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How valuable DDoS mitigation hardware is for Layer 7 Sophisticated attacks

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How valuable DDoS mitigation hardware

is for Layer 7 Sophisticated attacks

Stop DDoS before they stop you!

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What Is Distributed Denial of Service

A Denial of Service attack (DoS) is any intended attempt to

prevent legitimate users from reaching a specific network

resource, from a single source.

Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) is an extension to a

DoS attack however is harder to mitigate because source traffic is

from multiple source addresses. The attack traffic can be difficult

to distinguish from legitimate traffic.

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Types of DoS Attacks

Layer 3 (Network Protocol) - (DoS, DDoS, DRDoS, CDRDoS)

IP Address attacks targeting network bandwidth - UDP Flood style attacks – DNS, NTP, SSDP, CHARGEN, SNMP.

Layer 7 (Application Protocol) (DoS, DDoS) TCP attacks on server sockets

HTTP attacks on Web server threads Protocol Attacks (SYN flood, fragments) Packet Storm (Excessive PPS)

Resource Starvation (CPU, I/O, Memory) Stealth/Creeper (Slowloris, Slow POST) Exploit (Application or OS Specific DoS)

They attack the top layer OSI model, They have low bandwidth consumption. They have a legitimate and stealth appearance.

They’re mostly non-volumetric. They’re increasingly popular.

There are a variety of methods, targets, and open-source tools. They’re difficult to defend against.

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Common DDoS Defensive Techniques

Simple Site Failover

Null Route (Black Hole) (Automated or Manual)

Anycast – BGP Multi Home

Onsite Web Application Firewall

Load Balancing Appliances

Commercial Hardware Solutions – On Premises

Commercial Solutions – In the Cloud

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Large Global Denial of Service attacks

Second Largest

300G

DDoS Attack in History March 2013 DNS Reflection Attack Largest

400G

DDoS Attack in History February 2014 NTP Reflection Attack

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Micron21 Statistics

Long Term Average Since Jan 2013

Long term average attack lasts 34.5 hours

China is #1 origin of DDoS traffic, making up 40-50% of all

unwanted traffic activity

25% of attacks are against Infrastructure (Layers 3 attacks)

75% against Connection and Applications (layer 4 to 7 attacks)

75% of all attacks are under 1 Gbit

20% of all attacks are under 4 Gbit

5% of all attacks are above 4 Gbit

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Tools used by Faceless Hacker in Layer 4 to 7 Attacks HTTP GET Flood

Syn Flood Attack Ack Flood Attack

SSL Based Attacks - CURL back track, THC SSL very hard to detect LOIC Low Orbit Ion Cannon

R.U.DY R U Dead Yet Slowloris

Pylorius DDoSim

THC-SSL-DOS

Dirt Jumper Drive2 – Method: HTTP flood, SYN flood, POST flood, and more. Tor’s Hammer – Method: Slow POST

Nuclear DDoSer – Method: Slow POST Railgun – Method: Slow POST

HTTP has a 60 known vulnerabilities which can be attacked

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Micron21 Total Attacks Since January 2013

Attack Type Attack Count Dropped Traffic Dropped Traffic (packets) Dropped Traffic Percentage of Percentage of Attack Type

SYN-Flood 544,272 260.7 G 547.4 M Less than 1.0% 43%

ACK-Flood 161,204 175.9 G 227.1 M Less than 1.0% 12.8%

UDP-Flood 111,429 2,660,087 G

(2597 TB) 47 Billion 98.0% 8.9%

ICMP-Flood 2,962 243.2 G 310.6 M Less than 1.0% 0.23%

Conn-Flood 173,042 44.2 G 8.6 M Less than 1.0% 13.8%

Stream-Flood 131,076 734.8 G 93.4 M Less than 1.0% 10.4%

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Current Active DDoS Attacks -

42 Current 19th Aug 2014 8:14pm

Total Data PPS Target Type Port Peak Speed

0.05GB 49 111.223.226.91 Others 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 20 103.4.18.149 Stream Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 4 111.223.232.30 SYN-Flood 443 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.75.35 Conn-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.231.34 ACK-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.75.36 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.75.35 Conn-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.105.189 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.228.178 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.231.34 ACK-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.75.35 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.105.189 Conn-Flood 25 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.228.186 ACK-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.228.178 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.231.34 ACK-Flood 21 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.75.36 SYN-Flood 443 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.75.35 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.105.189 ACK-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.228.178 SYN-Flood 25 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.231.34 Conn-Flood 443 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.228.178 Conn-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.66.209 Others 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.105.189 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.228.178 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.75.35 ACK-Flood 443 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 27.131.105.189 SYN-Flood 80 0.0Mbps 0.0GB 1 111.223.231.34 Conn-Flood 25 0.0Mbps

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Firewalls and Layer 4 to 7 Attacks

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Juniper SSG550M Firewall Specifications

ScreenOS version tested ScreenOS 6.2

Firewall Perf (Large Packets) 1+ Gbps

Firewall Performance (IMIX) 1 Gbps

Firewall Packets Per Second 600,000 PPS

3DES+SHA-1 VPN Perf 600 Mbps

Concurrent VPN Tunnels 1,000

Max Concurrent Sessions 256,000

New Sessions/Second 15,000

Max Security Policies 4,000

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ACK Flood – Juniper SSG 550m Firewall

BOTNET 983 hosts

Each bot sends 8 packets per second at 25 bytes in size 7832 packets per second – 1.5mbits of traffic

Juniper SSG 550m 0.25m TCP sessions fails in 32 seconds Juniper SRX 1400 / Sonic Wall SuperMassive 9000 1.5m TCP sessions fails in 3.2 minutes Juniper SRX 3400 / Sonic Wall SuperMassive E10200 TCP 3.0m sessions fails in 6.4 minutes Juniper SRX 5800 / 100m sessions (over $1m investment) unlikely to fail with this attack

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Layer 4 to 7 Attacks Prevention

How Does Micron21 Prevents Stateful devices from failing?

IE. Firewalls and Load Balancers ?

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So How Does NSFOCUS work

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NSFOCUS ADS - 6020

Collapsar 流量清洗系列 ADS 4020(10-20G) 8,928,000 pps ADS 6020 (20-40G) 14,880,000 pps Attack Mitigation ADS ADS 2010 (2G) 1,488,000 pps ADS 2020 (4G) 2,976,000 pps

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ADS -- Multilayer Cleaning

Rate Limit

2. Access Control List

 Layer 4 ACL  Conn-Exhaustion ACL  URL ACL 1. Protocol Analysis Protocol Validation by RFC Check 3. Reputation List  White/Black List  Dynamic Prioritizing 4. Layer 4 Flood Mitigation Source/destination IP address check/verification  Various mitigation algorithms Traffic Cleaning Center Internet 5. Layer 7 Flood Mitigation  Various mitigation algorithms Pattern Matching P ro to co l A na ly sis A cce ss C o nt ro l L is t Re p ut at io n L ist La ye r 4 F lo o d M it ig at io n La ye r 7 Flo o d M it ig at io n Attacker 6: Rate Limit

Restricts traffic and

ensures the critical business.

1 2 3 4 5

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Packet Inspection and Capture

Netflow information is useless in application DDoS detection; you need advance packet inspection along with behavioral patterns.

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Selected Clients - NSFOCUS provides over

4000G+

DDoS mitigation

capacity to global customers

Telecommunications

Korea Telecom

Banking and Finance

Enterprises

Hosting , IDC, ISP, MSSP

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HQ

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Overview

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Regional Subsidiaries

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Jan. 2014 IPO

Over 13 years experience in DDoS mitigation

Dedicated to network security

About NSFOCUS

US: Santa Clara, US EMEA: London, UK Japan: Tokyo, JP APAC: Singapore Global Business HQ:

Santa Clara, USA CN HQ: Beijing Founded in 2000

Over 1,600 employees

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THANK YOU !

come and talk with us on our booth.

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