Repu blic v s CA a n d Zen a ida Bobiles G.R. No. 9 2 3 2 6 Ja n u a r y 2 4 , 1 9 9 2 Fa cts:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Con da t, th en six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, befor e th e Reg ion a l Tr ia l Cou r t.
Th e trial court rendered the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be fr eed fr om a ll leg a l obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural pa r en ts, a n d be, to a ll in tents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of th e ch ild be ch a n g ed to "Bobiles" w h ich is th e su r n a m e of th e petition er .
Th e petition for adoption was filed by private r espon den t Zen a ida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1 988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth W elfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on a ppeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on A ugust 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband a n d w ife i s m a n da tor y . On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for a doption sh ou ld be dism issed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husba n d, in v iolation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires join t a doption by th e spou ses. It
a rgues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as th e latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for a doption .
Issu e: Ca n the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for a doption filed by Zenaida Bobiles and granting that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, should the CA h ave modified the trial court‘s decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respon den t on ly , h er h u sba n d n ot bein g a petition er ?
Held:
A rticle 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relev a n t pr ov isions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retr ospectiv e a pplica tion w ill not pr ejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or oth er la w s.
A v ested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon ev ents foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after th e r ig h t h a s v ested.
Un der the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for a doption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition , sh e was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing th er eof, h er right to file such petition alone and to have the same pr oceed to fin a l a dju dica tion , i n a ccordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and can n ot be pr eju diced or im pa ir ed by th e en a ctm en t of a n ew la w .
W h en private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceedin g , th e tr ia l cou r t a cqu ir ed ju risdiction there ov er in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction bein g a m a tter of su bstantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is deter m in ed by th e sta tu te in for ce a t th e tim e of th e com m en cem en t of th e a ction .
A lthough Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for a doption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent attached to the petition and expressly made an in tegral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. Th ose declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficien t to m a ke h im a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtainin g , a n d by r ea son of h is for eig n r esidence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that a n a ffida v it of con sen t on h is pa r t su fficed to make him a party to the petition. This is eviden t fr om th e tex t of h is a ffida v it . Pu nctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements sh ou ld y ield to a n d be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of a n in n ocen t ch ild m ust not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on t h e for m of plea din g s.
Her bert Cang vs. CA and Spouses Ron a ld Cla v a n o a n d Ma r ia Cla r a Cla v a n o G.R. No. 1 05 3 08 Septem ber 2 5 , 1 9 9 8
Fa cts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on Janua r y 2 7 , 1 973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1 9 7 7 , a n d Joseph A n th on y , bor n on Ja n u a r y 3 , 1 9 8 1 .
Du r ing the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's r ela tion sh ip w a s u n distu r bed.
However, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with W ilm a Soco, a fam ily friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Ma r ie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite w ith th e th en Ju v en ile a n d Dom estic Relations Court which rendered a decision approving the joint manifesta tion of th e Ca ng spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or fr om bed a n d boa r d.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before th e Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decr ee th a t a lso granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation a t all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and n ev er r em a r r ied.
W h ile in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P1 8,000.00 to P2 0,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted to th e Ph ilippin es for h is ch ildr en 's ex pen ses a n d a n oth er , deposited in th e ba n k in th e n a m e of h is ch ildr en . Mea nwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavan o a n d Ma r ia Cla r a Dia go Clavano, respectively the br oth er a n d sister -in -la w of A n n a Ma r ie, filed Specia l Pr oceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Cou r t.
Th e petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consen t to h is a doption . A nna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "ev aded his lega l obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V . Cla v a n o, h a d been helping her in taking care of the children; that beca u se sh e w ou ld be g oin g to th e Un ited States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and would n aturally hamper her job-seeking venture abroad; and that her husband had long for feited h is pa r en ta l r ig h ts ov er th e ch ildr en .
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippin es a n d filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald a n d Ma r ia Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his fina n ces w er e "too m eager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow a n y body to str ip h im of h is pa r en ta l a u th or ity ov er h is belov ed ch ildr en ."
Pen ding resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody ov er h is ch ildren alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of th eir children to private respondents. The Regional Trial Court issued an order finding that Anna Ma r ie had, in effect, relinquished custody ov er the children and, therefore, such custody sh ou ld be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver cu stody ov er th e m in or s to petition er .
Issu e:
Ca n minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural paren t on th e g r ou n d th a t th e la tter h a s a ba n don ed th em ?
Held:
It is ev ident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natura l pa rent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity . Th e w r itten con sen t of th e n atural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption . Nev er th eless, th e r equirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned th e ch ildor that such parent is ―insane or hopelessly intemperate.‖ The court may acquire juri sdiction ov er th e case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that th e petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance th er ew ith . However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent th er eto w as not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a pr oper issu e for determination.The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issu e that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural fath er to pr ov e to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his ch ild m a y th e petition for a doption be considered on its merits. In its ordinary sense, the word ―abandon‖ means to forsake en tirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the a ct of abandonment imports ―any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego a ll parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.‖ It means ―neglect or refusal to per form the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.‖
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct did not manifest a settled pu r pose to for ego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitu te a bandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and m oral deser tion , is n ot tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal oblig a tion s of lov e, ca r e a n d su pport for his children. He maintained regular communication with h is w ife a n d ch ildr en through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to th eir w h im s.
W h erefore, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Cou r t of A ppea ls, a s w ell a s th e decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying th e petition for a doption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph A n th on y , a ll su r n a m ed Ca n g , by th e spou se r espon den ts Ron a ld a n d Ma r ia Cla r a Cla v a n o.
In the matter of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of a minor Ang elie A n n e Cer v a n tes, Nelson Cervantes and Zenaida Cervantes vs. Gina Ca r r eon Fa ja r do a n d Con r a do Fa ja r do G.R. No. 7 9 9 5 5 Ja n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 8 9
Fa cts:
Th is is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over th e per son of th e m in or A n g elie A n n e Cer v a n tes.
Th e minor was born on 14 February 1 987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo a n d Gin a Ca rreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes an d Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely tw o (2 ) w eeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petition er s, w a s a lso ex ecu ted by r espon den t Gin a Ca r r eon
Th e appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the Reg ional Trial Court and rendered a decision granting the petition. The child was then known as A ngelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be freed from parental authority of h er n atural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from n ow on sh all be, for all legal intents and purposes, know n a s A n g elie A n n e Cer v a n tes, a ch ild of petition er s a n d ca pa ble of in h er itin g th eir est a te .
Th ereafter, adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cer v a n tes, r eceiv ed a letter fr om th e r espondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get ba ck th eir ch ild. Petition er s r efu sed to a ccede to th e dem a n d.
A s a result, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from h er yaya at the petitioners' r esidence on the pretext that she w a s in str u cted to do so by h er m other. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to h er h ou se. Petition er s th er eu pon dem anded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give u p her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed w a s n ot fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, howev er , r etu r n th e ch ild to th e petition er s if sh e w er e pa id th e a m ou n t of P1 5 0,000.00.
Issu e:
W h o h a s th e r ig h t to th e cu stody of A n g elie A n n Cer v a n tes?
Held:
In a ll cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is pa ramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) yea r s of a g e, will not apply where the Cou r t fin ds com pellin g r ea son s to r u le oth er w ise. In a ll con troversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physica l a n d social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well a s social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated fr om th is cr iter ion . It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a w om a n oth er th a n r espondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife r elationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the min or that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and mora l -m in ded per son. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another m arried man with whom she lived for almost three years bu t w h o ev en tu a lly left h er a n d v anished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose fa th er is n ot her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other h and, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physica lly , fin a n cia lly , a n d socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than wh a t th e n a tu r a l m other who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a m a r r ied m a n , ca n m ost likely g iv e h er .
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and con sen t of r espondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving th e a u th or ity
v ested in natural parents ov er the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of th e natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority ov er the adopted sha ll be ex ercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of th e a dopted ch ild a n d ex er cise pa r en ta l a u th or ity a n d r espon sibility ov er h im . Th e custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petition er s to w hom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliv er sa id m in or to th e petition er s im m edia tely u pon n otice h er eof.
Ma cario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo vs. CA a n d Hon . Ru bio a n d V ictor Bu n du c a n d Cla r a Bu n du c
G.R. No.8 5 04 4 Ju n e 3 , 1 9 9 2 Fa cts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her dea th . A ccor din g ly , a civ il com plaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court by petitioner Macario Tam a r g o, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural pa rents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural paren ts w ith w h om h e w a s liv in g a t th e tim e of th e tr a g ic in ciden t.
Pr ior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the th en Cou r t of Fir st Instance. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 1 8 November 1 9 8 2 , th a t is, a fte r A delber to h a d sh ot a n d killed Jen n ifer .
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the r esu lt of th e foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rath er th e a doptin g pa r en ts, n amely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to th e a ction sin ce pa rental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for a doption w a s filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually l ivin g w ith h is natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mer e filin g a n d g r a n tin g of a petition for a doption .
Th e trial court dismissed petitioners' com plaint, ruling that r espon den t n a tu r a l pa r en ts of A delber to in deed w er e n ot in dispen sa ble pa r ties to th e a ction .
Petitioners, then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for m andam us a n d certiorari qu estioning the trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ru lin g th a t petition er s h a d lost t h eir r ig h t to a ppea l.
Issu e:
W h ether or not Adelberto‘s natural parents are indispensable parties to th e a ction ? Held: This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious lia bility, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence, where a per son is n ot on ly lia ble for tor ts
W h ether or not Adelberto‘s natural parents are indispensable parties to th e a ction ? Held: This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious lia bility, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence, where a per son is n ot on ly lia ble for tor ts