PRELIMINA RY CONSIDERA T IONS
T A ÑA DA V S. T UV ERA
G.R. No. L-63915. A pr il 24, 1985 Doctr in e:
Th e publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applica bility " is a r equirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must fir st be officia lly a n d specifica lly in for m ed of its con ten ts.
Fa cts:
Th e petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instruction s, g eneral orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administr a tiv e or der s.
Th e respondents contend that the publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for the effectivity of the laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to th e da te th a t th ey are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity ba sed on A r ticle 2 of th e Civ il Code.
Th e interpretation of the respondent is in accord with the Court‘s construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, the Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in ca ses where the legislation itself does not provide for a n effectiv ity da te - for th e da te of pu blication is material in determining its date of effectivity which is the 15th da y follow in g its pu blication - but not when the law itself pr ov ides for th e da te w h en it g oes in to effect. Issu e:
W h ether there is still a need for publication of the presidential decrees with specified da tes of effectiv ity .
Held:
Yes, there is still a need for publication. A r ticle 2 does n ot pr eclu de th e r e qu ir em en t of pu blication in the Officila Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectiv ity . Section 1 of CA 6 3 8 pr ov ides th a t:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1 ] all important legislativ e a cts a n d r esolutions of a public nature of the, Con g r ess of th e Ph ilippin es; [2 ] a ll ex ecu tiv e a n d a dm inistrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no g en er a l a pplica bility ; [3 ] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of A ppea ls a s m a y be deem ed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have genera l a pplica bility a n d leg a l effect, or w h ich h e m a y a u th or ize so to be pu blish ed. Th e clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the v arious laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and pu blication, there would be no basis for the application of the ma x im "ig n or a n tia leg is n on ex cusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherw ise bu r den a citizen for th e transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever , n ot ev en a con str u ctiv e on e. Th e very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be publish ed in th e Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon r esp on den t officia ls a n im perative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitu tion a l r ig h t of th e people to be in formed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Su ch listin g , to ou r m in d, lea v es r espondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded fr om su ch pu blica tion .
Th e publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applica bility " is m andated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or pena lties for their violation or otherwise impose a bur den or th e people, su ch a s ta x a n d r ev en u e m easures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particu la r per sons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on th e a ssu m ption th a t th ey h a v e been cir cu la r ized to a ll con cer n ed.
It is n eedless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a pu blic n a tu r e" or "of g eneral applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must fir st be officia lly a n d specifica lly in for m ed of its con ten ts. Th e Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which ha v e n ot been pu blish ed, sh a ll h a v e n o for ce a n d effect.
T A ÑA DA V S. T UV ERA
G.R. No. L-63915 Decem ber 29, 1986 Fa cts:
1 . In the first Tanada case the petitioners were invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as r equ ir ed by law, which is Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The government a r g u ed th a t w h ile pu blica tion w a s n ecessary as a rule, it was not so when it wa s "oth er w ise pr ov ided," a s w h en th e decr ees th emselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approv al. In th e decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for th e pu blica tion of som e of th ese decr ees, decl a r in g in th e dispositiv e por tion a s follow s:
W HEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to pu blish in th e Officia l Ga zette a ll u npublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so pu blish ed, th ey sh a ll h a v e n o bin din g for ce a n d effect.
2 . Petitioners are now moving for a reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned decision. Issu e: 1. Whether or not the clause ―UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED‖ solely r efer s to th e fifteen -da y per iod a n d n ot to th e r equ ir em en t of pu blica tion .
2 . Whether or not the word ―LAWS‖ refer to all laws or only to those of g en er a l a pplica tion . 3 . W h er e sh ou ld pu blica tion of sa id la w s be m a de?
Held:
1 . The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" r efers to the date of effectiv ity a n d n ot to th e r equirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be om itted. Th is cla u se does n ot m ean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other da te, w ith ou t its pr ev iou s pu blica tion .
Pu blication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide th a t th e usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed ou t by th e pr esent Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Ga zette bu t "on e y ear after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. " It is n ot correct to say that under the disputed clau se pu blica tion m a y be dispen sed w ith a ltogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would den y th e public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern th e leg isl a tu r e cou ld v a lidly pr ov ide that a law be effective immediately upon its approva l n otw ith sta n din g th e la ck of
pu blication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication ), it is n ot u n likely th a t per sons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so n ot beca u se of a fa ilu r e to com ply w ith bu t sim ply beca u se th ey did n ot kn ow of its ex isten ce. It m ust be noted at this point the conclusive presumption that ever y per son kn ow s th e la w , w hich of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to hav e a n y legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rig h ts r ecognizes "the right of the people to information on m a tter s of pu blic con cer n ," a n d th is certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the leg isla tiv e en a ctm en ts of th e g ov er n m en t.
2 . The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to th ose of g en er a l a pplica tion , for str ictly speaking all laws relate to the people in g eneral albeit there are some that do not apply to th em dir ectly .
Thus, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be publish ed a s a con dition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differ en t effect iv ity da te is fix ed by th e leg isla tu r e. Cov er ed by th is r u le a r e:
a . Presidential decrees and executive orders prom ulgated by the President in the exercise of leg islative powers whenever th e sa m e a r e v alidly delegated by th e leg isla tu r e or , a t pr esen t, dir ectly con fer r ed by th e Con stitu tion ;
b. A dministrative rules and regulations, if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing la w pu r su a n t a lso to a v a lid deleg a tion ;
c. Ch a r ter of a city ;
d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if meant to ―fill in the deta ils‖ of th e Cen tr a l Ba n k A ct w h ich th a t body is su pposed to en for ce.
How ev er , n o pu blica tion is r equ ir ed for th e follow in g :
a . Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the per sonnel of the a dm in istr a tiv e a g en cy a n d n ot th e pu blic;
b. Letters of instructions issued by administrative su per ior s con cer n in g th e r u les or g u idelines to be followed by their subordina tes in th e per for m a n ce of th eir du ties; c. Mun icipa l or din a n ces, w h ich a r e cov er e d by th e Loca l Gov er n m en t Code. 3 . Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of th e contents of the laws, and publication is to be made in the Official Gazette as decided upon in th e fir st Ta n a da ca se, h ow ev er , th e Cou r t m a de th is pr on ou n cem en t: Th ere is much to be said of the view that the publication n eed n ot be m a de in th e Officia l Ga zette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Un dou btedly , n ewspapers of g eneral circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to th e people a s such periodicals are more easily available, hav e a w ider r eadership, and come out regularly. Th e trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one requ ir ed or a u t h or ized by ex isting law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it ex ists. If it does, it obv iou sly h a s n ot y et been pu blish ed.
A t any rate, the Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to th e leg isla tu r e. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and appr ov ed by th e politica l departments of the government in accordance w ith th e pr escr ibed pr ocedu r e.
Con sequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of th e Civ il Code, th e pu blication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requiremen t for
th eir effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period pr ov ided by th e leg isla tu r e.
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT a n d SERV ICES CORPORA T ION v T HE HON. SECRET A RY OF LA BOR A ND EMPLOYMENT , V IV ENCIO DE MESA , RODRIGO MIKIN a n d CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144. A pr il 4, 2001 Doctr in e:
A ll statutes, including those of local application and pr iv a te la w s, sh a ll be pu blish ed a s a con dition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differ en t effectiv ity da te is fix ed by th e leg isla tu r e.
Cov ered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the Presiden t in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, a t present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implemen t ex istin g la w pu r su a n t to a v a lid deleg a tion .
In terpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, th a t is, r eg u la tin g on ly th e per sonnel of the administrative agency and the pu blic, n eed n ot be pu blish ed. Neith er is pu blication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superior s con cerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in th e per for m a n ce of th eir du ties
Fa cts:
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic cor por a tion en gaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in Janu a r y 1 9 8 5 , pr ivate respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi A r a bia , w er e r equired to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private responden t Rodr ig o L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Ley son . A fter the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Ar a bia on January 29, 1 985. They then began work for Al-Heja ila n Con su lta n ts A /E, th e for eig n pr in cipa l of petition er .
W h ile in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a secon d con tr a ct on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the r eduction of som e of their benefits and privileges. On April 1, 1985 , th eir for eig n em ploy er a llegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 6 0 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. W h en th ey r efused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were term in a ted by A l -Heja ila n a n d th ey w er e r epa tr ia ted to th e Ph ilippin es.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa th e r eturn of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired por tion of th eir contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA a g a in st petition er Ph ilsa a n d its for eig n pr in cipa l, A l -Heja ila n .
Sev eral hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer. On the aspects of th e ca se inv olving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, th e POEA r en der ed a decision da ted A u g u st 3 1 , 1 9 8 8 , or der in g r espon den t PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay complainants, join tly a n d severally with its principal Al – Hejailan. Almost simultaneous with the pr om u lg a tion of A ugust 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respon den ts m on ey cla im , POEA issu ed separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment v iola tion a spect of pr iv a te r espondents‘ complaint. In this order, POEA found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal
ex action, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of w ith h oldin g or u n la w fu l dedu ction fr om sa la r ies of w or ker s.
Fr om the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration wh ich w a s su bsequ en tly den ied. After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of La bor and Em ployment. However, public respondent Secretary of La bor a n d Em ploy m en t a ffirmed en toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration bu t th is w a s likew ise den ied. Hen ce, th e in sta n t Petition for Cer tior a r i.
Petitioner insists, however , th a t it ca n n ot be h eld lia b le for illeg a l ex a ction a s POEA Mem orandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1 983, which enumerated the allowable fees which m a y be collected fr om a pplica n ts, is v oid for la ck of pu blica tion .
Issu e:
W h ether or not POEA Memorandu m Cir cu la r No. 1 1 Ser ies of 1 9 8 3 is v oid for la ck of pu blica tion ?
Held:
Yes, th e sa id m em or a n du m cir cu la r is v oid for la ck of pu blica tion . In Ta ñ a da v s. Tu v er a , th e Cou r t h eld, a s follow s:
"W e h old therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be pu blished as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen day s a fter pu blica tion u n less a differ en t effectiv ity da te is fix ed by th e leg isla tu r e.
Cov ered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the Presiden t in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, a t present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implemen t ex istin g la w pu r su a n t to a v a lid deleg a tion .
In terpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, th a t is, r eg u la tin g on ly th e per sonnel of the administrative agency and the pu blic, n eed n ot be pu blish ed. Neith er is pu blication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superior s con cerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in th e per for m a n ce of th eir du ties."
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1 983 must likewise be declared ineffective a s th e sam e was never published or filed w ith th e Na tion a l A dm in istr a tiv e Reg ister . POEA Mem orandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private em ployment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, th e maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipin o ov er sea s w or ker s is P2 ,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 3 2 of th e La bor Code.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is on e of th ose issu a n ces w hich should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and im plem en t a n ex isting law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circula r No. 2 , Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, th e sa m e is in effectiv e a n d m a y n ot be en for ced.
Th e Office of the Solicitor General argues however th a t th e im position of a dm in istr a tiv e sa nctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 a n d A r ticle 3 4 (a ) 2 8 of th e La bor Code.
Th e argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of th e POEA a n d Secr eta r y of La bor a n d Em ployment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of A dm inistrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the im position of administra tiv e sa nctions against petitioner. Furthermore, ev en assuming that petitioner was held liable u n der
th e said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes th e pr om ulgation of a valid schedule of fees by th e Depa r tm en t of La bor a n d Em ploy m en t . Con sidering that, as, previously discussed, Administra tiv e Cir cu la r No. 2 , Ser ies of 1 9 8 3 em bodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of th e a dm in istr a tiv e sa n ction s a g a in st petition er
Th e Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circula r is n ot among those requiring publication contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuver a a s it is a ddr essed on ly to a specific g r ou p of per son s a n d n ot to th e g en er a l pu blic.
A gain, there is no merit in this argument. The fact that the said circular is addr essed on ly to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away fr om the ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. A ssocia tion of Ser v ice Ex porters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an ev en sm aller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies en g a g ed in th e r ecr u itm en t of w orkers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, th e sa id cir cu la r s m a y n ot be en for ced or im plem en ted.
Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Admin istr a tiv e r u les a n d r egulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursua n t to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in n ature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors con cer n in g th e rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. A dm inistrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fa ll u n der a n y of th ese ex ception s.
Un cia n o Pa r a m edica l College c CA G.R. No. 100335; A pr il 7, 1993 Doctr in e:
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is ov erruled and a different view is adopted, th e new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on th e old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction w a s issu ed by th e tr ia l cou r t w ith g r a v e a bu se of discr etion .
Fa cts:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their m oth er s, V ictoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Reg ion a l Tr ia l Cou r t, Na tional Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with pr a y er for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, In c., Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dom inador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana V itu g , th ey a lleg ed th er ein th a t:
On July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition proposing to the school authorities th e organization of a student council in the school. They solicited support of their petition fr om th e studentry by asking the students to endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to g et a t lea st 1 8 0 sig n a tu r es.
On August 18, 1 989, the students w er e su m m on ed to th e Office of Dr . Mor a l a n d w er e a dm onished not to proceed with the proposal because, according to h er , th e sch ool does n ot a llow a n d h a d n ev er a llow ed su ch a n or g a n iza tion .
On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see th e Dea n of Nu r sin g , th e a bove-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they w ou ld be barred from enrollment for the second semester because the sch ool does n ot a llow th eir students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable Dism issa l.
On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them tha t th ey w ere no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the Nation a l Un ion of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officer s of th e student organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students asked for pr oof of th ese a ccu sa tion s bu t w er e n ot g iv en a n y .
On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally refused to a llow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to the school officia ls to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wr ote to th e sch ool officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll . Dr. Moral informed them th a t th e Boa r d of Tr u stees w ill h a v e to decide on th ese r equ ests.
On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Tr u stees h a d r efu sed to g r a n t th e pa r en ts' r equ est."
Th e trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petition er sch ool from not enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and setting the h ea r in g for th e issu a n ce of th e w r it of pr elim in a r y in ju n ction on Ju n e 4 , 1 9 9 0. Petitioners filed an opposition but the RTC still ordered the sch ool to a llow th e stu den ts to en r oll.
Th e Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and based its the ruling in the recent ca se of A r iel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, , May 20, 1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned a n d ov er r u led its decision in A lcu a z a n d decla r ed th u s:
― The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued w ith pu blic interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all education a l in stitu tion s. W h en a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrollin g for th e en tir e sch ool y ea r 'Ev ery student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific r equirement and reasonable regulation : Pr ov ided, th a t ex cept in th e ca se of a ca dem ic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for en rollment for the entire period he is expected to his complete his course without pr eju dice to h is r ig h t to tr a n sfer .'
Hen ce th e in sta n t a ppea l.
Issu e: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be applied retroactively to govern and invalidate the legal effects of the incidents that took place prior to its adoption and which incidents were proper and v alid under th e A LCUA Z doctr in e pr ev a ilin g a t th e tim e sa id in ciden t took pla ce. Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to the instant case. Under the then prevailin g A lcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and priva te r espondents was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1 989-1 990. A lthough said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was pr om ulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the con tr a ct betw een th em had long becom e fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doctr in e of th is Cou r t is ov erruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and sh ou ld n ot apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Thus, the w r it of pr eliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion. Th e ruling in the Non case should not be g iven a retroactive effect to cases that arose befor e its pr om ulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on Apr il 1 6 , 1 9 9 0. If it w er e oth erwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situa ted w h o r elied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 19 8 8 , w h ich r ecog n ized th e ter m in a tion of con tr a ct th eor y .
Th e contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the fir st sem ester of sch ool year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petition er s to a llow private respondents "to enroll for the first semester of school yea r 1 9 9 0 -1 1 9 0." 1 6 Gu ided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but w ill g o a step ba ckward, then restore the condition preceding the status qu o. Pr iv a te r espon den ts do n ot possess any clear legal right to reenroll, corollarily, petitioners are not oblig ed leg a lly to r e -a dm it th em .
Cu i v A r ella n o Un iv er sit y G.R. No. L-15127; Ma y 30, 1961 Fa cts:
Pla intiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant university from the school y ea r 1 9 4 8 -1 949. He finished his law studies in the defendant university u p to a n d in clu din g th e fir st sem ester of the fourth year. During all the time he was studying law in the defendant university , h e was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees w er e r eturned to him after the end of each semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to h im . The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by th e la tter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the colleg e of law or the fourth year, is in total of P1 ,033.87. However, before defendant awarded to plaintiff th e scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant a n d a greement which provides that in consideration of the sch ola r sh ip g r a n ted to h im by th e Un iversity, he waives his right to transfer to another school without h a v in g r efu n ded to th e Un iv er sity (defen da n t) th e equ iv a len t of h is sch ola r sh ip ca sh .
For the last semester of his law studies, plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad Santos Un iversity and graduated therefrom. After gra du a tin g in la w h e a pplied t o ta ke th e ba r ex amination. Plaintiff then petitioned the defendant univer sity to issu e to h im th e n eeded transcripts. However, the defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1 ,033 8 7 w h ic h defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examina tion w ith ou t th ose transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum w h ich pla in tiff seeks to r ecov er fr om defen da n t in th is ca se.
Issu e: W h eth er or n ot th e sa id pr ov ision of th e con tr a ct is v a lid.
Held: No, the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. Th e pr actice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep th em in sch ool is n ot a g ood cu stom nor has it received som e kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private in stitutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippin es w h ich im plem en ts Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free sch ola r sh ips to g ifted children, does not require schola r s to r eim bu r se th e cor r espon din g v a lu e of th e sch olarships if they transfer to other schools. The same goes for leading colleges and universities of th e United States after which our educational practices or policies ar e pa tter n ed. In th ese in stitutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant studen ts in sch ool for th eir propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted studen ts in w h om society h a s a n esta blish ed in ter est or a fir st lien .
People v s Ja bin a l 55 SCRA 607 Fa cts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a r ev olv er w ith ou t th e r equisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret A g en t fr om th e Pr ov in cia l Gov er n or of Ba tangas and as Confidential Agent fr om th e PC Pr ov in cia l Com m a n der , a n d th e sa id a ppointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the said fir ea r m . Th e accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquitta l on th e basis of the Supreme Court‘s decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucer o. Th e trial court found the accused crimin a lly lia ble for illeg a l possession of fir ea r m a n d a mmunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed a n d a ba n don ed in People v s. Ma pa **.
Th e ca se w a s elev a ted to th e Su pr em e Cou r t. Issu e:
W h ether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court‘s ruling s in th e ca ses of Ma ca r a n da n g a n d of Lu cer o.
Held: Th e a ppella n t w a s a cqu itted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless ev iden ce of w hat the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of th e New Civ il Code pr ov ides th a t, ― Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form par t of th e legal sy stem.‖ The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of th e law as of the date the law was originally passed, since th e cou r t‘s con str u ction m er ely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that th e la w th u s con str u ed in ten ds to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a r esta tem en t of th e leg a l m axim ―legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet‖—the interpretation placed upon the written law by a com petent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Maca r a n da n g w as part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant w a s fou n d in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by th e tr ia l cou r t. It is tr u e th a t th e doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctr in e of th e Su pr em e Cou r t is ov erruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and sh ould not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on th e fa ith th er eof. Con sidering that the appellant possessed a firea r m pu r su a n t to th e pr ev a ilin g doctr in e en unciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to h is possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for a n a ct w h ich a t th e tim e it w a s don e w a s h eld n ot to be pu n ish a ble.
*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret a g en t th ey w ere deemed to be ―peace officers‖. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms withou t licen se.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that th ela w did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential agents are among those w h o a r e ex em pted fr om a cqu ir in g a licen se to ca r r y a fir ea r m .
V a n Dor n v s. Rom illio 139SCRA 139
Doctr in e:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 on ly Ph ilippine nationals are covered by the policy a g a in st a bsolu te div or ces th e sa m e bein g con sidered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens m a y obta in div orces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid accor din g to th eir n a tion a l la w
Fa cts:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. Th ey were married in Hongkong in 1972. A fter the marriage, they established their residence in th e Philippines. They begot two children born on Apr il 4 , 1 9 7 3 a n d Decem ber 1 8 , 1 9 7 5 , r espectively. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and petitioner h a s r e-m arried also in Nevada, this tie-me to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1 983, private respondent filed su it a gainst petitioner alleging the petitioner‘s business in Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is a con ju g a l pr operty of the parties and prayed that private respondent be declared with right to manage said pr operty. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground tha t th e ca u se of a ction is ba rred by previous judgement in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. Th e Cou r t below denied the motion to dismiss since the property involved is located in the Philippin es so that the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this ca se. Th e den ia l is n ow th e su bject of th is cer tior a r i pr oceedin g .
Issu e:
W h ether the foreign divorce on the parties has affected the alleged conju g a l pr oper ty in th e Ph ilippin es?
Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civ il Code, on ly Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divor ces th e sa m e bein g con sidered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens m a y obta in div orces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid accor din g to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent fr om th e m arriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolv es th e m a r r ia g e. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He w ould have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husba n d en titled to ex er cise con trol over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Cou r t, w h ich v alidly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right ov er the alleg ed con ju g a l pr oper ty .
To m aintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be con sider ed still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 , et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be oblig ed to liv e tog eth er w ith , observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The la tter sh ou ld n ot con tinue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal pr oper ty . Sh e sh ou ld n ot be discr im in a ted a g a in st in h er ow n cou n tr y if th e en ds of ju stice a r e to be ser v ed.
QUIT A v s. CA
Decem ber 22, 1998 G.R. No. 124862 Fa cts:
Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941, but n ot blessed with any children. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, USA, submittin g a s ev idence their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their con ju g a l pr operties. A decree of divorce was granted on July 23, 1 954. After 3 weeks, Fe m a r r ied Felix Tu paz in San Francisco, but eventually ended into a divorce. For the third tim e, sh e m a r r ied a g a in in USA .
A pril 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed w ith RTC QC a petition for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of th e Philippine Trust Company. Blandina Dandan, surviving spouse of Arturo, and their children opposed the petition. Later, Ruperto Padlan, claiming to be th e sole su r v iv in g br oth er of deceased Arturo, intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot the immediate declaration of h eir s of decea sed A r tu r o a n d distr ibu tion of h is esta te.
Th e trial court disregarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo, and expressed the view that their m a r r ia g e su bsisted u n til th e dea th of A r tu r o in 1 9 7 2 .
Issu es:
W h eth er or n ot Bla n din a ‘s m a r r ia g e to A r tu r o w a s v oid a b in itio.
W h eth er or n ot Fe ca n be decla r ed th e pr im a r y ben eficia r y of A r tu r o‘s esta te. Held:
No, Blandina‘s marriage to Arturo was valid, thus, Fe ca n n ot be decla r ed a ben eficia r y to A r tu r o‘s esta te.
A t the time Fe obtained a divorce decree against Arturo in San Francisco, she w a s a lr ea dy a n a lien and no longer a Filipino citizen. Hence, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines, sin ce it is con sider ed v a lid in Fe‘s n a tion a l la w , w h ich is th e USA la w .
CA T A LA N v s. BRA GA NZA
(Febr u a r y 6, 2007 G.R. No. 167109) Fa cts:
Felicitas Catalan married Orando on June 4 , 1 9 5 0. Th ey m ig r a ted to USA a n d beca m e n a tu r a lized citizen s th er eof. On A pr il 1 9 8 8 , th ey div or ced.
Ju ne 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Later , Felicita s filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC Dagupan against Orlando and Merope, conten din g that Merope has a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. RTC ruled in favor of Felicitas. Issu e:
W h ether Felicitas has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of Or la n do on th e g r ou n d of big a m y .
Held:
Th ere is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage under th e New Civil Code, which is the law governing at the time of marriage betw een Or la n do a n d Mer ope, nor even in the Family Code. however, only a party w h o ca n dem on str a te pr oper in terest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage mu st be pr osecu ted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and m u st be ba sed on a ca u se of a ction . In the instant case, Felicitas personality to file the petition to declare the n u llity of m a r r ia g e ca nnot be ascertained due to the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allow in g it. Thus, the case is remanded to trial court for reception of a ddition a l ev iden ce n ecessa r y .
SA N LUIS v s. SA N LUIS
(Febr u a r y 6, 2007 G.R. No. 133743) Fa cts:
Th e case involves the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. During his lifetim e, h e con tr a cted 3 m arriages. First was with Virginia, who predeceased him. On May 1 , 1968, Felicisim o m a r r ied Mer ry Lee Corwin, but ended to a divorce, when Merry filed a divorce complaint in Hawa ii a n d w as granted. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad. Felicisimo died on December 1 8 , 1 992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets a n d settlem en t of Felicisimo‘s estate. She filed with RTC Ma ka ti a petition for letter s of a dm in istr a tion . Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on th e g r ounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action, alleging that the petition should h ave been filed in the Province of Laguna where Felicisimo‘s pla ce of r esiden ce pr ior to h is death, and that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition beca u se sh e w a s on ly a m istr ess.
Issu e:
W h ether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarr y u n der th e Civ il Code, considering that Felicidad‘s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or befor e th e effectiv ity of th e Fa m ily Code.
Held:
Th e divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry , w ould have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spou se of Felicisimo. But there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce decree obtained by Merry, as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the la w s of USA . Pr esentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficien t, pr oof of its a u th en ticity a n d du e ex ecution must also be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or documen t m ay be proven as a public or official record of a for eig n cou n tr y by eith er (1 ) a n officia l pu blication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the documen t. If th e record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompan ied by a cer tifica te issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in th e foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by th e sea l of h is office. W ith regard to Felicidad‘s marriage to Felicisimo solem n ized in Ca lifor n ia USA , sh e on ly su bmitted photocopies of the Marriated Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of Ca lifornia. The Court, however, cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws a s th ey m u st be a lleg ed a n d pr ov ed.
Th erefore, this case was remanded to the trial court for further reception of ev iden ce on th e div or ce decr ee obta in ed by Mer r y a n d th e m a r r ia g e of Felicida d a n d Felicisim o.
A ZNA R V S. GA RCIA
(Ja n u a r y 31, 1963 7 SCRA 95) Fa cts:
CIF of Davao directed the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,6 00 pa id by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Ch r isten sen en titled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, a n d in ca se of dea th w ithout issue, ½ of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C Borton, etc, in accordance w ith the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. Helen Christensen Ga r cia filed an opposition, as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledg ed n a tu r a l ch ild, sh e h aving been declared by the Court as one. The court ruled that Edward E. Ch r isten sen w a s a citizen of the United States of America and of the State of California at the time of his death a n d h e w a s dom iciled in th e Ph ilippin es.
Issu e:
W h ether or not the Philippine Law shall govern the a dm in istr a tion of th e w ill of Edw a r d Ch r isten sen .
Held:
Th e Court ruled that the Philippine Law shall gov ern the testamentary di sposition of Edw a r d Ch r isten sen .
A rticle 1 6 of the Civil Code provides that the national law shall govern intestate and testamentary su ccessions. National law refers to the private law of the state of which the decedent is a citizen , in the case at bar, the private law of the State of California. Article 94 of the Civil Code of State of Ca lifornia refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the la w of h is dom icile, th e Ph ilippin es in th e ca se a t ba r .
BELLIS v s. BELLIS
(Ju n e 6, 1967 20 SCRA 358) Fa cts:
A m os Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, United States. He had 5 legitimate children w ith h is first wife, 3 legitimate children with hi second wife, and had 3 illeg itim a te ch ildr en . On A ugust 5, 1952, Amos Bellis executed a will in th e Ph ilippin es. Ju ly 8 , 1 9 5 8 , A m os died. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Pa lm a Bellis filed th eir r espectiv e oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children of Amos Bellis, and therefore, com pulsory heirs of the deceased. Under th e La w s of Tex a s, th er e a r e n o for ced h eir s of leg itim es.
Issu e: W h ich la w m u st a pply – Tex a s La w or Ph ilippin e La w ?
Held: The decedent‘s national law, which is the Texas law, governs the order of succession , th e a m ount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and the capacity to su cceed.
It is n ot disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile th er eof a t th e tim e of h is dea th .
A provision in a foreigner‘s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance w ith Philippine Law and not with his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those ma tter s th a t A r ticle 1 6 of th e Civ il Code sta tes sa id n a tion a l la w sh ou ld g ov er n .
Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights a r e to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine law on legitimes ca n n ot be a pplied to th e testa cy of A m os Bellis.
T EST A T E EST A T E OF BOHA NA N v s. BOHA NA N (Ja n u a r y 30, 1960 G.R. No. L-12105)
Fa cts:
On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O. Bohanan‘s last will and testamen t, ex ecu ted on A pril 23, 1944 in Manila, CFI found that the testator was born in Nebr a ska a n d a citizen of Ca lifornia, but temporarily stayed in the Philippines for a long period of time. At the time of h is death, he was a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada, and his will was executed
in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total estate of P211,639.33 in cash , th e testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and ½ of a ll sh a r es of stock of sev er a l m in in g com panies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children, he gave a leg a cy of on ly P6,000 each. Magdalena, his wife, a n d h er 2 ch ildr en opposed th e v a lidity of th e testamentary prov ision s con ten din g th a t th e w ill depr iv ed th em of th eir leg itim e. Ma g dalena alleged that the trial court erred in recognizing the Reno div or ce secu r ed by th e testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce should be declared a nullity in th is ju r isdiction .
A ccording to the laws of the State of Nevada, no right to share in the inherita n ce in fa v or of a div or ced w ife. Th e div or ce w a s g r a n ted to th e testa tor on Ma y 2 0, 1 9 2 2 . Issu e:
W h eth er Ph ilippin e la w s or th e la w of th e Sta te of Nev a da sh ou ld a pply . Held:
Th e testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil Code governs. The old Civ il Code pr ov ides th a t su ccessional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose su ccession is in qu estion .
Th e foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled Newada Laws, was introduced as eviden ce. That law can be taken judicial notice by the Court, without proof of such law having been offered a t th e h ea r in g of th e pr oject of pa r tition .
A ccording to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the validity of testa m en ta r y disposition s a r e g ov erned by the national law of the testator, and it has been decided without dispu te th a t th e n ational law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose of all h is pr oper ty a ccor din g to h is w ill.
LLORENT E v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS (Nov em ber 23, 2000 G. R. No. 124371) Fa cts:
Lor enzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from March 10, 1927 – Septermber 30, 1957 ) a n d Pa ula were married on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo wen t ba ck to the US while Paula stayed in the conjugal home at Camarines Sur. On Nov em ber 3 0, 1 943, Lorenzo was naturalized as an American citizen. He visited the Philippines and discovered th a t h is w ife, Pa u la w a s pr eg n a n t a n d w a s liv in g in w ith h is br oth er Cefer in o. On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California a n d w a s g r a n ted.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13, 1981, Lor enzo executed a notarized Last Will and Testament. On December 14, 1983, Loren zo filed a petition with the RTC for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament, movin g th a t A licia be appointed as Special Administratrix of his estate, but was denied because Lorenzo w a s still alive. On January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will to proba te. On Ju n e 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 , Lor enzo died. On September 4, 1 985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letter s of a dm inistration ov er Lorenzo‘s estate in her favor, contending that she was Lorenzo‘s surv iv in g spou se and that the testamentary provisions in Lorenzo‘s will encroached on her legitime and ½ sh a r e in th e con ju g a l pr oper ty .
Issu e:
Held:
For eign law should apply. Loren zo‘s div or ce decr ee w ith Pa u la is r ecog n ized a s v a lid. For eign laws must be alleged and proved. Our cour ts do n ot ta ke ju dicia l n otice of th em . Th e fact is Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from Pa ula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will; and 4) death. Issu es a r isin g fr om th ese in ciden ts a r e g ov er n ed by for eig n la w .
Both RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying Philippine la w a r e er r on eou s. Her e‘s w h y : A liens may obtain divorces abroad provided they are valid according to their national law. In this ca se, LORENZO‘s divorce from PAULA was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of com ity .
LORENZO‘s will is valid. Article 17 The forms and solemnities of contr a cts, w ills, a n d oth er pu blic instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are ex ecu ted. In th is case, whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answer ed by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The trial court should not tha t Congress did not intend to extend the same succession (system of legitime) to foreign nationals.
HUMA N RELA T IONS
A LFREDO M. V ELA YO v s. SHELL G.R. No. L-7817. Oct ober 31, 1956. FA CTS:
CA LI, a domestic airline corporation, met with its creditors to inform them that the corporation w as on the verge of insolvency and had to stop operations. To ensure payment of th eir cla im s a gainst CALI, the creditors agreed that it would be advantageous not to presen t su its a g a in st CA LI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets, although CALI announced that in ca se of n on-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file in solv en cy pr oceedings. Right after the meeting, defendant Shell Philippines, one of CALI‘s creditor s w h o w as present in the meeting and who agreed to the pro-rata division, a ssig n ed its cr edit to its sister company, Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with a California court an action for collection of th e assigned credit and applied for a writ of attachment again st CA LI‘s Dou g la s C -5 4 pla n e w hich was in California. Prior to the meeting with creditors, CALI had already offered the pla n e to Shell Philippine but the offer was rejected. Velayo, as assignee of the other creditors of CA LI, filed this action for damages against defendant Shell Philippines. He claims that that fraudulen t a ssignment of Shell Philippines‘ credit to Shall USA prejudiced th e oth er cr editor s a n d w a s con tr a r y to th e a g r eed pr o-r a ta div ision of a ssets.
ISSUE:
W ON Shell Philippines, taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI's airplane in th e US, acted in bad faith in assigning its credit to its sister company effectively defea tin g th e a g r eed pr o-r a ta div ision of a ssets a m on g th e cr editor s of CA LI.
HELD:
PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS INTENDED AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR A NY W RONG FOR W HICH NO SPECIFIC REMEDY IS PROV IDED FOR BY LA W .
Defendant schemed and effected the transfer to its sister corporation in the United States, where CA LI's plane C- 54 was. By that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of sa id
in solvent's property depriving the latter and the Assignee tha t w a s la tter a ppoin ted, of th e oppor tu n ity to r ecov er sa id pla n e.
Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides th e follow in g :
"A r t 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, a ct w ith ju stice, g iv e ev er y on e h is du e a n d obser v e h on esty a n d g ood fa ith ". It m aybe said that this article only contains a mere declaration of prin ciples a n d w h ile su ch statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is im plem en ted by A r ticle 2 1 a n d sequ en ce of th e sa m e Ch a pter w h ich pr escr ibe th e follow in g : "A r t. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary t o m orals, good customs or pu blic policy sh a ll com pen sa te th e la tter for th e da m a g e". A nother rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired 'without just or legal grounds'. This provision em bodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly en r ich h im self at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal sy stem for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in th e Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit h im self to the prejudice of another. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to pr ov ide th a t:
"Ev en if an act or event causing damage to another's pr oper ty w a s n ot du e to th e fa u lt or n egligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event h e w as benefited." with much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for a cts it com m itted in ba d fa ith a n d w ith betr a y a l of con fiden ce.
A lben son En t er pr ises Cor por a t ion v s. Cou r t of A ppea ls G.R. No. 88694 Ja n u a r y 11, 1993
FA CTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. Mapa St. Sta.Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. As part payment, Albenson was given a check drawn against th e account of E.L. Woodworks. However, when the check was presented for pay m en t, it w a s dishonored because of lack of funds. This led Albenson to trace the origin. Th is led th em to a certain Eugenio Baltao. They made afterwards an extrajudicial demand to priva te r espon den t Ba ltao. But he denied that he signed on the check because Guaranteed Industries w a s a lr ea dy in existent. This led Albenson to file a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22. However, it w a s la ter found out that his namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, his son, was the one who m a n a g es E.L. W oodworks located on the ground floor of the Baltao Building. Nevertheless, A ssista n t Fisca l Sum away filed the information. But Prov incial Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to dismiss th e information. Because of the unjust filing of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a com pla in t for damages against Albenson Enterprises. The trial court ruled in favor of Baltao. The Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffir m ed th e decision of th e low er cou r t.
ISSUE:
W h ether or not the filing of the criminal complaint by Albenson En ter pr ises con stitu ted a n a bu se of r ig h t?
RULING:
Th e Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, the following are the r equisites for abuse of right: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith ; (3 ) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for a ll other prov isions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Article 2 1
dea ls with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act w h ich is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is don e with intent to injure. A closer look at the said articles and it can be revealed that Articles 19 a n d 21 share a common element: that the act is intentional. A r ticle 2 0, h ow ev er , does n ot distinguish. It is dependent on the circumstances of the case. By applying th ese to th e ca se a t h and, it cannot be said that Albenson Enterprises was abusing the righ ts of Ba lta o. Th e tr ia l court and the appellate court made a mistake of lumping the three articles a n d u sed th em a s ba ses for the award of damages in a civil com plaint filed against the petitioners. A lben son w a s pr om pted by its natural instinct and right to file a criminal com plaint because it was not a ble to collect the payment of the mild steel plates it had delivered. It had every right to exhaust all legal r em edies to collect its u n pa id cr ed it.
GLOBE MA CKAY CABLE AND RA DIO CORPORA T ION V . COURT OF A PPEA LS GR No. 81262, A u gu st 25, 1983
FA CTS:
Pr ivate respondent Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay in a dual capacity a s a pu r ch a sin g a g ent and administrative assistant. Petitioner discov er ed fictitiou s pu r ch a ses a n d oth er fr audulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Tobias was im plicated as the n umber one suspect. Police investigation s w er e con du cted a s a r esu lt of sa id a n om a ly . Th e police reports exculpated Tobias from any pa r ticipa tion in th e offen se. Un sa tisfied , petitioner still hired private investigators. Pending the investigation of the priva te detectiv es, petition er filed a com pla in t for esta fa a g a in st Tobia s.
La ter, Tobias was terminated. Hence, he filed an action for illega l dism issa l. W h ile h is ca se a waits resolution, he sought employment with RETELCO. However, petitioner, with ou t bein g a sked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter sta tin g th a t Tobia s w a s dism issed du e to dish on esty .
Thus, Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious and abusiv e a cts of petition er .
ISSUE:
W h et h er or n ot petition er sh ou ld in dem n ify pr iv a te r espon den t for da m a g es. HELD:
A rticle 1 9 of the Civil Code known to contain what is commonly referred to as th e pr in ciple of a buse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exe r cise of on e's r ights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with ju stice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. Violation of Ar ticle 1 9 ca n r esu lt to r ig h t to da m a g es pu r su a n t to A r ticle 2 1 or A r ticle 2 2 .
Th is article was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, w h ich lea v e so m a n y v ictims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered materia l a n d m or a l in ju r y .
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were m er ely ex er cisin g th eir leg a l r ig h t to dism iss pr iv a te r espon den t.
Nev ertheless, the Court, after examining the record and circumstances of th e ca se r u led th a t petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent. Notwithstanding the fact that it was private responden t Tobia s w h o r epor ted th e possible ex istence of anom alous transactions, petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and told pla in tiff that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communica te
w ith the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to petitioner Hendr y . Th e h igh-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly u n c a lled for . A n d th is r eprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to w or k a fter his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry wh o sa id. "Tobby , y ou a r e th e cr ook a n d sw in dler in th is com pa n y ."
Th e imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Th e Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an em ploy ee sh ou ld n ot be con fused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flow in g th er efr om . Th er efor e, petition er s a r e lia ble for da m a g es.
BA RONS MA RKET ING V S COURT OF A PPEA LS GR NO 126486, Febr u a r y 9, 1998
FA CTS
Pr ivate respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil. Appointed petitioner Barons Marketing Cor p a s on e of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such, petitioner was given by private respondent 6 0 day s credit for its purchases reckoned from the date of delivery. During the per iod Decem ber 1 986 to August 1987, defendant purchased on credit from plaintiff various electrical w ir es a n d ca bles in the total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this amount, P3 00,000 w a s pa id lea v in g a ba lance of P3,802,748.2. Respondent wrote petitioner dema n din g pa y m en t of its u n pa id obligation. In response, petitioner requests to pay the amount in m on th ly in sta llm en ts of P5 00,000 plus 1% interest. Said offer was rejected by r espon den t. Th er ea fter , pr iv a te r espondent filed a com plain t befor e th e Pa sig RTC a g a in st petition er for r ecov er y of P3 ,802,748.2, including interest with 25% attorney‘s fees, exemplary damages of P1 00,000 a n d cost of litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted the purchase made but disputed the amount. Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim on the ground of abuse of rights since it su ffer ed in ju r y to its r epu ta tion .
Th e trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, which decision was affirmed by th e Cou r t of A ppea ls.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is guilty of a bu se of r ig h ts or w h eth er pr iv a te r espondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected petitioner‘s offer and filed th e a ction for collection .
HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in jurisdiction that good faith is pr esu m ed a n d th a t th e burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner h a s fa iled to pr ov e ba d fa ith on th e pa r t of pr iv a te r espon den t.
Pr ivate respondent was driven by legitima te r ea son s for r ejectin g petition er ‘s offer a n d in stituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private responden t. Th e corporation had its own ―cash position to protect in order to pa y its ow n oblig a tion s‖ . Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially profit-or ien ted on e like private respondent. It is plain to see that this is a case of an exercise of rights, not an a bu se th ereof. As such, private respondent has not acted in a m a n n er con tr a r y to m or a ls, g ood cu stom s or pu blic policy a s to v iola te A r ticle 2 1 of th e Civ il Code.
MWSS v s. A ct T h ea t er
G.R. No. 147076 Ju n e 17, 2004 FA CTS:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., n a m ely , Rodolfo Ta bian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of th e Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 4 01 , a s amended by B.P. Blg. 876. On account of the inciden t, th e r espon den t‘s w a ter ser v ice connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complain t for in ju n ction w ith da m a g es a g a in st th e petition er MW SS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed w ith th e cou r t a qu o th a t th e petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondent‘s w a ter service connection without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of th e respondent‘s patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adver sely a ffected. Th e r espon den t pr a y ed th a t th e petition er be dir ected to pa y da m a g es.
Th e petitioner insists that in cutting off the respondent‘s water service connection, the petitioner m erely exercised its proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code, which prov ides that the ow ner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposa l th er eof.
ISSUE:
W h ether or not the petitioner validly exercised its right under Article 4 2 9 of th e Civ il Code. HELD:
No, the petitioner did not validly exercise its right under Article 429 of the Civil Code. A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decision a l la w , or r ecognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable cla im of on e per son a gainst the other. Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any per son fr om th e en joyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is n ot w ith ou t lim ita tion s. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. W h en a right is exercised in a manner, which discards these nor m s r esu ltin g in da m a g e to a n other, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In th is ca se, th e petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petition er u n cer em on iou sly cu t off th e r espon den t‘s w a ter ser v ice con n ection .
Ca r pio v s. V a lm on t e
G.R. No. 151866, Sept em ber 9, 2004 FA CTS:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario an d Jon Sier r a en gaged her services for their church wedding. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to th e Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. W h en sh e a r r iv ed, sev er a l per sons were already there. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of th e br ide w h o w a s pr epa r in g to dr ess u p for th e occa sion .
A fter reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite. Sh e pr oceeded to th e Ma y n ila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowa n ce to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed th e people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered th e follow in g w or ds to V almonte: "Ikaw lang ang lum abas ng kw arto, nasaan ang dala m ong bag? Saan ka pum unta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered on e of th e ladies to search Valmonte‘s bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to a tten d
to h er duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort r oom in a pa per ba g w er e lost.
Th e bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was a llegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the even in g . La ter, police officers arrived and interviewed all per son s w h o h a d a ccess to th e su ite a n d fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by th e police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang a n g lu m a ba s n g kw a r to." V almonte‘s car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded n oth in g .
A fter a futile attempt for a formal apology, Valmonte filed a suit for damag es a g a in st Ca r pio. Th e trial court rendered dismissed Valmonte‘s complaint for da m a g es. It r u led th a t w h en petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercisin g h er r ig h t a n d if damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it is dam num absque injuria. Th e CA reversed, holding that petitioner‘s verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with m a lice a n d in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioner‘s suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valm on te to a n a w a r d of m or a l da m a g es for sh e w a s pu blicly h u m ilia ted, deeply in su lted, a n d em ba r r a ssed. ISSUE:
Sh ou ld V a lm on te be en titled to Da m a g es? HELD:
Yes. The victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently , is n ot left w ithout any remedy or recourse to obtain r elief for th e da m a g e or in ju r y h e su sta in ed. In corporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts w hich are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good con scien ce a n d which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under A r ticle 1 9 of th e Civ il Code. It pr ov ides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the perform ance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." On e is n ot a llowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if h e w ou ld th er eby offen d m or a ls or g ood cu stom s.
In the case at bar, petitioner‘s verbal reproach against respondent was certa in ly u n ca lled for con sidering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind a n d a m ou n t of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with h er in nuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory . By open ly a ccu sin g r espondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of th e jew elr y in th e pr esence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be im m edia tely bodily sea r ch ed, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to a scer ta in th e identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the on e who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by a n y sta n da r d or pr in ciple of la w is im permissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to r espon den t in a m a n n er w h ich is con trary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to fin d h er m issin g jew elr y ca nnot justify her acts toward respondent. She did n ot a ct w ith ju stice a n d g ood fa ith for a pparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petition er transgressed the prov isions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which sh e sh ou ld be h eld a ccou n ta ble.
