A dissertation submitted to the
University of London
in candidature for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Alba Papa-Grimaldi
(Department of Philosophy)
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This thesis is globally the result of ten years of work. I started to reflect
on the them es developed in it after I took m y first degree in Italy in 1985.
None of the actual w ork done before 1990 is contained in the present thesis,
though.
H ow ever, I h o p e the rea d er w ill forgive the still u n satisfacto ry
treatm ent of som e of the issues this thesis deals with.
I w o u ld also like to say th at a form of the ch ap ter nam ed "The
Paradox of Phenom enal O bservation" has, in the m eantim e, been accepted
for publication by the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology.
My thanks to the D epartm ent of Philosophy (UCL) are not sim ply
perfunctory. W orking in this departm ent has furnished me w ith the stylistic
and linguistic tools indispensable to develop m y speculation. If it is true that
thought is language, m y experience certainly proves to me th at the them es of m y speculation could not have come to be w h at they are w ith o u t the
constant appeal to clarity characteristic of anglo-saxon philosophy.
A special thanks goes, obviously, to m y supervisor. Dr. Tim Crane,
who has show n the rare quality of being able to guide me w ithout sacrificing
m y n atu ral intellectual exuberance and so m aking m y Ph.D. an entirely enjoyable experience.
I w ould also like to thank Dr. Michael M artin for a critical reading of
some of m y w ork and some very stim ulating discussions.
Finally, I w ant to say th at w orking on this thesis I have come to
u n d erstan d w hy there are so m any au th o rs w ho acknow ledge the p atien t
help and co-operation of their wives. M y w ork w o u ld have been m uch
h ard er w ith o u t the encouragem ent, the m oral and m aterial help I received from m y husband, Keith Grimaldi.
I w o u ld also like to th an k m y p aren ts for generously paying m y
In m y thesis I analyse the n a tu re an d the lim its of p h en o m en al observation: the im possibility for the h u m an m ind to u n d erstan d the final structure of Being or, as it is otherw ise called by science, the Universe. This investigation w as partly prom pted, in fact, by the claims of som e respectable physicists that w e will one day know everything or, as they often say, G od's m ind.
My thesis is built around the central chapter (the third) in w hich I analyse the nature of our u n derstanding of events. There I claim that w hen subjected to a rigorous analysis, the concept of event as hap p en in g in time and occupying a duration of time, is som ehow a paradoxical concept. While on the one han d an event requires to be thought of as covering a duration, on the other h an d this necessary d u ratio n m eans th at w hatever event we observe, is n o t w h at is really happening. This is because its h ap p en in g consists in w hatever is happening in this duration: certain subevents w hich w hen observed display the sam e paradoxical nature.
Title. 1
Acknowledgem ents. 2
Abstract. 3
Introduction. 6
Chapter 1: Being and Logos — One and M any. 11
a) The Appearance of Abstract Thought in the Western World. 11
b) The Parmenidean Discovery. 16
c) Metaphysical Solutions of Parmenides' Prohibition — A
Comparison Between Descartes' Cogito and Parmenides. 20
d) Identity as the Self-Evident Truth of the Cogito. 28
e) The Impossibility of Conceptualising Cheinge. 36
f) The Three Aristotelian Principles Express One Truth. 41
g) The Skepsi as Regulative Principle of Human Knowledge. 45
h) The Passage from One to Many. 55
i) Conclusions. 61
Chapter 2: The Search fo r a Certain Being. 65
a) To be or.... not to be: The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics. 65
b) The "Fundamental" Question and the Sceptical Feeling. 69
c) Acting "as if....": The Dogmatic Answer to the "Fundamental Question." 82
d) To Answer the "Fundamental Question" Means to Know God's Mind. 98
e) God's Mind: an Unavoidable Objective of Physical Realism. 103
Chapter 3: The Paradox o f Phenomenal O bservation. 115
a) Introduction. 115
b) The Analysis of our Concept of Event. 118
c) Observation and Real Happening. 120
d) Zeno's Arrow. 128
Chapter 4: Is E m pty Time Conceivable? 152
a) Introduction. 152
b) Some Preliminary Considerations. 15 7
c) Why Does Shoemaker's Argument Appear Plausible? 162
d) An Alternative Interpretation of Shoemaker's Fantasy. 169
e) Two Dogmatic Presumptions. 182
b) Newton-Smith's Feintasy Theory. 194 c) States and Changes: A Necessary but Unsupportable
Presumption of Anti-Reductionism. 201
d) The Immobility of States Involves Indifference of its Parts. 206
e) Spatial Relations are not Conceivable in the Immobility. 2 15
f) Conclusions. 22 8
C hapter 5: (Appendix). 231
C hapter 6: Conclusions. 235
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a reflection on a them e that, despite the variety of its
form ulations, has constantly characterised w estern p h ilo so p h y and m ore
broadly w estern thought. This them e is the dialectic of identity (or unity),
an d plurality. The unity and identity of Being, and therefore of th o u g h t in
thinking of this Being, and the plurality of h u m an experience. The first is
seen as the only tru th th at hum an m ind can think w ith absolute necessity
an d the second as an essential dim ension of h u m an life deprived, though,
of this sam e logical necessity.
Spelled out as the dialectic of identity and plurality, this problem m ay
seem at first very alien to us, lost in the night of time, in the rem ote p ast of
ancient philosophy. So w hy do I w an t to phrase it in these term s? I have a
good reason. I w ould like, in fact, to em phasise the continuity of this them e
as one of the crucial topics of ou r philosophical th o u g h t, and w ith it the
persistence of a ""vice" in h u m an thin k in g , directly d e p e n d e n t on this
dichotom y of the One (Being) and the M any (plurality of experience): the
attitude of resolving this dichotom y w ith the appeal to a ""bad"" m etaphysics.
By ""bad"' m etaphysics I intend the need, constantly displayed by the hum an
m ind since the appearance of this dichotom y, to be reassured in its cognitive
practice. Once thought has abstracted from the given plurality of experience
the concept of being as th at of an u n d erly in g u nity, it has d isp lay ed a
constant subjection to this concept, an aspiration to it, som etim es a nostalgia
for it, as the ultim ate and only truth, tow ards w hich n o t only its theoretical
enquiry b u t also its spirit should move.
This first and ultim ate tru th has been called various things, as we
shall see, and acquired different values, b u t it has invariably represented the
need for a legitim ation of h u m an know ledge. This ""bad"" m etaphysics,
our h u m an condition, has sought a reassuring foundation in the authority
of some unfounded dogm atic principle. But such a principle will alw ays be
u n fo u n d ed .
This thesis is not a detailed review of this "w eakness" th ro u g h o u t
history, how ever. W hat I am really concerned w ith is, first, to restate the
im possibility of overcom ing this d u a lism an d , second, to u n v eil the
persistence of this m etaphysical a ttitu d e th a t inspires, especially, som e
contem porary physics.
These tw o projects are not distinct b u t are carried out sim ultaneously
and at the same level of enquiry. I shall argue that the reason w hy I believe
this dualism cannot be overcom e is the im possibility of o u r m ind's ever
conceptualising "real" change, and so reproducing the m ovem ent from the
one (which is the sim ple form of ou r thought), to the m any contents of
experience. T hat is, from the identical to the different, w hich is otherw ise
sim ply given in our perception and cognition, and therefore deprived of any
fo undation.
The possibility of u n d erstan d in g the "real" u ltim ate change and so
capturing in a hu m an theory th at last stru ctu re th at un d erlies h appening
everyw here and constitutes the access to the law s of nature in their ultim ate
essence and reality, — or as we often hear from some physicists, "the access
to G od's mind"^ —, is the aim that underlies the struggle of some physics in
its attem pt to provide a final theory of everything. This aim is not comm on
to all physicists, though, b u t it is certainly held by som e of them such as
W einberg an d Hawking^, as a m anifesto, and, I am sure, by m any other
scientists and philosophers as a possibility, or a secret hope.
^S. Hawking, A Brief H istory of Time, p.175.
W ith m y analysis of ou r conception of change and the im possibility
of conceptualising it in intelligible term s, inherent in the constitution of our
m ind, I in ten d to p ro v e th at the irreconcilable d u alism of id en tity and
plurality, discovered by Parm enides at the outset of w estern philosophy, is
alive and w ell now adays and w ill alw ays be. In the light of this argum ent I
intend to dism iss as b a d m etaphysics the ho p e th a t one d ay w e could
u n d e rsta n d "ch an g e", or w h atev er u n d erlies the h a p p e n in g of reality.
Therefore w e can never give a foundation to this p lu rality of phenom enal
experience.
The thesis divides into five chapters, of w hich chapter one is the
m ost complex. In chapter one I outline some of the historical background to
the crucial "discovery" by Parm enides w hich forms the fulcrum of the whole
thesis (section (a)), I then go on to explain the content of Parm enides' claim
(section (b)), an d illu strate h o w its echoes m ay be fo u n d in D escartes
(sections (c) - (d)) and how it form s the fundam ental basis of A ristotelian
logic (section (f)). I apply the Parm enidean insight to the notion of change,
and I give a p relim in ary arg u m en t to the effect th a t change cannot be
conceptualised (section (e)). The rest of the chapter prepares the w ay for the
epistem ological discussion of chapter 2, by introducing the notion of skepsi
or inquiry, as the p ro p er epistemological response to Parm enides' challenge
(section (g)). The final section (h) returns to the question of change, seen as
an instance of the general 'p a ssag e ' from one to m any, from u n ity to
plurality. The them e of change will be returned to in chapter 3.
C h ap ter 2 is chiefly a b o u t epistem ology. In it I d istin g u ish tw o
fundam ental epistem ological approaches, the sceptical and the dogm atic, to
the q uestion of the existence of reality. I focus the discussion of these
approaches on th eir responses to the question 'w h y is th ere som ething
In section (d) - (e) I examine scientific realism, as an exam ple of the dogm atic
ap p ro ach , a n d 1 show h o w certain c o n te m p o ra ry cosm o lo g ists an d
theoretical p h y sicists are g u ilty of som e of th e d e ep e st m istak es of
dogm atism .
H ow ever, ch ap ter 2 does n o t show u s, b y m ean s of a ratio n al
argum ent, how to choose betw een scepticism and dogm atism . Can such a ratio n al a rg u m e n t be given? In ch ap ter 3 1 a tte m p t to give such an
argum ent. This argum ent, w hich bases itself on prem ises w hich should be
agreed on all sides — 'commonsense' prem ises about the concepts of event,
time an d change — attem pts to show th at real h appening, w h a t is really
'going on', can n o t h ap p en in tim e. This p arad o x 1 call the p arad o x of
ph en o m en al observation. 1 conclude from it th a t o u r com m onsense or
phenom enal concepts cannot be applied to reality itself. This is tantam ount
to saying th at w e cannot know reality in itself — the dogm atic realist (and
idealist) m ust be wrong. (The chapter also contains an extended discussion
of Zeno's paradoxes).
The paradox has m any ramifications. O ne possible response is to say
that tim e does not require happening: there can be 'em pty tim e'. 1 attack
this claim in chapter 4, by attacking a w ell-know n arg u m en t, of Sydney
Shoem aker's, for the possibility or conceivability of em pty time. In sections
(a) - (c) 1 outline Shoem aker's argum ent, w hile in section (d) 1 offer m y
response. Finally ((e) - (f)) 1 expose som e of the dogm atic assum ptions
behind Shoem aker's argum ent.
The final c h ap ter is also concerned w ith tim e. C h a p te r fo u r's
argum ent w as defensive in character: it argues th at Shoem aker's argum ent
tim e w h ic h d etach es it from ch an g e o r h a p p e n in g , b y tak in g , as
representative, the w ork of W. N ew ton-Sm ith. Time, on this conception,
could only be a n o u m en o n — it could n e v er be a possible object of
CHAPTER ONE
BEING A N D LO G O S — ONE AN D M ANY
a) The appearance of abstract thought in the Western world
It is generally accepted th at abstract th o u g h t in the w estern w orld
began in Greece^ w ith the socio-political transform ations th at bro u g h t to the
end of the caste-based society w hose predom inant culture w as still based on
m ythical th o u g h t. This led to the tran sfo rm atio n of the polis from an
archaic, patriarchal structure to the m odern polis as state.
Between the 8th and 7th century B.C., there started in Greece a series
of transform ations th at constituted the passage from a religious, m ythical
existence, th at of the archaic tow n, to a historical existence w ith the advent
of the m odern polis, the Greek cities. These w ere the p ro d u cts of a socio
political evolution that transform ed the archaic tow n, stru ctu red according
to rigid religious criteria on the m odel of a p atriarch al organism , into a
^In M yth and Thought among the Greeks. J.P. Vemant writes:
Rational thought, has, as it were, its personal credentials in order: its date and place of birth are known. It was in the sixth century BC, in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, that a new positivist type of thought about nature emerged, (p.343).
Discounting a thesis of J. Bumet according to whom philosophy is seen as a traveller without luggage as it w ould be futile to seek the origins of rational thought in the past for true thought could have no origin outside itself, he argues, voicing instead a theory of Comford (Comford, P.M. Principium Sapientiae.), that:
...there was no immaculate conception where reason was concerned. The emergence of philosophy was, as Comford has shown, a historical fact with its roots in the past, growing out of the past as well as away from it. (p.365).
Vernant also interestingly indicates two features that characterise the new type of thought that developed in Greek philosophy:
"m o d ern " political organism in w hich in d iv id u al an d classes are finally
acknow ledged in their subjective wills. It is from the interaction of these
wills th at a State is form ed and, w ith the State, the b irth of history. It is this
progressive laicization of pow er that m ust be seen, historians suggest, as the
necessary condition for the advent of abstract thought. It is interesting in
this respect to read a description th at J.P. V ernant gives of this tu rb u len t
period of transform ation:
The tu rn in g po in t th at came w hen the philosopher em erged from the m agus is, then, characterised by this divulging of a religious secret, this extension of a reserved privilege to an open group, and the publicising of a h ith erto fo rb id d en k n o w led g e The holy idols, the old xoana, w hich h ad been talism ans jealously g uarded in the royal palace or the p riest's h ouse are now m oved to the tem ple, a public place Legal decisions, the themistes, th at used to be the privilege of the eupatridai, are now w ritten dow n and m ade public. A t the sam e tim e as p riv ate cults w ere th u s d iv erted to w ard s a public religion, n ew form s of relig io u s g ro u p in g s, centred around pow erful personalities, em erged on the p eriphery of official city religion....The creation of religious sects and the establishm ent of brotherhoods of 'sages', such as that of Pythagoras, are all m anifestations, in different conditions an d circles, of the sam e great social m ovem ent of the expansion and p opularisation of w hat had been an aristocratic sacred tra d itio n .^
On another level w e w itness a sim ilarly radical transform ation. The
ind iv id u al th at existed only as a m em ber of a genos (lineage) in w hich he w as com pletely integrated as he participated in the essence of his divine
ancestors, becom es p roperly a (juridical) person, a m em ber of a polis, an
essen tial p a rt of its h istory. To this h isto ry he w ill n o w p e rso n ally
participate, because, this is the relevant aspect, a citizen w ith o u t genealogy
can also determ ine the decisions of the polis. It is the p assag e for an
individual from a natural condition, th at of his position in the genos, to an artificial condition, that of a m em ber of a state. In fact the "state is not a
n a tu ra l being, b u t an idea, an abstract entity w hich derives its substance
from the decision of all its citizens"^ w ho are, for this reason, p a rt of its
history:
...the m em ber of the genos that partakes of his divine ancestor and is the incarnation of an atem poral essence..." and w hereas "the m an w ith o u t a genealogy is n o th in g an d his actions are w ith o u t any im p o rta n c e the citizen th ro u g h h is b elo n g in g to a political organism is integrated in a profane becom ing from w hich all of his destiny depends. It is not possible for him now to ignore th at he is p a rt of this history because the reality in w hich he lives m anifests itself to him as an historical datum^.
The so cial d y n am ics th a t in th e se c e n tu rie s p ro d u c e d th e
transform ation of the tow ns, consisted m ainly in the struggle of the lowest
classes, the plebs, to break those ancient m echanism s th at precluded them
from the political power. Either w ith a violent insurrection or w ith a pacific
protest or, gradually, w ith the enlightened legislation of a king, or even w ith
the help of ty ran ts — those leaders w ith no relig io u s b a ck g ro u n d or
functions, brought to rule by the sam e insurrections of the plebs — the low
classes finally "forced the gates of the city w here they had been forbidden to
live"^ and could so partake of the political life of the city.
O bviously in th at period particular an d favourable socio-economical
conditions arose to m ake this struggle of the plebs possible and successful.
The m ost im portant of w hich w as the creation of a new w ealth. So at the
b eg in n in g of th is socio-political tran sfo rm a tio n , like of m an y o th ers
afterw ard s, th ere is m oney. M oney is the th in g th a t u n d e rm in es the
religious structure of the patriarchal society. A pro fo u n d transform ation of
the econom y from essentially ag ricu ltu ral to m ercan tile occurred as a
consequence of the vast colonisation of the M e d ite rran e an area.® The
creation of a new w ealth w hich is not anym ore only a result of hereditary
privilege, b u t also a product of w ork and intelligence, creates from the plebs
^F. Chatelet., N aissance de l'histoire, p.47. ^ ibid.
^For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon see Fustel de Coulanges The A ncient C ity p.261-70.
a new class, the bourgeoisie, w hich will determ ine this laicization of pow er
— the end of a polis with a rigid caste structure, and the rising of a new open
society whose fluidity is the direct consequence of the new fluidity of m oney
that has finally substituted the use value w ith the exchange value:
M oney w as not subject to the sam e conditions as landed property, it w as according to the expression of the law yers, res nec mancipi, and could pass from hand to han d w ithout any religious form ality, and w ith o u t difficulty could reach the plebeians. Religion, w hich h ad given its stam p to the soil, had no pow er over money.^
The coin is the sym bol and the in stru m en t of such a com plex and
deep transform ation:
On a w hole series of levels is effect w as revolutionary. It accelerated the process of w hich it w as itself an effect, th a t is to say, the developm ent, in the Greek economy, of a comm ercial sector dealing in some of the everyday articles th at w ere produced. It allow ed a new type of wealth to be created, radically different from w ealth in land or flocks and also a new class of w ealthy m an w hose effect upo n the political reorganisation of the city proved decisive.!^
Furtherm ore V ernant w onders, quoting a thesis of Thom son, w h eth er the
in tro d u ctio n of the coin h a d a fu n d am en tal influence in the process of
transform ation of the Greek mentality:
Is one justified in going even further and assum ing th at there is a direct link between, on the one hand, the m ost im p o rtan t concepts of philosophy, nam ely, being, essence, and substance, an d on the other, if n o t m oney itself, then at least the abstract character of merchandise...?^^
But then he concludes that to suggest that:
....in the last analysis, philosophy applies a form of rational and positivist thought acquired through the use of m oney to the concept of im p erish ab le an d in d iv isib le b e in g th a t it to o k o v er from religion w ould be an oversimplification.^^
^Fustel de Coulanges., op. cit. p.265. Vemant., op. cit. p.360 - 361. ^Mbid. p.361.
But certainly m oney, coinage, accelerated the developm ent of th at level of
artificiality and rationality over that of the phusis or the n atu ral process that w ould have regulated hum an interrelations from now on.
The in d iv id u a l (and the society) has ceased in fact to be strictly
connected w ith nature, b u t comes out of the n atu ral condition in w hich he
finds himself at birth. The caste society centred on the genos is substituted by a political o rd er based on the census, in w hich the new citizen follow s
criteria w hich are not w holly natural anym ore, b u t rational.
P articu larly in terestin g for us is a tran sfo rm atio n in the G reek
language as a sign of this progressive process of abstraction: a new use of the
article w hich introduces abstract nam es such as attributes of quality, i.e. 'the
heat', or infinitive verbs used as nouns, i.e. 'th e thinking'. This introduces a
strong elem ent of abstraction in the discourse an d m akes possible reasoning
about the functions of w hich those qualities or actions consist. But it is
w ith Parm enides, rightly considered by m any as the father of philosophical
speculation, th at the abstraction reaches its peak. In Parm enides w e find, for
the first tim e, the p lu ral expression 'ta onta' (until then used to m ean 'all things'), su b stitu ted by 'to on', a singular term w hich m eans 'th e whole of the th in g s', w h a t w e call b e i n g W hereas n o t on ly H o m er b u t also H esiodus still:
talk of 'ta eonta', the things th at exist as of w h at exist only in the present and oppose them to 'ta essomena' e 'ta pro eonta', the things that will be in the future and those th at have been in the past...''^^ This m eans that "..originally the w ord w as used only to refer to the tangible presence of things.!^
^^Bruno Snell., Discovery of the M ind, p.227 - 229.
Vemant writes: "....Parmenides is the first to express being with a singular, 'to on': it is no longer a question of particular beings, but of being in general, complete and unique. This change
of vocabulary registers the emergence of a new concept of being as the intelligible subject of
logos, that is, of reason, expressed through language in accordance with its own principle of noncontradiction." op. cit. p.363 - 364.
But already in the M ilesians and in H eraclitus w e can record an evolution
in the language as we find 'ta onta' as describing not only w h at is present now b u t '"all th a t exists in n a t u r e " . as I an ticip ated , it is w ith
P arm enides th at abstraction reaches its peak. This abstract idea to w hich
thought had arrived of all that exists in nature is further refined in the idea
of "the w hole of the existents", a singular and therefore m ore abstract term
w hich m eans th at all things have been th o u g h t n o t only in their concrete
plurality, b u t according to the invisible nexus, th at belonging to them all,
holds them together and allow s us to think them as One. Things in their
totality constitute a w hole w hich is for Parm enides one and indivisible; we
are not considering things in their concrete existence anym ore, b u t the m ind
has abstracted from them a link, a com m on g ro u n d th a t rep resen ts the
highest form of abstraction. It is n o t possible for us to think of anything
m ore essential, m ore abstract and m ore fundam ental th an this indivisible
'w hole'. As Hegel writes:
in the surviving fragm ents of Parm enides this is enunciated w ith the p u re en th u siasm of th o u g h t w hich has for the first tim e apprehended itself in its absolute abstraction.^*
b) The Parm enidean discovery.
In his poem Peri' phuseos, P arm enides is g u id ed b y a G oddess to d istin g u ish th e W ay of O p in io n from th e W ay of T ru th . The first
corresponds to the senses and the second to the faculty of our intellect. The
goddess show s him that the know ledge given by the senses m ust be rejected
as illusion in the light of a revelation th at com es from m in d w hich is
independent of the s e n s e s .T h i s distinction, betw een m ind as a principle of
^^Jaeger La Teologia dei Prim i Pensatori Greci. p.54. ^*Hegel. The Science of Logic., tr. A.V. Miller., p.83.
order and the senses as givers of deceitful im pressions, w hich w as implicitly
present already in the Pythagorean "num ber" and in the H eraclitean logos,
becomes w ith Parm enides a central problem in the Greek th o u g h t and, then,
in w estern p h ilo so p h y.20 The superiority of m ind over sensation depends
for Parm enides on the fact th at only th o u g h t can know "W hat is", w hereas
the senses offer us a constantly changing w orld, an inconceivable m ixture of
Being an d non-Being. But o u r m ind cannot th in k of non-B eing, as this
w ould am ount, literally, to not thinking at all. Therefore non-Being does
not exist. Being is the only possible object of thought, and because of this.
Being and th o u g h t are the sam e th in g.21 Of this changing w o rld and its
objects, in fact, Parm enides argues, we say th at they are, b u t because they
change and perish we also say they are not anym ore. But w h at really is for our m ind cannot cease to be. In fact, to explain this change w e should
conceive of non-Being, but, Parm enides argues, ou r m ind cannot conceive
of it. This is w hy by following the senses w e say self -contradictory things:
that Being is non-Being and vice versa. As if, says Parm enides, w e possessed
"tw o heads" one denying and one affirm ing the sam e thing.22
Unlike his predecessors w ho sought the arche' (the ultim ate principle of reality) in naturalistic principles such as w ater, air, fire etc.., all changing
aspects of a sensible reality, Parm enides w as the first to pick out this Being,
as the only unchangeable principle of reality an d th o u g h t, the to on, to
20por a review of this problem see:
The Presocratic Philosophers. (Vol. I), J. Barnes. The Presocratic Philosophers, K. Freeman.
The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, W. Jaeger.
An original and suggestive interpretation of the dichotomy of being and appearance can be found in Heidegger: "The Limitation of Being" in A n Introduction to M etaphysics p.98-115. ^^It is the famous:
"... TO yap auTo voeiu eaxiv t e xa i eivai"
"...for the same thing can be thought and can exist" Parm enides tr. L. Taran., p.41.
which our th o u g h t can refer, alw ays, w ith o u t fear of being p roved w rong.
As consequence of its im m utability or identity, this Being does n o t come
into being, because it alone exists. If it cam e into being, it w ould have to
come from som ew here else. It is also hom ogeneous and continuous as it is
everyw here the same, and because there is no non-Being to p rev en t it from
holding to g eth er it does n o t divide into parts. This Being is w hole and
indivisible.^^
This indivisibility of the w hole is very im p o rtan t, as w e shall see,
because it does not leave room for anything else to be further understood or
grasped by ou r thought. O ur thought can finally rest assured in this sim ple
identity. F u rth erm o re by th in k in g of this u n ity an d id en tity of being,
th o u g h t conceptualises its ow n id en tity , the n ecessary co n d itio n of all
thinking and the only necessary tru th th at it can contem plate because it is
th e o n ly se lf-e v id en t one a n d so n o t in n e ed of fu rth e r p ro o fs.
C ontem plating the identical Being, th o u g h t becom es literally at one w ith
itself. This Being is necessary for thought because by contem plating it, it does
not need any further labour to u n d erstan d it. T hought is, in fact, sim ply
contem plating its ow n identity. Being is one, we could say, because thought
is one.
The necessary identity of th o u g h t w hile th in k in g is conceived by
Parm enides as the unity and identity of Being as the only possible object of a
rational thought. This is w hy in Parm enides, th o u g h t an d Being coincide;
and th at is w hy Parm enides holds th at any other know ledge w hich is not
this p u re identity, is just u n founded opinion. This 'false' know ledge is, in
fact, p ro d u ce d by change an d m ovem ent w h ich is inconceivable as a
^^"There is a solitary word still left to say of a way: 'exists'; very many signs are on this road: that Being is ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and complete. It was not once nor will it be, since it is now altogether, one, continuous. For, what origin could you search out for it? How and whence did it grow?
transform ation of the original identity. W hat is one and identical w ith itself,
as Being m ust be, cannot allow any division or change, as there is no w ay in
which ou r th o u g h t could im agine difference in w hat is originally one. A nd
since we cannot ""think" of change, this does not really exist for Parm enides.
T hought an d being coincide in so far as only w h a t is identical can be
properly thought, and w h at cannot be thought does n o t exist. (Throughout
this thesis, I shall som etim es refer to this claim as 'the identity'). The form
of o u r th o u g h t, id e n tity w ith itself w h ile th in k in g , becom es w ith
Parm enides the "discovery" of an objective truth; unity and identity as the
u ltim ate n a tu re of Being. This w ill be from now on in the h isto ry of
p h ilo so p h y , the u ltim ate referent of any tru th an d th e aim of h u m an
speculation.
In this context, I think, w e have to place the origin of w estern
th o u g h t. To u n d e rsta n d the rad icality an d p ro fu n d ity of Parm enides"
philosophy, and the long lasting influence of his "discovery", w e need to
look beyond those esoteric elem ents in w hich his speculation w as certainly
very m uch entrenched, and focus our attention on w h at w as really central
to his philosophy: the "to on", th at appears now for the first tim e in w estern thought as the conceptualisation of being, the idea of som ething com m on to
"ta onta", all the ex isten ts.^ ^ I shall claim it w ill never d isap p ear from our theoretical horizon, and w ith m ore or less aw areness it w ill constitute one
of the epicentres of w estern culture: the problem of tru th conceived as a
(m ore or less explicit) aspiration to know this Being, or to reconcile this
identical being which w e can know w ith logical necessity, w ith the plurality
of experience that, devoid of this same necessity, appears always unfounded.
c) M etaphysical solutions of Parmenides' prohibition — A comparison between Descartes' cogito and Parmenides.^
A fter Parm enides, to th in k of the link betw een being an d h u m an
logos (our discourse on the w orld) m eans to becom e aw are of its alienation from us, of the distance betw een this real fundam ental n atu re of all things,
and the things in their concrete existence as w e m eet them in ou r everyday
experience. As Kathleen Freem an writes:
H ow ever, the challenge that all results thus obtained w ere m erely O pinions n o t authorised by reason h ad now to be faced. Thinkers could n o t begin w ith an apologetic statem ent th at n o thing can be kno w n for certain, an d proceed to explain p h e n o m e n a The n ature of knowledge itself w as soon to come up for analysis.^^
Also V ernant in M yth and Thought Among the Greeks, writes:
A fter Parm enides, the task of Greek philosophy w as to re-establish the link betw een the rational universe of speech and the sensible w orld of nature by means of a m ore accurate and m ore sophisticated definition of the principle of contradiction.^^
To resolve the problem of the foundation of know ledge, in the centuries
after Parm enides, has involved avoiding this chasm betw een the necessary
tru th of the identity of Being, and the p lu rality of h u m an experience. I
believe th at all of these attem pts have issued (and could only issue) in a
m etap h y sics w h ich has tried to overcom e P a rm en id es' p ro h ib itio n by
in tro d u cin g an ad hoc, totally dogm atic principle th at should resolve this alienation of being and h u m an logos by b rid g in g the gap w ith fictitious m etaphysical constructions.
^^G.E.L. Owen also suggests this analogy: "The comparison with Descartes' co g ito is inescapable: both arguments cut free of inherited premisses, both start from an assumption w hose denial is peculiarly self-refuting." in Logic, Science and Dialectic, p .16.
My thesis, as I have already said, is n o t a historical docum entation of
this p ractice, b u t an a tte m p t to b rin g som e decisive a rg u m e n ts to
dem onstrate that Parm enides' prohibition against bridging the gap betw een
being and logos, represents an unresolvable dualism , an objective lim it of our know ledge, structurally inherent in our m ind and for this reason trying
to overcom e it can only issue in a dialectical paralogism in the K antian
sense.
I w a n t nonetheless to recall briefly som e of the m ost im p o rtan t
m om ents of th e reaction to this p ro h ib itio n , since th ey hav e b een so
influential in the evolution of our scientific and philosophical thought.
These attem pts at overcom ing P arm en id es' dualism have variously
consisted of resolving the id en tity as the only necessary tru th th at ou r
thought can contem plate, in term s of a m u ltitu d e of unchangeable, eternal
structures underlying the phenom enal w orld. In this w ay, th o u g h t m irrors
the identity and im m utability of being in the phenom enal world: w ith these
structures our m ind, according to various solutions, participates, and on this
participation ou r know ledge is founded. This is the them e com m on to two
principal stream s of m etaphysics: the Platonic and the A ristotelian one. So
we see, for example, th at in Aristotle our logos is an em anation of a superior
logos, w hich is infused in all creation. In fact the active intellect of the De Anima and God as "T hought of th o u g h t" of M etaphysics are one and the sam e thing operating on different levels. The first representing the presence
of the divine logos in the h u m an m in d and the second its presence in n ature. They are the subjective an d the objective w hose relation in the
epistemic experience is thus granted by a transcendental principle common
N ow since in all n atu re there is a factor th at is as m atter in the genus, and is potentially all that is in the genus, and som ething else w hich is as cause and agent as m aking everything in it (thus art is related to its m aterial): so there m u st be these differences in the soul. There is th at intellect, w hich is such as being able to become everything; and there is that w hich acts u p o n everything, as a sort of state, like light; for light too, in a w ay, m akes potential colours actual.
A nd this is intellect separable, uncom pounded and incapable of being acted on, a thing essentially in act. For the agent is alw ays m ore excellent th a n the recip ien t, an d the p rin cip le th a n its m aterial.
K now ledge in act is the sam e as the thing itself. But w h at is potential has tem poral priority in the individual; yet this is not true universally, even w ith respect to time. M ind does n o t know at one tim e and n o t know at another time.
Only separated, however, is it w hat it really is. A nd this alone is im m ortal and perpetual.
It does not rem em ber, because it is im passable; the passive intellect is corruptible, and the soul u n d e rsta n d s n o th in g a p art from this latter.^s
This should guarantee the rationality of creation and of ou r th o u g h t that
know s this creation. But w ith o u t referring to an external principle (whose
relation to ou r logos is itself u n fo u n d ed ) th a t g u aran tees th e com m on rationality of being and logos, h u m an know ledge rem ains u n fo u n d ed , and d an g ero u sly on the verge of th a t chasm : the d u alism d isco v ered by
Parm enides w ho forbade for this reason the rational foundation of hum an
w orldly knowledge. It is not necessary for me to elaborate here on the fact
th at Plato's form s express the sam e epistemic function of justification of the
unfounded "particular" in our knowledge.^^ It w ill suffice here to rem em ber
that if the soul as it is argued m ainly in the Meno the Phaedus, the Phaedrus
and the S ym p o siu m , is anterior to the b ody an d before its fall on Earth
28Aristotle De A nim a Book III, Ch. V, 430 a 10-25, (pp. 425-426).
(Phaedrus) dw elled in the H y p eru ran eu m w ith the other eternal ideas, it m u st th u s k n o w the ab so lu te form s th a t cause the m aterial objects
(Phaedus). K now ledge as anamnesys or rem iniscence, w here the sensuous m ultiplicity of experience is gradually purified of any transient elem ent and
bro u g h t back to the p u rity of the original ideas, is again an attem p t at
overcom ing Parm enides' prohibition to reconcile the necessary identity and
the unfounded plurality.
In fact the unity and the identity as an original possession of the soul
which once knew the unchangeable ideas, is a possession that it can regain
through a conversion tow ards its ow n essence. K nowledge, p u re knowledge,
is the true being of the soul, its partaking of the ideal being.
The philosopher is he w ho has discovered this reappropriation of the
true nature of the soul that, as we can read:
...will be security for y our happiness,"^^ an d "... since neither the body, no r the union of the tw o [sc. body and soul], is m an, it m ust be inferred th at either m an has no real existence, or th at m an is nothing other than — soul."3i Furtherm ore: " the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the m ortal. A nd in every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and im m ortality, and the body of the h u m an and m ortal. A nd w hereas the bod y is liable to speedy dissolution, the soul is alm ost if not quite indissoluble.^^
The repossession of the ideal form s, m an y b u t u n ch an g eab le an d so
identical, "resolve" in this w ay the problem of the reconciliation of identity
and plurality and so grant tru th to our knowledge.
I should now like to examine the fact that m any centuries afterw ards,
Descartes, celebrating the apotheosis of doubt, could only rationally say:
'Cogito ergo sum'. That is, on the interpretation I w ill defend^^, all he could
^^Alcibiades 134e, The Dialogues of Plato, (tr. B. Jowett), Vol. I, p.673. ^^Alcibiades 130c, ibid. p.667.
^^Phaedus 80b, ibid. p.388.
think w ith necessity and derive rationally w ith no doubt, w as the identity of
thought w ith itself, the actual being of thought. I cannot be thinking and not
thinking at the sam e time, so it m ust be at least true th at I am thinking and
th at I am w h ile I think. To fo u n d any o th er n ecessary tru th an d the
rationality of science after he h ad p u sh ed h u m an th o u g h t into this tight
corner, he can only resort to an external principle, God, as in the '"best"
m etap h y sical tradition.34 N either did he have an alternative once he had
acknowledged the dualism of identity and plurality, of the necessary being of
thought and the unfounded plurality of the logos.
D escartes' hyperbolic doubt w as not as extrem e as one m ay think. It
expressed in the only w ay possible, a drastic w ay, a p ro fo u n d anxiety in
philosophical thought: th at the content of our experience and therefore the
w ork of science is not true, does not correspond to anything "real". Once you
start doubting the truthfulness of your sensory experience and therefore the
tru th of know ledge as a pre-g ran ted correspondence betw een being and
logos, you cannot actually stop at any po in t before you have reached the sim ple tru th of a formal identity of thought w ith itself. That is you end up
reducing the logos to one sim ple assertion w ith o u t any content except its ow n identity. I th in k , therefore, I think. It is a form al tru th w ithout content,
b u t the only one we can be certain of. This is how also in D escartes, as already in Parm enides, after the exercise of the hyperbolic doubt, the logos,
divested of all its dubious knowledge, coincides w ith Being in one assertion:
the only thing I can be certain of is m y ow n thinking, this is because of all
the d u bious tru th s I h ad to give up, one only I cannot renounce because
im m ed iately self-evident: the existence of th o u g h t w h ile th in k in g and,
therefore, m y ow n existence as thinking being. This existence, though, does
not have any other specification than th at of thinking. I exist 'in so far as I
th in k '.
This can be u nderstood in tw o ways: (i) I am a thought, (ii) I am a
thing w hose essential attribute is thinking. Descartes says (ii), b u t he is only
entitled to say (i). The reason w hy he says (ii) is because, paying his tribute to
the old m etaphysics, he distinguishes the substance from its attribute: b u t in
fact th o u g h t rem ains the only true being he should assert. But th o u g h t is in
the C artesian m etap h y sics, the ''principium individuationis" of the res cogitans, the th in k in g substance. Because on the one h a n d a created substance "...cannot be first discovered m erely from the fact th at exists, for
that fact alone is not observed by us" and on the other, because
nothing is possessed of no attributes, p ro p erties or qualities.... w hen w e perceive any attribute, w e therefore conclude th at som e existing th in g or substance to w hich it m ay be a ttrib u te d , is necessarily p r e s e n t . ^ ^
A nd "there is alw ays one principal pro p erty of substance w hich constitutes
its n a tu re and e s s e n c e ...".^6 Thought as the "principium individuationis" of the th inking substance is the conditio sine qua it is im possible to talk of a th in k in g substance. The th in k in g substance, obviously, can n e v er exist
w ithout thought, b u t because of this substance, thought itself m ust be alw ays
p resen t to guarantee the principium individuationis to the substance, and this is not a logical im plication of the cogito b u t of the concept of substance w hich im plies perm anence. So even if in the "Second M ed itatio n " he
stresses:
I am — I exist: that is certain. But how often? Just w hen I think; for it m ight possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to think, th at I should likewise cease altogether to exist.^^
H e nonetheless believes th at I never cease to think, so long as I am a
thinking substance. So it is as if the m etaphysical principle overcom es the
p u rely rational tru th of the cogito, of th o u g h t w hen it thinks, doubts, feels etc... So "I think, therefore I am ", becom es "I am a th in k in g substance.
Descartes., Principle LIL, Descartes Selections, (ed. R. Eaton) p. 276. ^^Principle LIIL, ibid., p.276
therefore I alw ays think". This gratuitous extension of the cogito, appears very clear in D escartes' answ er to the objection m oved by G assendi to the
second meditation.^s H ere G assendi pointed out the difficulty arising from
the identification of a m an w ith a "...m ind w hich has divested itself not
only of the body b u t of the soul i t s e l f H e finds it h ard to believe that our
essence can be a m ind an d not, m ore generically, a soul, because it is
impossible "...to com prehend how you can think d u rin g a lethargic sleep."
But w ith o u t the attrib u te of th o u g h t, th ere is no th in k in g substance.
Descartes' very firm answ er in this respect w as the following:
You have difficulty, how ever, you say, as to w hether I think that the soul alw ays thinks. But w hy should it not alw ays think, w hen it is a thinking substance? W hy is it strange that w e do not rem em ber the thoughts it has had w hen in the wom b or in a stupor, w hen we do not even rem em ber the m ost of those w e know w e have h ad w hen grow n up, in good health and awakeT^o
T he c o n c e p t of su b s ta n c e re q u ire s c o n s ta n tly its p r i n c i p i u m individuationis, this is w hy Descartes has to stress th at o u r soul alw ays thinks (sive mens sive animus, the identification th at G assendi disputes). But this passage from the p u re presence of th o u g h t w h en it thinks, to a
p ersistin g substance th at alw ays thinks is a clear petitio principii: "W hy sh o u ld it n o t alw ays think, w hen it is a th in k in g su b stan ce?", arg u es
Descartes in the attem pt to justify the perm anence of thought.
This p o in t of m ine is sim ilar to the criticism m oved by Lichtenberg
and reported by Parfit in Reasons and Persons:
L ichtenberg claim ed th at in w h at he th o u g h t to be m ost certain, Descartes w ent astray. He should not have claim ed th at a thinker m ust be a separately existing entity. His fam ous cogito did not justify th is belief. H e sh o u ld n o t h av e claim ed 'I th in k , th erefo re I a m ' Descartes could have claim ed instead, 'It is thought: thinking is going on'. Or he could have claimed, 'This is a thought, therefore at least one thought is being thought....But w e cannot deduce from the content of our experiences, that a thinker is a separately existing
3BR. Descartes., Descartes Selections, (ed. R. Eaton), p.224. p.225
entity. A nd, as Lichtenberg suggests, because we are not separately existing entities, w e could fully describe o u r experiences and the connections betw een them , w ithout claim ing th at they are had by a subject of experiences...
I agree w ith Parfit an d L ichtenberg th at D escartes could n o t d raw the
conclusion th at he is a substance or a sub-jectum from the tru th of the
cogito. But it w ould be w rong to conclude from the epistem ic situation of the cogito th at w e have no self, no "I think'. W hile it is tru e th at w e d o n 't know anym ore w h at this self is, it is also tru e th at th o u g h t does p resent
itself as an 'I'. N ow just as it is gratuitous to extend the presence of this T
into a substance w ith all the constraints th a t this involves, it w o u ld be
likewise gratuitous to assert that this T is not legitim ate, and deny it on the g ro u n d of som e know ledge th at certainly exceeds the know ledge of the
cogito. In fact to prefer 'There is thinking going on' to 'I think', is already to deny som ething th at the cogito is sim ply telling you as it presents itself in the form of an I w ithout further specification.
Descartes had, in effect, already answ ered a sim ilar objection in his
response to H obbes' objection to the second m editation:
I adm it also quite gladly that, in ord er to designate th at thing or substance, w hich I wished to strip (my italic) of everything th at did not belong to it, I em ployed the m ost highly abstract term s I could; ju st as, on the co ntrary this Philosopher uses term s th a t are as concrete as possible,...to signify th at w hich thinks, fearing to let it be sundered from the body.^2
But Descartes on the contrary wished to strip th a t w hich th in k s from the b o d y and everything th at did not belong to it, in order to find a tru th or a being that cannot be denied even by the m ost virulent doubt. A nd this being
he found in thought, in its sim ple an d undeniable id en tity w ith itself, so
th at w hen it thinks, it cannot deny that it is thinking.
Descartes' fault consisted in m aking the presence of th o u g h t depend
on the perm anence of the substance. H e comes to know th at th o u g h t is
Parfit. Reasons and Persons p224-5.
because in divesting his 'Y of any attribute th at is not certain, including the body, he can stop only w hen this is reduced to the p u re presence of thought
so th a t h is existence coincides w ith th a t of th o u g h t. T hanks to the
indubitable tru th of thought, w hen everything seem s lost, this endangered
'"ego" can exalt: som ething is, an d I (who have been deprived of any other
ground for m y existence), am at least this thought.
Thought appears in the form of an I and I is only this thought.
d) Identity as the self-evident truth of the Cogito. I agree w ith K ant's rem ark that
....just as w hat is referred to as the C artesian syllogism , cogito^ ergo sum , is really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my existence im m ediately. 'I am simple' m eans nothing m ore th an that th is re p re se n ta tio n , 'I ', do es n o t c o n ta in in itself th e least m an ifo ld n ess an d th a t it is absolute (alth o u g h m erely logical) unity.43
"1 think", argues Kant, implies th at "I am " (thinking).
There are tw o things th at I w o u ld like to p o in t o u t here though.
D escartes him self denied this w as a syllogism , in his an sw er to the
objections collected by Mersenne:
H e w ho says T think, hence I am, or exist,' does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, by a sim ple act of m ental vision, recognises it as if it were a thing that is know n per seM
On the other hand, Descartes certainly needed to p o in t o u t the identity of
the cogito, to find the reason of its indubitable reality before he could say
"sum cogitans" or I am. Cogito and sum d o n 't express different realities, b u t they still need to be disentangled from D escartes' p o in t of view . He was
looking for som ething undeniably real for thought and he found it in the "I
think". But w h at is the reason for its indubitable reality? Kant answ ers that
reality is in the Cogito because this is in fact a "sum cogitans". But the
question is exactly this: w hy is cogito a sum cogitans w hose reality cannot be denied, (why can I be certain that I am because I think) w hile this is not so
for other propositions such as "1 eat" or "I walk"? W hy can 't I be certain that I am because I eat? The reason is th at the subject of the cogito is sim ply identical w ith itself in its presenting itself as thought, and therefore cannot
deny itself w ithout falling into a surd, a nonsense. W hen I w an t to find out
if the p ro p o sitio n I th in k is true, all I have to do is to see if it can be
coherently denied. It cannot be denied because w hen I think th at I think, I
am sim ply asserting an identity, w h atev er I do w ith the content of m y
thoughts, h o w ev er I d o ubt it, I cannot d en y th at I am th in k in g it. But
thought can deny that eating and w alking are real functions of the soul:
But if it is so that I have no body it is also tru e th at I can neither w alk no r take nourishment.^^
So w e need to point out the sim ple identity of the cogito as the reason for its indubitable reality in order to m ake of it im m ediately a "sum cogitans".
This is w hat Descartes does to introduce the "sum cogitans": he insists on the im possibility of denying th at I th in k w h en I doubt, u n d e rstan d ,
affirm and so on. But if it w asn 't for the im possibility of thought to deny its
ow n identity, I could have not survived as a "sum cogitans", just as I d id n 't survive as a sum deambulans, for example. This is w hy there is a reason for the syllogism-like form w ith which Descartes expresses first the reality of the
"cogito" and then th at of the 'I'. Even th o u g h they are indeed the sam e thing: that is once we have assessed that this thought cannot deny itself, we
recognise it as a "sum cogitans". It has reality and so I exist after all, at least as a sum cogitans.
The po in t here is that everything else being other than thought, being
m ore than the p u re identity of this self-evident presence, cannot be thought
of as absolutely true. So propositions such as I eat' or I walk' d o n 't carry the
same reality as 1 think' because they are other than thought. T hought thinks
them b u t they could be not real. That is, w h at th o u g h t thinks as eating or
w alking could be not the real thing and therefore not true in this absolute
sense required by the hyperbolic doubt. W hereas w hen thought thinks itself,
its p u re presence w ith o u t any content is not thinking an ything outside of
itself, b u t is purely asserting its ow n identity, and therefore cannot be wrong.
W hat is th en this reality of the cogito ex p ressed in th e " s u m cogitans"? W hen I think: "I am w alking", this as a content of m y th o u g h t is other than th o u g h t itself and so cannot be sim ply identical w ith w h at I am
thinking of. M y thought is, in this case, only correct in respect to its form,
b u t as far as the "real" act of w alking goes, there is no w ay for th o u g h t to
assess if it corresponds to m y thought of it. The th o u g h t of w alking, could
have no "identity" w ith the w alking "in itself". This could be nothing at all
outside of m y thought (the dream hypothesis and m aterial idealism ) or be
som ething com pletely different from w h at I th in k of as w alking (K ant's
formal idealism). In this gap betw een the sim ple identity of th o u g h t and the
unfounded plurality of its contents, the dem on or just a form al idealism can
set in.46
This is the very po in t about the foundation of tru th in th e hum an
logos. The existence of thought is the one "content" of th o u g h t th at thought cannot deny w ithout falling into a surd. This, fundam entally, has the same
speculative m eaning as the Parm enidean identity of T hought an d Being. In
this sense w alking and eating as contents of ou r th o u g h t (w hich are ex
hypothesi other than thought), cannot be thought as being true except as a
"thought of w alking and eating". So, coming back to K ant's rem ark th at the
Cogito is already sum cogitans w e have to conclude th at "I think therefore I am" m eans that I possess an undeniable Being, a being th at cannot be denied
by thought because it is sim ply identical w ith thought itself. So th at thought,
by denying it, needs to assert it at the sam e time. This is w hy Cogito is "sum cogitans".
We know that the w ay Descartes gets o u t of his d oubt and founds the
veracity of the logos beyond this sim ple identity of th o u g h t is a dogm atic move. H e falls in w h at it has been described as a "vicious circle": he uses
God to legitim ate u ltim ately clear an d d istin ct ideas an d the idea of
causality47 and the idea of causality to legitim ate the theoretical relevance of
God. This is how he tries to rebuild the credibility of h u m an know ledge that
the hyperbolic d oubt h ad system atically destroyed. But u n fo rtu n ately the
path from know ledge to the assertion of identity as the only tru th , is a one
w ay street; there is no w ay back. N othing left to b u ild on. This is w hy
Leibniz reproached Descartes for having
sinned twice: for doubting too m uch and too easily com ing out of the doubt.^8
For a m etaphysician to destroy any tru th of reason until the Parm enidean
identity emerges, is a "sin", a big sin, since the w ork of m etaphysics consists,
on th e c o n tra ry , of p a in sta k in g ly try in g to fill, w ith its d o gm atic
constructions, th at gap betw een logos and the identity, the only undeniable truth, that Parm enides had exposed. It is, presum ably, a sin of arrogance that
reason com m its against itself: transcending those lim its th at are variously
established by m etaphysics w hich tries to bridge that gap, and beyond which
there is no knowledge. This, m etaphysics, of all disciplines, m ust know best!
Only by "sinning" again against itself, reason w ill be able to recover from
this experience. The sin is now m ore explicit: it consists in advocating a
'^^This is "...a first principle than which none clearer can be entertained." R, Descartes., Descartes Selections, (ed. R. Eaton), p.181.
