(1)1. Ask students what influences their opinions and beliefs in life: Books, people, movies, music 2. Students brainstorm about the principles supported in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
a. separation of church and state g. Checks and balances
b. limited government h. Majority Rule/Minority Rights c. Individual rights i. Self-government
d. Natural rights j. Consent of the government
e. Three branches k. Social Contract
f. Separation of powers
3. Divide students into groups of 4-5. Give each group copies of one of the following documents:
a. The Magna Carta b. English Bill of Rights
c. Excerpt from, John Locke Two Treatises of Government d. Excerpt from Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws
e. The Mayflower Compact f. Northwest Ordinance
4. Students will also receive worksheets to evaluate the documents, and assignment to share their information.
5. Students will present their final project to class for grade.
Name of Document: ____________________________________
1. Who wrote the document?
2. Who is the audience for the document?
3 What is the purpose of the document?
4. What government principles does the document contain?
5. Does the document outline specific rules for government? Give examples that
support your answer.
Magna Carta
Translation
(Clauses marked (+) are still valid under the charter of 1225, but with a few minor amendments. Clauses marked (*) were
omitted in all later reissues of the charter. In the charter itself the clauses are not numbered, and the text reads
continuously. The translation sets out to convey the sense rather than the precise wording of the original Latin.)
JOHN, by the grace of God King of England, Lord of Ireland, Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and Count of Anjou, to his
archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, barons, justices, foresters, sheriffs, stewards, servants, and to all his officials and
loyal subjects, Greeting. . . .
(1) FIRST, THAT WE HAVE GRANTED TO GOD, and by this present charter have confirmed for us and our heirs in
perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired. That
we wish this so to be observed, appears from the fact that of our own free will, before the outbreak of the present dispute
between us and our barons, we granted and confirmed by charter the freedom of the Church's elections - a right reckoned
to be of the greatest necessity and importance to it - and caused this to be confirmed by Pope Innocent III. This freedom
we shall observe ourselves, and desire to be observed in good faith by our heirs in perpetuity.
TO ALL FREE MEN OF OUR KINGDOM we have also granted, for us and our heirs for ever, all the liberties written out
below, to have and to keep for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs:
(2) If any earl, baron, or other person that holds lands directly of the Crown, for military service, shall die, and at his death
his heir shall be of full age and owe a `relief', the heir shall have his inheritance on payment of the ancient scale of `relief'.
That is to say, the heir or heirs of an earl shall pay £100 for the entire earl's barony, the heir or heirs of a knight l00s. at
most for the entire knight's `fee', and any man that owes less shall pay less, in accordance with the ancient usage of `fees'
(3) But if the heir of such a person is under age and a ward, when he comes of age he shall have his inheritance without
`relief' or fine.
(4) The guardian of the land of an heir who is under age shall take from it only reasonable revenues, customary dues, and
feudal services. He shall do this without destruction or damage to men or property. If we have given the guardianship of
the land to a sheriff, or to any person answerable to us for the revenues, and he commits destruction or damage, we will
exact compensation from him, and the land shall be entrusted to two worthy and prudent men of the same `fee', who shall
be answerable to us for the revenues, or to the person to whom we have assigned them. If we have given or sold to
anyone the guardianship of such land, and he causes destruction or damage, he shall lose the guardianship of it, and it
shall be handed over to two worthy and prudent men of the same `fee', who shall be similarly answerable to us.
(5) For so long as a guardian has guardianship of such land, he shall maintain the houses, parks, fish preserves, ponds,
mills, and everything else pertaining to it, from the revenues of the land itself. When the heir comes of age, he shall
restore the whole land to him, stocked with plough teams and such implements of husbandry as the season demands and
the revenues from the land can reasonably bear.
(6) Heirs may be given in marriage, but not to someone of lower social standing. Before a marriage takes place, it shall be'
made known to the heir's next-of-kin.
(7) At her husband's death, a widow may have her marriage portion and inheritance at once and without trouble. She shall
pay nothing for her dower, marriage portion, or any inheritance that she and her husband held jointly on the day of his
death. She may remain in her husband's house for forty days after his death, and within this period her dower shall be
assigned to her.
(8) No widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she wishes to remain without a husband. But she must give security
that she will not marry without royal consent, if she holds her lands of the Crown, or without the consent of whatever other
lord she may hold them of.
(9) Neither we nor our officials will seize any land or rent in payment of a debt, so long as the debtor has movable goods
sufficient to discharge the debt. A debtor's sureties shall not be distrained upon so long as the debtor himself can
discharge his debt. If, for lack of means, the debtor is unable to discharge his debt, his sureties shall be answerable for it.
If they so desire, they may have the debtor's lands and rents until they have received satisfaction for the debt that they
paid for him, unless the debtor can show that he has settled his obligations to them.
* (10) If anyone who has borrowed a sum of money from Jews dies before the debt has been repaid, his heir shall pay no
interest on the debt for so long as he remains under age, irrespective of whom he holds his lands. If such a debt falls into
the hands of the Crown, it will take nothing except the principal sum specified in the bond.
* (11) If a man dies owing money to Jews, his wife may have her dower and pay nothing towards the debt from it. If he
leaves children that are under age, their needs may also be provided for on a scale appropriate to the size of his holding
of lands. The debt is to be paid out of the residue, reserving the service due to his feudal lords. Debts owed to persons
other than Jews are to be dealt with similarly.
* (12) No `scutage' or `aid' may be levied in our kingdom without its general consent, unless it is for the ransom of our
person, to make our eldest son a knight, and (once) to marry our eldest daughter. For these purposes ouly a reasonable
`aid' may be levied. `Aids' from the city of London are to be treated similarly.
+ (13) The city of London shall enjoy all its ancient liberties and free customs, both by land and by water. We also will and
grant that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall enjoy all their liberties and free customs.
* (14) To obtain the general consent of the realm for the assessment of an `aid' - except in the three cases specified
above - or a `scutage', we will cause the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons to be summoned
individually by letter. To those who hold lands directly of us we will cause a general summons to be issued, through the
sheriffs and other officials, to come together on a fixed day (of which at least forty days notice shall be given) and at a
fixed place. In all letters of summons, the cause of the summons will be stated. When a summons has been issued, the
business appointed for the day shall go forward in accordance with the resolution of those present, even if not all those
who were summoned have appeared.
* (15) In future we will allow no one to levy an `aid' from his free men, except to ransom his person, to make his eldest son
a knight, and (once) to marry his eldest daughter. For these purposes only a reasonable `aid' may be levied.
(16) No man shall be forced to perform more service for a knight's `fee', or other free holding of land, than is due from it.
(17) Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the royal court around, but shall be held in a fixed place.
(18) Inquests of novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor, and darrein presentment shall be taken only in their proper county court.
We ourselves, or in our absence abroad our chief justice, will send two justices to each county four times a year, and
these justices, with four knights of the county elected by the county itself, shall hold the assizes in the county court, on the
day and in the place where the court meets.
(19) If any assizes cannot be taken on the day of the county court, as many knights and freeholders shall afterwards
remain behind, of those who have attended the court, as will suffice for the administration of justice, having regard to the
volume of business to be done.
(20) For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence
correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant shall be spared his
merchandise, and a husbandman the implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal court. None of
these fines shall be imposed except by the assessment on oath of reputable men of the neighbourhood.
(21) Earls and barons shall be fined only by their equals, and in proportion to the gravity of their offence.
(22) A fine imposed upon the lay property of a clerk in holy orders shall be assessed upon the same principles, without
reference to the value of his ecclesiastical benefice.
(23) No town or person shall be forced to build bridges over rivers except those with an ancient obligation to do so.
(24) No sheriff, constable, coroners, or other royal officials are to hold lawsuits that should be held by the royal justices.
* (25) Every county, hundred, wapentake, and tithing shall remain at its ancient rent, without increase, except the royal
demesne manors.
(26) If at the death of a man who holds a lay `fee' of the Crown, a sheriff or royal official produces royal letters patent of
summons for a debt due to the Crown, it shall be lawful for them to seize and list movable goods found in the lay `fee' of
the dead man to the value of the debt, as assessed by worthy men. Nothing shall be removed until the whole debt is paid,
when the residue shall be given over to the executors to carry out the dead man s will. If no debt is due to the Crown, all
the movable goods shall be regarded as the property of the dead man, except the reasonable shares of his wife and
children.
* (27) If a free man dies intestate, his movable goods are to be distributed by his next-of-kin and friends, under the
supervision of the Church. The rights of his debtors are to be preserved.
(28) No constable or other royal official shall take corn or other movable goods from any man without immediate payment,
unless the seller voluntarily offers postponement of this.
(29) No constable may compel a knight to pay money for castle-guard if the knight is willing to undertake the guard in
person, or with reasonable excuse to supply some other fit man to do it. A knight taken or sent on military service shall be
excused from castle-guard for the period of this servlce.
(30) No sheriff, royal official, or other person shall take horses or carts for transport from any free man, without his
consent.
(31) Neither we nor any royal official will take wood for our castle, or for any other purpose, without the consent of the
owner.
(32) We will not keep the lands of people convicted of felony in our hand for longer than a year and a day, after which they
shall be returned to the lords of the `fees' concerned.
(33) All fish-weirs shall be removed from the Thames, the Medway, and throughout the whole of England, except on the
sea coast.
(34) The writ called precipe shall not in future be issued to anyone in respect of any holding of land, if a free man could
thereby be deprived of the right of trial in his own lord's court.
(35) There shall be standard measures of wine, ale, and corn (the London quarter), throughout the kingdom. There shall
also be a standard width of dyed cloth, russett, and haberject, namely two ells within the selvedges. Weights are to be
standardised similarly.
(36) In future nothing shall be paid or accepted for the issue of a writ of inquisition of life or limbs. It shall be given gratis,
and not refused.
(37) If a man holds land of the Crown by `fee-farm', `socage', or `burgage', and also holds land of someone else for
knight's service, we will not have guardianship of his heir, nor of the land that belongs to the other person's `fee', by virtue
of the `fee-farm', `socage', or `burgage', unless the `fee-farm' owes knight's service. We will not have the guardianship of
a man's heir, or of land that he holds of someone else, by reason of any small property that he may hold of the Crown for
a service of knives, arrows, or the like.
(38) In future no official shall place a man on trial upon his own unsupported statement, without producing credible
witnesses to the truth of it.
+ (39) No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or
deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by
the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land.
+ (40) To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.
(41) All merchants may enter or leave England unharmed and without fear, and may stay or travel within it, by land or
water, for purposes of trade, free from all illegal exactions, in accordance with ancient and lawful customs. This, however,
does not apply in time of war to merchants from a country that is at war with us. Any such merchants found in our country
at the outbreak of war shall be detained without injury to their persons or property, until we or our chief justice have
discovered how our own merchants are being treated in the country at war with us. If our own merchants are safe they
shall be safe too.
* (42) In future it shall be lawful for any man to leave and return to our kingdom unharmed and without fear, by land or
water, preserving his allegiance to us, except in time of war, for some short period, for the common benefit of the realm.
People that have been imprisoned or outlawed in accordance with the law of the land, people from a country that is at war
with us, and merchants - who shall be dealt with as stated above - are excepted from this provision.
(43) If a man holds lands of any `escheat' such as the `honour' of Wallingford, Nottingham, Boulogne, Lancaster, or of
other `escheats' in our hand that are baronies, at his death his heir shall give us only the `relief' and service that he would
have made to the baron, had the barony been in the baron's hand. We will hold the `escheat' in the same manner as the
baron held it.
(44) People who live outside the forest need not in future appear before the royal justices of the forest in answer to
general summonses, unless they are actually involved in proceedings or are sureties for someone who has been seized
for a forest offence.
* (45) We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only men that know the law of the realm and are
minded to keep it well.
(46) All barons who have founded abbeys, and have charters of English kings or ancient tenure as evidence of this, may
have guardianship of them when there is no abbot, as is their due.
(47) All forests that have been created in our reign shall at once be disafforested. River-banks that have been enclosed in
our reign shall be treated similarly.
* (48) All evil customs relating to forests and warrens, foresters, warreners, sheriffs and their servants, or river-banks and
their wardens, are at once to be investigated in every county by twelve sworn knights of the county, and within forty days
of their enquiry the evil customs are to be abolished completely and irrevocably. But we, or our chief justice if we are not
in England, are first to be informed.
* (49) We will at once return all hostages and charters delivered up to us by Englishmen as security for peace or for loyal
service.
* (50) We will remove completely from their offices the kinsmen of Gerard de Athée, and in future they shall hold no
offices in England. The people in question are Engelard de Cigogné', Peter, Guy, and Andrew de Chanceaux, Guy de
Cigogné, Geoffrey de Martigny and his brothers, Philip Marc and his brothers, with Geoffrey his nephew, and all their
followers.
* (51) As soon as peace is restored, we will remove from the kingdom all the foreign knights, bowmen, their attendants,
and the mercenaries that have come to it, to its harm, with horses and arms.
* (52) To any man whom we have deprived or dispossessed of lands, castles, liberties, or rights, without the lawful
judgement of his equals, we will at once restore these. In cases of dispute the matter shall be resolved by the judgement
of the twenty-five barons referred to below in the clause for securing the peace (§ 61). In cases, however, where a man
was deprived or dispossessed of something without the lawful judgement of his equals by our father King Henry or our
brother King Richard, and it remains in our hands or is held by others under our warranty, we shall have respite for the
period commonly allowed to Crusaders, unless a lawsuit had been begun, or an enquiry had been made at our order,
before we took the Cross as a Crusader. On our return from the Crusade, or if we abandon it, we will at once render
justice in full.
* (53) We shall have similar respite in rendering justice in connexion with forests that are to be disafforested, or to remain
forests, when these were first a-orested by our father Henry or our brother Richard; with the guardianship of lands in
another person's `fee', when we have hitherto had this by virtue of a `fee' held of us for knight's service by a third party;
and with abbeys founded in another person's `fee', in which the lord of the `fee' claims to own a right. On our return from
the Crusade, or if we abandon it, we will at once do full justice to complaints about these matters.
(54) No one shall be arrested or imprisoned on the appeal of a woman for the death of any person except her husband.
* (55) All fines that have been given to us unjustiy and against the law of the land, and all fines that we have exacted
unjustly, shall be entirely remitted or the matter decided by a majority judgement of the twenty-five barons referred to
below in the clause for securing the peace (§ 61) together with Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, if he can be present,
and such others as he wishes to bring with him. If the archbishop cannot be present, proceedings shall continue without
him, provided that if any of the twenty-five barons has been involved in a similar suit himself, his judgement shall be set
aside, and someone else chosen and sworn in his place, as a substitute for the single occasion, by the rest of the twenty-
five.
(56) If we have deprived or dispossessed any Welshmen of lands, liberties, or anything else in England or in Wales,
without the lawful judgement of their equals, these are at once to be returned to them. A dispute on this point shall be
determined in the Marches by the judgement of equals. English law shall apply to holdings of land in England, Welsh law
to those in Wales, and the law of the Marches to those in the Marches. The Welsh shall treat us and ours in the same
way.
* (57) In cases where a Welshman was deprived or dispossessed of anything, without the lawful judgement of his equals,
by our father King Henry or our brother King Richard, and it remains in our hands or is held by others under our warranty,
we shall have respite for the period commonly allowed to Crusaders, unless a lawsuit had been begun, or an enquiry had
been made at our order, before we took the Cross as a Crusader. But on our return from the Crusade, or if we abandon it,
we will at once do full justice according to the laws of Wales and the said regions.
* (58) We will at once return the son of Llywelyn, all Welsh hostages, and the charters delivered to us as security for the
peace.
* (59) With regard to the return of the sisters and hostages of Alexander, king of Scotland, his liberties and his rights, we
will treat him in the same way as our other barons of England, unless it appears from the charters that we hold from his
father William, formerly king of Scotland, that he should be treated otherwise. This matter shall be resolved by the
judgement of his equals in our court.
(60) All these customs and liberties that we have granted shall be observed in our kingdom in so far as concerns our own
relations with our subjects. Let all men of our kingdom, whether clergy or laymen, observe them similarly in their relations
with their own men.
* (61) SINCE WE HAVE GRANTED ALL THESE THINGS for God, for the better ordering of our kingdom, and to allay the
discord that has arisen between us and our barons, and since we desire that they shall be enjoyed in their entirety, with
lasting strength, for ever, we give and grant to the barons the following security:
The barons shall elect twenty-five of their number to keep, and cause to be observed with all their might, the peace and
liberties granted and confirmed to them by this charter.
If we, our chief justice, our officials, or any of our servants offend in any respect against any man, or transgress any of the
articles of the peace or of this security, and the offence is made known to four of the said twenty-five barons, they shall
come to us - or in our absence from the kingdom to the chief justice - to declare it and claim immediate redress. If we, or
in our absence abroad the chiefjustice, make no redress within forty days, reckoning from the day on which the offence
was declared to us or to him, the four barons shall refer the matter to the rest of the twenty-five barons, who may distrain
upon and assail us in every way possible, with the support of the whole community of the land, by seizing our castles,
lands, possessions, or anything else saving only our own person and those of the queen and our children, until they have
secured such redress as they have determined upon. Having secured the redress, they may then resume their normal
obedience to us.
Any man who so desires may take an oath to obey the commands of the twenty-five barons for the achievement of these
ends, and to join with them in assailing us to the utmost of his power. We give public and free permission to take this oath
to any man who so desires, and at no time will we prohibit any man from taking it. Indeed, we will compel any of our
subjects who are unwilling to take it to swear it at our command.
If-one of the twenty-five barons dies or leaves the country, or is prevented in any other way from discharging his duties,
the rest of them shall choose another baron in his place, at their discretion, who shall be duly sworn in as they were.
In the event of disagreement among the twenty-five barons on any matter referred to them for decision, the verdict of the
majority present shall have the same validity as a unanimous verdict of the whole twenty-five, whether these were all
present or some of those summoned were unwilling or unable to appear.
The twenty-five barons shall swear to obey all the above articles faithfully, and shall cause them to be obeyed by others to
the best of their power.
We will not seek to procure from anyone, either by our own efforts or those of a third party, anything by which any part of
these concessions or liberties might be revoked or diminished. Should such a thing be procured, it shall be null and void
and we will at no time make use of it, either ourselves or through a third party.
* (62) We have remitted and pardoned fully to all men any ill-will, hurt, or grudges that have arisen between us and our
subjects, whether clergy or laymen, since the beginning of the dispute. We have in addition remitted fully, and for our own
part have also pardoned, to all clergy and laymen any offences committed as a result of the said dispute between Easter
in the sixteenth year of our reign (i.e. 1215) and the restoration of peace.
In addition we have caused letters patent to be made for the barons, bearing witness to this security and to the
concessions set out above, over the seals of Stephen archbishop of Canterbury, Henry archbishop of Dublin, the other
bishops named above, and Master Pandulf.
* (63) IT IS ACCORDINGLY OUR WISH AND COMMAND that the English Church shall be free, and that men in our
kingdom shall have and keep all these liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peaceably in their fulness and entirety
for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all things and all places for ever.
Both we and the barons have sworn that all this shall be observed in good faith and without deceit. Witness the
abovementioned people and many others.
Given by our hand in the meadow that is called Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, on the fifteenth day of June in
the seventeenth year of our reign (i.e. 1215: the new regnal year began on 28 May).
ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS
[1689]
An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown Whereas the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster, lawfully, fully and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did upon the thirteenth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-eight [old style date] present unto their Majesties, then called and known by the names and style of William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, being present in their proper persons, a certain declaration in writing made by the said Lords and Commons in the words following, viz.:
Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges and ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of this kingdom;
By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the execution of laws without consent of Parliament; By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed power;
By issuing and causing to be executed a commission under the great seal for erecting a court called the Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes;
By levying money for and to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative for other time and in other manner than the same was granted by Parliament;
By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace without consent of Parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law;
By causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law;
By violating the freedom of election of members to serve in Parliament;
By prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench for matters and causes cognizable only in Parliament, and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses;
And whereas of late years partial corrupt and unqualified persons have been returned and served on juries in trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason which were not freeholders;
And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects;
And excessive fines have been imposed;
And illegal and cruel punishments inflicted;
And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures before any conviction or judgment against the persons upon whom the same were to be levied;
All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes and freedom of this realm;
And whereas the said late King James the Second having abdicated the government and the throne being
thereby vacant, his Highness the prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased Almighty God to make the glorious
instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and arbitrary power) did (by the advice of the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal and divers principal persons of the Commons) cause letters to be written to the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal being Protestants, and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs
and cinque ports, for the choosing of such persons to represent them as were of right to be sent to Parliament, to
meet and sit at Westminster upon the two and twentieth day of January in this year one thousand six hundred
eighty and eight [old style date], in order to such an establishment as that their religion, laws and liberties might not again be in danger of being subverted, upon which letters elections having been accordingly made;
And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representative of this nation, taking into their most serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends aforesaid, do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare:
That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal;
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal;
That the commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes, and all other commissions and courts of like nature, are illegal and pernicious;
That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal;
That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal;
That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law;
That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law;
That election of members of Parliament ought to be free;
That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament;
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted;
That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned, and jurors which pass upon men in trials for high treason ought to be freeholders;
That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction are illegal and void;
And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening and preserving of the laws, Parliaments ought to be held frequently.
And they do claim, demand and insist upon all and singular the premises as their undoubted rights and liberties, and that no declarations, judgments, doings or proceedings to the prejudice of the people in any of the said premises ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter into consequence or example; to which demand of their rights they are particularly encouraged by the declaration of his Highness the prince of Orange as being the only means for obtaining a full redress and remedy therein.
Having therefore an entire confidence that his said Highness the prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance so far advanced by him, and will still preserve them from the violation of their rights which they have here
asserted, and from all other attempts upon their religion, rights and liberties, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster do resolve that William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, be and be declared king and queen of England, France and Ireland and the dominions thereunto
belonging, to hold the crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to them, the said prince and
princess, during their lives and the life of the survivor to them, and that the sole and full exercise of the regal
power be only in and executed by the said prince of Orange in the names of the said prince and princess during
their joint lives, and after their deceases the said crown and royal dignity of the same kingdoms and dominions
to be to the heirs of the body of the said princess, and for default of such issue to the Princess Anne of Denmark
and the heirs of her body, and for default of such issue to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange. And
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do pray the said prince and princess to accept the same accordingly.
And that the oaths hereafter mentioned be taken by all persons of whom the oaths have allegiance and supremacy might be required by law, instead of them; and that the said oaths of allegiance and supremacy be abrogated.
"I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to their Majesties King William and Queen Mary. So help me God."
"I, A.B., do swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical this damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope or any authority of the see of Rome may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or any other whatsoever. And I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm. So help me God."
Upon which their said Majesties did accept the crown and royal dignity of the kingdoms of England, France and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to the resolution and desire of the said Lords and Commons contained in the said declaration.
And thereupon their Majesties were pleased that the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, being the two Houses of Parliament, should continue to sit, and with their Majesties' royal concurrence make effectual provision for the settlement of the religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom, so that the same for the future might not be in danger again of being subverted, to which the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons did agree, and proceed to act accordingly.
Now in pursuance of the premises the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament
assembled, for the ratifying, confirming and establishing the said declaration and the articles, clauses, matters and things therein contained by the force of law made in due form by authority of Parliament, do pray that it may be declared and enacted that all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said declaration are the true, ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom, and so shall be esteemed, allowed, adjudged, deemed and taken to be; and that all and every the particulars aforesaid shall be firmly and strictly holden and observed as they are expressed in the said declaration, and all officers and ministers whatsoever shall serve their Majesties and their successors according to the same in all time to come.
And the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, seriously considering how it hath pleased Almighty
God in his marvellous providence and merciful goodness to this nation to provide and preserve their said
Majesties' royal persons most happily to reign over us upon the throne of their ancestors, for which they render
unto him from the bottom of their hearts their humblest thanks and praises, do truly, firmly, assuredly and in the
sincerity of their hearts think, and do hereby recognize, acknowledge and declare, that King James the Second
having abdicated the government, and their Majesties having accepted the crown and royal dignity as aforesaid,
their said Majesties did become, were, are and of right ought to be by the laws of this realm our sovereign liege
lord and lady, king and queen of England, France and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging, in and to
whose princely persons the royal state, crown and dignity of the said realms with all honours, styles, titles,
regalities, prerogatives, powers, jurisdictions and authorities to the same belonging and appertaining are most
fully, rightfully and entirely invested and incorporated, united and annexed. And for preventing all questions
and divisions in this realm by reason of any pretended titles to the crown, and for preserving a certainty in the
succession thereof, in and upon which the unity, peace, tranquility and safety of this nation doth under God
wholly consist and depend, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do beseech their Majesties that
it may be enacted, established and declared, that the crown and regal government of the said kingdoms and
dominions, with all and singular the premises thereunto belonging and appertaining, shall be and continue to
their said Majesties and the survivor of them during their lives and the life of the survivor of them, and that the entire, perfect and full exercise of the regal power and government be only in and executed by his Majesty in the names of both their Majesties during their joint lives; and after their deceases the said crown and premises shall be and remain to the heirs of the body of her Majesty, and for default of such issue to her Royal Highness the Princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs of the body of his said Majesty; and thereunto the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do in the name of all the people aforesaid most humbly and faithfully submit themselves, their heirs and posterities for ever, and do faithfully promise that they will stand to, maintain and defend their said Majesties, and also the limitation and succession of the crown herein specified and
contained, to the utmost of their powers with their lives and estates against all persons whatsoever that shall attempt anything to the contrary.
And whereas it hath been found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfare of this Protestant kingdom to be governed by a popish prince, or by any king or queen marrying a papist, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do further pray that it may be enacted, that all and every person and persons that is, are or shall be reconciled to or shall hold communion with the see or Church of Rome, or shall profess the popish religion, or shall marry a papist, shall be excluded and be for ever incapable to inherit, possess or enjoy the crown and government of this realm and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging or any part of the same, or to have, use or exercise any regal power, authority or jurisdiction within the same; and in all and every such case or cases the people of these realms shall be and are hereby absolved of their
allegiance; and the said crown and government shall from time to time descend to and be enjoyed by such person or persons being Protestants as should have inherited and enjoyed the same in case the said person or persons so reconciled, holding communion or professing or marrying as aforesaid were naturally dead; and that every king and queen of this realm who at any time hereafter shall come to and succeed in the imperial crown of this kingdom shall on the first day of the meeting of the first Parliament next after his or her coming to the crown, sitting in his or her throne in the House of Peers in the presence of the Lords and Commons therein assembled, or at his or her coronation before such person or persons who shall administer the coronation oath to him or her at the time of his or her taking the said oath (which shall first happen), make, subscribe and audibly repeat the declaration mentioned in the statute made in the thirtieth year of the reign of King Charles the Second entitled, An Act for the more effectual preserving the king's person and government by disabling papists from sitting in either House of Parliament. But if it shall happen that such king or queen upon his or her succession to the crown of this realm shall be under the age of twelve years, then every such king or queen shall make,
subscribe and audibly repeat the same declaration at his or her coronation or the first day of the meeting of the first Parliament as aforesaid which shall first happen after such king or queen shall have attained the said age of twelve years.
All which their Majesties are contented and pleased shall be declared, enacted and established by authority of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain and be the law of this realm for ever; and the same are by their said Majesties, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled and by the authority of the same, declared, enacted and established accordingly.
II. And be it further declared and enacted by the authority aforesaid, that from and after this present session of Parliament no dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute or any part thereof shall be allowed, but that the same shall be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute, and except in such cases as shall be specially provided for by one or more bill or bills to be passed during this present session of Parliament.
III. Provided that no charter or grant or pardon granted before the three and twentieth day of October in the year
of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-nine [old style date] shall be any ways impeached or invalidated
by this Act, but that the same shall be and remain of the same force and effect in law and no other than as if this
Act had never been made.
John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government
(¶ 1.3) In this last age a generation of men has sprung up amongst us, that would flatter princes with an opinion, that they have a divine right to absolute power, let the laws by which they are constituted and are to govern, and the conditions under which they enter upon their authority, be what they will;
and their engagements to observe them ever so well ratified by solemn oaths and promises.
To make way for this doctrine, they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom...
(¶ 1.4) However we must believe them upon their own bare words, when they tell us, "We are all born slaves, and we must continue so" there is no remedy for it; life and thraldom we entered into together, and can never be quit of the one till we part with the other. Scripture or reason, I am sure, do not any where say so...
Chapter 2: Of paternal and regal Power
(¶ 1.6) Sir Robert Filmer's great position is, that "men are not naturally free." This is the foundation on
which his absolute monarchy stands, and from which it erects itself to an height, that its power is
above every power...
From the Second Treatise of Government Chapter 1: Of Political Power
(¶ 2.1) It having been shown in the foregoing discourse:
Firstly. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, nor dominion over the world, as is pretended.
Secondly. That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.
Thirdly. That if his heirs had, there being no law of Nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined.
(¶ 1.8) Let us then endeavour to find what account he gives us of this fatherly Authority, as it lies scattered in the several parts of his writings. And first, as it was vested in Adam, he says
"Not only Adam, but the succeeding patriarchs, had by right of fatherhood royal authority over their children"
[Filmer].
"This lordship which Adam by command had over the whole world, and by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolute dominion of any monarch which has been since creation" [Filmer]
"Dominion of life and death, making war, and concluding peace" [Filmer]
"Adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death" [Filmer]
"Kings, in the right of parents, succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction" [Filmer]
"As kingly power is by the law of God, so it has no inferior law to limit it, Adam was lord of all." [Filmer]
"The father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will" [Filmer]
"The superiority of princes is above laws" [Filmer]
"The unlimited jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by Samuel" [Filmer]
"Kings are above the laws" [Filmer]
And to this purpose, see a great deal more which our A... delivers in Bodin's words: [etc] O. p.279. [Then returns to Filmer quotes:]
"The reason why laws have been also made by kings was this: When kings were either busied with wars, or
distracted with public cares, so that every private man could not have access to their persons, to learn their
will and pleasure, then were laws of necessity invented, that so every particular subject might find his prince's
pleasure deciphered unto him in the table of his laws" [Filmer]
Fourthly. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam's posterity being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance.
All these promises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power, "Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction" so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence...
must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power... than what...
Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
(¶ 2.2) To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss to set down what I take to be political power. That the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another, and show the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.
(¶ 2.3) Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.
Chapter 2: Of the State of Nature
[State of Nature] (¶ 2.4) To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another: there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the Lord and Master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
(¶ 2.5) This equality of men by Nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are:
"The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty to love others than
themselves, for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot
but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own
soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to
satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men weak, being of one and the same nature: to
have anything offered them repugnant to this desire must needs, in all respects, grieve them as much
as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should show
greater measure of love to me than they have by me showed unto them; my desire, therefore, to be
loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of
bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant." [Hooker, R. 1593 (volume 1)]
[Law of Nature] (¶ 2.6) But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence. Though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order and about his business, they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's, pleasure. And being
furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.
Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own preservation comes not in competition ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, liberty, health, limb or goods of another.
[Everyone is responsible for justice in the state of nature] (¶ 2.7) And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed which wills the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands; whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
(¶ 2.8) And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another: but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal when he has got him in his hands according to the passionate heats or boundless extravancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature the offender declares himself to live by another rule, than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security;...
[In the state of nature], every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.
(¶ 2.9) I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it,
I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death or punish an alien for
any crime he commits in their country ...
...if by the law of nature, every man hath not a power to punish offenses against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another...
(¶ 2.11) ...every man in the state of nature has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom man can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded the great law of nature: who so shedeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed..
(¶ 2.12) By the same reason, may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law.
It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like.
(¶ 2.13) To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that selflove will make men partial to themselves and their friends. And on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others. And hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men.
I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature, which must certainly be great where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easily to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury will scare be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection to remember that the absolute
monarchs are but men, and if governments is to be the remedy of those evils which necessarily follow from men being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or control those who execute his pleasure? And in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? Much better it is in the state of nature wherein man are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another. And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
(¶ 2.14) 'Tis often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were, there any men in such a
state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present; that since all Princes and rulers of
independent governments all through the world are in a state of nature, 'tis plain the world never was,
nor ever will be, without numbers of man in that state. I have named all governors of independent
communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for 'tis not every compact that puts
an end to the state of nature between man, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter
into one community and make one Body politick; other promises and compacts men may make one
with another and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck between the
two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega in his History of Peru, or between a
Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state
of nature in reference to one another. For truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.
Chapter 3: Of the State of War
(¶ 2.17) ...he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life. For I have reasons to conclude that, he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it...
He that in the state of nature would take away the freedom, that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that in the state of society would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else and so be looked on as in a state of war.
(¶ 2.19) And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which, however some men have confounded, are as far distant as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservations, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature.
But force, or a declared design of force upon the person of another, where there is no common
superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and 'tis the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm but by appeal to the law for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill when he sets on me to rob me, but of my horse or coat: because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which if lost is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor,
because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.
(¶ 2.20) But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the future: nay where an appeal to the law and constituted judges lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice and a bare- faced wrestling of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war. For wherever violence is used and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiased application of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
(¶ 2.21) To avoid this state of war (wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no
authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men putting themselves into
society and quitting the state of nature. For where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded and the controversy is decided by that power.
Chapter 4: Of SLAVERY
[Freedom in the state of nature and freedom in society] (¶ 2.22) The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what the legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it.
Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, a liberty for everyone to do what he likes, to live as he pleases and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man. As freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.
Chapter 8: Of the Beginning of Political Societies
(¶ 2.95) Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently
incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
(¶ 2.96) For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being one body, must move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority, or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that in assemblies empowered to act by positive laws where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines as having, by the law of Nature and reason, the power of the whole.
(¶ 2.97) And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the
determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he
with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact if he be left free
and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of Nature. For what appearance would
there be of any compact? What new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the
society than he himself thought fit and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty as
he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of Nature, who may submit himself
and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
(¶ 2.98) For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual, nothing but the consent of every individual can make anything to be the act of the whole, which, considering the infirmities of health and avocations of business, which in a number though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly; and the variety of opinions and contrariety of interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, it is next impossible ever to be had. And, therefore, if coming into society be upon such terms, it will be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, tantum ut exiret. Such a
constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in, which cannot be supposed till we can think that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
(¶ 2.99) Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth. And thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
Chapter 9: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government
[Reasons for entering into society] (¶ 2.123) If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which 'tis obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others. For all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and 'tis not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
(¶ 2.124) The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.
First, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them.
For though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
(¶ 2.125) Secondly, in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to
determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both
judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is
very apt to carry them too far and with too much heat in their own cases; as well as negligence, and
unconcernedness to make them too remiss in other men's.
