How long will it take? Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of energy transitions

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How long will it take? Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics

of energy transitions

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Sovacool, Benjamin K (2016) How long will it take? Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of

energy transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 13. pp. 202-215. ISSN 2214-6296

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Energy

Research

&

Social

Science

j ou rn a l h o m epa g e :w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / e r s s

Original

research

article

How

long

will

it

take?

Conceptualizing

the

temporal

dynamics

of

energy

transitions

夽

Benjamin

K.

Sovacool

a,b,∗

a_Department_of_Business_and_Technology,_Aarhus_University,_Birk_Centerpark_15,_DK-7400_Herning,_Denmark

b_Science_Policy_Research_Unit_(SPRU),_School_of_Business,_Management,_and_Economics,_University_of_Sussex,_United_Kingdom

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory:

Received11March2015

Receivedinrevisedform19October2015

Accepted9December2015

Availableonline19January2016

Keywords: Time Speed Energytransition Socio-technicaltransition

a

b

s

t

r

a

c

t

Transitioningawayfromourcurrentglobalenergysystemisofparamountimportance.Thespeedat whichatransitioncantakeplace—itstiming,ortemporaldynamics—isacriticalelementof considera-tion.Thisstudythereforeinvestigatestheissueoftimeinglobalandnationalenergytransitionsbyasking: Whatdoesthemainstreamacademicliteraturesuggestaboutthetimescaleofenergytransitions? Addi-tionally,whatdoessomeofthemorerecentempiricaldatarelatedtotransitionssay,orchallenge,about conventionalviews?Inansweringthesequestions,thearticlepresentsa“mainstream”viewofenergy transitionsaslong,protractedaffairs,oftentakingdecadestocenturiestooccur.However,thearticlethen offerssomeempiricalevidencethatthepredominantviewoftimingmaynotalwaysbesupportedby theevidence.Withthisinmind,thefinalpartofthearticlearguesformoretransparentconceptionsand definitionsofenergytransitions,anditasksforanalysisthatrecognizesthecausalcomplexityunderlying them.

1. Introduction

Transitioningawayfromourcurrentglobalenergysystemisof paramountimportance[1].AsGrublercompellinglywrites,“the needforthe‘next’energytransitioniswidelyapparentascurrent energysystemsaresimplyunsustainableonallaccountsofsocial, economic,andenvironmentalcriteria[2]”.AndasMilleretal.add, “thefutureofenergysystemsisoneofthecentralpolicychallenges facingindustrial countries[3]”.Unfortunately, however,neither privatemarketsnorgovernmentagenciesseemlikely tospura transitionontheirown[4].Moreover,transitionstonewer,cleaner energysystemssuchassourcesofrenewableelectricity[5,6]or electricvehicles[7,8]oftenrequiresignificantshiftsnot onlyin technology,butinpoliticalregulations,tariffsandpricingregimes, andthebehaviorofusersandadopters.

Thespeedatwhichatransitioncantakeplace—itstiming,or temporaldynamics—isavitalelementofconsideration.According totheInternationalEnergyAgency,forexample,if“actiontoreduce CO2emissionsisnottakenbefore2017,alltheallowableCO2

emis-夽_The_author_of_this_paper_is_an_editor_for_Energy_Research_&_Social_Science._They

werenotinvolvedinmanagingthepeerreviewprocessforthisarticle.

∗ Correspondingauthorat:SciencePolicyResearchUnit(SPRU),Schoolof

Busi-ness, Management, and Economics, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

E-mailaddress:[email protected]

sionswouldbelocked-inbyenergyinfrastructureexistingatthat time[9]”.Inotherwords,ifatransitiondoesnotoccurquickly,or soon,itmaybetoolate.Giddenswentsofarastocallthisthe “cli-mateparadox”,thefactthatbythetimehumanitymaycometo fullyrealizehowmuchtheyneedtoshifttolow-carbonformsof energy,theywillhavealreadypassedthepointofnoreturn[10].

Thisstudy,therefore,investigatesthecriticalissueoftimein globalandnationalenergytransitions.Althoughotherelementsof transitionssuchastheirscale,magnitude,direction,drivers,actors, andmechanisms aretoucheduponwhen exploringthis theme, thearticle’scentralpurposeistoask:Whatdoesthemainstream academicliteraturesuggestaboutthetimescaleofenergy transi-tions?Inaddition,whatdoessomeofthemorerecentempirical datarelatedtotransitionssay,orchallenge,aboutthemainstream view?

Inansweringthesequestions,thearticleproceedsasfollows.It beginsbypresentingamainstreamviewofenergytransitionsas long,protractedaffairs,oftentakingdecadestocenturiestooccur. Partofthisargumentdrawsfromthehistory ofpreviousmajor energytransitionssuchastheswitchfromwoodtocoalorcoalto oil.Partofthisargumentalsodrawsonthesheerscaleand com-plexityinvolvedinmajortransitions,aswellasthetendencyfor newsystemstofacethe“lock-in”or“pathdependency”ofexisting systems.However,thearticlethenofferssomeempiricalevidence thatthepredominantviewoftimingmaynotalwaysbesupported bytheevidence.Thesecondhalfofthepapershowsthattherehave

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.020

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B.K.Sovacool/EnergyResearch&SocialScience13(2016)202–215

Table1

Fivedefinitionsofenergytransitions.

Definition Source

Achangeinfuels(e.g.,fromwoodtocoalor coaltooil)andtheirassociatedtechnologies (e.g.,fromsteamenginestointernal combustionengines)

HirshandJones[22]

Shiftsinthefuelsourceforenergyproduction

andthetechnologiesusedtoexploitthatfuel

Milleretal.[23]

Aparticularlysignificantsetofchangestothe

patternsofenergyuseinasociety,potentially

affecting resources, carriers, converters, and

services

O’Connor[24]

Theswitchfromaneconomicsystem

dependentononeoraseriesofenergysources

andtechnologiestoanother

FouquetandPearson[25]

Thetimethatelapsesbetweenthe

introduction of a new primary energy source,

or prime mover, and its rise to claiming a

substantial share of the overall market

Smil[26]

beenmanytransitions—atvaryingscalesandsectors—thathave occurredquitequickly—thatis,betweenafewyearsandadecade orso,orwithinasinglegeneration.Atsmallerscales,theadoption ofcookstoves,airconditioners,andflex-fuelvehiclesareexcellent examples.Atthestateornationalscale,almostcompletetransitions tooilandelectricityinKuwait,naturalgasintheNetherlands,and nuclearelectricityinFrancetookonlyadecade,roughly,tooccur. Thispartofthearticlepresentstencasestudiesofenergy tran-sitionsthat,inaggregate,affectedalmostonebillionpeopleand neededonly1–16yearstounfold.Clearly,thisevidencesuggests thatsomeenergytransitionscanoccurmuchmorequicklythan commonlybelieved.

2. Energytransitions:conceptualizationsfromthe literature

This section of the article presents a “mainstream” view of energytransitionsdrawnmostlyfromtheacademicandpolicy lit-eratureabouttransitions.Itintroducesdefinitionsandstatements aboutthetimingbehindtransitionsanddiscusseshowthe histori-calrecordconfirmstheseconceptualizations.Italsoillustratesthe complexity,phases,andpathdependentnatureofenergy transi-tions.

2.1. Definitions,timing,andcontextualspecificity

AsTable1reveals,althoughthereisnostandardorcommonly accepteddefinitionofanenergytransitionintherecentacademic literature,thereisacommonthemewithinthem.Anenergy transi-tionmostbroadlyinvolvesachangeinanenergysystem,usuallyto aparticularfuelsource,technology,orprimemover(adevicethat convertsenergyintousefulservices,suchasanautomobileor tele-vision)[11–14].Somestudieschoosetofocusonlyonthefirstof thosedimensions—fuelssuchasoil,coal,gas,anduranium—causing sometocritiquethattheynarrowlyframetransitionsasawayof foreclosingfuturechange[15]orofmasking“thesocialand politi-caldimensionsofenergysystemsbehindafalseveneeroflimited technologicalchoices[16]”.Otherstakeabroaderviewthat encom-passesshiftsintechnologyaswellastheresulting“constellation ofenergyinputsandoutputsinvolvingsuppliers,distributors,and end users along withinstitutionsof regulation,conversion and trade[17]”,orstructuralchangesinthewayenergyservicesare delivered.Still othersarguethat theterm“energytransition”is meanttobesimilartoenergy“transformation”or“revolution”,a disruptiveorradicaltransformationofbothtechnologyandsocial practices[18–20],oftencenteredonexpandingaccesstoenergy, orabundance,butoccasionallyfocusedonscarcity[21].

Transitions,perhapsobviously, mustbemeasuredovertime, usuallyfromthepointatwhichanenergysystemortechnology occupiesa1%marketshareandthengrowsorshrinksaccordingly. AsMelosiputsit,“Theconceptof‘energytransitions’isbasedon thenotionthatasingleenergysource,orgroupofrelatedsources, dominatedthemarketduringaparticularperiodorera, eventu-allytobechallengedandthenreplacedbyanothermajorsource orsources[18]”.Smilevenputsadefinitivethresholdtohis def-inition,arguingthatanenergytransitionreferstothetimethat elapsesbetweentheintroductionofanewfuelorprimemover” anditsriseto25%ofnationalorglobalmarketshare[26].Sodoes Grubler,whoarguesthat“grandtransitions”canoccurwhenthey reach50%ofamarket[27].

Complicatingmatters,insomecircumstanceswhatmayseem asweepingtransitionorradicaltransformationcanactuallybea bundleofmorediscreteconversions.AsO’Connorconcludes,“Big transitions are thesumof manysmall ones.Looking atoverall energyconsumptionwillmissthesmall-scalechangesthatarethe foundationofthetransitions[28]”.Thebigascentofoilatthestart ofthepreviouscentury,forexample,canalsobeinterpretedasa seriesoflessgrandchangesinvolving:

•Theswitchfromanimalpowertointernalcombustionengines

forprivatevehicles,andthesocialrejectionofelectricvehicles

[29];

•Theconversionofsteamenginesonshipsandlocomotivesto

dieselformarinevesselsandtrains[30];

•Theshiftfromcandlesandkeroseneforlightingtooilbasedlamps

[31];

•Theadaptationofcoalboilerstooilboilersforthegenerationof

electricpower[32];

•Theexchangeofwoodenfireplacesandcoalstovestooilandgas

furnacesinhomes[33].

Similarly,atransitionintheUnitedStatestoairconditioning, exploredingreaterdetailbelow,wasactuallytheresultof concur-rentinnovationsinaircirculation,heatexchangers,heatpumps, halocarbonrefrigerants,customizationandmassproduction,and marketing[34].Itisoccasionallythese“minortransitions”that, whentheyoccurinaconcertedmanner,createthe“major transi-tions”thataresoeasilyidentifiable.

Sometimes,however,measuringatransitionismore compli-catedthanitmayseem.Anenergysystemcangrowrapidlyinan absolutesensebutstillfailtogrowinacomparativesense. Hydro-electricityin theUnitedStateswasa low-costsourceofenergy inthe1950sand1960s,whereitgrewincapacitythreefoldfrom 1949to1964.However,duringthistime,becauseothersources ofenergy(anddemandforelectricity)grewfaster,hydropower’s overallnationalsharedroppedfrom32%to16%.Similarly,from 2000to2010,globalannualinvestmentinsolarPVincreasedby afactor of16,investmentinwindgrewfourfold,investmentin solarheating threefold.Thissoundsimpressive—yettheoverall contributionofsolar(heatingandPV)andwindtototalglobalfinal energyconsumptiongrewfromlessthanone-tenthofonepercent toslightlylessthan1%overthesameperiod[35,36],aproverbial dropinthebucket.

Inothersituations,theriseofanenergysystemmaydepend,or bemutuallydependenton,another—meaningitcanbeamistaketo identifyoranalyzeasingleenergysystemortechnologybyitself. Occasionally,twoshiftshavetooccurtoresultinonecombined effect,sincetheonetendstorequireintandemtheadoptionofthe other.AsFig.1illustrates,Grublerfoundthistobethecasewith technologiessuchastherailwayandthetelegraphaswellasthe roadnetworkforautomobilesandoilpipelines[37].

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Fig.1.GrowthofInfrastructuresintheUnitedStatesasaPercentageoftheirMaximumNetworkSize.

Source:Ref.[38]

Table2

The differences in timing and speed of energy transitions in Europe.

Phase-outtraditional renewablesphase-incoal:

Diffusion midpoint Diffusion speed Core England 1736 160 Rim Germany 1857 102 France 1870 107 Netherlands 1873 105 Periphery Spain 1919 111 Sweden 1922 96 Italy 1919 98 Portugal 1949 135

Phase-outcoalphase-inoil/gas/electricity:

Core Portugal 1966 47 Italy 1960 65 Sweden 1963 67 Rim Spain 1975 69 Netherlands 1962 62 France 1972 65 Periphery Germany 1984 50 England 1979 67 Source:Ref.[39]

2.2. Phases,pathdependency,lock-inandsubversion

The mainstream literature on energy transitions has also advanceda number ofinterrelated conceptsthatare helpfulin understandingwhytransitionsareexpectedtotakesomuchtime. Oneofthemisthenotionof “phases”.Grublerhasposited that majorEuropeanenergy transitionssince 1800allwent through phasesofhavingacoreorinnovationcenter,wherethat innova-tionbegan,movingupwardtoearlyadopters(whathecalledthe rim)to,lastly,thelateadopters,whichheclassifiedasthe periph-ery[39].Hisdatasuggeststhatthetimeittooktotransitionfrom pre-industrialbiomass(“traditionalrenewables”)tocoal—thetime neededforcoaltopassthroughallthreephasesofcore,rim,and periphery—rangedfrom96to160years,asTable2reveals.The shiftagainfromcoaltooilandelectricitywasmorerapid,butitstill rangedfrom47to69yearsforthosetechnologiestopassthrough thethreephases.

Duringthesetransitions, two thingsareof note.Oneis that atensionexisted betweenearlyandlateadopters,witheach of themconfrontingseparatesetsofadvantagesandrisks.Theidea hereisthattransitionortechnologyadoptionwillrarelybe uni-form,andwilloccurinfitsandstarts—leadingtoinconstantrates ofchange.Anotheristhattransitionscaninvolveattimesnot neces-sarily“goingtowards”somethingbutinstead“movingaway”from

it.Or,asGrublerremarked,historyinEuroperevealsapatternof “firstin,lastout;andlastin,firstout”withrespecttothelifecycle ofrelatedenergytechnologiesandsystems.Thatis,sometimeslate adoptersstickwiththetechnologyevenpastitspointof competive-nessorattractiveness—takinga longertime. Inothersituations, earlyadoptersoverinvestinatechnologyandgetstuck,findingit difficulttogetoutcomparedtolatecomers.

Furthercomplicating matters, Grubler hypothesizedanother numberoffactorsthatcancomplicate—andthusextend—thetime neededfora transitiontooccur[37].Oneisthat noinnovation spreadssimultaneously,insteadallundergoatypicalSshaped tem-poralpatternthattakesmonths,years,orevendecadestooccur. Oneisthatdiffusionisaspatialaswellastemporalphenomenon, meaningthatitwilltaketimeforaninnovationornewsystemto transitfromthecentertotheperiphery.Oneisthatthedensityof adoptionwilldifferbasedonavarietyofcontextualfactors, mak-ingadoptionaprocessof“clustersandlumps”ratherthanastraight line.

DrawingfromGrubler’swork,Wilsonpresenteda conceptual-izationofphasesinhisanalysisofsuccessful“scaling-up”exercises forvariousprimemoversandtypesofenergyequipmentsuchas windturbines,solarpanels,automobiles,oilrefineries,andnatural gaspowerplants[40].Acrossthesevarioustypesofenergysystems, heconcludedthatfourphasesmustoccurinorder:

•Anextendedperiodofexperimentationandlearningwithsmall

unit-scaletechnologiesandadiversityofdesigns,withindustry scalebeinggenerallysmallanddiverse;

•Scaling-up at the unit level as designs are improved and

economiesofscalebegintoemerge;

•Scalingupattheindustrylevel,epitomizedbythephrase“sell

many,andlargeunitsincoremarkets”aswellasa“crowding out”ofsmallercompetitors;

•Asindustry structurebecomesstandardized andcoremarkets

becomesaturated,furtherindustrygrowthisdrivenby global-ization,thediffusionofasuccessfuldesignfromtheinnovation coretorimandperipherymarkets.

In sum: each of these individual phases requires require substantial time and are sequential rather than simultaneous, explainingthusthemanydecades-longpaceunderwhichenergy transitionsunfold[41].

Usingadifferentapproach,inhishistoricalworkNetworksof Power[42]Hughesexploredtheevolutionofthesmallintercity lighting systems of the1880s into theregional powersystems

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ofthe1920s.Drawingheavilyfromanon-engineeringapproach to systems theory,Hughes argued that the electric utility sys-tem–likealllargetechnicalsystems–progressedthroughfive othertypesofphases,each onetakinga meaningfulamountof time[43].1_First_came_invention_and_development,_where

inventor-entrepreneurs invented a product and enrolled engineers and financerstotheirproject.Secondcametechnologytransfer,where successfultechnologies wereexportedbetween societies.Third camesystemgrowth,wherereversesalientsweresolvedandthe systemoperatorsmanagedchallenges.Fourthcamemomentum, wherethesystemacquiredvelocity.Fifthcamestyle,wherethe systemoperatorsbecameparticularlyadeptatsolvingproblems in their own way, creating technological differentiation. In his laterwork,Hugheselaboratedthattheprocesstookalongtime (decades) and alsothat it tended to create a pathdependency thatresistschange.The“momentum”ofagivensystemreferred tothemachines,structures,andphysicalartifactswherecapital hadbeeninvestedinatechnology;thepersonswhoseprofessional skillswereattached,trained,andassociatedwithatechnology;and thebusinessinterestsandpoliticalconcernsconnectedtoa large-scalesociotechnicalsystem.Takentogether,theseelementsform thesystem’srateofgrowth,whichoftenaccelerates.Putanother way,largesumsoflabor,capital,andeffortare“sunk”intoexisting socio-technicalsystemssothattheycreatetheirown“inertia”[44]

or“lock-in”whichhighlyresistchange[45].AsLundnotes,“the inertiaofenergysystemsagainstchangesislarge,amongothers becauseofthelonginvestmentcyclesofenergyinfrastructuresor productionplants[46]”.

Anadditionalfactorcontributingtopathdependencecanbethe strategiccapture,cooption,or“subversion”ofanewenergy sys-temoridea.ByrneandRichproposethatratherthansitidlybyand acceptanewinnovation,manyincumbentactorswilltryto con-tainorcooptit[47].Thatis,theywillconcedetheneedforchange butthenattempttodirectresourcesorcapitalbackintotheirown energysystems.Oneparticularlyperniciouspracticeisthe suppres-sionofpatents,wheresomeenergycompaniesactivelysuppress newandinnovativetechnologiesthatthreatentodisruptprofits inamarket[48–51].Stirlingalsoarguesthatenergy transforma-tionscanbecomesubvertedbydominantinterests—whoattempt tocapturethedriversordiscoursesbehindthemwithoptionsthat willdirectlybenefitthem,withshalegas,carboncaptureand stor-age,nuclearpower,andclimatechangegeoengineeringservingas examples[52,53].

Inordertocounteract pathdependence,inertia,andlock-in, scholarslookingattransitionstheoryhavearguedthattruly trans-formativechangemustbetheresultofalterationsateverylevel ofthesystemsimultaneously.Thatis,onemustaltertechnologies, politicalandlegalregulations,economiesofscaleandpricesignals, andsocialattitudesandvaluestogether.Awidelycited theoret-icalmanifestationoftheseideasisencapsulatedinaframework knownasthe“multilevelperspective”onsocio-technical transi-tionsandinnovation[54–58].Thissuggeststhattransitionsoccur throughinteractionsbetweenthreelevels:theniche,theregime, andthelandscape.Theideaisthatthatniche-innovationsoftenface uphillstrugglesagainstexistingsystems.The“landscape”refersto exogenousdevelopmentsorshocks(e.g.economiccrises, demo-graphicchanges,wars,ideologicalchange,majorenvironmental disruptionlikeclimatechange)thatcreatepressuresontheregime, whichinturncreatewindowsofopportunityforthediffusionof niche-innovations.

1_These_{five are}_{modified into “seven”}_stages_{in Hughes}_{later work. He split}

“inven-tion”and“development”intoseparatephasesandalsoaddedoneon“innovation”

after“development”andbefore“style.”

Akey termofart withintheframework is thatofa “transi-tion pathway”. Analytically,theclaim is that differentkinds of interactionsbetweenniche,regimeandlandscaperesultin differ-entkindsofalignments.GeelsandSchotconstructedatypology basedoncombinationsbetweentwodimensions:thetimingand natureofmulti-levelinteractions[59].Thisledthemtodistinguish four transition pathways: (1) technological substitution, based ondisruptiveniche-innovationswhicharesufficientlydeveloped whenlandscapepressureoccurs,(2)transformation,inwhich land-scape pressuresstimulate incumbentactors tograduallyadjust the regime, when niche-innovations are not sufficiently devel-oped,(3) reconfiguration,based onsymbioticniche-innovations thatareincorporatedintotheregimeandtriggerfurther (archi-tectural)adjustmentsunderlandscapepressure,(4)de-alignment andre-alignment,inwhichmajorlandscapepressuresdestabilize

theregimewhenniche-innovationsareinsufficientlydeveloped; theprolongedco-existenceofniche-innovationsisfollowedby re-creationofanewregimearoundoneofthem.Theimplicationis thattransitionsarecompetitive–manynichesfail–andthat exist-ingenergysystemsandinfrastructurecandominateandsuppress threateninginnovations.

Indeed,theideathatenergytransitionswilltakeasubstantial amountoftimeisembeddedinnolessthanfourmajoracademic theories or approaches—each with their differentfoci, units of analysis,andconcepts—showninTable3,includingthemultilevel perspectiveaswellasthreeothersfromthedisciplinesof envi-ronmentalscience,sociology,andpoliticalecology.Socio-technical transitionsscholarsfocusonhowtocounteractthemomentum ordominationofexistingsystems[60,61];ecologicalmodernists highlightthelengthyprocessofregulatoryreform[62–64]; soci-ologistsunderscorehowalteringeverydayroutinesandpractices cantakeageneration[65–69];politicalecologistsproclaimhow neo-liberalideology hasfurtherentrenched capitalisminto our social and political spaces so that alternativesare rarely imag-inedletaloneimplemented[70–74].Theendresultisthatenergy transitions, breaking outof theseembeddedsystems, requirea “long-termtransformation”thatis“amessy,conflictual,andhighly disjointedprocess[75]”.

2.3. Conceptualizingthetemporaldynamicsofhistorical transitions

Independent of these theories and concepts, the historical recorddoesseeminglysupportthemainstreamviewthatenergy transitionsalltaketime.IntheUnitedStatescrudeoiltookhalfa centuryfromitsexploratorystagesinthe1860stocapturing10%of thenationalmarketinthe1910s,then30yearsmoretoreach25%. Naturalgastook70yearstorisefrom1%to20%intheUnitedStates. Coalneeded103yearstoaccountforjust5%oftotalenergy con-sumedintheUnitedStatesandanadditional26yearstoreach25%

[77].Nuclearelectricitytook38yearstoreacha20%shareinthe UnitedStates,whichoccurredin1995.AsSmilpointsout,“It’staken between50and70yearsforaresourcetoreachalargepenetration. Whenyoulookatthemoney,theinfrastructure,theregulation,the technologies,ittakesmanydecadesforanyfuelsourcetomakea largeimpact[78]”.

Attheglobalscale,weseeevenlongertimeframesinvolvedwith energytransitions,illustratedbyFig.2.Coalsurpassedthe25%mark in1871,morethanfivehundredyearsafterthefirstcommercial coalminesweredevelopedinEngland.Crudeoilsurpassedthesame markin1953,aboutninedecadesafterEdwinDrakedrilledthefirst commercialwellinTitusville,Pennsylvania,in1859. Hydroelectric-ity,naturalgas,nuclearpower,and“other”sourcessuchaswind turbinesandsolarpanelsstillhaveyettosurpassthe25%threshold. Assessingprimemoversratherthanfuels,Smiladdsthatsteam enginesweredesignedinthe1770s,butdidnottakeoffuntilthe

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Table3

Fourkeyconceptualapproachestounderstandingenergytransitions.

Socio-technicaltransitions Ecologicalmodernization theory

Sociologyandsocial practicetheory

Politicalecology Relatedacademic

disciplines

Scienceandtechnology studies,evolutionary economics,structuration theory Environmentalscience, environmentalsociology, policystudies Sociology,anthropology, culturaltheory Humangeography, ecology,political geography

Primaryfocus Thedevelopmentor

introductionofnew technologiesleadingto newsocio-technical configurations

Environmentalregulation, reform,andgovernance

Everydayroutinesand practices

Conflictovernatural resourcesandopposition tochange

Themes Transitionpathways,

momentum,path dependency,carbon lock-in,resistanceby incumbents

Energytransitions, environmentalreform,risk society,socialmovements

Changingpractices,habits, socialization, normalization Contestation,enclosure andexclusion, accumulationby dispossession,global productionnetworks, neoliberalism

Unitsofanalysis Socio-technicalsystems,

niches,regimes,and landscapes

Sectors,industries, institutions

Everydaypracticesor discourses

Ecologicalchange,local communities,institutions Selectedkeyauthors FrankGeels,JohanSchot,

ArieRip,FransBerkhout, RenéKemp,WimA.Smit, ThomasHughes

UlrichBeck,MaartenHajer, APJMol,FHButtel,Richard York,MartinJaenicke

ElizabethShove,Gordon Walker,LorenLutzenhiser, HaroldWilhite

DavidHarvey,Michael Watts,PaulRobbins,James McCarthy,GavinBridge Source:ModifiedfromRef.[76,171]

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 18 30 18 37 18 44 18 51 18 58 18 65 18 72 18 79 18 86 18 93 19 00 19 07 19 14 19 21 19 28 19 35 19 42 19 49 19 56 19 63 19 70 19 77 19 84 19 91 19 98 20 05 % of T o ta l Glo ba l S u pply Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Wood/Biomass Other 25% Threshold

Fig.2.GlobalEnergySupplybyFuelSourceasa%oftheTotal,1830–2010.

Note “Wood/Biomass” includes biofuels, and “Other” includes renewable sources of energy such as wind, solar, and geothermal.

Source:ModifiedfromRefs.[79–81]

1800s,andthegasolinepoweredinternalcombustionengine,first deployedbyBenz,Maybach,andDaimlerinthemiddleofthe1880s, reachedwidespreadacceptanceintheUnitedStatesonlyinthe 1920s,evenlaterforEuropeandJapan.AsSmildeducesfromthese examples,whichtendtorefertolargenationswithhighpercapita energyuse:

Energytransitionshavebeen,andwillcontinuetobe,inherently prolongedaffairs,particularlysoinlargenationswhosehighlevels ofpercapitaenergyuseandwhosemassiveandexpensive infras-tructuresmakeitimpossibletogreatlyacceleratetheirprogress evenifweweretoresorttosomehighlyeffectiveinterventions...

[81].

Thisiswhyhecallsenergysystems“aslow-maturingresource” andjokesthat“energysources,theygrowupso...slowly[77]”.

Analogously, Fouquetstudied various transitions between both energyfuelsand energyservicesfrom1500to1920,andfound

that,onaverage,eachsingletransitionhadaninnovationphase exceeding100yearsfollowedbyadiffusionphaseapproaching50 years[82].

Theargumentthathistoricalenergytransitionsareinherently lengthyeventsfindsfurthersupportfromenergyanalystslooking attheinnovationordiffusionofprimemoversorspecific technolo-gies.Lund,lookingatprimemovers,foundthatmarketpenetration ofnewenergysystemsortechnologiescantakeaslongas70years

[83].Short“take-overtimes”oflessthan25yearsarelimitedto afewend-usetechnologiessuchaswaterheatersorrefrigerators, andarenotcommonformajorinfrastructuralsystemslikethose involvingelectricityortransport.EdmondstestifiedtoU.S.senators that:

Giventhatittakesdecadestogofrom“energyresearch”tothe prac-ticalapplicationoftheresearchwithinsomecommercial“energy technology”andthenperhapsanotherthreetofourdecadesbefore thattechnologyiswidelydeployedthroughouttheglobalenergy

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market,wewilllikelyhaveto[combatglobalwarming]with tech-nologiesthatarealreadydeveloped[84].

GorteandKaarsbergalsoremarkthatresearchanddevelopment onenergytechnologies“usuallytakesyearstopayoff...thepiper

ispaidfive,ten,ormoreyearsinthefuture[85]”.

Thus,whenmanyscholarsconceptualizethetemporal dynam-icsofahistoricalorevenfuturetransition,theypresumethatshifts andchangeswilltakemany,manyyears,sincesomanydiscrete alterationsneedtoaccumulateandalign.AsSmilremarks,“itis impossibletodisplace[theworld’sfossil-fuel-basedenergy] super-systeminadecadeortwo—orfive,forthatmatter.Replacingitwith anequallyextensiveandreliablealternativebasedonrenewable energyflowsisataskthatwillrequiredecadesofexpensive com-mitment.Itistheworkofgenerationsofengineers[77]”.Inanother article,Smilwritesthat“allenergytransitionshaveonethingin common:Theyareprolongedaffairsthattakedecadesto accom-plish,andthegreaterthescaleofprevailingusesandconversions, thelongerthesubstitutionswilltake[86]”.Onereviewoffourteen historicaltransitionsconcludedthat“theprocessfrom technolog-icalinnovationtonichemarkettodominancetookaminimumof 40years”forsinglesystemsandthat“anaggregateenergy transi-tion,involvingtheentireeconomy,couldtakecenturies[87]”.As Grublerechoedinhisreviewoftheliterature,“Thefactthat his-toricalenergytransitionshavetakenmanydecades,evenabovea centurytounfoldisabynowwidelysharedinsight[88]”.Fouquet andPerasonopinethatenergytransitions“haveinthepasttended toberelativelyrareeventswhosecomplexandlongdrawn-out processesunfoldedoverdecadesandsometimescenturies[89]”. TheGlobalEnergyAssessment,amajorinternational, interdisci-plinaryefforttobetterunderstandenergysystemsin2012,notes that“transformationsinenergysystems”are“long-termchange processes”onthescaleofdecadesorevencenturies[90].Thisview holdsthat,astwoStanfordUniversityscientistswrite,“itappears thatthereisnoquickfix;energysystemtransitionsareintrinsically slow[91]”.Grubbetal.[92]Allen[93],andRubioandFolchi[94]

alsoeacharguethatenergytransitionsaregradualandsluggish processesthattakeupwardsof75oreven130yearstooccur.Fast transitions,whentheyoccuratall,areconsideredanomalies, lim-itedtocountrieswithverysmallpopulationsoruniquecontextual circumstancesthatcanhardlybereplicatedelsewhere.

3. Thetimingofenergytransitions:conflictingevidence

Contrarytothelegitimatereasonsandargumentspresentedin favorofthelongevityofenergytransitions,someempiricaldata suggeststhatundercertainconditions,theycanoccurrather speed-ily.Thisdatatendstosupportthreeargumentsinfavorofrapid transition:(1) we haveseen fasttransitionsin termsof energy end-useandprimemovers,(2)examplesofrapidnational-scale transitionsinenergysupplydopopulatethehistoricalrecord,(3) thedriversof future transitions maydifferfundamentallyfrom thedriversofhistoricaltransitions;wecansufficientlylearnfrom previoustrendssothatfavorablefutureenergytransitionscanbe expedited.

Thefirstpartofthissectionofthearticleexploresnolessthan ten“quick”energytransitions – broadlydefined –five ofthem focusedonend-usedevicessuchaslightingandairconditioning, fiveofthemfocusedonnationalenergy,electricity,orheating sys-temssuchasoilandelectricityinKuwait,cogenerationinDenmark, andnuclearpowerinFrance.Table4providesanoverviewofthese cases,whichcollectivelyimpactedmorethan967millionpeople. AsAraujowrites,“countriescan,infact,altertheirenergybalance ina significantway–stressinglowcarbon energysources –in muchlesstimethanmanydecision-makersmightimagine.Critical substitutionshiftswithin[Brazil,France,Denmark,andIceland]

Fig.3.Market Change and Market Share of Energy-Efficient Ballasts in Sweden,

1986–2000.

Source:Ref.[98]

wereaccomplishedofteninless than15years.Moreover,these transitionswereeffectuatedevenamidstcircumstancesattimes involvinghighlycomplexenergytechnologies[95]”.

3.1. Rapidtransitionsinprimemovers

Atleastfivetransitionsinend-usedevices,orprimemovers, haveoccurredwithremarkablerapidity:lightinginSweden, cook-stoves in China, liquefied petroleum gas stoves in Indonesia, ethanolvehiclesinBrazil,andairconditioningintheUnitedStates. Swedenwasabletophaseinanalmostcompleteshifttoenergy efficientlightingincommercialbuildingsinabout9years.Swedish EnergyAuthoritiesarrangedfortheprocurementofhigh-frequency electronicballastsforlightsinofficebuildings,commercial enter-prises,schools,andhospitals,which saved30–70%compared to ordinaryballasts,in1991[96].Theyusedamulti-prongedapproach of standardization and quality assurance, direct procurement, stakeholderinvolvement,anddemonstrationstodisseminatethose ballasts.Theybegan bycollaborating withexpertstodevelop a listoflightingqualityfactorsforcommercialbuildings,andthen askedforcompetitivetendersfrommanufacturersthatmetthese standards.Then,thegovernmentdirectlypurchasedalmost30,000 unitsinapilotphase,andworkedwithrealestatemanagement companies (fornew buildings)and owners of public, commer-cial and industrial buildings (for retrofits) to ensure that they wereinstalled[97].Afterthepilotphase, theypromoted distri-butionthroughgovernmentsubsidies,sponsoreddemonstrations ofthetechnologyamongthecommercialsector,andinvolved con-sumergroupsindiscountedbulkpurchases.Duetotheseconcerted efforts,self-supportingvolume effectswere reachedas earlyas 1996,catalyzingveryrapidmarketpenetrationwhichjumpedfrom about10%that yeartoalmost70%by2000(thelast yearLund analyzed)—growthexhibitedbyFig.3.Inessence,thismeantthat between1991and2000,2.3millionSwedishworkersexperienced changesinthelightsattheiroffices.

TheChineseMinistryofAgriculturesponsoredanevenmore impressive National Improved Stove Program (NISP), managed by theBureau of Environmental Protection and Energy (BEPE), from1983to1998[99,100].TheBEPEadopteda “self-building, self-managing,self-using”policyfocusedonhavingruralpeople themselvesinvent,distribute,andcareforenergy-efficient cook-stoves,anditsetuppilotprogramsinhundredsofruralprovinces. Fromthestartoftheprogramuntil1998,theNISPwasresponsible fortheinstallationof185millionimprovedcookstovesand facili-tatedthepenetrationofimprovedstovesfromlessthanone1%of theChinesemarketin1982tomorethan80%by1998—reaching half a billion people, as Table 5 shows. The cookstoves being installed in China in 1994, during the height of the program,

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Table4

Overviewofrapidenergytransitions.

Country Technology/fuel Marketorsector Periodoftransition Numberofyearsfrom

1to25%marketshare

Approximatesize(population affectedinmillionsofpeople)

Sweden Energy-efficientballasts Commercialbuildings 1991–2000 7 2.3

China Improvedcookstoves Ruralhouseholds 1983–1998 8 592

Indonesia Liquefiedpetroleumgasstoves Urbanandrural households

2007–2010 3 216

Brazil Flex-fuelvehicles Newautomobilesales 2004–2009 1 2

UnitedStates Airconditioning Urbanandrural

households

1947–1970 16 52.8

Kuwait Crudeoilandelectricity Nationalenergysupply 1946–1955 2 0.28

Netherlands Naturalgas Nationalenergysupply 1959–1971 10 11.5

France Nuclearelectricity Electricity 1974–1982 11 72.8

Denmark Combinedheatandpower Electricityandheating 1976–1981 3 5.1

Canada (Ontario)a

Coal Electricity 2003–2014 11 13

a_The_Ontario_case_study_is_the_inverse,_showing_how_quickly_a_province_went_from_25%_coal_supply_to_zero.

Table5

HouseholdsadoptingimprovedstovesundertheChineseNISPandaffiliatedprovincialprograms.

NISPhouseholds(million) Householdsunderprovincialprograms(million) Totalhouseholds/year(million) Totalpeople/year(million)

1983 2.6 4 6.6 21.1 1984 11 9.7 20.7 66.2 1985 8.4 9.5 17.9 57.3 1986 9.9 8.5 18.4 58.9 1987 8.9 9.1 18 57.6 1988 10 7.5 17.5 56 1989 4.5 5 9.5 30.4 1990 3.6 7.8 11.4 36.5 1991–1998 7.8 57.2 65 208 Total 66.7 118.3 185 592 Source:Ref.[100]

wereequivalentto90%ofallimprovedstovesinstalledglobally. Asaconsequence,althoughsubstitutionwasnevercomplete—all existinginefficientcookstoveswereneverreplaced,justmostof them—Chineseenergyusepercapitadeclinedinruralareasatan annualrateofsavingsof5.6%from1983to1990.

Indonesiaalsoranalargehouseholdenergyprogramfocusing ontheconversionfromkerosenestoves toliquefied petroleum gas(LPG) stovesto improveair quality. Under leadershipfrom theirVice President JusufKalla, the Indonesian “LPG Megapro-ject”offeredhouseholdstherighttoreceiveafree“initialpackage” consistingof a3kgLPGcylinder,afirstfreegas-fill,oneburner stove,ahose,andaregulator.Thegovernment,intandem, low-eredkerosenesubsidies(increasingitsprice)andconstructednew refrigeratedLPG terminals toact as national distributionhubs. Amazingly,injust3years–from2007to2009–thenumberofLPG stovesnationwidejumpedfromamere3millionto43.3million, meaningtheyservedalmosttwo-thirdsofIndonesia’s65million households(or about216million people).Six entireprovinces, includingthat ofJakarta,thecapital,weredeclared“closedand dry”,meaningthattheprogramreachedallofitstargets,andthat allkerosenesubsidieswerewithdrawn[101].

Brazil has perhaps the fastest energy transition on record, though(tobefair)itdependsonwhatonecounts.Brazilcreatedits ProálcoolprograminNovember1975toincreaseethanol produc-tionandsubstituteethanolforpetroleuminconventionalvehicles, andin1981,sixyearslater,90%ofallnewvehiclessoldinBrazil couldrunonethanol—animpressivefeat.However,amorerecent transition,connectedinparttotheProálcoolprogram,isevenmore noteworthy.TheBraziliangovernmentstartedincentivizing flex-fuelvehicles(FFVs)in2003throughreduced taxrates andfuel taxes.TheseBrazilianFFVswerecapableofrunningonanyblend ofethanolfrom0to100%,givingdriverstheoptionofswitching betweenvariousblendsofgasolineandethanoldependingonprice andconvenience.ThefirstyearFFVsenteredthemarketin2004

Fig.4. Flex-Fuel Vehicle Sales as a Percentage of Overall New Car Sales in Brazil,

2004–2009.

Source: Modified from Ref.[102]

theyaccountedfor17%ofnewcarsalesbuttheyrapidlyjumped to90%in2009—asFig.4illustrates—meaning2millionFFVswere purchasedintotaloverthefirstfiveyearsoftheprogram[102].

Air conditioning in the United States is a final example. In 1947,mass-produced,low-costwindowairconditionersbecame possible,enablingmanypeopletoenjoyairconditioningwithout theneedtobuyanewhomeorcompletelyrenovatetheir heat-ingsystem[103].Thatyear,only43,000unitsweresold,butby 1953thenumberhadjumpedtoonemillion,asairconditioners becameendorsedbybuilderseager tomassproduceaffordable, yetdesirable,modernhomesandelectricutilitiesthatwantedto increaseelectricityconsumptionthroughoutthegrowingsuburbs

[104].Consequently,morethan12%ofpeople(occupying6.5 mil-lionhousingunits)reportedtotheU.S.Censusin1960thatthey ownedanairconditioner,risingto25%in1963and35.8%in1970, representing24.2millionhomesandmorethan50millionpeople

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familyhomesjumpedfrom49%in1973to87%in2009[107].In hotandhumidplacessuchasSouthernFlorida,itsusegrewfrom fivepercentin1950to95%in1990.Americanmotoristsalsouseup 7–10billiongallonsofgasolineannuallytoairconditiontheircars. Inaggregate,theUnitedStatesonanannualbasisnowconsumes moreelectricityforairconditioningthantheentirecontinentof Africaconsumesforallelectricityuses[108].Or,inotherterms, theUnitedStatescurrentlyutilizesmoreenergy(about185billion kWh)forair-conditioningthanallothercountries’airconditioning usagecombined[109].

3.2. Rapidtransitionsinenergysupply

Empiricaldataalsopointstofiveothertransitionsinsupplythat haveoccurredatthenationallevel:tocrudeoilandelectricityin Kuwait,naturalgasintheNetherlands,nuclearelectricityinFrance, combinedheatand powerinDenmark,and coalretirements in Ontario,Canada.

Twoconcurrentmodifications,inelectricityandtransport, cat-alyzedanalmostcompleteshiftinKuwait’snationalenergyprofile inabout9years.Oilusecatapultedfromconstitutinga negligi-bleamountoftotalnationalenergysupplyin1946to25%in1947 andabove90%in1950[110].In1938,whenKuwaitwasstill a small,impoverishedBritishprotectorate,geologistsdiscoveredthe Burganoilfield,whichprovedtobetheworld’ssecondlargest accu-mulationof oilfollowing SaudiArabia’sGhawar oilfield [111]. Commercialexploitationbeganinearnestin1946aftera suspen-sionofoperationsduetoWorldWarII,increasingfrom5.9million barrelsthatyearto16.2millionbarrelsin1947andalmost400 millionbarrelsin1955,intandemwiththedevelopmentofother oilfields[112].Withinfiveyears–1945to1949–theKuwaitioil industrywastransformedfromonedependentonfivegallon bar-relsbeingdistributedmanuallytocustomers,carriedoncamels, donkeys,orwoodenpushcartstoonecharacterizedbyhuge vol-umes and scale economies that were dependenton motorized trucksandtankers,pipelines,andfillingstations[113].

Simultaneously,Kuwaitbeganusingoilforelectricity gener-ation. TheKuwaitOil Company obtainedand commissionedits first500kWgeneratorin1951andin1952builta2.25MWSteam PowerStationatAl-Shewaikh,essentiallytriplingnational electric-itycapacityinthreeyears[114].Demandforsuchelectricitygrew considerably,doublingagainby1960andthenincreasing(inper capitaterms)fromabout1500kWhtomorethan9200kWhin1985

[115].Thereafter arapid expansionof distillationunits, refiner-ies,petrolstations,andtheestablishmentoftheKuwaitNational PetroleumCompanyin1960,thesameyearKuwaithelpedform theOrganizationofPetroleumExportingCountries,sawoil’srise continuesothatin1965Kuwaitbecametheworld’sfourthlargest producerofoil(behindtheUnitedStates,USSR,andVenezuela,and aheadofSaudiArabia)[81].AsevenenergytransitionskepticSmil concedes,“inenergytermsKuwaitthusmovedfromapre-modern societydependentonimportsofwood,charcoal,andkeroseneto anoilsuperpowerinasinglegeneration[81]”.

TheNetherlands—thanksinlargeparttothediscoveryofagiant Groningennaturalgasfieldin1959—startedarapidtransitionaway fromoilandcoaltonaturalgas[81].Thatyear,coalsuppliedabout 55%ofDutchprimaryenergysupplyfollowedbycrudeoilat43% andnaturalgaslessthan2%.InDecember1965,however,oneyear aftergasdeliveriesbeganfromGroningen,naturalgassupplied5% oftheNetherland’sprimaryenergy,risingquicklyto50%by1971. Tofacilitatethetransition,thegovernmentdecidedinDecember 1965toabandonallcoalminingintheLimburgprovincewithina decade,doingawaywithsome75,000miningrelatedjobs impact-ingmorethan200,000people.Whatmadethetransitionsuccessful wasthatthegovernmentstrategicallysteeredit[116], implement-ing countermeasuressuchas subsidiesfor new businesses,the

relocationofgovernmentindustriesfromthecapitaltoregionsof thecountryhardesthitbythemineclosures,retrainingprograms forminers,andofferingsharesinGroningentoStaatsmijnen(the stateminingcompany).Afteritspeak outputin themid-1970s, extractionofgasatGroningenwaspurposelyscaledbackto maxi-mizethelifetimeofthefield,thoughnaturalgascontinuedtoplay aprominentroleinthenation’senergymix.In2010,forinstance, naturalgasstillprovided45%oftotalprimaryenergysupply,larger thananyothersource[117].

TheFrenchtransitiontonuclearpowerwasalsoswift.Following theoilcrisisin1974,PrimeMinisterPierreMessmerannounceda largenuclearpowerprogramintendedtogenerateallofFrance’s electricityfromnuclearreactorstodisplacetheRepublic’sheavy dependenceonimportedoil.Asthemaximwentatthetime,“No coal,nooil,nogas,nochoice![95]”.The“MessmerPlan”proposed theconstructionof80nuclearpowerplantsby1985and170plants by2000.Workcommencedonthreeplants–Tricastin,Gravelines, andDampierre–immediatelyfollowingtheannouncementofthe planandFranceendedupconstructing56reactorsfrom1974to 1989.Asaresult,nuclearpowergrewfrom4%ofnational elec-tricitysupplyin1970to10%in1978andalmost40%by1982.As Grublerhasnoted, “thereasonsfor thissuccesslayinaunique institutionalsettingallowingcentralizeddecision-making, regula-torystability,dedicatedeffortsforstandardizedreactordesignsand apowerfulnationalizedutility,EDF,whosesubstantialin-house engineeringresourcesenabledittoactasprincipalandagentof reactorconstructionsimultaneously[118]”.

ThoughDenmarkis perhapsmorefamousfora transitionto wind energy, a far more accelerated transitionoccurred in the 1970sand1980s.Thistransitioninvolvedtwosetsofchanges,from oiltocoalasafuelforelectricityandfromindividualtodistrict heating inheating. Before1974,almostallheating inDenmark wasprovidedbyfueloil,whichmeanttheoilcrisishad particu-larlypainfulimpactsonthecountry’seconomy[119].TheDanish EnergyPolicyof1976thereforearticulatedtheshort-termgoalof reducingoildependence,anditstatedtheimportancealsoof build-inga“diversifiedsupplysystem”andmeetingtwo-thirdsoftotal heatconsumption with“collectiveheatsupply”by2002. More-over,itsoughttoreduceoildependenceto20%,anambitiousgoal thatinvolvedtheconversionof800,000individualoilboilersfrom naturalgasandcoal.Inamerefiveyears–from1976to1981– Danishelectricityproductionchangedfrom90%oil-basedto95% coal-based.Stipulationsinfavorofcombinedheatandpower(CHP) werefurtherstrengthened bythe1979HeatSupplyAct,whose purposewasto“promotethebestnationaleconomicuseofenergy forheatedbuildingsandsupplying themwithhotwaterand to reducethecountry’sdependenceonmineraloil”.Asaresult,CHP productionincreasedfromtrivialamountsin1970tosupply61% ofnationalelectricityand77%ofthecountry’sdistrictheatingin 2010.2

Afinalexampleisintriguingbecauseratherthantransitioning towardssomething,itinvolvestransitioningaway.In2003,the gov-ernmentofOntariocommittedtoretiringallcoal-firedelectricity generationby2007,somethingtheydidaccomplish,albeitafew yearsbehindschedule.Ontario’soldestcoalplant,the1140MW Lakeviewfacility,wasclosedinApril2005followedbysequential closuresofThunderBay(306MW),Atikokan(211MW),Lambton (1972MW), andNanticoke(3945MW)from2007to2014.Coal generationthusdeclinedfrom25%ofprovincialsupplyin2003to 15%in2008,3%in2011,and0%in2014.Theprimaryjustification

2_As_an_aside,_national_{planners managed}_a_third_transition,_away_from_{coal, in}_the

1990s, when the Danish parliament passed the “coal stop,” functionally outlawing

theconstructionofnewcoalfiredpowerstations,withexceptionsgivenonlytotwo

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fortheclosure,apartfromitsobviousclimatechangebenefits,was publichealth.Agovernmentstudyestimatedthatshiftingaway fromcoalwouldreducesome330,000relatedillnessesandmore than700deathsrelatedtocoalpollutiontofewerthan6deathsand only2460illnesses.Putintomonetaryterms,the“coalswitch”was estimatedtosave$4.4billionperyearinhealth,environmental, andfinancialdamagesalongwith$95millionindisplaced operat-ingandmaintenancecosts[120].Toachievethistransition,Ontario investedmorethan$21billionincleanersourcesofenergy includ-ingwind, hydroelectricity, solar,and nuclearpower,as wellas $11billionin transmissionanddistributionupgradesandother investmentsinenergyefficiency[121].Ontarioisontracktosee renewablesourcesofelectricitygrowto46%ofsupplyby2025, andtypicalresidentialcustomersareexpectedtosave$520ontheir bills,andlargeindustrialcustomerstosave$3millioneachontheir bills,from2013to2017[121].

3.3. Re-conceptualizingthetemporaldynamicsoffuture transitions

Thetenexamplesabove—fivecoveringprimemovers,five cov-ering changes in supply—do cast some doubt on mainstream conceptionsthattransitionsmustinvariablytakedecadestooccur. Indeed,althoughprevious,historicaltransitionsmayhavetakena greatdealoftime,theargumentrunsthatwehavelearneda suf-ficientamountfromthemsothatcontemporary,orfuture,energy transitionscanbeexpedited.Futuretransitionsmayalsobecome asocialorpoliticalpriorityinwaysthatprevioustransitionshave notbeen—thatis,previoustransitionsmayhavebeenaccidental orcircumstantial,whereasfuturetransitionscouldbecomemore plannedand coordinated,orbacked byaggressivesocial move-mentsorprogressivegovernmenttargets.Thissectionofthepaper discussesthreesignificantdriversbehindthepossibilityof accel-eratedfuturetransitions:scarcity,climatechange,andinnovation. First,unlikeearliertransitionsdrivenprimarilybypriceoran abundanceofresources, future onesmaybe drivenby scarcity and the unaffordabilityof resources.Consider crude oil. Sorrel etal.examinedoilfield-size,reservegrowthanddeclinerates,and depletionratesfortheentireindustry[122].Theyconcludedthat, asaglobalaverage:

The (reserve diminishment)rate of post-peak fields isat least 6.5%/yearandthecorrespondingdeclinerateofallcurrently pro-ducing fields isat least 4%/year.Both areonanupward trend asmore giantfields enter decline,asproductionshiftstowards smaller,youngerandoffshorefieldsandaschangingproduction methodsleadtomorerapidpost-peakdecline.Morethantwothirds ofcurrentcrudeoilproductioncapacitymayneedtobereplaced by2030,simplytokeepproductionconstant.Atbest,thisislikely toproveextremelychallenging.

Numerousotherstudiessuggestthatresourcepeaksare immi-nent,ifnotalready present.Oneassessmentofthe“mostlikely scenarios”estimatedthatglobaloilproductionpeaked in2015, that naturalgas production would peak in 2035,and that coal productionwouldpeakin2052—formingthebell-shapedcurves inproductionillustratedbyFig.5[123].Similarpeaksinsupply havebeenconfirmedby multiple,independentanalyses under-taken by some of the world’s best geologists, economists, and energyanalystsforoilandnaturalgas[124–128],coal[129–136], andevenuranium [137,138].BritishPetroleum,hardlyasource biasedagainstfossilfuels,estimatedin2014thatglobalreserveto productionratiosforoil,naturalgasandcoalwere53.3years,55.1 yearsand113years,respectively[139].

Even if such peaks in supply are exaggerated or uncertain, thereisalsothepossibilityofpeaksindemand—ofdemand-driven scarcity.Putanotherway,“demandpeaks”canquicklyexertchange

Fig.5. ProjectedGlobalPeaksinProductionforOil,Gas,andCoal,1850–2250.

Source: Ref.[140]

on“supply-side”energytechnologies,alteringtheirconfigurations inwaysunheardofbefore.Manystudiessupportsuchacontention aboutrapidshiftsindemandforfossilfuels.Oneresearchteam, forinstance,predictedthattheinflatedpricesforpetroleumthat areexpectedthiscenturycouldpracticallybankrupttheiron, fertil-izer,andairtransportindustries[141].CitiBank,aglobalfinancial firm,declaredin2013thatglobaloildemandwas“approachinga tippingpoint”andthat“theendisnigh”forgrowthdueto substi-tutiontrendsofnaturalgasforoilcoupledwithimprovementsin thefueleconomyofvehicles[142].

Second,speedyfuturetransitionsmaybenecessarytoavoidthe socialandenvironmentalcostsstemmingfromunabatedclimate change.Thissecondmajordriverrelatestoenvironmentalcarrying capacitylimits.Whetherwechoosetoacknowledgeitornot, pro-ponentsofthisviewholdthathumanitymustundertakeeconomic activitiessubjecttoa“carbonbudget.”Atacertainlevelof green-housegasemissions,wecannotaffordtoutilizemorefossilfuels, eveniftheywerefree[143].AsHansenandhiscolleagueshave noted,“Burningallfossilfuelswouldproduceadifferent, practi-callyuninhabitable,planet[144]”.Thus,manybarrelsofoil,cubic metersofnaturalgas,andtonsofcoalwillneedtostayintheground as“strandedassets[145,146]”.Onestudyexaminedthevolumes ofoilthat“cannotbeused”by2035duetocarbonrestraintsand projectedthat500–600billionbarrelsmustbe“unburnable”and that40–55%ofnewdeep-waterresourcesmustnotbedeveloped

[147].Evenifgeologicoreconomicpeakswereavoidable,these folksargue,thethreatofclimatechangeforcesaretreatfromfossil fuelconsumption[126]–itrequiresafast,andeventuallycomplete transition.

Third, technological learning and innovation can result in newtechnologiesandsystemswiththepotentialforexponential growth.FormerUnitedStatesVicePresidentAlGoreencapsulated thistypeofthinkingwhenheargued,in2008,that“todayI chal-lengeournationtocommittoproducing100%ofourelectricity fromrenewableenergyandtrulycleancarbon-freesourceswithin 10years[148]”.Gorewentontosaythatacompletechangein energyproductionwas“achievable,affordableandtransformative” withinthecourseofonedecade.Histhinkingrestedonthe assump-tionthat innovationsin bothtechnologyand policydesign can acceleratetechnologicalchange,andachieveanenergytransition, inwaysnotpossibleevenjustafewdecadesago.

Forexample,previoustransitionssuchasthat fromwoodto coalorcoaltooiloccurredwithouttheaccumulationof knowl-edgewehavecurrentlyaboutthesociology,politics,andeconomics ofenergytransitions,i.e.,withoutthecomplexhistoricalanalyses conductedbythelikesofSmil,Grubler,Wilson,Hughes,and

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quet.Becausewenowpossessthisknowledge,wecanapplyitgoing forwardtominimizetheunnecessarylagordelayofafutureenergy transition.EvenFouquetandPerasonwritethat“pastenergy tran-sitionsmaynotbethebestanalogiesforafuturelowcarbonenergy transition[149]”. Why?In part,we nowpossess better knowl-edge abouttheco-benefits oflow-carbon supplyincluding less airpollutionandimprovedpublichealth,economicdiversification, andenhancednationalcompetitiveness[150–152].Wehave bet-tercausalmodelsandanalysisofhowtransitions occurandare beginningtoestablishmethodologiesandpolicyprescriptionsfor howtomanagefuturetransitions[153–157].Wenowhavenewly developedpolicymechanismssuchasproductiontaxcredits, feed-intariffs,andrenewableportfoliostandardsthatcanhastenthe adoptionofpreferredtechnologies[158].And,manynewerenergy technologiescanprovidemultipleenergyservicesatonce,such asmicrohydro dams(whichcanprovide mechanicalenergy for agriculturalprocessing,electricity,andirrigationsimultaneously)

[159],TEGcookstoves(whichcanprovidebothheatforcookingand smallamountsofelectricity)[160]ortri-generation(electric gen-eratorsthatcanprovideelectricity,heat,andcoolingatthesame time)[161].Eachofthesenewsystemscanreplacetwoorthree previouslydistinctdevices,andoperatemorelikegeneralpurpose technologies.

Forthesereasons,perhapsfutureenergytransitions,because theycan draw onsynergistic advancesin multiple domains at once—cutting across multiplicity of energy services, materials science,computing,combustiondynamics,gasification, nanotech-nology,biological and geneticengineering,3D printing andthe industrialinternet—cantrulybeacceleratedinwaysthatpast tran-sitionshave(generally)notbeen,despitethefactthatitmaybe scarcityorconcernsaboutclimatechange,ratherthanabundance or price, drivingthem. “Accelerated diffusion” can becomethe norm,nottheexception.

4. Conclusionandpolicyimplications

Thisfinalpartofthepaperoffersfourconclusionsforenergy analystsandpractitioners.

First,atabasiclevel,whetheranenergytransitioncanoccur quicklyorslowlycandependingreatdealabouthowitisdefined. Somecoredefinitionalissuesinclude:

•Differentinterpretationsof“significant”.Significancemay

pre-sume large absolute magnitude or share with respect to a particularenergysector(narrowsuchascookingandhousehold electricity,ornewcommerciallightingsystems,orbroadsuch asentireenergysupplyorallbuildings).Significancecanalsobe subjective,withgoodsocialscienceusuallyasking“significantfor whom?”;

•Differentinterpretationof“inasociety”.Thismayrefertothe

worldasawhole,a groupof countries,onecountry(smallor large),partofacountry(Ontario)oraparticularsegmentof pop-ulation(e.g.low-incomepeasantsinChina,newcarpurchasers inBrazil,officeworkersinSweden);

•Differentinterpretationsof“resources,carriers,convertersand

services”.Many historicanalysesof energy transitionslooked forsituationswhenalloftheseweresignificantlyaffected(e.g. substitutingcoalwithoilaffectednotonlythetype of miner-alsbeingextracted,butalsodistributioninfrastructure,refining, typesofvehiclesandengines,mobility patternsofpopulation heating,electricitygeneration,urbandevelopment,etc.).In con-trast,switchingfromkerosenetoLPGinIndonesiahadamuch moreconfinedeffectonresources,carriers,convertersand ser-vices. Switching to FFVs in Brazil didnot affect services and converters(FFVshaveasimilarengine)andmayormaynotaffect

resourcesorcarriers(dependingonwhetherpeoplefilltheirFFVs withconventionalfueloralcohol).3

Suchdefinitionalassumptionsanddemarcationsarenotalways clearintheacademicliterature,yettheyareimportant,forthey capturehowtransitionsareframedandalsopropagated rhetori-callytothepublic[162].

Second,timingofatransitioncanbesubjective.Sometimesthe “speed”atwhichanenergytransitionoccurshaslesstodowith whatactuallyhappenedandmoretodowithwhatorwhenone counts[163].TheAmericantransitiontooil,accordingtoSmil,took about80yearstoreacha25%share,yetduringthemost acceler-atedphaseofthattransition—from1990to1925—oilgrewfrom 2.4%ofnationalenergysupplyto24%,justifyingthosewhowould callit“quick[164]”.Forairconditioning,whetheronetakesthe timeoffirstconception(NikolaTesladevelopedelectricmotorsthat madepossibletheinventionofoscillatingfansin1885),first inven-tion(WillisCarrierinventedthefirstmodernsystemin1902),or firstsuccessfulcommercialapplication(whenHenryGalson devel-opedanaffordablemassproducedsystemin1947)greatlyalters theperceivedrateofmarketpenetration[165].Brazil’stransition toflex-fuelvehicles,arguably,tookayear(fromthestartofthe nationalprogramtolarge-scalediffusion),morethantwentyyears (fromthefirstinventionofaFFVin1980),almostthirtyyears(from thestartoftheirnationalethanolprogram),ormorethaneight decades(fromthefirstinventionofaBrazilianenginecapableof usingethanolinthe1920s).

Inthecase ofnationaltransitions,we seesimilarambiguity. Kuwait’stransitiontooilcanbesaidtohavebegunin1934,with thefirstconcessiongiventotheKuwaitOilCompany;orin1937, whenthefirstexploratorywellsweredrilledintheBurganfield; orin1946,whencommercialproductionbegan(thestartingpoint takenhere);orevenin1949,whenthefirstrefinerywas estab-lished. Similarly theFrenchnuclearpowerprogram couldhave defensiblybegunin1942withthefirstchainreactionunderthe Manhattanproject;orin1945,withtheformationofthe Commis-sariatàl’ÉnergieAtomique;orin1948,whentheirfirstresearch reactorwascommissioned;orin1974withthelaunchofthe Mess-merPlan(takenhere).Decidingwhatonecountsincludeswithin itnormativeassumptionsaboutwhatanenergytransitionis;the problemisthatanalystsdonotalwaysmake theseassumptions transparent.

Third, adding to the difficultyof defining and dating them, energytransitionsarecomplex,andirreducibletoasinglecause, factor,or blueprint.Theycanbeinfluencedbyendogenous fac-torswithinacountry,likeaggressiveplanninginChina,Denmark, Indonesia,theNetherlands,OntarioorSweden,intensifiedby polit-icalwillandstakeholderinvolvement,orexogenousfactorsoutside ofacountry,suchasmilitaryconflict(theWorldWarsspawningthe Frenchnuclearprogram,theircessationenablingKuwaittoinvest inoilfields),amajorenergyaccident(Chernobyl,Fukushima),or someglobal crisis(the oilshocks ofthe 1970s, thecollapse of communismintheearly1990s,climatechangetoday).Other tran-sitions,suchastheadoption of airconditioning,canbealmost entirelymarketdriven.Somecanofferfinancialorsocialbenefits toearlyadopters—coolerhomesfortheownersofair condition-ing,improvedhealthforcookstoveusers,savingsatthepumpfor FFVdrivers—whereasothers(suchasnuclearpowerinFrance,oilin Kuwait,andnaturalgasintheNetherlands)primarilydiffusedtheir benefitstogovernmentsandprivatecorporateactorsintheform ofeconomicrents.Putanotherway,sometransitionswerequick

3_Also,_the_Brazilian_case_is_rather_incremental_{technological}_substitution_rather

thansystemicchangetowardsamoresustainabletransportsysteminvolving

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becausetheywere managedorincentivized;others weremore naturallyoccurringasafunctionofchangesintechnology,price, orconsumerdemand.Somebenefitedhomeownersorconsumers, othersbenefittedcorporationsorgovernments.

Thismakeseachofthetenrapidcasestudiesexaminedunique andcontextdependent.Somewereaboutdiscrete artifacts(e.g. stoves,airconditioners,cars),whichareperhapseasiertodiffuse thanentiresystems.Quiteafewareinsmallcountries:Denmark, Kuwait,theNetherlands,OntarioandSweden.Manyhavespecial governancecharacteristics:communistChina,Brazilunder mili-tarydictatorship,Swedenwitha corporatisteconomy,Denmark anditssocialistcommunes,andcentrallyplannedFrance.Some werebasedonspecialnaturalresourcediscoveries:naturalgasin DenmarkandtheNetherlands,oilinKuwait,wind,solarandhydro potentialinOntario.Eachcasehascertainspecificitiesthathelp explaintherapidityoftransition.

Theimplicationhereisthatenergytransitionshavenomagic formula.TheUnitedKingdom,forinstance,hadthesameaccessto naturalgasthattheNetherlandsdid,yetitwasunabletocultivate thesametypeofchangeover[81].Countriesthroughoutthe Asia-PacifichaveaccesstothesameLPGstovetechnologythatexistsin Indonesiabuthavenotseenwidespreadadoption[166].The expe-rienceoftiny,affluentcountriessuchasDenmarkandKuwaitmay berelevantforcountriesinasimilarclass(suchasBelgium,Brunei, orQatar),butlesssoforanIndiaorNigeria.Moreover,the sociocul-turalorpoliticalconditionsbehindtransitionsinBrazilandChina, atthetimemilitarydictatorshipsandcommunistregimes (respec-tively),areincompatiblewiththegovernancenormsespousedin moderndemocraciesacrossEuropeandNorthAmerica. Further-more, history seemsto suggest that pasttransitions—including manyofthecasestudiespresentedhere—arebasedondiscoveries ofnew,significant,andaffordableformsofenergy(usually carbon-intensive)ortechnology,leadingtoabundance.Yetinthefuture, itmaybescarcityand“strandedassets,”ratherthanabundance, whichinfluencesdecisions[167].

Fourth,andlastly,isthatgiventheseattributesofcomplexity, timing,andcausality,mostenergytransitionshavebeen,andwill likelycontinuetobe,pathdependentratherthanrevolutionary, cumulativeratherthanfullysubstitutive.Touseparlancefromthe multilevelperspectiveandsociotechnicaltransitionstheory,niches willonlyrarelyevolvetocompletelydominatealandscape.Older sourcesofenergy—suchasmusclepower,animatepower,wood power,andsteampower—stillremaininusethroughouttheworld today,theyhavenotentirelybeenreplacedbyfossil,nuclear,and modernrenewableenergy[168,169].Grublerhimselfwritesthat “Infact,anewsolutiondoesnotevolveinavacuumbutinteracts withexistingpracticesandtechnologies[37]”.OneanalystatMIT commentedthat“we’lluserenewableenergymoreastechnology makesitcheaper,butwe’relikelytokeepusingmoreoftheother sourcesofenergy,too[170]”.Themotorizedautomobilebehind (inpart)thetransitiontooilinKuwaitandFFVsinBrazilisactually aconsolidationofearlierinventionsfusedtogether:theinternal combustionengine,thewheel,thecastingofsteel,electriclights, tires,theassemblyline,andsoon.TheCHP,biomass,wind,andsolar technologybehindthetransitionsinDenmarkandOntariohave benefittedfromadvancesinthefossil-fuelchainincluding com-binedcycleturbines,batteries,andcompressedairenergystorage. Thus,transitionsoftenappearnotasanexponentiallineona graph,butasapunctuatedequilibriumwhichdipsandrises.Fast transitionshaveoccurredandarecapableofoccurring,butthey onlybecomeapparentwhenonecarefullyadherestoaparticular notionofsignificance,society,energyresources,andenergy ser-vices,andthenappreciatescontextualspecificity.Futureenergy studies,forecasts,andscenarios ought tomake theseattributes muchmoretransparentandexplicit.

Acknowledgments

Thisarticledrawsfromandextendstheargumentspresented inaforthcomingbooktobepublishedwithJohnsHopkins Univer-sityPressin2016entitledFactandFictioninGlobalEnergyPolicy: FifteenContentiousQuestions.Theauthorappreciatesthegenerous feedbackfromhiscoauthorsMarilynA.BrownfromtheGeorgia InstituteofTechnologyandScottV.ValentinefromtheCity Univer-sityofHongKong,FrankGeelsfromtheUniversityofManchester, and FlorianKern fromtheUniversity ofSussex, aswellas two anonymouspeerreviewersandtheeditorsof thespecialissue, forhelpinghimrefinetheanalysisdepictedhere.Also,theauthor ofthispaperisaneditorforEnergyResearch&SocialScience.He wasnotinvolvedinmanagingtheeditorialorpeerreviewprocess forthisarticle.Lastly,theauthorisgratefultotheResearch Coun-cilsUnitedKingdom(RCUK)EnergyProgramGrantEP/K011790/1 “CenteronInnovationandEnergyDemand”andtheDanishCouncil forIndependentResearch(DFF)SapereAudeGrant4182-00033B “SocietalImplicationsofaVehicle-to-GridTransitioninNorthern Europe,”which have supported elementsof theworkreported here.Anyopinions,findings,andconclusionsorrecommendations expressedinthismaterialarethoseoftheauthoranddonot nec-essarilyreflecttheviewsofRCUKEnergyProgramortheDFF.

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