Concept for a cryptographic infrastructure for measurement components in smart grids

Concept

for a cryptographic infrastructure

for measurement components

in smart grids

Norbert Zisky

Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt

Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt

Braunschweig und Berlin

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Norbert Zisky 2 1887- 2013

Dr. Norbert Zisky

Head of WG 8.52

„Datacommunication and -security“

Projects

• INSIKA (Intergrated security concept for OPT)

• On-Board Metering • EMRP JRP14 WG4

METROLOGY FOR SMART ELECTRICAL GRIDS

Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt

Braunschweig und Berlin

www.ptb.de

Committees

• Task Force Smart Grid EG Privacy and Security

• Smart Grid Coordination Group Sub Group Information Security

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Content

EU-Commission and European standardization mandat M/490

CEN/CENELEC/ETSI – Smart Grid Coordination Security concepts measurement and grid control Conclusions

Personal view

Norbert Zisky 4 Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Security and privacy aspects

are not in the scope /in mind of metrology mostly but:

there is a need on it

Missing: EU directive for protection of smart grids



General security concept for European smart grids Compared with the clear decission from 2012:

EU – Principles and Activities

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

3. Energy package

Energy and Climate package 20/20/20 –Vision

2. Strategic energy report

„Towards a secure, sustainable and competitive European energy network“ (Nov. 2008)

Statements on Smart Grids

Directive 2009/72/EC vom 13.07.2009

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013 Norbert Zisky 6

Task Force Smart Grid – Expert groups

1

Functionalities for Smart Grids

2

Regulatory

recommendations for data safety, data handling and

data protection

3

Roles and

responsibilities of actors involved in the Smart

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Mandate M/490 CEN/CENELEC/ETSI

European Smart Grid deployment

Struktur SGCG

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Status M/490 – SGCG Overview

Framework Document Smart Grid

Smart Grid Framework Document (SGCG_Sec0036_DC).pdf, p. 16

First Set of Standards

SGCG_Sec_0042_DC - First set of standard (draft) V1 0.pdf, Oct, 2nd 2012, p. 204

Sustainable Processes

Report WG SP_ver0 65 (SGCG_Sec0033_DC).pdf Aug, 8th _{2012 p. 84}

Reference Architecture:

SGCG - RAWG - Reference Architecture TR v2.0.pdf Aug, 8th _{2012 p. 96}

Information Security

M490-SGCG-SGIS-DRAFT-V0-7050.doc Oct, 31st _{2012, p. 46}

First Set of Standards – draft: available in preparation CEN/CENELEC 85 39 ETSI 60 CEN 44 31 ITU 41 1 ISO 102 Sum 332 !!!! 71 Norbert Zisky 10

Standards, Standards….

IEC 61850-x-y Substation automation

IEC 62056-5-3 Electricity metering – DLMS/COSEM Security

IEC 62443-x-y Security for industrial automation control systems IEC 62351 Power systems data and communications security IEC 15118-2 Vehicle-to-Grid Communication Interface

ISO/IEC 19790 Security requirements for cryptographic modules

Important Standards for SGIS

Development of security concepts

Determine the system architecture Use case analysis

Security analysis of the system environment Fixing security objectives/ security policiies Fixing security level

Security concept and security services, organisational measures

Fixing the residue risk

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013 Source: NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security

Reference Architecture – IEC TR 62357

Source: Final report of the CEN/CENELEC/ETSI JWG on Standards for Smart Grids, 2011-06-05, Fig. 9

Norbert Zisky 14 Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Security terms

provision of assurance that a claimed characteristic of an entity is correct

Confidentiality

property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes

Integrity

property of protecting the accuracy and completeness of assets Non-repudiation

ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event or action and its originating entities

Availability

property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Norbert Zisky 15

Protection objectives and security measures

protection objective security measures

confidentiality encryption

integrity Hash, MAC, signatures

authenticity signatures

non-repudiation signatures

availability techn. measures, redundancy

identifikation password, challenge response

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

 Use of signatures based on symmetric or

asymmetric crypto systems are state of the art for high level security solutions

Security classes

1. Trusted by information theory 2. Strong cryptografy

3. Well investigated 4. Less investigated

5. Not open („security by obscurity“)

Level of security

Critical components and elements

All sensors and actors which show the grid state or influence them e. g. :

measurement devices, switches, controller, energy management systems, persons

Thesis 1: a system is so strong only as it weakest link is  distinction in protection classes is not optimal

Thesis 2: Bigger grid areas can be disturbed by many small attacks to non important elements

Thesis 3: The need for grid state information and the confidentiallity is opposite

Thesis 4: Availability can not ensured by IT-security measures

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Security concept – approach

End-to-End-Security on a functional level,

Clear assignment of functions to components Data encryption if needed

No pattern approval of distributed components

Each component/each element has an unique identity at the same defined security level

Main security requirement: Nobody has access to the secret elements!!!

Security concept smart grid

end-to-end security

CIA

Security concept – realization

authenticated data exchange between processes with strong cryptography PDU (AES, ECDSA)

Use of smart card or cryptocontroller Key management with PKI

Data encryption with ECDH, TLS

Security depends on crypto measures in general

EU Certified CA and RA with unique policies for smart grid

Data modeling

Syntax and semantic of meter data including signatures - all data objects should be identifiable individual

e.g. OBIS-codes as a good approach

- good experiences with coding (Basic Encoding Rules) - creating of hierachical data objects

Data verification based on unique data models e. g.

XML structures  !! problems, if real time requirements

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Data modeling – example

Signed_billing_data /A-XDR- coded

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013 sbd_type ::= SEQUENCE { billing_data billing_data_type billing_data_sig auth_data_type } billing_data_type ::= SEQUENCE {

begin_cp date_time -- time start charging end_cp date_time -- time end charging counter_values SEQ. value_type -- meter values

…….

meter_id VisibleString -- meter ID

}

auth_data_type ::= SEQUENCE {

signature sig_type -- signature

certificate_info certificate_info_type -- certificate identification }

Public key infrastructure – Example Need for trusted systems

DAS meter controls CA controls manufacturer Root-CA Management CA meter manufacturer Root-CA Controls Root-CA meters Controls certificates Meter certificates Norbert Zisky 24 Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

DAS authorisiation for control linked with a meter

control meter DAS

Authorisation Request Authorisation Response time meter signature meter authorisation request authorisation result +/- signature DAS control ID meter ID random number time control signature control Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Results of the EMRP project Task 4.4

Generic security concept

Proposal for a cryptographic infrastructure

Test PKI for measurement and control components First approach for an operational concept for trusted measurements

Current work:

Implementing and testing laboratory components Changing the security platform

smart card

secure complex microcontoller

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Conclusion

Many activities of the EU-Kommission for coordination of smart grids

Important standardization mandates M/441, M/490 M/468 with special issues IT security

Smart grids needs complete and system wide security concepts

Sensors and actors have to support a end-to-end-security based on strong cryptographic measures and trusted infrastructures

Noordwijk, 24.-25.06.2013

Norbert Zisky 28

Many

Thanks!