RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Earlier cases:PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. JOSE BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, SIEGFRED DEDURO y DELFIN alias "Raul Delfin y Zerrudo”, ET AL., G.R. No. 92739, August 2, 1991
FACTS:
On 2 September 1989, an information for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 ["An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein and for Other Purposes"] was filed against nine persons by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. The information recommended no bail, the accused allegedly being leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
After arraignment, the accused filed petition for bail. The prosecution filed opposition except as to accused Catalina Peras, who was then in her eighth month of pregnancy, and for which the court thereafter fixed bail.
While the prosecution was still presenting evidence for purposes of determining whether or not bail should be granted, the court issued an Order fixing bail for the five of the remaining eight accused. The court, however, denied the application for bail of the three other accused on the ground that insofar as these particular accused were concerned, the evidence of guilt was strong.
The trial court disallowed the prosecution’s request for its witness, a computer programmer, to print out in open court the material encoded in certain diskettes seized from the accused by virtue of a search warrant. According to the trial court the diskettes have been in possession of the
prosecution since the start and anything may happen while they were in their possession. The court explained that to let the witness operate the computer is very dangerous, because the witness said that these diskettes can be manipulated or altered which would be prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
HELD:
The respondent Judge's insinuation or speculation that the prosecution, considering the fact that it had the diskettes in its possession prior to the hearing, may have tampered with them appears absolutely baseless and quite unfair to the prosecution. Such statement had in fact no basis in the evidence before the respondent Judge. There was neither testimonial evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes themselves which might indicate they had actually been tampered or their contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the accused. Respondent Judge was in effect charging the prosecution with fabricating evidence against the private respondents, which constitutes serious misconduct and quite possibly a criminal offense.
The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had altered or tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objectives. Indeed, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
We, therefore hold that the printing out of data (if any) encoded in the diskettes should be allowed. Respondent Judge's asserted apprehension that the witness brought in by the prosecution to undertake the printing out of the diskettes' contents could himself "manipulate" said diskettes during the actual printing out in court may very easily relieved by designating a competent person agreeable to both parties, and especially to respondent Judge, who can perform the task of printing out the contents of the diskettes. Respondent Judge's ostensible lack of confidence in the prosecution witness should not in any way affect the integrity of the diskettes themselves or the right of the prosecution to show the contents of the diskettes subject, of course, to applicable rights of the accused.
Moreover, contrary to accused’s contention that the diskettes themselves should be deemed inadmissible in evidence because they
were not included in the things mentioned in the search warrant, we find that these diskettes had been sufficiently described in the search warrant. The search warrant states:
You are, therefore, hereby commanded to make immediate search at any time of the day or night of Rm. 31 of the third floor of said building where the persons or suspects above-named are presently occupying and to seize and to take possession of the following properties used or intended to be used as the means of committing violation of RA 1700 and/or Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code:
Incendiary or subversive documents, pamphlets; books, computer print-outs and subversive materials, and computer machine used imprinting seditious or subversive literature.
The phrase "computer machine used in printing seditious or subversive literature" is appropriately regarded as necessarily including diskettes into which data is encoded and stored, such as those seized in the present case on the same occasion the computer itself was seized, for indeed a computer system cannot store and print out any data without diskettes. Technically and realistically speaking, diskettes are deemed integral parts of a computer system, the diskettes constituting one of the "input-output devices" or "peripherals," in the same manner that the keyboard is an "input-output device" and the monitor, keyboard and printer are "peripherals" in relation to the memory or central processing unit (CPU) of a computer system.
IBM PHILIPPINES, INC., VIRGILIO L. PEÑA, and VICTOR V. REYES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANGEL D. ISRAEL, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999
FACTS:
IBM Philippines, Inc. (IBM) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling computers and computer services, with Virgilio L. Peña and Victor V. Reyes as its ranking officers. Angel D. Israel on the other hand was employed by IBM as Office Products Customer Engineer, who was assigned to the team supervised by Reyes. On June 27, 1991, Reyes handed a letter to Israel informing him that his
employment was to be terminated effective July 31, 1991 due to habitual tardiness and absenteeism.
Alleging that his dismissal was illegal, Israel filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on July 18, 1991. In its defense, alleged that Israel had unsatisfactory performance in the company and was given sufficient warning and opportunity to "reform and improve his attitude toward attendance," but which he never did. According to IBM, Israel was constantly told of his poor attendance record and inefficiency through the company’s internal electronic mail (e-mail) system, which allows paperless or "telematic" communication.
The word "telematic" is not yet found in regular English dictionaries, and according to IBM it is derived from the French word telematique which is used in communications to refer to the combination of computers and telecommunications for data processing and information communication among IBM personnel in the company offices here and abroad. An employee is assigned a "User ID" and the corresponding password is provided by the employee himself and, theoretically, known only to him. Employees are then expected to turn on their computers everyday, "log in" to the system by keying in their respective IDs and passwords in order to access and read the messages sent to and stored in the computer system. To reply, an employee types in or encodes his message-response and sends the same to the intended recipient, also via the computer system. The system automatically records the time and date each message was sent and received, including the identification of the sender and receiver thereof. All messages are recorded and stored in computer disks.
IBM submitted copies of print-outs of alleged computer entries/messages sent by Reyes to Israel through IBM’s internal computer system. Through these computer print-outs calling Israel’s attention to his tardiness and absenteeism, IBM sought to prove that Israel was sufficiently notified of the charges against him and was guilty thereof because of his failure to deny the said charges. The labor arbiter found in favor IBM and dismissed the complaint.
Prior to the release of the labor arbiter’s decision at 11:21 a.m. on March 26, 1992, Israel filed a "Manifestation And Motion To Admit Attached New Evidence For The Complainant" which was received by the Arbitration Branch at 10:58 a.m. of the same day. The evidence
consisted of Israel’s Daily Time Records (DTRs) for the period June 1, 1990 to August 31, 1990 and pay slips for the period January 1990 to June 1991 showing that Israel did not incur any unexcused absences, that he was not late on any day within the period and that no deduction was made from his salary on account of tardiness or absences.
Israel appealed to the NLRC which thereafter reversed the labor arbiter’s decision and found private the dismissal illegal. The NLRC ruled: (1) that the computer print-outs which IBM presented in evidence to prove that Israel’s office attendance was poor were insufficient to show that the latter was guilty of habitual absences and tardiness; and (2) that Israel was not heard in his defense before the issuance of the final notice of dismissal.
IBM argued that the computer print-outs submitted by them need not be identified or authenticated according to the rules of procedure in regular courts in order for the same to be admissible in evidence. They contend that technical rules of evidence do not apply to administrative/labor cases and because of a relaxation of the rules of evidence, Israel was in fact allowed by the labor arbiter to adduce additional evidence even after a decision had been rendered.
HELD:
It is indeed true that administrative agencies, such as the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases. This was the reason Israel was allowed to submit additional evidence even after the case was deemed submitted for resolution by the labor arbiter. The practice of admitting additional evidence on appeal in labor cases has been sanctioned by this Court.
However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process.
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of IBM, afford no assurance of their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
In Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja,26 [186 SCRA 431 (1990)] this Court struck down the decision of the Director of Labor Relations which was based on an unsigned and unidentified manifesto. It was held:
From even a perfunctory assessment, it becomes apparent that the "evidence" upon which said decision is professedly based does not come up to that standard of substantiality.
It is of course also a sound and settled rule that administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure observed in the courts of law, and this so that disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible. But what is involved here transcends mere procedural technicality and concerns the more paramount principles and requirements of due process, which may not be sacrificed to speed or expediency...The clear message of [Article 221 of the Labor Code] is that even in the disposition of labor cases, due process must never be subordinated to expediency or dispatch. Upon this principle, the unidentified documents relied upon by respondent Director must be seen and taken for what they are, mere inadmissible hearsay. They cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be deemed substantial evidence of the election frauds complained of.
Likewise, in the case of EMS Manpower & Placement Services v. NLRC,27 [276 SCRA 117 (1997)] the employer submitted a photocopy of a telex which supposedly shows that the employee was guilty of "serious misconduct" and which became the basis of her dismissal. This Court ruled that the telex, a "single document, totally uncorroborated and easily concocted or fabricated to suit one’s personal interest and purpose," was insufficient to uphold the employer’s defense.
In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held as incompetent unsigned daily time records presented to prove that the employee was neglectful of his duties:
Indeed, the [DTRs] annexed to the present petition would tend to establish private respondent’s neglectful attitude towards his work duties as shown by repeated and habitual absences and tardiness and propensity for working undertime for the year 1992. But the problem
with these DTRs is that they are neither originals nor certified true copies. They are plain photocopies of the originals, if the latter do exist. More importantly, they are not even signed by private respondent nor by any of the employer’s representatives...
In the case at bar, a specimen of the computer print-out submitted by petitioners reads:
Date and time 10/12/90 09:23:1 From: REYESVV -- MNLVM1
To: ISRAEL -- MNLRVM Israel, A.D. SEC: I IBM INTERNAL USE ONLY Subject:
Angel, have been trying to pin you down for a talk the past couple of days. Whatever happened to our good discussion 2 weeks ago? I thought you would make an effort to come in on time from then on? If you have problems which prevent you from coming in on time, let me know because I would really like to help if I can. The sum of all your quotas is less than mine so I really need all of you pitching in. Kindly take a look at your proofs in-tray as there are some to do’s which are pending. Acts such as St. Louis U. and NEECO should be worth looking into as they’ve been inquiring about upgrading their very old boxes. If you are too tied up for these accounts do let me know so I can reassign. By Monday morning please. Let’s give it that final push for the branch!
============================================== ===
Regards from the APPLICATION MNLVM 1 (REYESVV) SYSTEMS MARKETING group T (832)8192-279
Victor V. Reyes - Marketing Manager
============================================== ===
Not one of the 18 print-out copies submitted by petitioners was ever signed, either by the sender or the receiver. There is thus no guarantee that the message sent was the same message received. As the Solicitor General pointed out, the messages were transmitted to and received not by private respondent himself but his computer.
Neither were the print-outs certified or authenticated by any company official who could properly attest that these came from IBM’s computer system or that the data stored in the system were not and/or could not have been tampered with before the same were printed out. It is noteworthy that the computer unit and system in which the contents of the print-outs were stored were in the exclusive possession and control of petitioners since after private respondent was served his termination letter, he had no more access to his computer.
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., versus REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
FACTS:
The accusatory portion of the Amended Information for Libel filed by the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory
article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex F of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Several of the accused challenged the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.
Petitioners moved to quash the Information which, they alleged, failed to vest jurisdiction upon the court because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. The trial court denied the motion.
ISSUE: Was venue properly laid? Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the offense charge?
HELD:
In the present case, petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC on whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, which reads:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 255, the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo, G.R. No. L-47880, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 699, which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication. The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125813, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 279, 285-286, explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioner’s website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s pronouncements in Chavez, supra, at 291-292, are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.
Comment:
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (Republic Act No. 10175) punishes the crime of libel committed through the use of the Internet, in this manner:
“Sec. 4(c)(4) Libel. – The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.”
The new law does not change the definition of the crime of libel under the Revised Penal Code. However, it does two things.
First, it adds a new element—the crime must be committed through a computer system or any other similar means that may be devised in the future. Second, the crime of “Internet libel” is punishable by a penalty one degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code. Under the new law, the penalty is imprisonment for a minimum period of four years and one day to a maximum of eight years, per offense.
Top 5 cybercrime complaints Online Libel
Online Scam Identity Theft Online Threat
Anti-Photo and Video VoyeurismAct
In 2016 –– online libel emerged as the top complaint of Filipino internet users, with 494 complaints recorded compared to 311 recorded in 2015. It comprised 26.49% of the 1,865 cybercrime complaints for 2016.
Meanwhile, online scam complaints came in at second place, with 444 complaints in 2016, up from the 334 complaints recorded in 2015. Rounding up the top 5 complaints were identity theft, online threats, and violation of the anti-photo and video voyeurism act.
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC) Rule 1
COVERAGE
Section 1. Scope. – Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall apply whenever an electronic document or electronic data message, as defined in Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.
Sec. 2. Cases covered. - These Rules shall apply to the criminal and civil actions and proceeding, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases. [A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002]
Section 3. Application of other rules on evidence. – In all matters not specifically covered by these Rules, the Rules of Court and pertinent provisions of statutes containing rules on evidence shall apply.
Rule 2
Electronic signature – refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures.
Digital signature – refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately determine:
i. whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key; and
ii. whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made.
"Digitally signed" refers to an electronic document or electronic data message bearing a digital signature verified by the public key listed in a certificate.
Electronic document – refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
Electronic data message – refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
Ephemeral electronic communication – refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
Rule 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents. – Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.
Section 2. Admissibility. – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.
Section 3. Privileged communication. – The confidential character of a privileged communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.
Rule 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Section 1. Original of an electronic document. – An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. – When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the original.
Rule 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. – A document electronically notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.
Rule 6
Section 1. Electronic signature. – An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticated in the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written document.
Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. – An electronic signature may be authenticated in any of the following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verify the same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature.
Section 3. Disputable presumptions relating to electronic signatures. – Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated without error or fault.
Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and,
(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.
Rule 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. – In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be considered:
(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated, including but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant agreement;
(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored, including but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as programming errors;
(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and information system;
(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information system upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based; or
(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic document or electronic data message.
Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. – In any dispute involving the integrity of the information and
communication system in which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded or stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors:
(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system;
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with interest adverse to that of the party using it; or
(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using it.
RULE 8
BUSINESS RECORDS
AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Section 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. – A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
Section 2. Overcoming the presumption. – The presumption provided for in Section 1 of this Rule may be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of the source of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation, transmission or storage thereof.
Rule 9
Section 1. Affidavit evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.
Section 2. Cross-examination of deponent. – The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party.
Rule 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1. Electronic testimony. – After summarily hearing the parties pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may authorize the presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the court shall determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and conditions as may be necessary under the circumstances, including the protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.
Section 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. – When examination of a witness is done electronically, the entire proceedings, including the questions and answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypist or other recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript done by him. The transcript should reflect the fact that the proceedings, either in whole or in part, had been electronically recorded.
Section 3. Storage of electronic evidence. – The electronic evidence and recording thereof as well as the stenographic notes shall form part of the record of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be deemed prima facie evidence of such proceedings.
Rule 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. – Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. – Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
RA 10175 was passed on Sept. 12, 2012. The Supreme Court declared it constitutional last February 18, 2014, except three provisions on the automatic takedown clause, real-time collection of online data and on unsolicited commercial communication, like spam. The High Court upheld the Internet libel provision but limited it to the author of the libelous statement and clarified that only original authors of libelous material are covered by the Cybercrime law, and not those who merely received or reacted to it.
Instances when cybercrime law was applied:
1. The Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor has indicted an American who allegedly maligned the reputation of his co-worker on Facebook in 2014. Prosecutor Fatima Asjali-Maadil found evidence to charge Andre Philippe Laflamme with violation of Republic Act 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, before the Regional Trial Court.
In her judicial affidavit, the complainant alleged that the respondent, a senior manager of their outsourcing firm based in Cebu City, defamed her on the social networking site, by posting her photo
with the caption, “I’d do anything for money.” According to complainant “In posting that ‘I’d do anything for money,’ respondent imputed a vice upon me by insinuating that I have a serious character flaw and he did it publicly through Facebook,”
2. A woman from Cebu who allegedly maligned a single mother in a social networking site was also charged before the Cebu City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violating Republic Act (RA) No. 10175 otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The accused called the victim names like “cheap.”
In her affidavit, complainant alleged that the accused sent her messages through cellular phone criticizing her for allegedly hurting a man on Sept. 16, 2013. It was further alleged that complainant and this man were in an illicit affair. The accused threatened complainant that she will post the libelous statements on Facebook, whereupon complainant deactivated her account. But the accused continued to malign the complainant. When complainant reactivated her Facebook account, she then was able to read the accused’s accusations against her.
According to complainant, the accused posted the following statements against her: “This the counterfeiter, forger and a thief. A lot of cases will be coming out soon from Cebu. Beware of this woman!” 3. On March 13, 2012, an information for libel was filed in the RTC against a teenager blogger and four others. The group was accused by complainant of maligning her on a blog posted by one of them on April 6, 2008, on the website Multiply. According to complainant the group put a Yahoo Messenger conversation between them on a blog by one of them titled “Meet My Backstabber Friend” but “edited” her chat name into an alias.”
Complainant further alleged that several persons commented on the blog further mocking her with contempt and insults. Worse, details of confirming complainant’s identity were placed, like deliberate and obvious hints in a sarcastic fashion of a futile attempt to cover up. One of those who commented referred to the object of the blog as a “bitch” and other derogatory names.
The information alleged that “Calling a person ‘backstabber,’ ‘ugly,’ ‘frikin face,’ ‘mother frikin dead kid,’ ‘loser,’ ‘bakla,’ ‘bitch,’ ‘ass’ and ‘liar’ within the knowledge of other persons is defamatory because there is
an imputation of a condition or a status, which tends to cause dishonor or contempt of the offended party,”
CASES:
ZALDY NUEZ vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, A.M. No. CA-05-18-P, April 12, 2005 FACTS:
Complainant Zaldy Nuez filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of text messages they exchanged via short message service (SMS), complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for Php1Million.
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time, to which respondent replied, “Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya na.” Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to make the decision. Respondent even admonished complainant with the words “Wala tayo sa palengke iho!” when the latter bargained for a lower amount.
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force-Special Projects Group (PAOCTF-SPG) where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for Php1Million was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission (PAOCC).
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia Siringan, a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-law. During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of Php1Million, he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out. Respondent also explained that the amount guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later.
When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA 5th Division where complainant’s case was pending. She also claimed that she will not get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their second transaction and the reason why the amount was closed at Php1Million was because on a previous occasion, only Php800,000.00 was paid by the client despite the fact that the amount had been pegged at Php1.3Million. Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of Php700,000.00 while the balance of Php300,000.00 will be paid once
the decision had been released. However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned their lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance of Php500,000.00 after the decision had come out.
Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting. After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, “Ah, panalo ka”. The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo Maclang (Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena (Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos Reyes arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee. Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent. The envelope did not actually contain the Php1Million demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper money in denominations of Php100.00, Php500.00 and Php1,000.00, as well as newspaper cut-outs. There were also ten (10) authentic Php100.00 bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder by the PAOCTF. The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away and there were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the whole transaction.
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m. She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the meeting. Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that were shown on Imbestigador. She thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive the money.
More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and she was afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be arrested and handcuffed. At one point, she even said, “Ayan o, tapos na silang
kumain, bakit hindi pa sila umaalis?”, referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay respondent’s suspicion, the two agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was going on.
Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour. Complainant and Siringan bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning. Respondent became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant.
On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the Pp1Million.
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed.
Question 1: Under the facts of this case, are the text messages (SMS) admissible in evidence against respondent?
Answer: Yes. Text Messages constitutes an Ephemeral electronic communication which is considered an electronic evidence. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for Php1Milliion in exchange for a favorable
decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
Question 2: How should Ephemeral electronic communications be proven under the rules?
Answer: Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant.
It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS v. CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-81-CA-P, September 9, 2005 FACTS:
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. On appeal, the case was assigned to the 6th Division of the Court of Appeals. Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a Php200,000.00 bond. Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed that respondent CIELITO M. SALUD had unusual interest in the Lagua case. The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found. Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.
On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m. In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent Cielito M.
Salud. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative.
What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:
4. That upon telephone queries made with the office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, I learned that Rhodora Valdez is the incumbent Process Server of RTC, [Branch] 163, Pasig City, from which the original case against accused-appellant Lagua originated. Disguising myself as accused-appellant Lagua’s relative, I dialed [Branch] 163, RTC, Pasig (6314273) but Rhodora Valdez did not report for work that day, according to Baby (also known as Ester), her officemate (who) answered my call. She added that Rhodora Valdez has been waiting for us (Lagua’s relatives) to call. Her exact words were these: Wala si Rhodora. Meron lang siyang nilakad. Pero kahapon pa nya hinihintay ang tawag nyo. May kulang pa kayo eh. Kailangan kasing i-en banc sa Court of Appeals ang kaso ni Lagua.
5. That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, to inquire if it was usual/normal for her to text her process servers on the field for an update of their deliveries, to which she answered in the affirmative. While she was in the office, she texted Salud for his whereabouts and he replied, that he was on his way back to Quezon City. That was before 4 p.m., adding that his deliveries were ok.
6. That I got Salud’s mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I represented myself as Arlyn, Lagua’s relative. Most of his text messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received one text message from him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman of the 6thDivision and the ponente of C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this incident. Those stored in my phone are the following:
1. bkit, C rhodora to. 639204439082. Nov. 2003, 15:36:15
2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:14:47
3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:40:21
4. TAWAG K S AKIN 639204439082 7 Nov 2003 17:18:47
5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO 639204439082-7 Nov 2003 19:44:52 6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa middle nyo. Puede bang malaman 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:32:05
7. Gud evening. May gusto lng akong malaman. Sana alang makaalam kahit cino. Lito 6391844701117 Nov. 2003 19:54:20
8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora. Pwede bang malaman 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:37:57 9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta bukas nang umaga 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:56:31
10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na lang kta kung saan. 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:52:58
11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga magkita tyo. 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 20:57:10
12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May gusto lang ako malaman 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:02:41
13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa kasama ko kaninang lalakeng pinsan 639184470111 7 Nov 2003, 21:04:28
14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa hapon po puede kyo 639184470111, 7 Nov 2003 21:07:23 15. Kay Melchor Lagua 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:08:19
16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang lumabas 639184470111 7 Nov. 2003 21:13:05
17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:15:52
18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon. Bkit. 639184470111 7 Nov. 2003 21:54:24
19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB 639004039082 10 Nov 2003 12:09:32
20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa kanya. Ok naman 639184470111 7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13
21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO 639204439082 10 Nov. 2003, 12:20:16
22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO 639204439082 10 Nov 2003 15:12:14
23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S IYO. 639204439082 10 Nov 2003 18:36:03
7. That Salud called me up in the morning of November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I purposely did not answer him. Why did he need to call me up?
8. That I personally called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was delivered and when accused appellant Lagua was released. I learned that the Order of Release was received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua was released between 5-5:30 P.M. of November 7, 2003.
9. That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003. Again, I introduced myself as Lagua’s relative, Arlyn and told her I only wanted to know how much more we had to pay for Laguas release. She refused to entertain me because according to her, Hindi ikaw ang kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo, puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para magkita tayo. Pero lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud. Then, she [hung] up.
10. That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to Justice Magtolis. Out of the confrontation, we discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel, Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them to a certain Art, allegedly Lagua’s relative who he claimed approached him at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he gave these documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even before he could deliver the copy addressed to the Director of Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the office of accused-appellant’s counsel. Because of this information from Salud himself, I did not sign the Certificate of Service, Annex C.
11. That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to apologize. But before he could even say a word, he broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered, Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran.
Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals (CA) was subsequently charged with the following offenses:
1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;
2. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
3. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction, under Section 22, paragraphs (p), (t) and (u), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law.
Question 3: Respondent claims that the admission of text messages against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy. Is this claim valid?
Answer: Respondent’s claim is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.
At any rate, any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.
In Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT, et al., G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014
FACTS:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the Las Piñas Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.
