. and his son Eugenio Basbas, Jr. (Eugenio Jr.). Claiming that the land they occupied is not the same land subject of the CFI Decision,* they demanded that a relocation survey be conducted. Hence, a relocation survey was conducted by order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ormoc City.*
In an Order* dated September 13, 1989, the RTC approved the Commissioners Report* on the relocation survey and ordered the original oppositors, petitioners Eugenio Sr., Teofilo and Rufino, as well as their co-petitioners herein Gervacio Basbas (Gervacio), Ismael Aras (Ismael), Eugenio Aras (Eugenio), Simfronio Aras (Simfronio), Feliciano Aras (Feliciano), Rosita Aras (Rosita) and Eugenio Jr. to vacate the subject property, viz:
[R]espondents are directed to vacate the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-08-000235 covered by OCT No. 2496 and subject of the final decree of registration which, [up to the] present, said respondents are still possessing pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals and as particularly defined in the Commissioners report submitted on August 3, 1989 x x x.
Id. at 8-13; penned by Associate Justice Leonor Ines Luciano and concurred in by Presiding Justice Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr., and Associate Justices Edgardo P. Caguioa and Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa.
See Entry of Judgment, id. at 14. Id. at 15.
See the (Sheriffs) Progress Report, id. at 16-17. See RTC Order dated June 16, 1989, id. at 18. Id. at 21-22.
Respondents are reminded that under Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, failure on their part to so obey this order may make them liable for contempt of this Court.
SO ORDERED.*
Gervacio, Ismael, Eugenio, Simfronio, Feliciano, Rosita and Eugenio Jr., although not oppositors in CA-G.R. No. 66541, were likewise ordered to vacate the property in view of the following pronouncement in the RTCs September 13, 1989 Order:
It appearing from the records that respondents Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras, Gervacio Basbas, Rufino Aras, Ismael Aras, Eugenio Aras, Simfronio Aras, Feliciano Aras, Rosita Aras and Eugenio Basbas[,] Jr. are parties to the present case, they having been the principal oppositors to the petition filed by the applicants as shown in the records, pages 34, 35 and 36, Vol. 1 x x x* (Emphasis supplied.)
This September 13, 1989 Order was, however, not implemented within the five-year period from the time it became final.* Hence, respondent Beata and her son Roberto Sayson, Jr. (Roberto Jr.), as successor-in-interest of the late Roberto Sr., filed on August 18, 1995 a Complaint for Revival of Judgment* before the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch 12,* docketed as Civil Case No. 3312-0. Impleaded as defendants were Eugenio Sr., Teofilo, Rufino, Gervacio, Ismael, Eugenio, Simfronio, Feliciano, Rosita, and Eugenio Jr. Petitioner-spouses Pablito Basarte and Marcelina Basbas-Sabarte* (spouses Basarte), who, although not identified in the September 13, 1989 Order as principal oppositors in
Id. at 22. Id. at 21.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, Sec. 6 provides:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. x x x.
Records, pp. 1-7.
The case was later transferred to Branch 35 of RTC, Ormoc City per Order dated September 22, 1997, id. at 80. Later amended to read as Basarte per Order dated July 3, 1998, id. at 120.
the land registration case, were likewise impleaded as defendants since they also allegedly harvested, processed, and sold the coconuts found in the subject property.
Upon receipt of summons, Gervacio, Rufino, Ismael, Eugenio, Feliciano, Rosita and Eugenio Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss* on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action. This was, however, denied* so the same set of petitioners, except for Feliciano, filed an Answer with Counterclaim.*
In their Answer with counterclaim, said petitioners admitted the allegations in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of respondents Complaint which state that:
x x x x
4. On March 22, 1979, the Honorable Judge Numeriano Estenzo rendered a decision in the above-mentioned Land Registration [c]ase in favor of the petitioners x x x and against the oppositors, the dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered x x x [and] the land described under Plan PSU-08-000235 dated September 10, 1973 of Geodetic Engineer Nestorio Encenzo already APPROVED by the Acting Regional Director on June 27, 1974 is hereby adjudicated and registered in the names of the Spouses ROBERTO SAYSON and BEATA O. SAYSON, of legal ages, Filipinos, spouses and residents of Campokpok, Tabango, Leyte, Philippines and as soon as this decision becomes final, let a decree of registration be issued by the Land Registration Commission.
SO ORDERED. (x x x)
Id. at 30-32.
See the RTCs Order dated May 9, 1997, id. at 49-50. Id. at 73-77.
5. From the above decision the oppositors (defendants herein) appealed;
6. On July 24, 1985, the Honorable Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion [of which] reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding no merit in this appeal the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
and the said decision has become final and executory on August 21, 1985 per Entry of Judgment issued by the Court of Appeals x x x.
7. That consequently, on September 17, 1986 an Original Certificate of Title No. N-2496 was issued in the names of Roberto Sayson and Beata O. Sayson, pursuant to Decree No. N-191615, by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Leyte;
8. That on motion, the Honorable Court, on November 21, 1985, issued a Writ of Possession which for some reason or [another] was not satisfied, so that the Honorable Court, on April 7, 1989 acting on an ex-parte motion dated April 6, 1989 directed the issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession;
9. That the Deputy Sheriff of this Court, Mr. Placid[o] Cayco tendered the Alias Writ of Possession to the oppositors, particularly to Mr. Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Eugenio Basbas, Jr. who, as the Deputy Sheriff stated in his Progress Report dated May 18, 1989 did not believe and obey the CFI Decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals and x x x [t]hey demanded a relocation survey to determine the exact location of applicants
(complainant[s] herein) property described in the alias writ of possession. x x x;
10.That on June 16, 1989, the Honorable Court, acting on the Progress Report of Deputy Sheriff Placido Cayco, issued an Order on even date appointing Geodetic Engineer Jose A. Tahil as Court Commissioner specifically to relocate Lot No. 1, Plan Psu-08-000235, LRC No. 0-177, Land Reg. Record No. N51830 x x x This Order was dictated in open court in the presence of Mr. Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Eugenio Basbas, Jr. who had both objected to the Writ of Possession, and their counsel Atty. Evargisto Escalon, and Attorney Demetrio D. Sarit, counsel for the applicants. x x x
11. That pursuant to the [O]rder dated June 16, 1989 x x x the Court assigned Commissioner, Engr. Jose A. Tahil, submitted his report stating that the job assigned to the commissioner was already fully and peacefully accomplished; that his findings [show] that all points are existing and intact on the field except x x x corner 3 of said lot x x x which at present [is] already defined and indicated on the ground. The commissioner also attached a Sketch Plan of the land to his report. x x x
12.That, finally, the Honorable Court, on September 13, 1989 issued an Order approving the Commissioners Report and further stated:
[R]espondents (defendants herein) are directed to vacate the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-08-000235 covered by OCT No. 2496 and subject of final decree of registration which, until [the] present, said respondents are still possessing, pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals and as particularly [defined] in the Commissioners Report submitted on August 3, 1989 x x x
Respondents are reminded that under Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, failure on their part to so obey this Order may make them liable for contempt of this Court.*
However, petitioners admitted but denied in part:
1) paragraphs 2 and 3, insofar as they alleged that they were all oppositors to the land registration case when only Eugenio Sr., Teofilo and Rufino were the oppositors therein; and
2) paragraph 14, with respect to the allegation on the retirement of the Deputy Sheriff and the heart condition of the Clerk of Court, for lack of sufficient knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief thereon.
On the other hand, they specifically denied:
1) paragraph 13, on the ground that they have the right of ownership and/or possession over the subject property; and
2) paragraph 15, on the ground that the property they are cultivating is owned by them, hence, respondents cannot suffer losses and damages.
Paragraphs 2, 3, 13, 14 and 15 alluded to in the foregoing are as follows:
2. All the defendants named above are x x x of legal age and are residents of Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte where they may be served summons and other court processes; while defendant-spouses Pablito Basarte and Marcelina Basbas Basarte were not named as among the oppositors in the land registration case whose decision is herein sought to be revived, said
spouses are nonetheless participating in the harvest, processing and sale of the coconuts with the other defendants named above;
3. Plaintiffs Beata Sayson and her late husband, Roberto Sayson are petitioners in Land Registration Case No. 0-177 for the registration of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Barrio Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte, filed on September 2, 1976 with the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City. The above-named defendants, namely: Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras, Gervacio Basbas, Rufino Aras, Ismael Aras, Eugenio Aras, Simfronio Aras, Feliciano Aras, Rosita Aras and Eugenio Basbas, Jr. were oppositors to the application;*
x x x x
13.That despite this admonition in the [September 13, 1989] [O]rder that they could be cited for contempt of Court, the respondents, defendants herein, had continuously defied the same and this notwithstanding the fact that it was upon their own demands and insistence that a relocation survey be made on the premises subject of this case before they would obey the alias writ of possession x x x and that the finding[s] of the Court[-]appointed Commissioner Engr. Jose A. Tahil show that the oppositors-respondents did [encroach] on the land of plaintiffs herein;
14.That this [September 13, 1989] Order however was not implemented thru a Writ of Execution within the five-year period from the time the Order became final because of the retirement of Deputy Sheriff Placido Cayco and by reason also of the fact that the then Clerk of Court, Atty. Constantino A. Trias, Jr. who was also the ex-officio Provincial Sheriff was not physically fit to hike thru the mountains and hills of Brgy. Balagtas where the property and the defendants therein reside due to his heart condition;
15.That despite their knowledge of the Court[s] [September 13, 1989] Order, the same [having been] dictated in open court, the respondents
had continued to occupy the land of the plaintiffs and for more than five (5) years since this Order for them to vacate the land in question was issued, they had harvested the coconuts growing thereon and such other produce of the land herein involved. And until the decision of the Court of Appeals is executed, plaintiff will continue to suffer losses and damages by reason of defendants unlawful occupation and possession and their continued harvesting of the produce of this land of the herein plaintiffs.*
By way of special and affirmative defenses, said petitioners contended that the Order sought to be revived is not the judgment contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, hence the action for revival of judgment is improper. Also, except for Rufino, petitioners averred that they cannot be made parties to the complaint for revival of judgment as they were not parties to the land registration case. They thus believed that the September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived is not binding upon them and hence, the complaint states no cause of action with respect to them. As to the counterclaim, petitioners prayed that respondents pay them moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Pre-trial conference was thereafter set* but since not all petitioners were served with summons, this was reset and alias summons was issued and served upon Simfronio and the spouses Basarte.* Upon receipt of summons, Simfronio adopted the Answer with Counterclaim of Gervacio, Rufino, Ismael, Eugenio, Feliciano, Rosita and Eugenio Jr.* while the spouses Basarte filed a Motion to Dismiss* on the ground of lack of cause of action. As said motion was also denied,* the spouses Basarte later filed a Manifestation* that they were also adopting the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Gervacio and the others.
Id. at 5-6.
See Notice of Pre-Trial, id. at 85.
See Orders dated March 9, 1998 & May 20, 1998, id. at 102 & 112 respectively; Alias Summons dated June 1, 1998, id.
at 113; and Officers Return, id. at 115. See also the Summons served to the spouses Basarte, id. at 148, and the Officers Return thereof, id. at 147, after the spouses surname was amended to read as spouses Basarte instead as Sabarte.
See Simfronios Manifestation and Second Manifestation, id. at 116-119. Id. at 149-151.
See RTC Order dated February 9, 1999, id. at 186. Id. at 253.
During the pre-trial conference on July 14, 1999, the RTC issued an Order* which provides in part, viz:
In todays pre-trial conference, manifestations and counter-manifestations were exchanged. All the parties and their counsels are present. x x x [P]laintiffs counsel presented a Special Power of Attorney by Beata Sayson but the Court observed that same was not duly acknowledged before the Philippine Consulate or Embassy in Canada. However, this matter is not so important[.] [W]hen the Court tried to dig and discuss with the parties on their real positions, it turned out that the plaintiffs are seeking revival of the previous final judgment, the original parties of which were Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras and Rufino Aras. Eugenio and Teofilo are all dead, leaving Rufino Aras alive. It is quite complicated considering that in this action, the plaintiffs relied on the Order of this Court penned by the previous judge dated September 13, 1989 which was made after or consequent to the final judgment aforementioned, wherein the names of the other defendants were mentioned in the body thereof. After considering the merits of the various contentions, the Court is of the view that the complaint had to limit itself to the names of the original parties appearing in the original judgment now being sought for revival. The interest of the plaintiffs in seeking implementation or execution of the judgment sought to be revived which would involve the other defendants can be taken when the judgment shall have been revived.
In this connection therefore and as part of the matters to be made part in the pre-trial conference, in the exercise of the authority granted to it by law, this Court directs the plaintiffs to make the necessary amendment and/or to submit a manifestation first to this Court on the point above raised regarding amendment of the designation of the parties having in mind the objection of the defendants who manifested that should there be an amendment, this counter-claim shall be disregarded since they were brought in unnecessarily in this kind of action.
Plaintiffs therefore are given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to submit the requisite manifestation furnishing copy thereof
to the defendant who upon receipt shall also be given a period of ten (10) days within which this Court will make the necessary resolution before allowing any amendment.
Hold the pre-trial conference in abeyance.
SO ORDERED. * (Emphasis supplied.)
In their Manifestation with Prayer,* respondents informed the RTC about the death of Eugenio Sr. and Teofilo who were oppositors in the land registration case and the substitution by their heirs, namely, Gervacio, Marcelina Basbas Basarte,* and Eugenio Jr. for Eugenio Sr. and Ismael, Vicente, Ligaya Aras (Ligaya), Rosendo Aras (Rosendo) and Daina Aras (Daina) for Teofilo. Respondents prayed that their manifestation be considered for the purpose of determining the proper parties to the case. Despite petitioners Counter-Manifestation,* the RTC issued the following Order* on May 15, 1999:
The Manifestation of plaintiffs and the Counter-Manifestation of defendants having already been submitted and duly noted, the Court hereby directs that henceforth in the denomination of this case, the names of the original parties, Eugenio Basbas and Teofilo Aras (in Land Registration Case No. 0-177) shall still remain to be so stated as defendants for purposes of the present case but with additional names of their respective heirs to be included and stated immediately after each name as heirs in substitution, namely: for Eugenio Basbas 1) Gervacio Basbas, 2) Marcelina Basbas Basarte, and 3) Eugenio Basbas, Jr.; and for Teofilo Aras 1) Ismael Aras, 2) Vicente Aras, 3) Ligaya Aras, 4) Rosendo Aras, and 5) Daina Aras.
Id.
Id. at 231-233.
One of the Spouses Basarte. Records, pp. 237-239. Id. at 250.
Since from the records, only Gervacio Basbas, Eugenio Basbas, Jr. and Ismael Aras were duly served with summons, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to serve summons on the other heirs, namely: Marcelina Basbas Basarte, Vicente Aras, Ligaya Aras, Rosendo Aras, and
Daina Aras.
x x x x*
After summons were served, Vicente, Rosendo, Ligaya and Daina were, however, declared in default for not filing any responsive pleading.* On February 2, 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order* where the controverted stipulations and issues to be tried, among others, were enumerated as follows:
Controverted Stipulations:
1. That defendants are not enjoying the produce of the land because there are period[s] wherein the fruits were subject of theft and the same is now pending at the Municipal Trial Court of Matag-ob;
2. That [even] before the start of the original case, the original defendants referring to the late Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Teofilo Aras, [and] Rufino Aras were occupying the property and they were succeeded by the respective heirs of the deceased Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Teofilo Aras [sic];
3. That plaintiff Teofilo Aras, Sr. has a daughter named Fedeliza Aras; Issues
Id.
See 1st page of Pre-Trial Order, id. at 348. The Rufino Aras declared in default in said Pre-Trial Order is actually
Rosendo Aras. Rufino filed his Answer together with Gervacio and the others.
1. Whether x x x the plaintiffs are entitled to revival of judgment in the earlier [land registration] case;
2. Whether x x x the defendants except for defendant Rufino Aras are the proper parties in the present action;
3. Whether x x x the complaint states a cause of action;
4. Whether x x x defendants are entitled to their counterclaim, and;
5. Whether judgment on the pleadings is allowed or is tenable.*
Respondents subsequently filed an Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment.* They contended that since petitioners Answer failed to tender an issue, they having expressly admitted the material allegations in the complaint, particularly paragraphs 4 to 12, a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment is proper.
Petitioners filed an Opposition Re: Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment and Memorandum Re: Failure of Plaintiff Beata Sayson to Appear in the Pre-trial Conference.* They argued that the case cannot be decided based on the pleadings nor through summary judgment considering that the controverted stipulations and issues defined in the Pre-Trial Order must be proven by evidence. In addition, they questioned the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Beata in Canada empowering her son Roberto Jr. to appear on her behalf in the pre-trial conference. They argued that since said SPA has not been authenticated by a Philippine Consulate official, it is not sufficient authorization and hence, Beata cannot be considered to have attended the pre-trial conference. The case must, therefore, be dismissed insofar as she is concerned.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Id. at 349. Id. at 377-382. Id. at 435-439.
In resolving respondents Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment, the RTC found that petitioners Answer does not essentially tender an issue since the material allegations of the Complaint were admitted. Hence, said court issued an Order* dated May 21, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, finding merit in the motion, judgment is hereby rendered for and in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the revival of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 24, 1985 affirming the decree of registration of this Court in the decision of the Land Registration Case No. 0-177 dated March 22, 1979, and of the final Order of this Court dated September 13, 1989 and upon finality of this Order, ordering the issuance of Writ of Possession for the lot made subject of the decision. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.*
Petitioners thus filed a Notice of Appeal* which was approved in an Order dated June 06, 2001.*
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding no merit in the appeal, the CA denied the same in a Decision* dated February 17, 2004. It noted that petitioners Answer admitted almost all of the allegations in respondents complaint. Hence, the RTC committed no reversible error when it granted respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. The appellate court likewise found untenable the issue as regards the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. To the appellate court, petitioners refusal to vacate the subject
Id. at 440-442 Id. at 442. Id. at 445. Id. at 450. Supra note 1.
property despite the final and executory Decision of the CA in the land registration case and the September 13, 1989 Order of the RTC for them to vacate the same, clearly support respondents cause of action against them. Also contrary to petitioners posture, the September 13, 1989 Order is a final order as it finally disposed of the controversy between the parties in the land registration case. The CA likewise found the SPA executed by Beata in favor of Roberto Jr. as valid, hence, she was duly represented during the pre-trial conference. The dispositive portion of said CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DENIED. The May 21, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.*
Their Motion for Reconsideration* having been denied in a Resolution* dated April 19, 2006, petitioners are now before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues
Petitioners impute upon the CA the following errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law in its decision and Resolution dated February 17, 2004 and April 19, 2006 when it affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated May 21, 2001 and declared that no reversible error was committed by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City in granting respondents motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment;
CA rollo, p. 93. Id. at 95-101. Supra note 3.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law in its Decision and Resolution dated February 17, 2004 and April 19, 2006 when it affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City dated May 21, 2001 and declared that petitioners argument that respondents complaint failed to state a cause of action has no merit.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law when it affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City which ordered the revival of the Judgment of this Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 66541 entitled Beata Sayson and Roberto Sayson vs. Eugenio Basbas, et al., despite the fact that this was not the judgment sought to be revived in Civil Case No. 3312-0;
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law in ruling that the duly notarized Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto Sayson[,] Jr. is valid and the latter is authorized to represent his mother, Beata Sayson[,] which is contrary to the ruling in the case of ANGELITA LOPEZ, represented by PRISCILLA L. TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY x x x (G.R. No. 77008, December 29, 1987).*
The Parties Arguments
Petitioners insist that a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment
is not proper in this case since the controverted stipulations and the first three issues enumerated in the pre-trial order involve facts which must be threshed out during trial. They also claim that the Complaint for Revival of Judgment states no cause of action because the September 13, 1989 Order which it sought to revive is not the judgment contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, cannot be the subject of such an action. Moreover, they argue that the CA Decision in the land registration case should not have been revived as same was not prayed for in the Complaint for Revival of Judgment. Lastly, petitioners assail the SPA which authorized Roberto Jr. to represent his mother, Beata, during the pre-trial conference, it not having been authenticated by a Philippine consulate officer in Canada where it was executed. Citing Lopez v. Court of Appeals,* they contend that said document cannot be admitted in
evidence and hence, Beata was not duly represented during said pre-trial conference. The case, therefore, should have been dismissed insofar as she is concerned.
For their part, respondents point out that the RTCs basis in granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment was petitioners admission of practically all the material allegations in the complaint. They aver that Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on the pleadings. Also, the test for a motion for summary judgment is whether the pleadings, affidavits or exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is clearly meritorious. And since, as found by the CA, petitioners Answer did not tender an issue and that there is no defense to the action, the grant of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment was appropriate. Respondents likewise contend that if their prayer in the Complaint is taken in its proper context, it can be deduced that what they were really seeking is the implementation of the CA Decision dated July 24, 1985 and the orders ancillary thereto. With respect to the SPA, they submit that the law does not require that a power of attorney be notarized. Moreover, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court simply requires that a representative appear fully authorized in writing. It does not specify a particular form of authority.
Our Ruling There is no merit in the petition.
I. The instant case is proper for the rendition of a summary judgment.
240 Phil. 811 (1987); In this case, an SPA was executed abroad by the real party in interest in favor of a representative here in the Philippines to initiate an action for ejectment. Finding said SPA to be without the authentication of an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country pursuant to Sec. 25, Rule 132 of the old Rules of Court (now Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, see footnote 63), this Court declared the same as not admissible in evidence. Hence, the litigation was considered not commenced by the real party-in-interest or by one duly authorized to do so, making the entire proceedings before the lower courts null and void.
Petitioners principally assail the CAs affirmance of the RTCs Order granting respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment.
In Tan v. De la Vega,* citing Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,* the court distinguished summary judgment from judgment on the pleadings, viz:
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. x x x.
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.* On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.*
a) Judgment on the pleadings is not proper because petitioners Answer tendered issues.
In this case, we note that while petitioners Answer to respondents Complaint practically admitted all the material allegations therein, it nevertheless asserts the affirmative defenses that the action for revival of judgment is not the proper action and
G.R. No. 168809, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 538, 550-551. 398 Phil. 733,740 (2000).
Tan v. De la Vega, supra note 52 at 545.
that petitioners are not the proper parties. As issues obviously arise from these affirmative defenses, a judgment on the pleadings is clearly improper in this case.
However, before we consider this case appropriate for the rendition of summary judgment, an examination of the issues raised, that is, whether they are genuine issues or not, should first be made.
b) The issues raised are not genuine issues, hence rendition of summary judgment is proper.
To resolve the issues of whether a revival of judgment is the proper action and whether respondents are the proper parties thereto, the RTC merely needed to examine the following: 1) the RTC Order dated September 13, 1989, to determine whether same is a judgment or final order contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and, 2) the pleadings of the parties and pertinent portions of the records* showing, among others, who among the respondents were oppositors to the land registration case, the heirs of such oppositors and the present occupants of the property. Plainly, these issues could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings. A full-blown trial on these issues will only entail waste of time and resources as they are clearly not genuine issues requiring presentation of evidence.
Petitioners aver that the RTC should not have granted respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment because of the controverted stipulations and the first three issues enumerated in the Pre-trial Order, which, according to them, require the presentation of evidence. These stipulations and issues, however, when examined, basically boil down to questions relating to the propriety of the action resorted to by respondents, which is revival of judgment, and to the proper parties thereto the same questions which we have earlier declared as not constituting genuine issues.
In sum, this Court holds that the instant case is proper for the rendition of a summary judgment, hence, the CA committed no error in affirming the May 21, 2001 Order of the RTC granting respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment.
II. The Complaint states a cause of action.
Petitioners contend that the complaint states no cause of action since the
Particularly the (1) Complaint, records, pp. 1-7; (2) Answer, id. at 73-77; (3) respondents Manifestation with Prayer, id.
September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived is not the judgment contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. They also aver that the RTC erred when it ordered the revival not only of the September 13, 1989 Order but also of the July 24, 1985 CA Decision, when what was prayed for in the complaint was only the revival of the former.
This Court, however, agrees with respondents that these matters have already been sufficiently addressed by the RTC in its Order of May 9, 1997* and we quote with approval, viz:
The body of the Complaint as well as the prayer mentioned about the executory decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 24, 1985 that had to be finally implemented. So it appears to this Court that the Complaint does not alone invoke or use as subject thereof the Order of this Court which would implement the decision or judgment regarding the land in question. The Rules of Court referring to the execution of judgment, particularly Rule 39, Sec. 6, provides a mechanism by which the judgment that had not been enforced within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date the said judgment has become final and executory could be enforced. In fact, the rule states: judgment may be enforced by action.
So in this Complaint, what is sought is the enforcement of a judgment and the Order of this Court dated September 13, 1989 is part of the process to enforce that judgment. To the mind of the Court, therefore, the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.*
III. Any perceived defect in the SPA would not serve to bar the case from proceeding.
Anent the SPA, we find that given the particular circumstances in the case at bar, an SPA is not even necessary such that its efficacy or the lack of it would not in any way preclude the case from proceeding. This is because upon Roberto Sr.s death, Roberto Jr., in succession of his father, became a co-owner of the subject property together with his mother, Beata. As a co-owner, he may, by himself alone, bring an action for the recovery of the owned property pursuant to the well-settled principle that in a ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of
Id. at 49-50. Id. at 49.
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners.*
While we note that the present action for revival of judgment is not an action for recovery, the September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived herein ordered the petitioners, among others, to vacate the subject property pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the CA affirming the CFIs adjudication of the same in favor of respondents. This Order was issued after the failure to enforce the writ of execution and alias writ of execution due to petitioners refusal to vacate the property. To this Courts mind, respondents purpose in instituting the present action is not only to have the CA Decision in the land registration case finally implemented but ultimately, to recover possession thereof from petitioners. This action is therefore one which Roberto Jr., as co-owner, can bring and prosecute alone, on his own behalf and on behalf of his co-co-owner, Beata. Hence, a dismissal of the case with respect to Beata pursuant to Sec. 5,* Rule 18 of the Rules of Court will be futile as the case could nevertheless be continued by Roberto Jr. in behalf of the two of them.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 2004 and Resolution dated April 19, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72385 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice
Chairperson
Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 469, 487 citing Baloloy
v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398, (2004) and Adlawan v. Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 275, 283.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be caused for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. x x x.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice
