Atty. Legaspi Case Digest

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GR# 127406, NOV. 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 86 Article 40 – Exception to the Rule

FACTS: In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower court however ruled that Ofelia‘s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be invoked in the case at bar.

HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, ―The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.‖ This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first require a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia‘s marriage with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in ‘87) cannot be applied retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights

of Ofelia under the CC which was operational during her marriage with Reyes.

Alcantara v. Alcantara GR# 167746, AUG. 28, 2007 531 SCRA 446

FACTS: Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a ―fixer‖ who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State‘s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the

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marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent‘s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Sy v. CA

GR# 127263 / APR. 12, 2000 330 SCRA 550

The case: For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.

The facts: Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their mother.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are

different and incongruous.

The Issues:

Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?

Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

Held:

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code

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character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time

heir marriage was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

Cariño v. Cariño GR# 132529 / FEB. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127

Article 40

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4‘s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been

solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

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GR# 158298/Aug 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27

Facts: Isidro Ablaza – petitioner, is the brother of Cresencio Ablaza filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila on the ground that their marriage was celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal Isidro raised the lone issue: The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

Issue: Whether or not Isidro not being a party in the said marriage has right to bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage.

Ruling: Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. The following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Since the marriage in question is governed by the Civil Code the Court ruled that only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.16 Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity

about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano‘s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

Carlos v. Sandoval

GR# 179922 / DEC. 16, 2008 574 SCRA 116

Facts: On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. Petitioner and respondent entered into compromised agreements to divide the land equally. In August 1995, petitioner filed an action with the following causes: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Ruling: The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.

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respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.

The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.

Bolos v. Bolos

GR# 186400/October 20, 2010 634 SCRA 429

Facts: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code where the RTC ruled in her favor.

The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

Cynthia appealed to the SC and one of the issues raised is that A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC entitled ―rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages‖ is applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the family code and the phrase ―under the family code‖ in A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word ―petitions‖ rather than to the word ―marriages.

Issue: Whether or not A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC pertains to petitions during the effectivity of the Family Code and not to marriages. Ruling: The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner‘s interpretation that the phrase ―under the Family Code‖ in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word ―petitions‖ rather than to the word ―marriages.‖

Juliano-Llave v. Rep (Tamano) GR# 169766, March 30, 2011

Facts: Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice -initially under the Islamic laws and tradition and under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur. In the marriage contract, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as 'divorced.' Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites. The RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita's marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. CA affirmed decision. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law.

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Tamano was bigamous.

Whether Zorayda and Adib, has legal standing to file a declaration of nullity of marriage of Estrellita and Sen. Tamano.

Ruling: Muslim personal laws cannot benefit Estrillita, Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO G.R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005 FACTS:

In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City.

In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married an American.

Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a petition for ―Authority to Remarry‖ invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted the petition.

The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

HELD: Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent‘s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent‘s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas GR# 186571/ Aug 11, 2010 628 SCRA 266

FACTS:Gerbert Corpuz (―Gerbert‖) was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas (―Daisy‖). Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding because of his work. He returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but discovered that she was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce.

2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian

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registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (―NSO‖) informed him that the marriage between him and Daisy still subsists under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the petition. In fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar case but was prevented by financial constrains. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert‘s. The RTC denied Gerbert‘s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, 2 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:WON Art. 26, 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD:NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, ¶2 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE.

Art. 26, 2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, ¶2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without Art. 26, ¶2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond.

An action based on Art. 26, ¶2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally

Toring v. Toring

GR# 165321 / AUG. 3, 2010 626 SCRA 389

Facts: Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978, On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him. Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresita‘s Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita‘s eldest son).

Issue: Whether or not Teresita is psychologically incapacitated. Ruling: We find the petition unmeritorious, In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning

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the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction – already then existing – was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed. We find the totality of the petitioner‘s evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife.

The requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential – although from sources other than the respondent spouse – to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition. In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita‘s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses‘ eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes GR# 185286 / Aug 18, 2010 628 SCRA 461

Facts: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she

thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the university. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner‘s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter‘s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent‘s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent‘s parents, and the couple‘s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent‘s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondent‘s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family‘s financial woes and further straining the parties‘ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner‘s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well. In 1985, petitioner, who

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that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled. In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent‘s fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent‘s business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent‘s gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties‘ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent‘s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room. Still, petitioner made a string of ―final‖ attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respondent‘s siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondent‘s siblings waved the white flag on respondent. Adolfo Reyes, respondent‘s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties‘ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to ―determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning.‖ As with all other

attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist‘s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent‘s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent‘s relationship with his children.

Issue: WON the respondent is psychologically incapacitated

Ruling: The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. The clinical psychologists‘ and psychiatrist‘s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent‘s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent‘s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock‘s textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry, treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan‘s recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent‘s psychological incapacity is incurable.

Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

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GR No. 173138, Dec. 1, 2010; 636 SCRA 350

Facts: Noel married Maribel because Maribel claims that she is pregnant with Noel‘s child. After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel‘s family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noel‘s family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the family‘s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel‘s claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribel‘s office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse. Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noel‘s mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted ―Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam‖ at her. Because of this, Noel‘s mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noel‘s house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls. Noel filed declaration of nullity on the ground of Psychological Incapacity.

Issue: WON Maribel is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling: In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and

nullity.The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,

(b) alleged in the complaint,

(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of the celebration‖ of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their ―I do‘s.‖ The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ―mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts‖ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness

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neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

x x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.

Agraviador v. Agraviador GR No. 170729, Dec 8, 2010; 637 SCRA 519

Facts: On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioner‘s family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondent‘s work and because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.

On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.[5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.

The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became ―very close‖ to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.

Issue: WON respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling: We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondent‘s psychological incapacity

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced the

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marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition. The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this ―psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.

Pimentel v. Pimentel GR# 172060/Sept 13, 2010 630 SCRA 437

Facts: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved to suspend on the ground of prejudicial question.

Issue: Is there a prejudicial question in the case at bar?

Ruling: There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action

an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person ―who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.‖ The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

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02-10-11 SC; Arts. 147 & 148 Valdes v. RTC Br. 102, QC GR# 122749 / JULY 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221

Facts: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes. The Court declared plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares following Article 147 of the Family Code on liquidation of properties of common-law spouses, hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Article 147 of FC is correctly applied in the case at bar.

Ruling: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases. The trial Court did not commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,[12] of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the

property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.

MBTC v. Pascual

GR# 163744 / FEB. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246

Facts: Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving a lot. Florencia secured a waiver from Nicholson. Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, initiated a foreclosure proceedings over the properties. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.

Issue: Whether or not the properties in contest form part of the conjugal properties of Nicholson and Florencia.

Ruling: The property is deemed conjugal. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.

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disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

Diño v. Diño

GR# 178044/January 19, 2011

Facts: Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage. On a motion for reconsideration, the Trial court rendered a decision that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Ruling: For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Atienza vs. Brillantes,

AM # MTJ 92-706/March 29, 1995 243 SCRA 32

Facts: Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986

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alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.

Ruling: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

9. RA 9262 – Law on Violation against Women and their Children; Support; Art. 213 FC

Go Tan v. Tan

GR# 168852 / SEPT. 30, 2008 567 SCRA 231

Facts: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of R.A No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. The RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismiss because RA 9262 does not cover parents-in-law.

Ruling: Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats

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deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Ang v. CA/ Sagud

GR# 182835 / APR. 20, 2010

Facts: Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became ―on-and-off‖ sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish‘s face superimposed on the figure. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: ―Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.‖ Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender‘s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone.

Issue: Whether or not a ―dating relationship‖ existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;

Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

Ruling: -"Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster‘s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her." But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple‘s relationship, i.e., "a love affair.

-Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. The Court laid down the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.