[RULE 126, SEC. 13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. COGAED June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334 LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle; (4) Consented warrantless search; (5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
[RULE 110, SEC. 8] In a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
PEOPLE VS. DIONALDO, ET AL. July 23, 2014, G.R. No. 207949 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Edwin Navarro, had been kidnapped by four men from Health Is Wealth Gym. The kidnappers, including Dionaldo, demanded from Edwin’s brother 15 million as a ransom. After negotiations, the ransom has been lowered to P110,000. However, the payment of the ransom and subsequent rescue operations with the police failed. The dead body of Edwin was later on found by the police and the kidnappers was later on identified and arrested by the police.
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted. The RTC and CA convicted the four kidnappers of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting the kidnappers with the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
HELD: YES. The court held that it was constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim's (i.e., Edwin's) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
[RULE 110, SEC. 5] As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman.
ARAULLO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN July 30, 2014, G.R. No. 194157
REYES, J.
FACTS: Araullo, who was illegally dismissed by the Club Filipino, filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for the issuance of unjust interlocutory order under Art. 206 of the Revised Penal Code against Labor Arbiter Arden S. Anni.
The Office of the Ombudsman found no probable cause for the complaint given Araullo's failure to establish that the LA Anni and the other labor arbiters gave undue advantage to Club Filipino, or that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.
Araullo then filed a petition for certiorari to assail the Office of the Ombudsman's dismissal of his criminal complaint.
ISSUES: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal complaint of Araullo.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that there was no probable cause in the unjust interlocutory order complaint of Araullo. Upon review, the Court has determined that the Office of the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion because explained clearly in the assailed resolution were the grounds that supported its finding of lack of probable cause, and which then justified the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed by Araullo.
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” (Casing v. Ombudsman, 2012)
Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof. "[It] can only find support in facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged warrants a prosecution." To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the complainant, then should have proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed. In addition, there should have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the respondents, to at least support a ruling that would call for their further prosecution.
Specifically for the charge of violation of Article 206 of the RPC which penalizes the issuance of unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first, the orders issued by the respondents to his complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
On this matter, the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held that LA Anni's order for the quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRC's resolution affirming it, were not unjust.
[RULE 116, SEC. 11] The suspension of arraignment of an accused, while authorized under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, is only for a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Its own failure to act for seven (7) months without arraigning the accused cannot be an excuse to dismiss the case.
ROBERT KUA, ET AL. VS . GREGORIO SACUPAYO, ET AL. September 24, 2014, G.R. No. 191237
PEREZ, J.
FACTS: [Petitioners] are members of the Board of Directors and the officers of Vicmar Development Corporation. [Respondents] Gregorio G. Sacupayo and Maximiniano Panerio were VICMAR employees.
As required by law, Vicmar, deducted the Social Security System (SSS) contributions of [respondents] from their wages. It also deducted (Php468.00) per month from the wage of Sacupayo as his monthly amortization for a ten thousand peso (Php10,000.00) loan he obtained from the SSS on November 14, 2002.
Vicmar remitted the deductions to the SSS at first. Sometime in 2003 and 2004, unknown to [respondents] and despite the continued SSS deductions from their wages, Vicmar stopped remitting the same to the SSS.
On August 7, 2004 and August 9, 2004 respectively, Sacupayo and Panerio were dismissed from employment. Both filed complaints for illegal dismissal.
Panerio was thereafter afflicted with Chronic Persistent Asthma on September 28, 2004. But when he applied for sickness benefits before the SSS in October 2004, the same was denied for the reason that no contributions or payments were made for twelve (12) months prior to the semester of confinement. Sacupayo, for his part, filed another loan application before the SSS. But this was also denied outright for nonpayment of a previous loan which should have been fully paid if not for the failure of Vicmar to remit the amounts due to the SSS.
[respondents] filed complaints before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Cagayan de Oro City. Vicmar then remitted to SSS the contributions and loan payments of [respondents] sometime thereafter.
Nevertheless, probable cause was found and three (3) separate Informations all dated June 6, 2005 were filed against [petitioners] officers of Vicmar for violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997.
[Petitioners] appealed the finding of probable cause against them before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (RSP). This was granted by the RSP in a Resolution dated July 14, 2005, which ordered the City Prosecutor to desist from filing the case or to withdraw the cases if one has already been filed for the following reason:
Section 28 of RA 8282 above cited merely lays down a disputable presumption that the members’ contribution to the SSS is deemed misappropriated if the employer fails to remit the same to the SSS within 30 days from the date they became due. The full payment and remittance of the same destroys this presumption.
Pursuant to the Resolution of the RSP reversing the finding of probable cause by the City Prosecutor, [petitioners] filed a Motion to Dismiss dated February 13, 2006 before [the] RTC. The City Prosecutor likewise filed a Comment manifesting agreement to the withdrawal of the criminal cases pending resolution of the appeal with the DOJ.
RTC granted the Motion of [petitioners] and ordered the withdrawal of the criminal cases.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court to annul and set aside the trial court’s withdrawal of Criminal Case Nos. 2006-072, 2006-073 and 2006-074 from its docket.
As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition, reversed and set aside the RTC’s ruling, and reinstated the criminal cases against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated the criminal cases against the petitioners
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) that: (1) the lapse of almost seven (7) months without any action taken by the DOJ; and, (2) the manifestation to withdraw the case by the Public Prosecutor, were flawed and insufficient to effect a withdrawal of the criminal cases. The suspension of arraignment of an accused, while authorized under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, is only for a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Its own failure to act for seven (7) months without arraigning the accused cannot be an excuse to dismiss the case, especially when the rules dictate that the deferment of arraignment in such case may only be done for a period of 60 days. The controlling case of Crespo v. Mogul teaches us that, while the prosecution of criminal actions is under the discretion and control of the public prosecutor, once a complaint or information is filed, any disposition of the case, be it a dismissal or a conviction or acquittal of an accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the principle that trial judges ought to make its own independent assessment of the merits of the case and not abdicate its judicial power and act as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice.
In any event, there exists probable cause to indict petitioners for violation of Sections 22 (a) and (d), in relation to Section 28 (e), of the SS Law. R.A. No. 8282, a special law, requires employers to: (a) register its employees with the SSS; (b) deduct employee contributions from their salaries; and (3) remit these contributions to the SSS within a given period.
The case in point is Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al. where good faith and absence of malicious intent of the accused and the subsequent remittance of the SSS contributions and loan amortizations, held no sway over the accused’s criminal liability under the SS Law for failure to remit SSS contributions and loan amortizations of accused’s employees.
[RULE 110, SEC. 16] Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedureexpressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action.
LEONARDO A. VILLALON, ET AL. VS. AMELIA CHAN September 24, 2014, G.R. No. 196508
BRION, J.
FACTS: The respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua. The respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person.
During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this time under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993.
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
On September 13, 2003, a verified complaint-affidavitalleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Antipolo
During the pretrial (or on February 6, 2006), Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia. Leonardo filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit. He also argued that Amelia had already waived her right to file a civil and criminal case against him and his codefendant Erlinda.
In a resolutiondated March 3, 2006, the RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. Trial of the case ensued thereafter.
Leonardo filed a demurrer to evidence. In an orderdated September 5, 2006, the RTC dismissed the bigamy case for failure of the prosecution to prove the petitioners’ guilt.
In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Amelia alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued its March 3, 2006 resolution and proceeded with the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor.
In a decision dated July 30, 2010, the CA granted Amelia’s petition and annulled the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia from participation in the case, and its September 5, 2006 order that dismissed the bigamy case against the petitioners. The CA ruled that the crime of bigamy, being public in nature, can be denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the prosecuting authorities without the offended party losing her right to recover damages. Thus, the CA concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not allow Atty. Atencia to intervene and represent Amelia in the bigamy case and that the trial court denied Amelia her right to due process.
CA found no such waiver from Amelia and held that Atty. Atencia’s appearance as private prosecutor was proof enough of Amelia’s determination to enforce her claim for damages in the bigamy case
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Atencia’s is disqualified to intervene in the bigamy case as private prosecutor.
HELD: NO. Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedureexpressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia’s disqualification violated the respondent’s rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even with Atty. Atencia’s disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the country during the whole proceedings on the bigamy case.
In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the respondent. The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
[RULE 113, SEC. 5] Even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements,” the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
ALVIN COMERCIANTE VS. PEOPLE July 22, 2015, G.R. No. 205926 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla. Standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance ofaround five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
HELD: NO. The petition is meritorious. The Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
xxx (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxx
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
The factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. Gonzales must be acquitted.
[RULE 117, SEC. 7] As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void; and the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
PEOPLE VS. GO August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 216 DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS: Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) was placed under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC began collecting on OCBC’s past due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement of their outstanding loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. A representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the signatures on the loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC. The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of manager’s checks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
The RTC found the Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the criminal case and acquitting all of the accused. The CA also affirmed the order; and, notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the trial court has already become final since the prosecution failed to move for the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached.
ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence was proper.
HELD: NO. A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to, as a general rule, an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, the Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void. In this case, the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the respondents.
[RULE 110, SEC. 6] The trial court was precluded from considering the attendance of such qualifying or aggravating circumstances, i.e., minority of the victim, in the judgment because of the failure to properly allege them; The date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy.
PEOPLE VS. RUDY NUYOK June 15, 2015, G.R. No. 195424 BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: The accused in this case is the paternal uncle of the victim who filed rape cases against him. It was alleged that the crimes were committed last June, July, August and September of 2005. The accused overpowered the victim while raping her and he also threatened to kill the victim and her family if she reveals the incident to anyone. The victim was only 13 years old when the crimes were committed.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA gravely erred in not appreciating the minority of the offended party (when the same was not indicated in the information)
(2) Whether or not the RTC erred in finding him guilty of rape despite the fatal defects of the information which did not specify the dates of commission of the rapes?
HELD:
(1) NO. According to the Supreme Court, the RTC correctly convicted the accused with only 4 counts of simple rape instead of qualified rape (which the CA affirmed). Although the minority under 18 years of AAA at the time of the rapes, and the fact that the accused was her paternal uncle were established during the trial, the RTC nonetheless correctly convicted him only of four counts of simple rape instead of qualified rape because the special qualifying circumstance of minority was not alleged in the informations. The circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur to qualify the crime of rape, but only her relationship to the accused was alleged and proved. The trial court was precluded from considering the attendance of such qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the judgment because of the failure to properly allege them. This conforms to Section 8 and Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
(2) NO. It is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless such date and time are essential ingredients of the offenses charged. It is sufficient that the information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 110 of Rules of Court. In this case, the failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the informations defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female against her will through force or intimidation. Precision as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on its commission. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
[RULE 112, SEC. 3] The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the informations for lack of probable cause since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, ET AL. VS. JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIANBELTRAN January 13, 2014 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367
BRION, J.
FACTS: Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (the Child Abuse Law) and R.A. No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office against Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean of the School of Health Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines (SPUP).
Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year because of her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP’s College Freshmen Program Curriculum.
The prosecutor’s office in its resolution found probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and recommended the filing of the corresponding informations against them. Junio and Lorica appealed the resolution of the prosecutor’s office, but Undersecretary Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denied their petition for review.
Afterward, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica’s motion for reconsideration and set aside the resolution of Undersecretary Salazar. Accordingly, in her resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of R.A. Nos. 7610 and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for lack of probable cause.
Subsequently, the prosecutor’s office still filed two informations against Junio and Lorica for violations of Section 10(a), Article VI, in relation with Article 3(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 12 of R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City presided by Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran.
This prompted the accused to file a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima’s resolution. They also filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) alleging that Judge Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" when she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary De Lima.
(1) Whether the respondent arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw informations. (2) Whether the respondent arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge.
HELD:
(1) NO. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. We stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
In the present case, the evidence provides that the respondent judge does not appear to have arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw informations. She explained the basis of her denial. No proof whatsoever exists in all these, showing that bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended the issuance of her order. It is also important to note in this regard that the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint motion to withdraw informations, despite the finding of Secretary De Lima of lack of probable cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and Lorica’s remedy under the circumstances should have been made with the proper court for the appropriate judicial action, not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint.
(2) NO. The court find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica’s argument that Judge Cacatian-Beltran “arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge” when she insisted that the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with a prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor’s action and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor.
of the public prosecutor (under Rule 110, Sect. 5) is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order quashing search warrants.
[RULE 126, SEC. 4] The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought. It need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE AND PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE (PLDT) COMPANY
January 13, 2014, G.R. No. 161106 SERENO, C.J.
FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants (NO)
(2) Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause (considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft) (YES)
(3) Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general warrant (NO)
HELD:
(1) NO. Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal
under the direction and control of the prosecutor. The provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of “all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.” However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; thus, conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order quashing search warrants.
(2) YES. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis. In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched." There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
(3) NO. The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought. It need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
A general warrant is defined as “(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized.” It is one that allows the “seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another” and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons. In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant.
In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm that they had "utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.”
[RULE 111, SEC. 1] It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
[RULE 122, SEC. 1] The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. (Rule 45, Section 1 must be read together with Rule 122, Section 1)
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL VS. CONSUELO C. ALIGA January 12, 2014 G.R. No 166995
PERALTA, J.
FACTS: An Information was filed against respondent Aliga for the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial Document. During arraignment, respondent Aliga pleaded not guilty. After the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for issuance of a hold departure order against respondent Aliga and the latter’s motion to suspend proceedings, trial on the merits ensued. Both the prosecution and the defense were able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their respective documentary exhibits. Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the acquittal of the CA of the accused which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without the representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (YES)
(2) Whether the petitioner correctly filed the correct petition (NO)
HELD: (1) YES. Petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without the representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the criminal, not the civil, aspect of the CA Decision. (2) NO. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Section 1 of Rule 45 should be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review. The instant petition is dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
[RULE 110, SEC. 8, 9] The averments in the two (2) sets of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare their respective defenses.
SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA VS PEOPLE April 2, 2014, GR No. 175750-51 PEREZ, J.
FACTS: Petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent Hermelina Moleta, the sum of P320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. As payment, petitioner issued 3 Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna.
In several attempts on different occasions, Moleta demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail.
Thus, Moleta deposited the 3 LBP checks to her account in Metrobank-Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the checks to Moleta as the checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited the checks. This time, however, she deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon presentation for payment, the checks were again returned for the reason, "Signature Not on File." Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the municipality’s account was already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the Philippines, and that petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.
Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 sets of Information against petitioner, in the latter’s capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of General Luna, Surigao del Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for finding petitioner guilty of estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision allegedly violated
HELD: NO. Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. As held in People v. Dimaano:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.
As early in United States v. Lim San, this Court has determined that:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended...”
Petitioner’s argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in the two (2) sets of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare their respective defenses.
[RULE 118, SEC. 2] All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission.
PEOPLE VS. LIKIRAN June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 217 REYES, J.
FACTS: Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno). It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being held at the basketball court. After a few hours, while Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran (Jerome), the accused-appellant’s brother, punched Mercado on the mouth. Jerome was armed with a short firearm while accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife. Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. Celso Dagangon (Dagangon) was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. The accused-appellant denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s culpability. Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive identification of the accused-appellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of murder. The RTC also rejected the accused–appellant’s defense of denial as it was not supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him be at the scene of the crime. The CA sustained the findings of the RTC. The accused-appellant asserted that the information charged him of murder committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record established that Sareno
was in fact shot by some other person. The CA disregarded the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled that “the cause of death was not made an issue in the court a quo” and the Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient basis for the CA’s disregard of the accused-appellant’s argument
HELD: YES. The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Dael of Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City “is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area.” Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim. The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death. The Court of Appeals’ decision is AFFIRMED.
[RULE 113, SEC. 5] Tancinco was arrested while attempting to conceal a firearm and could not produce a license to carry thereof when asked by the police officers. Immediately thereafter, as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, Tancinco was searched and found to have three (3) sachets of shabu in his possession. The search was lawful under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. DENNIS TANCINCO June 18, 2014, 726 SCRA 659 PEREZ, J.
FACTS: A team of police officers was on roving patrol along M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City when SPO1 Mendranos received a call from a member of the Barangay Intelligence Network (BIN) who gave information of an ongoing pot session by an unidentified alleged armed man and his companion. They proceeded to the location of where the armed person and his companions were supposedly holding their pot session. They did not find the alleged armed man. The BIN informant approached SPO1 Mendranos and told him that the alleged armed man had been spotted playing a bingo machine at a nearby house. The alleged armed man turned out to be accused-appellant Tancinco. Since Tancinco was unable to produce a license to carry a firearm, PO2 Abatayo consfiscated the firearm and arrested Tancinco without a warrant. Incident to the warrantless arrest, SPO1 Mendranos instructed PO2 Dio to make a body search of Tancinco. The body search of Tancinco produced three (3) medium plastic sachets, which were positive to be shabu. Subsequently, separate Informations for violation of R.A. No. 9165, specifically illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and for illegal possession of firearm were filed by the arresting police officers against Tancinco. The trial court found Tancinco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, specifically illegal possession of a dangerous drug. On appeal, the appellate court rejected Tancinco’s claim of frame-up as against the straightforward, direct and positive testimony of the police officers.
HELD: YES. Tancinco was searched as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The testimony of the police officers, including PO2 Dio, as to what went down when they arrested Tancinco was direct, straightforward and positive. PO2 Dio’s statement that he did not clearly see Tancinco holding the firearm does not detract from the prosecutions’ evidence and story that Tancinco was arrested while attempting to conceal a firearm and could not produce a license to carry thereof when asked by the police officers. Immediately thereafter, as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, Tancinco was searched and found to have three (3) sachets of shabu in his possession.
[RULE 110, SEC. 15] While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO VS. PEOPLE February 12, 2014, G.R. No. 188694
PERLAS–BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Ricardo Atienza requested Atibula (Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporter’s Division) to take out Volumes 260, 265 and 267 which the latter rejected even despite the offer of P50,000 for Volume 260.
Subsequently, Volume 266 was subsequently discovered to be missing and which access to the missing volume appears to have been acquired by entering through an opening because the air conditioning unit occupying the space thereat was taken out for repair earlier. A Clerk IV then handed to Atibula a bag containing a gift–wrapped package which turned out to be the missing Volume 266. Volume 266 bore badges of tampering evidenced by the “non–continuity of the front and the back cover flaps x x x and the pages of the book/volume differences in the cutting marks on the sides of the volume and the presence of artificial aging on [its] sides” and two (2) new documents which materially amended the original decision and resolution in the Fernando case were inserted in the said volume. After investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of RAs 3019 and 6713 were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but it was contrarily determined that there existed probable cause to charge Atienza, et al. for the crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the Revised Penal Code and of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1)54 in relation to Article 171(6)55 of the same
code. Thus, the corresponding Informations were filed before the RTC. The RTC found them guilty which the CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: Whether there was lack of jurisdiction
HELD: YES. The RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the falsification case since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1)90 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years91 ) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended by RA 7691. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well–settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. The accused were subsequently acquitted for reasonable doubt.
[RULE 110, SEC. 15] Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any part of the proceedings and even until it reached the Supreme Court, the SC applied the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.
[RULE 111, SEC. 1] The civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before this court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal.
ANTONIO M. GARCIA VS. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC. October 1, 2014, 737 SCRA 252
LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered into a deed of absolute· sale and purchase of shares of stock in July 1988 (including stocks in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and in Manila Polo Club, Inc.). However, this were sold in public auction. He was charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the RTC have jurisdiction? (NO)
(2) Is filing a separate case for civil action forum shopping? (NO)
case. The RTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This lack of jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment rendered. Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any part of the proceedings and even until it reached this court, we apply the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case.
(2) NO. The appeal before the CA is purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while the petition for certiorari before this court is allegedly only on the criminal aspect of the case. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before this court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal.
However, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court." The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping. On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the RTC or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeals to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping. This is not the situation here.
[RULE 110, SEC. 6] Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense.
FELINA ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE October 8, 2014, 737 SCRA 252
FACTS: In February 1996, 7 y/o Michael Ryan Gonzales (Grade 1 pupil in Iloilo), hurriedly entered the classroom and bumped into his teacher, petitioner Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Rosaldes asked for an apology but when Michael didn’t want to apologize, she pushed and repeatedly slammed Michael on the floor. The medical examination after the incident showed contusions and pain; thus, Rosaldes was charged with child abuse in the RTC, and found her guilty which the CA affirmed but modified for her “to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.”
ISSUE:
(1) Whether information is sufficient?
(2) Should civil liability be granted even if not proof of actual expenses or testimony of victim’s feelings?
HELD: (1) YES. Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The
