Dean’s
Circle
2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS Digested by: DC 2016 Members Editors: Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Luigi Gayya Cristopher Reyes Macky Siazon Janine Arenas Ninna Bonsol Lloyd Javier
CONSTITUTION
AL LAW 1
Table of Contents
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS2
THE STATE3
STATE IMMUNITY
6
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
15
DELEGATION OF POWERS 24
STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
30
LEGISLATURE
42
PRESIDENCY
74
JUDICIARY 108
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
132
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
138
COMMISSION ON ELECLTIONS
147
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
154
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
159
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, BELLOSILLO, J.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.
Facts:
GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government decided to sell through public bidding issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy the shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, Manila Prince matched the bid price of P44.00 per share. Perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, Manila Prince came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether GSIS is mandated to abide the dictates of the Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony.
Ruling:
YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA vs EDUARDO ERMITA G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011, Carpio
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory.
Facts:
R.A. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines. After five decades, RA 9552 was passed, amending RA 3046 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The new law shorterned one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the new law on the ground that: it reduces the Philippine maritime territory, in violation of Article 1 of the Constitution and it opens the country’s waters to maritime passage by all vessels, thus undermining Philippine sovereignty. Respondents, on the other hand, defended the new law as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS. Respondents stressed that RA 9522 does not relinquish the country’s claim over Sabah.
Issue:
Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional. Ruling:
NO. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969, FERNANDO, J.
The court cited Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon which held that the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
Facts:
Petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines, imported a 1960 Cadillac car. The car thereafter was sold to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed Petitioner for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. Consequently, petitioner questioned the assessment by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue contending that the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
Issue:
Whether the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond its jurisdictional power to tax.
Ruling:
NO. Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
Note:
In People v. Acierto thus: "By the Military Bases Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein."
Nor did he stop there. He did stress further the full extent of our territorial jurisdiction in words that do not admit of doubt. Thus: "This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government. If
anything, it is an emphatic recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the bases and of the truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States and not exercised by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for itself."
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SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City,
La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, MELO, J.
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA (Bases Conversion and Development Authority) under Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
Facts:
Rafael Galvez conveyed two parcels of land to Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat which in turn conveyed the said lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation. The latter then conveyed the said lots to petitioner Shipside Incorporated. However, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation, the Court of First Instance declared the land title of Rafael Galvez, including the two parcels of land, null and void. The Court, in this case, issue a writ of execution of the judgment declaring the land title of Rafael Galvez null and void.
Twenty four long years thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court have not been executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite receipt of the writ of execution.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court. The Solicitor General, nonetheless, argues that the States cause of action in the cancellation of the land title issued to petitioners predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible because it is included in Camp Wallace, which belongs to the government.
Issue:
Whether the Republic has a cause of action. Ruling:
NO. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvezs title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA (Bases Conversion and Development Authority) under Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
STATE IMMUNITY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER vs.HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First
Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents. R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985, ABAD SANTOS, J.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
Facts:
United States invited the submission of bids for projects for the repair of wharves and shoreline. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Thereafter, a letter was sent saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performancerating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the plaintiff to allow the company to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages.
The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. The Trial court issued the writ.
Issue:
Ruling:
NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez. Further, the latter case ruled that the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jureimperii and not for jure gestionis.
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MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS
G.R. No.L-23139, December 17, 1966, BENGZON, J.P., J.
Although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
Facts:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped and consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. Later on, the cases were discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. Unfortunately, only three cases of rotary drill parts were delivered. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case plus other damages. One of the arguments raised by the respondent was that they cannot be sued.
Whether or not the respondent arrastre service is immune from suit. Ruling:
YES. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its non-governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed. It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
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ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Fourth Branch, Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C. BORROMEO, THE
G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971, FERNANDO, J.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment."
Facts:
Petitioners as plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal.
The respondent lower court ruled that the suit was against the government without its consent. But granting that no compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is no showing that the government has consented to be sued in this case. It may be contended that the present case is brought against the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General and not against the National Government. Considering that the herein defendants are sued in their official capacity the action is one against the National Government who should have been made a party in this case, but, as stated before, with its consent.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials
Ruling:
YES. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean: "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."
has been used for road purposes." The only relief, in the opinion of this Court, would be for the government "to make due compensation, ..." It was made clear in such decision that compensation should have been made "as far back as the date of the taking."
If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA,
MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA G.R. No.L-52179, April 8, 1991, MEDIALDEA, J.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Facts:
The passengers of the jeepney died as a result of the collision between a jeepney and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. As a result, the heirs filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, as well as the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. The respondent judge rendered a judgment ruling that the Municipality of San Fernando is jointly and severally liable with the driver of the dump truck. Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision.
Issue:
Whether the Municipality can be held liable for the tort committed. Ruling:
NO. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of IlocosNorte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities." Consequently, municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, CARMELO V. CACHERO, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and TARCILA
LAPERAL MENDOZA,
G.R. No. 161657, October 4, 2007,GARCIA , J.
The State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiffs claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by processes of law.
Facts:
Tarcila Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar, alleging that he was the owner of the Arlegui property and that the Republic used the property for public use without just compensation. The trial court ruled that defendant Republic must pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,480,627,688.00 representing the reasonable rental for the use of the subject property, the interest thereon at the legal rate, and the opportunity cost at the rate of three (3%) per cent per annum, commencing July 1975 continuously up to July 30, 2003, plus an additional interest at the legal rate, commencing from this date until the whole amount is paid in full; Issue:
Whether the Republic should be held liable by the assessment. Ruling:
NO. The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs not being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law. The assailed trial courts issuance of the writ of execution against government funds to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.
Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner Republic, it is actually the Office of the President which has beneficial possession of and use over it since the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the elementary sense of justice, it behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements towards paying private respondent what is due her under the premises. This, to us, is the right thing to do. The imperatives of fair dealing demand no less. And the Court would be remiss in the discharge of its duties as dispenser of justice if it does not exhort the Office of the President to comply with what, in law and equity, is its obligation.
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MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII ADMIRAL
FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990, CORTES, J.
Well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.
Whether the funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.
Ruling:
YES. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.AL. VS. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, ET. AL. G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
Facts:
UP failed to pay in a contract it entered with Stern Builders Corporation. The RTC ruled in favour of Stern Builders Corporation. Consequently, the RTC authorized eventually the release of the garnished funds of the UP directing DBP to release the funds. While UP brought a petition for certiorari in the CA to challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order averring that the UP funds, being government funds and properties, could not be seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment.
Issue:
Whether UP funds are subject to garnishment. Ruling:
NO. The UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a “trust fund” as a fund that officially comes in the possession of an agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received for the fulfillment of some obligation. A trust fund may be utilized only for the “specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.”
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme:
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts were created or for which the funds were received except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in control of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations.Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the “appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
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MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, ET. AL. VS.SCOTT H. SWIFT, ET. AL. G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
Facts:
Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009", a "no-take" policy was created whereby entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The USS Guardian requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."However, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs.
Petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry; non-payment of conservation fees; obstruction of law enforcement officer; damages to the reef; and destroying and disturbing resources. Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan.
Issue:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
Ruling:
YES. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Under Article 197 of the UNCLOS provides, “Cooperation on a global or regional basis: States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.”
No Waiver of State Immunity in the VFA
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
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CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), v. HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, ROMEL R. BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER FRANCISCO C. BOLASTIG,
LEAGUE OF URBAN POOR FOR ACTION (LUPA), KILUSAN NG MARALITA SA MEYCAUAYAN (KMM-LUPA CHAPTER), DANILO M. CALDERON, VICENTE C. ALBAN,
MERLYN M. VAAL, LOLITA S. QUINONES, RICARDO D. LANOZO, JR., CONCHITA G. GOZO, MA. TERESA D. ZEPEDA, JOSEFINA A. LANOZO, and SERGIO C. LEGASPI, JR.,
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), EDY CLERIGO, RAMMIL DINGAL, NELSON B. TERRADO, CARMEN DEUNIDA, and EDUARDO LEGSON
G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, SERENO, J.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Facts:
Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System. Export Import Bank of China and the Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. Thereafter, Roque et al. filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the Chinese government, making it immune from suit.
Issue:
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity. Ruling:
NO. CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. The Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character.The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Facts:
Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Thereafter, MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. As a result, MeTc judge dismissed the two criminal cases. However, RTC set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest. Liang elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.
Issue:
Whether Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement. Ruling:
NO. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity”. Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity agreement because Philippines laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, v. SATURNINO DAVID G.R. No. L-6355-5, August 31, 1953, MONTEMAYOR, J.
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
Facts:
A petition was filed by Endencia and Jugo to declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 states that no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax. The basis of the petition were the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, mandates that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution and Supreme Court decision.
Issue:
Whether the Legislature can lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.
Ruling:
NO. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, and if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. The collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Supreme Court further held that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department. In enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
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SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, LEONEN, J.
The Court is possessed with the constitutional duty to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Facts:
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Joy C. Cabiles deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. to work as quality control for one year. Thereafter, without prior notice, she was terminated. This prompted Joy to file a complaint before NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal for illegally dismissal. She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. LA dismissed her complaint. Joy appealed to the NLRC and the latter reversed the decision. Sameer appealed before the CA which affirmed the decision of the NLRC. CA under Sec. 10 of RA 8042 and RA 10022 awarded Cabiles NT$46,080.00 or the three month equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation. SC reversed the CA and ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" Sec. 10 of RA 8042 and RA 10022 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. Issue:
Ruling:
YES. When RA 10022 was passed it incorporates the exact clause from R.A. 8042 which was already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances. This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals. When cases become moot and academic, SC do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are capable of repetition but will evade review. Limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers’ right to security of tenure is violated. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________
BLAS F. OPLE, v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER
and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, PUNO, J.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.
Facts:
Senator Blas F. Ople prays to declare Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" invalid on two constitutional grounds, first, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and second, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. According to Senator Ople, A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, violates their right to privacy and also not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
Issue:
Ruling:
YES. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
A.O. No. 308 does not merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
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KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation.
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420 requiring all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize their identification systems. Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number. KMU challenges the constitutionality of EO 420 because it allegedly usurped the
legislative power of Congress as President Arroyo has no power to issue EO 420 and that the implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
Issue:
Whether EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
Ruling:
NO. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO ERMITA G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006, Carpio, Morales J.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Facts:
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). Thereafter, President issued Executive Order 464, ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the constitution. Section 2 in relation to 3 of the said executive order states that Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. As a result, Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo et al., all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for violating the power of inquiry vested in Congress being hence, unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 contravene the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Ruling:
YES. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
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ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.:
The determination of a person’s gender appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC. He prays that his name to Mely and gender be changed to female since he underwent sex reassignment surgery. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of Silverio. Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. OSG alleges that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue:
Whether it is within the power of the court to change Silverio’s gender and name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Ruling:
NO. It is within the power of the legislative to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. It is the statutes that defines who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. FLORENCIO M. REYES, Officer-in-Charge, and RENE DE GUZMAN, Clerk, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija
A.M. No. P-08-2535, June 23, 2010, Per curiam
Legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of this Court’s constitutional power of administrative supervision over courts and court personnel.
Facts:
transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 1144-G to the Court of Appeals. De Guzman was also asked to comment on the allegation that he is using illegal drugs and had been manifesting irrational and queer behavior while at work. Thereafter, Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office after mandatory drug testing found de Guzman positive for "marijuana" and "shabu”. As a result, OCA recommended that de Guzman be held guilty of two counts of gross misconduct. Majority of the SC adopts the OCA’s recommendation. On the other hand, the minority opines that the SC’s action in this case contravenes an express public policy, under Republic Act No. 9165 "imprisonment for drug dealers and pushers, rehabilitation for their victims." They also posit that De Guzman’s failure to properly perform his duties and promptly respond to Court orders precisely springs from his drug addiction that requires rehabilitation.
Issue:
Whether or the not De Guzman must be sanctioned despite the underlying policy under Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
YES. The legislative power imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters both in the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. As such, it cannot limit the Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel. Neither should such policy be used to restrict the Court’s power to preserve and maintain the Judiciary’s honor, dignity and integrity and public confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing the conduct of justices, judges and court employees.
Finally, it must be emphasized at this juncture that De Guzman’s dismissal is not grounded only on his being a drug user. His outright dismissal from the service is likewise anchored on his contumacious and repeated acts of not heeding the directives of this Court. As we have already stated, such attitude betrays not only a recalcitrant streak of character, but also disrespect for the lawful orders and directives of the Court.
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BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL v. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY
A.M. No.SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015, MENDOZA, J.
Shari’a Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to divorce.
