New Constitution Based on Human Dignity

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Bekir Berat ÖZİPEK Levent KORKUT

Murat YILMAZ Vahap COŞKUN Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ

Yusuf TEKİN

For a Fully Democratic Turkey

Not Constrained by Guardianship

New Constitution

Based on Human Dignity

This report was originally published in May 2011 and translated to English by Nasuh Uslu

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SDE THEMATIC WORKSHOPS

OF CONSTITUTION

PARTICIPANTS and CONTRIBUTORS

1st_{Workshop: Citizenship in the New Constitution} • Ece GÖZTEPE, Assoc. Prof. Dr. /Bilkent University

• Bekir Berat ÖZİPEK, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Faruk BİLİR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Selçuk University

• Levent KORKUT, Assist. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Murat YANIK, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Istanbul University

• Murat YILMAZ, Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Nihat BULUT, Prof. Dr. / Erzincan University

• Orhan MİROĞLU, author / daily Taraf • Uğur KARA, Anadolu University

• Vahap COŞKUN, Assist. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Vahit DOĞAN, Prof. Dr. / Gazi University

• Yasin AKTAY, Prof. Dr. / SDE Chairman

• Yasin POYRAZ, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Kırıkkale University

• Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ - Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yusuf TEKİN - Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group

2nd_{Workshop: Freedom of Religion and Conscience in the New Constitution} • B. Berat ÖZİPEK, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Bilal SAMBUR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Süleyman Demirel University

• Cennet USLU, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Gaziosmanpaşa University • Ferit USLU, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Hitit University

• Garabet PAYLAN, Manager in Armenian schools

• Halit Eyüp ÖZDEMİR, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Marmara University • Hasan Yücel BAŞDEMİR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Hitit University • İhsan ÖZBEK / Former Head of the Turkish Protestant Church

• Levent KORKUT, Assist. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Mehmet Faysal GÖKAL, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Muğla University

• Mehmet Süreyya ER, Dr. / Michiagan University • Merdan HEKİMOĞLU, Prof. Dr. / Izmir University

• Murat YILMAZ, Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Mustafa ŞENTOP, Prof. Dr. / Marmara University

• Müçteba KILIÇ, Lawyer, lawyer of Young Civilians Group • Şenol KALUÇ, LDT Director of Alewite and Bektashi Studies • Yalçın ÖZDEMİR, Su TV

• Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ, Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yusuf TEKİN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group

3rd_{Workshop: General Regime of Human Rights in the New Constitution} • Adnan KÜÇÜK, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Kırıkkale University

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• Ayhan DÖNER, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Erzincan University • Bülent YAVUZ / Dumlupınar University

• Cennet USLU, Assist. Prof. Dr. /Gaziosmanpaşa University • Faruk BİLİR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Selçuk University

• Hikmet TÜLEN, Dr. / the Constitutional Court • Hüseyin ÖZCAN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Istanbul University

• Murat YILMAZ, Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Musa SAĞLAM, Dr. / the Constitutional Court

• Nihat BULUT, Prof. Dr. / Erzincan University

• Vahap COŞKUN, Assist. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yasin AKTAY, Prof. Dr. / SDE Chairman

• Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ, Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yusuf TEKİN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yüksel METİN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Süleyman Demirel University

4th_{Workshop: Turkey’s Administrative Structure and the Principle of}

Decentralization in the New Constitution

• Bayram ÖZBEY, Assist. Prof. Dr./ Gaziantep University

• Bülent ALGAN, Assist. Prof. Dr. / TOBB Economy and Technology University • Hamza ATEŞ, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Kocaeli University

• Hüseyin KALAYCI, Assist. Prof. Dr/ Maltepe University • Halil KALABALIK, Prof. Dr. / Sakarya University • Melikşah YASİN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Marmara University • Murat YILMAZ , Dr. /SDE New Constitution Working Group • Ramazan ÇAĞLAYAN, Assoc. Prof. Dr./ Kırıkkale University • Sevim BUDAK, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Istanbul University • Şermin ATAK, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Dokuz Eylül University

• Vahap COŞKUN, Assist. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yakup BULUT, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Mustafa Kemal University

• Yusuf ŞAHİN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Karadeniz Technical University

• Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ, Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yusuf TEKİN Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group

5th_{Workshop: The Governmental System of Turkey in the New Constitution} • Adnan KÜÇÜK, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Kırıkkale University

• Ali Rıza ÇOBAN, Dr. / the Constitutional Court • Ayhan DÖNER, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Erzincan University • Bülent YAVUZ, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Gazi University • Ece GÖZTEPE, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Bilkent University

• Erdal ABDÜLHAKİMOĞULLARI, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Ondokuz Mayıs University • Faruk BİLİR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Selçuk University

• Hikmet TÜLEN, Dr. / the Constitutional Court • Hüseyin ÖZCAN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Istanbul University

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• Musa SAĞLAM, Dr. / the Constitutional Court • Nur ULUŞAHİN, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Başkent University • Ozan ERGÜL, Assist. Prof. Dr. / Ankara University • Şule ÖZSOY, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Galatasaray University • Tevfi k Sönmez KÜÇÜK / Yeditepe University • Yasin AKTAY, Prof. Dr. / SDE Chairman

• Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ, Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yusuf TEKİN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group

6th_{Workshop: Guardianship and Civil-Military Relations in the New}

Constitution

• Faik TARIMCIOĞLU, Law / (Retired) Military Judge / (Former) Member of Parliament

• Faruk BİLİR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Selçuk University • Lale KEMAL, journalist-author / daily Taraf

• Levent KORKUT, Assist. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Muhsin ÖZTÜRK, journalist / Aksiyon (magazine).

• Murat YILMAZ, Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Sertaç BUCAK / Politician

• Vahap COŞKUN, Assist. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yasin AKTAY, Prof. Dr. / SDE Chairman

• Yılmaz ENSAROĞLU, Human Right Activist / SETA Human Rights Coordinator • Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ, Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group • Yusuf TEKİN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. / SDE New Constitution Working Group

II. Members of SDE High Advisory Council, who Contributed the Draft

• Sacit Adalı - Prof. Dr. /Dean of Law Faculty, Turgut Özal University / Former Member of the Constitutional Court

• Ali Şafak - Prof. Dr. /Turgut Özal University / Former Dean of the Faculty of Security Sciences of the Police Academy

• Yasin Aktay - Prof. Dr. / Sociology / Selçuk University

• Beril Dedeoğlu - Prof. Dr. / International Relations / Galatasaray University • Doğu Ergil - Prof. Dr. / Political Science / Ankara University

• İhsan Dağı - Prof. Dr. / International Relations / Middle Eastern Technical University

• Kıvılcım Özcan - Assoc. Prof. Dr. / Economy / Bilkent University • Faik Tarımcıoğlu - Law / (Retired) Military Judge / (Former) Member of

Parliament

• Salim Uslu / Trade Unionist / Former Chairman of Hak-İş Confederation (trade union)

• Mehmet Atalay / Director of the Press Advertisement Institute • Mehmet Akif Ak – Chartered Accountant / Researcher-Writer • Aydın Bolat – Educationist / Analyst / (Retired) Military Offi cer • Mustafa Karaalioğlu - Journalist / Editor in Chief of daily Star • Alper Tan - Journalist / General Manager of Channel A • Mustafa Akyol - Journalist / Columnist in daily Star

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Turkey is going through a rapid transformation period. It tries to save itself from the effects of the military coup carried out on 12 September 1980; to solve its chronic structural problems and to establish democracy as it should be. It is possible to reach these goals only by radical changes in domestic and foreign policy. However, there are important obstacles before this transformation.

In this process, one of the most important obstacles in front of Turkey is the constitution which does not have characteristics of a genuine social contract and which does not allow change. Every proposal of structural change aimed at solving basic problems of the country and every effort of reform aimed at widening the realm of freedoms hit the barricades erected by the interim-period constitution.

In fact, creating a new constitution which is based on a democratic and pluralist political structure, which strengthens human rights and freedoms and which will allow Turkey to turn its face to the world, is a feasible and achievable goal.

A new constitution, which will be a social contract between the individual and the state; which will guarantee human rights and freedoms and which will be built upon a democratic and pluralist structure, needs a process of negotiation and debate which will be enriched with the participation of all people and all sections of the society.

Having these kinds of concerns, the Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE) has prepared this report on constitutional principles in order to contribute the emergence of a participatory constitution and a social consensus.

This report, which is the product of a 6-month work, essentially represents the search for an answer to the question “how can we contribute the efforts of meeting the need for a new constitution?” which has become more prominent after the referendum on 12 September 2010. Of course, different answers can be put forward for this question; different proposals and different methods can be produced. The method preferred in this report is to underline the basic problem areas which should be definitely overcome in the new constitution and to present proposals for them. In this context, the questions for which answers are sought can be lined up in the following:

• What should be the vision of the new constitution?

• How should the regime of human rights and freedoms be arranged in the new constitution?

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• How should the guarantees regarding the freedom of belief and worship be arranged in the new constitution?

• What should be the degree of the emphasis on ethnicity and how should the citizenship stripped of hints be defined in the new constitution?

• How can the institution of guardianship in the present constitutional structure be eradicated and how can the institutionalization of democracy be realized in the new constitution?

• What kinds of changes regarding the governmental system of Turkey should be included in the new constitution?

• What kind of reforms regarding the administrative structure should be included in the new constitution?

• How should the judiciary protecting human rights and establishing the constitutional state be arranged in the new constitution?

This report has been born as a result of the thematic workshops in which the answers were sought for the questions above. The workshops were shaped with the contributions of academicians who produce solutions by looking at Turkey’s problems from different political and ideological perspectives. A workshop was organized for each question stated above and academicians who are experts in each field participated in the related workshop. Of course, the statements included in this report are not direct opinions of the academicians who participated in the workshops. However, it should be stated that the main source of reference for this report are those thematic workshops. Therefore, we would like to extend our gratefulness and thankfulness to the participants of the workshops, whose names are mentioned at the end of the study, and to the members of SDE High Advisory Council for their contributions.

We are also obliged to thank the Foundation of Strategic Thinking and Research, which has encouraged us steadfastly to prepare this report and supported all these works.

SDE New Constitution Working Team

Bekir Berat ÖZİPEK

Levent KORKUT Murat YILMAZ

Vahap COŞKUN

Yusuf Şevki HAKYEMEZ

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I. THE VISION OF NEW

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Constitutional reforms can be realized in two ways: adapting the constitution to the requirements of the era with partial changes or creating a new constitution. Adapting to new developments in stable societies can be possible with partial changes in constitutions. As for turbulent communities, frequently new constitutions are made here. The history of the eighty-year old Republic of Turkey saw three constitutions. These constitutions had been generally prepared in undemocratic environments and through illegal methods. Moreover, with the Constitution of 1961, the tradition of employing the institutions putting the political system under guardianship was introduced. This tradition, which was continued with the Constitution of 1982, left human rights unprotected and made it impossible to establish the democratic constitutional state as it should be. In result, Turkey has not been able to reach constitutional democracy.

Beginning to question its system in the 2000s, Turkey is now after making a democratic, civil and pro-freedom constitution based on the rule of law. This effort can result in concrete results only with a new vision and new goals.

Of course, it will not be an appropriate attitude to perceive a new constitution as a magic wand which will solve all problems. Nevertheless, in a society which experienced top-down approaches in its constitutional history, it is a compulsion to make a new constitution in a free environment and with a participatory method. The examples in the world demonstrate that countries which wanted to strengthen their democracies built the constitutional infrastructure of democracy as a first task. In the countries such as Spain, the Republic of South Africa, Hungary and Poland, it became possible to move to democracy only with a new constitution.

A new constitution can be created only through reconstituting the mentality which lies at the basis of constitution. This new mentality should reign over all constitutional principles and institutions. In a country in which the development level of the society is ahead of the legal structure, a constitution which lags behind the dreams of the citizens will not be a new one even if it carries the title “new”. If a new social contract becomes a necessity in a country, a constitution which does not serve this goal will bring about disappointment rather than hopes. In short, the expectations

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from a new constitution will be evaluated in the light of the vision provided by it.

A constitution which is compatible with the social change and developments in the world

• should be based on human dignity, • should be aimed at full democracy, • should establish rule of law, and

• should have a vision of constitutional system, which takes diversity and pluralism at its basis.

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II. HUMAN DIGNITY

The concept of human dignity has gained an increasing attention and use in the constitutions of the world countries. While it was included in the constitutions of only four countries in the 1900-1947 period, this figure reached 40 between 1947 and 1997. This increase in the usage of the concept of human dignity in constitutions can be explained with that it constitutes the basis of human rights and freedoms. The Article 7 of the Helsinki Declaration underlines this connection by saying that “the participating States will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.” It is accepted in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. Acting on this acceptance, it can be said that the concept of human dignity consists of three elements, namely rights and freedoms, justice and peace.

A. Human Rights Approach in the New Constitution

The most important function of the constitution is to guarantee human rights against the power of the state. A constitutional state is legitimate as long as it protects human rights and maintains a suitable environment of freedom in which human rights and freedoms are exercised. Therefore, the constitution should guarantee human rights against the power of the state. In terms of human rights, priority should be given in the constitution to the individual and his/her freedom since they are important.

“The state which is based on human rights” should be included in the new constitution while the characteristics of the state are listed. Likewise, it should be stated in the preamble of the constitution that the essential priority of the constitution is the individual and his/her freedom and that the human dignity is inviolable by and superior to the state. Unlike the 1982 Constitution, the new constitution should not include the statements which restrict democracy and human rights as contrary to the universal standards and which are based on ideological choices; but it should contain the norms which are compatible with the function of the constitution such as the individual, freedom, the will of people, and the rule of law.

A kind of arrangement and list which will ensure the privileged position of human rights should be prevailed in the organization of the constitution.

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Regulating some of human rights in the constitution is important because of the strong emphasis which is put on them. It is not necessary to regulate all human rights in the constitution and this is not possible. In this point, it is important to internalize the principle “freedom is rule, restriction is exception”, which is the most essential principle of the human rights law. However, it is a necessity to include the issues which are related to the restriction of human rights together with their guarantees in the constitution.

Moreover, the care should be taken to demonstrate that the constitution gives priority to the individual against the state and it is based on human rights. For this purpose, human rights and their guarantees should be mentioned in the first articles of the constitution and the issues related to the restriction of human rights and the legal regime which will be applied to human rights in the state of emergencies should be regulated in the subsequent articles. This approach which did not exist in the constitutions of 1961 and 1982 will be interpreted as the clear sign that the constitution is individual and freedom-oriented. It should be stated that the type of arrangement in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany is like this.

To put it more clearly, in the constitution, firstly the nature of human rights should be mentioned; secondly, the articles regulating human rights clearly should be inserted; and finally the provisions regulating restriction of human rights and the regime which will be applied to human rights in the state of emergencies should be included. Rights and freedoms should be regulated explicitly in the articles in which human rights are mentioned and subsequently the specific reasons for restriction should be given. The articles in which human rights are regulated should be as short as possible and should emphasize freedom.

It will be appropriate not to include a separate article which prohibits the abuse of human rights in the constitution. In fact, Article 14 of the 1982 Constitution titled as “Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” has been used so far mainly as a constitutional support to restrict human rights in higher level. Therefore, it will be appropriate not to include in a pro-freedom constitution the articles which will bring such unfavorable results. As it is looked from the perspective of what should be, it is not necessary to regulate the prohibition of abuse of human rights in the constitution. Each freedom has an objective norm area and the abuses

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which stay outside the objective norm area from the legal perspective cannot benefit from the protection of this freedom. Even if the constitution does not include a provision on the abuse of rights, the abuse of rights cannot be protected from the legal perspective as a requirement of the objective limit of each freedom. The legislative can regulate the abuse of rights in the penal code to punish those who abuse rights.

B. The Nature of Human Rights

To emphasize the place of the natural law in the origin of human rights, an article which includes the statement that “everyone is entitled to untouchable, indispensable and non-transferrable rights which are attached to his/her personality and owned by birth” should be inserted in the constitution. Another meaning of the inclusion of such an article in the constitution is to declare the following: the important thing is not whether rights are recognized by the state authorities or not, but it is that the individual is entitled to these rights by birth because he/she is a human being. From this perspective, the constitution should be seen as a text which guarantees only the rights owned by the individual by birth and restricts the state authority with these rights. In a constitution which is focused on the individual and freedoms, it is a compulsion to emphasize the reputability and immunity of human dignity in an article regulating the nature of human rights.

It will be more correct not to bring the duty aspect of rights and freedoms to the fore in the article in which the nature of human rights is regulated. Of course, the individual might have duties to the other individuals, the society and his/her family since freedom cannot be unlimited. However, emphasizing the duty aspect in the constitution might affect negatively the freedom aspect of a constitution which gives priority to human rights. In fact, issues which are related to the duty aspect of each human right can be seen as a part of specific reasons for restriction which are included in each article regulating a separate freedom. In the new constitution, under the title of the nature of human rights it should be stated that everyone has the responsibility of respecting rights of others while exercising his/her own rights and freedoms instead of mentioning the duty aspect.

In the article in which the nature of human rights is regulated, the goals and duties of the state regarding human rights should also be included. But, while doing this, it is important to emphasize that the main goal and

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duty of the state is “to protect human rights and to remove all kinds of obstacles to human rights”. In Article 5 of the 1982 Constitution which is about the fundamental aims and duties of the state, issues related to the protection of the state instead of human rights come first. Since such an arrangement gives the priority to the protection of the state, the state cannot fulfill its role of expanding freedoms which is expected from it. If the state’s fundamental duty of protecting and improving human rights is clearly stated in the article titled as “the nature and protection of human rights”, it will be possible to hold a more pro-freedom approach toward human rights in the new constitution.

In terms of determining the limit of the state intervention in human rights, it is important to include in the article in which the nature of human rights or the regime of its restriction is regulated that none of the provisions of the constitution can be interpreted in a way to eradicate rights and freedoms stated in the constitution or to restrict them at a higher degree than sought in the constitution. Such a provision which is included in Article 17 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 14 of the 1982 Constitution actually emphasizes that the state cannot destroy human rights and cannot restrict human rights in a higher degree than stipulated in the constitution. In fact, the constitution should determine the minimum level or the “basement” regarding human rights and the maximum level or the “ceiling” in restricting human rights. The constitution should take these into considerations in terms of the position of human rights.

Proposal:

Everyone is entitled to untouchable, indispensable and non-transferrable rights and freedoms which are originated from human dignity, attached to his/her personality and owned by birth.

The limit of each individual’s rights and freedoms is the rights and freedoms of the others.

The fundamental aim and duty of the state is to protect human rights and to remove all kinds of social, political, economic and other obstacles in front of them.

None of the provisions of the Constitution shall authorize the state to destroy human rights or restrict them at levels higher than it is stated in this Constitution.

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C. The Regime of the Restriction of Human Rights

In pro-freedom democracies, human rights are essential and restricting them is an exceptional way which is resorted to in cases of necessity. Restricting human rights is necessary to protect rights of the others and to maintain order. However, in this process, the balance between restrictions brought for human rights and freedoms and the reasons for restriction should be determined correctly. For this purpose, the restriction of human rights should be enacted by the constitution or it should be arranged with laws if there is no clear restriction in the constitution. While this restriction is regulated, the clear provisions which will be taken into consideration by the legislative should definitely be included in the text of the constitution.

In the process of restricting human rights, specific reasons for restriction should be stated in each article regulating a freedom. It should be avoided to include in the constitution the provisions which could be interpreted as “general reasons for restriction” for all freedoms. Specific reasons for restriction should be determined in line with the universal human rights standards. Although it is possible to include in the constitution the specific reasons for restricting human rights, restriction should be resorted to as an exceptional measure and at a reasonable degree and only if it is necessary. Therefore, taking into consideration sub-elements of the principle of proportionality and the regime of restriction will be an important guarantee for human rights. In order to benefit from the principle of proportionality as a guarantee, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and especially the Constitutional Court should use this principle in the correct way.

Restrictive measures which will be brought about in terms of the restriction regime should not be contrary to the requirements of the democratic order of the society and restrictions should be implemented in a way not to touch the essence of a right. To comply with universal human rights standards, the Legislative which will regulate restrictions with laws and the Constitutional Court which will check the computability of restrictions with the constitution should take these points into consideration. Especially the Constitutional Court with a pro-freedom approach should interpret these principles and rules which will be obeyed while restrictions are implemented.

While formulating the regime of the restriction of human rights in the new constitution, the statements like the ones in Article 13 of the 1982

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Constitution (“not being in conflict with the requirements of the secular Republic”, “being in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Constitution”) should not be included in the new constitution. The content of these kinds of statements could be filled in different ways, they do not have any place in the regime of restriction of human rights in the comparative law and they could be interpreted ideologically. While the criteria which will be taken into consideration in restricting human rights are mentioned in the text of the constitution and the specific reasons for restricting a specific freedom is included in each article regulating a freedom, it is unnecessary to state also that restrictions should not be in conflict with the “letter of the constitution”. In fact, provisions regarding human rights are included in the constitution to be taken into consideration by the Legislative in restricting human rights or by the Constitutional Court in checking the compatibility of those restrictions with the constitution.

D. Social Rights

Another important issue concerning the general human rights regime is related to social rights. The basic problem here stems from the similar statements to the one in Article 65 of the 1982 Constitution titled as “the Extent of the Social and Economic Duties of the State”: “The State shall fulfill its duties as laid down in the Constitution in the social and economic fields within the capacity of its financial resources, taking into consideration the priorities appropriate with the aims of these duties.” These kinds of provisions might at first sight create the impression that as if they are related to all social rights. However, especially in the rights such as the right to organize labor unions and the right to strike, which could be seen within the framework of the right of negative status as a requirement of their nature, there can be no mention of the duty of the state in the form of fulfilling its duties stemmed from social rights. Actually, the right to organize labor unions and the rights to strike and lockout do not necessitate such form of negative state act as a requirement of their nature.

Therefore, if it is necessary, the provision that the state will fulfill its duties concerning social rights within the capacity of its financial resources can be inserted separately in the articles related to the rights other than the rights having the nature of negative status right such as the rights to organize labor unions, to strike and to lockout instead of a general article similar to Article 65 of the 1982 Constitution. Moreover, since the right to

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social security is directly related to the right to life, it should be taken into consideration that providing this right will not be limited with financial resources of the state.

In this context, concerning social rights,

• the new constitution should grant the right to organize labor unions, the right of collective bargaining and the right to strike equally to all people employed in all sectors without making any distinction between the public and private sectors;

• measures eradicating inequalities of poor, women, disabled and children should be taken in the field of social rights;

• health, education, sheltering and environmental rights should be regulated in parallel with the responsibilities stemmed from the international law on the basis of human dignity;

• the state should take positive measures as a requirement of the equality and the prohibition of discrimination.

E. Freedom of Religion and Conscience

Creating a social, legal and political environment in which the individual can practice his/her religious beliefs without violating the rights of the others is one of the requirements of a decent life based on human dignity. Therefore, it is important to develop a just legal framework and to create a constitutional formulation which will constitute its basis.

Such a legal framework requires a category of rights which will enable all people, believers and unbelievers and those who believe differently, to continue their lives within the society as equal individuals.

The freedom of religion and conscience represents a basic right which includes believing or not believing in a religion, practicing the requirements of belief or disbelief, practicing or not practicing rituals, changing religion, propagating beliefs, organizing sects, cults etc., being members of such organizations and leaving them, and not being forced to believe in a certain way or not to believe.

The legal and political precondition of realizing this is to establish the principle of impartial state which keeps equal distance to all kinds of identities. Although this principle is a viable goal which can be reached

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in many countries, it has not been established in many other countries including Turkey as required.

The freedom of religion and conscience cannot be realized only through constitutional and legal arrangements. Different practices were observed in the countries having the same constitutional framework. Freedoms are narrowed and expanded in different periods in some countries such as Turkey though the same articles are included in the constitution. These facts demonstrate that creating an ideal constitutional arrangement for a freedom is not sufficient to protect it.

It might also be added that the Constitutional Court interprets the same principles differently in different periods remaining under the influence of the political atmosphere. So, the value of the constitution in terms of protecting freedoms can be questioned.

However, all these points do not eliminate the importance of creating an ideal constitutional framework in terms of guaranteeing freedoms. The constitution is mostly – always in Turkey – a necessary precondition of guaranteeing freedoms even if it is not sufficient on its own.

If secularism will be included in the constitution as a political principle, the content of this principle should be defined in a way which will not contradict with human rights. This definition should be based on the freedom aspect which is the basis of the principle of secularism and should guarantee “the impartiality of the state between religions and beliefs.”

On the freedom of expression, it should be stated that no distinction is made between religious and non-religious types of expression or the idiom of “religious expression” should also be included in the part in which the freedom of expression is regulated.

On the freedom of association, the new constitution should provide guarantees against the prohibitive arrangements imposed on religious groups and sects.

The right to religious education should also be included in accordance with international human rights texts and international conventions. In this context, the individual should be granted with the rights to learn and teach his/her religion and to establish institutions providing religious education and the legitimacy of the private religious organizations should

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be recognized. The right to conscientious objection should definitely be included in the new constitution.

As it is valid for other articles mentioned in this report, only specific restrictions should be included in the constitution on the freedom of religion and conscience if they are necessary. These restrictions should be included only if there are an open threat and coercion.

In line with these points, the formulation of the article might be the following:

Everyone has right to the freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. This right also includes declaring and propagating thoughts and beliefs individually or collectively, openly or privately, and in the form of worship, teaching, practice, organizing and rituals.

Nobody can be forced to participate in worship, religious rituals and ceremonies and to declare his/her religious beliefs and opinions; nobody can be condemned and denounced because of the religious society to which he/ she belongs.

Everyone is entitled to receive education and to teach others in line with his/her religion and beliefs and to organize his/her educational institutions and to create his/her own curriculum. Education and teaching based on a religion and belief and the teaching of religious culture and ethics depend on the will of people and the demand of the legal representatives of children. As a requirement of the principle of impartiality, the state cannot discriminate anybody in the state employment because of his/her choices and practices grounded on religion, belief, sect, views and philosophical opinions. This guarantee is also valid for those who benefit from the services of the state. Conscientious objection is a right for all citizens. Nobody can be forced to perform public services which are contrary to his/her religious and philosophical beliefs and choices. The right of conscientious objection can be used in responsibilities toward the state in accordance with the principle of equality.

F. Freedom of Expression

The freedom of expression should be guaranteed in the new constitution. The freedom of expression should be allowed outside the situations of call for violence, racist discourse of hatred and enmity, insult and violation of private life. The freedom of press and the freedom of science and art should be regulated briefly and concisely and restrictions which will bring about in

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these freedoms should be compatible with the standards of the international human rights law. The present constitution includes unacceptable restrictions like the one that the right of press and to disseminate cannot be exercised to change the provisions of the first three articles of the Constitution. The new constitution should not definitely include such reasons for restrictions.

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III. RULE OF LAW

A. Justice

One of the leading factors which make individuals happy is to think that they are treated justly and fair behavior is dominant in their societies. While justice makes it possible to implement the equality in front of law, it has also functions guaranteeing individual security such as preventing the individual from being subjected to life conditions not compatible with human dignity and maintaining the balance of rights and freedoms among individuals.

B. Security of the Individual and the Principle of Equality

One of the most important characteristics of today’s democracies is that equality in front of law is secured through the constitution and the laws. Therefore, the new constitution should adopt the widest framework accepted by democratic state orders regarding equality. The prohibition of discrimination should also be included in the constitutional arrangement together with the principle of equality.

The constitutions of 1961 and 1982 considered the principle of social state among the basic principles of the Republic. However, practices in the last fifty years demonstrate that social state has been misunderstood and misapplied. This principle has been made the basis of the approaches of statism and centralism. They have been used to establish a statist socio-economic structure and as the justification for the state’s intervention in economy. Secondly, they have been tried to be made economic policies of the social state. However, the constitution should not defend certain economic policy. Economic policies are choices of political parties and they are implemented if they are supported by people. Instead of establishing constitutional basis for an economic policy on the ground of the principle of social state, it should be acted in a way that economic policies will bring about the principle of social state. The primary objective of social state should be to enable poor people to live a decent life compatible with human dignity.

In this context,

• Acting on the assumption that the security of the society cannot be ensured without ensuring the security of individuals, the state’s responsibility of ensuring the security of individuals should be

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included in the constitution. The principle of security of individuals, which is regulated in the constitution, will constitute the basic premise of the rights of health, environment, sheltering, basic education and social security.

• The foreigners who immigrate to Turkey since they are persecuted in their countries should be accepted as refugees. An arrangement which will make it possible to take measures to ensure the security of refugees should be included in the constitution.

• The principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination should be regulated in the new constitution in such a way to cover explicitly all reasons for discrimination included in all international human rights arrangements.

• Rights and freedoms of women as well as their social rights should be considered together with the measures which will eradicate inequalities.

• Measures which will ensure the individual security of poor and disabled people and children should be taken.

C. The Judiciary

The independence of the judiciary is a crucial principle in the constitutional state. However, in order to ensure fair trial, the independence of the judiciary should be considered together with the impartiality of the judiciary, which is its inseparable part. In order to ensure this, members of the judiciary should not act with ideological biasness. Ensuring the ideological impartiality of the state is the precondition of an independent and impartial judiciary.

The statement that judicial review is limited with checking compliance with the law should definitely be included in the text of the constitution. The judicial review embodies such a limitation due to its nature. Unfortunately, in Turkey, the judiciary resorts to the review of appropriateness by going beyond checking the compliance with the law; therefore, this rule should clearly be expressed in the constitution.

The position of the Court of Accounts which audits on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) should be reregulated. Since its audit and decisions given at the end of audit have technical/peculiar

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characteristics, it will be more appropriate to transform the Court of Accounts to a fiscal court. Moreover, the Court of Accounts should be equipped with the authority of effective supervision to apply its same rules and sanctions of supervision to all the state organizations including the military.

Important revisions are needed in the new constitution in the structure of the high judiciary organs including the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the duties and authorities of the Constitutional Court and the Court of Accounts. Although the 2010 amendments to the Constitution of 1982 have brought positive changes on the judiciary, shortages and problems still continue in those issues.

1. The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK)

The chairmanship position of the Minister of Justice in the HSYK is in conflict with European standards and the principles determined by the Venice Commission on the structure of high judicial organs. The membership of the Minister of Justice in the HSYK should continue, but the chairmanship should be undertaken by one of the elected members. In order to increase the democratic legitimacy of the HSYK, one third of the members should be elected by the Parliament. The care should be taken to elect the members from different fields. The Council should not be composed of only members of the judiciary. Academicians, lawyers and high-level bureaucrats should also be elected as the members of the Council.

The members of the Council who come from the judiciary should be elected according to the principle of broad and fair representation of the judiciary. In order to ensure a more pluralist structure while creating the Council, each member should vote only for one candidate in the elections which will be held in the Supreme Court, the Council of State and in the judicial and administrative judiciary. In this way, the members who are elected by certain circles in the institutions having the authority to send members to the Council will not be able to vote in the Council as a bloc. In addition, subjecting all decisions of the HSYK to judicial review will contribute the legality of the Council.

The changes regarding the HSYK which are mentioned above should be made as a whole. Otherwise, if the status of the Minister of Justice is changed before the Turkish Grand National Assembly is authorized to elect

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members for the Council, it might be moved away from the democratic legitimacy and it might be tilted to the caste system at a higher degree. Therefore, in creating the new structure of the Council, all requirements of the standards mentioned in the report of the Venice Commission titled as “Judicial Appointments” should be met.

2. The Structure of Higher Judicial Organs

Since the military has a considerable weight in Turkey’s political system, the High Military Court of Appeals and the High Military Administrative Court of Appeals, which are included in the Constitution should be abolished. First instance courts in the military judicial judiciary should be integrated into the judicial judiciary as disciplinary tribunals. Disagreements concerning the military administrative issues should be brought to first instance courts. This change is important in terms of bringing the powerful position of the military down to the normal level and is indispensable to build a judiciary compatible with the norm of constitutional state.

In the elections which will be held to elect members for the Supreme Court and the Council of State, competency should be the main criterion. Changes should also be made to transform high courts to real courts of precedents (cases) and appellate reviews should be transferred mainly to courts of appeals. While doing this, the number of chambers and members in the Supreme Court and in the Council of State can be maintained with temporary provisions which will be included in the Constitution until the problem of heavy workload is solved, but their number should be reduced after this problem is solved.

3. The Constitutional Court

The existence of provisions concerning human rights in the constitution is, of course, important. However, in the practice, the Constitutional Court empties the content of the constitutional guarantees of human rights with its interpretations in spite of clear provisions of the constitution. Therefore, a provision emphasizing clearly the basic function of the Constitutional Court in the protection of human rights should be included in the new constitution. In its judgments concluded so far, the Constitutional Court has held an approach favoring prohibitions rather than freedoms and has stayed behind the universal law standards. In relation with this reason,

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the structure of the Constitutional Court and its composition of members should be reformulated to enable the Court to make interpretations favoring freedoms.

Although the 2010 changes in the constitutional law have brought some positive developments, the present situation cannot be seen as ideal. The number of the members of the Constitutional Court should be increased to reach 21. In addition, the working order in the form of two chambers should be made more functional and the appeals of cancellation and objection should be discussed in the chambers. The conclusion of the appeals of cancellation and objection by the Court in its General Assembly, which is the present situation, increases the workload and this prevents the Court from concluding judgments with more potent reasons.

In order to create a more pluralist Constitutional Court structure, members coming from different circles should be included in it. The majority of the members should be elected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). As higher judicial organs, the Supreme Court, the Council of State and the Court of Accounts should be able to elect members directly for the Constitutional Court. When the president is elected by people, he/she should be authorized to elect a certain number of members. Although all the members are elected by the parliament in some European countries, the mixed method should be adopted in creating the structure of the Court to ensure pluralism and to prevent domination of certain circles in it. For this purpose, the TGNA should elect members through qualified majority vote.

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Proposal:

The Constitutional Court shall be composed of twenty-one members. Eleven members shall be elected by three fifths of the total number of the Turkish Grand National Assembly members. Three members shall be elected by the President. Three members shall be elected among the President and members of the Supreme Court by its General Assembly with absolute majority; two members shall be elected among the President and members of the Council of States by its General Assembly with absolute majority; and one member shall be elected among the President and members of the Court of Appeals by its General Assembly with absolute majority. One member shall be elected among the Constitutional Court reporters who have worked for at least five years by the General Assembly of the Constitutional Court with absolute majority.

If the TGNA fails to elect members with three-fifth majority in the third round, these members shall be elected by the President among candidates having the qualifications required.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall elect at least eight members among the academicians in the fields of law, political science, finance or public administration. Five of the academicians shall be elected among those who study in the field of law. The other three members which will be elected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the members which will be elected by the President might be elected among top level bureaucrats and people working in the field of law, who have fifteen-year professional experience. To qualify as members of the Constitutional Court, candidates are required to be over the age of forty and to be graduates of the faculties of law, economic and administrative sciences and political sciences. Members shall be elected once and for ten-year period. The members who reached the age of sixty-six shall be retired.

Another important issue in electing members for the Court is that objective conditions giving priority to competency should be taken into consideration. Otherwise, the Court will not be able to conclude judgments which will allow it to fulfill the functions expected from it. Acting on the clear emphasis included in the text of the constitution in this issue, the qualifications which are sought in electing members for the Court should be regulated in laws.

The right of the individual petition to the Constitutional Court should be expanded to include all rights, not only those in the context of the European

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Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Moreover, an effective mechanism functioning fast should be created to allow the Constitutional Court to examine and conclude individual petitions.

Provisions concerning the authorities of the Constitutional Court, which have created a great number of problems at the recent period, should be regulated explicitly in the constitution. The Court has acquired the authority of suspending the implementation and the authority of reviewing changes in the constitution in terms of their content through interpretation (analogy) and this has brought about serious problems. Therefore, it should be explicitly stated that the Constitutional Court cannot exercise authorities other than ones mentioned in the constitution.

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IV. FULL DEMOCRACY

A. An Order without Guardianship

In the studies measuring the performance of the world democracies, Turkey is considered among “semi-democratic” or “partially free” countries. Semi-democracy is a concept used for the regimes having the following characteristics: they are based on general elections and multi-party structure, but, in these regimes, the elected people are controlled by bureaucratic or monarchial elites; human rights including political rights are restricted in a way which will be contrary to democracy. These regimes allow pluralism and participation in a limited way. All these factors have been influential in calling Turkey as semi-democracy. A guardianship regime aimed at controlling the elected people, the restriction of political rights, the frequent dissolution of political parties and the obstacles in front of expressing political, religious and cultural values in the public sphere are main democracy weaknesses of Turkey.

The regime whish was established after the military coup on 27 May 1960 was a guardianship regime which aimed to keep the representatives of people under the guardianship of the bureaucratic power. The distinguishing characteristic of the 1961 Constitution was to have a limited understanding of democracy. This thinking which was based on the suspicion and fear felt from the will of the majority was reflected in the constitution and, as a result, the mechanisms which would protect the political values and interests of the statist elites were included in the constitution. In accordance with the ideology of the guardianship, the institutions and organs such as the Republican Senate, the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council were granted the authorities of supervising and monitoring the political power (the parliament and the government).

It is possible to say that these ideological concerns which had been influential became more decisive in the constitution of 1982. The creators of the constitution, who adopted the most authoritarian and the most statist interpretation of the guardianship ideology, expanded the area of the guardianship phenomenon which functioned on the state power-political power duality and consolidated the power and authorities of the guardianship organs on democratic politics and society.

The expressions and ideological choices which contradict with the impartiality of the state such as Atatürkism, the principles and revolutions of Atatürk and the Atatürk nationalism should not be included in the

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constitution. The provisions similar to the one in Article 58 of the Constitution (“the state shall take measures to ensure the training and development of the youth in line with the principles and reforms of Atatürk”) should also not be included in the constitution.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) was at the centre of this power bloc which kept democratic politics under its guardianship in accordance with the official ideology. It can be said that the military gained more strength and authority after each military coup through legal and constitutional arrangements.

1. The Removal of the Constitutional Arrangements Causing Guardianship from the New Constitution

In this context, the problem of Turkey, which should be solved in the first place, is the eradication of the guardianship system whose foundations were laid down with the Constitution of 1961 with all its elements. For this purpose;

• The provision in Article 1982, which was introduced for the first time by the Constitution of 1961, (sovereignty will be exercised through authorized organs) constitutes the legal basis creating the possibility of intervening in the democratic regime for bureaucratic mechanisms because of the uncertainty it has created on the use of sovereignty. In a founder text, in which general principles concerning the state organization and the basic rights are included, an issue as important as the exercise of authorities stemmed from sovereignty should be regulated in accordance with the values of democracy, rule of law and pluralism. In principle, the exercise of authorities stemmed from sovereignty should be limited only with the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. In line with these points;

The sentence “Sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the nation.

The nation shall exercise sovereignty through the legislative, the executive and the judiciary and in accordance with the principles prescribed by the Constitution”

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should be included in the section titled as “general principles”.

• The authority of changing the constitution should be vested only in the TGNA and nation. The Constitutional Court should not have any authority of reviewing constitutional changes. Possible contradictions in the process of constitutional change can be corrected easily in the Committee of Constitution and the General Assembly of the TGNA.

2. The Position of the Turkish Armed Forces

The constitutional position of the Turkish Armed Forces is another point of criticism which is important for the guardianship system. In order to eliminate these criticisms, the following points should be taken into consideration.

• The Turkish Armed Forces was organized as an autonomous organ within the administrative structure of the state in the period after the 1960 military coup. One of the important foundations of this autonomy was that although there was a separate Ministry of Defense within the central government, the armed forces was directly associated with the Prime Ministry instead of the Ministry of Defense. In the new constitution, the Turkish General Staff should be organized under the Ministry of Defense as it is the case in other democratic countries. Moreover, unlike the present constitution, the new constitution should avoid the expressions which will imply the autonomy of the armed forces. In addition, the decisions of the Council of Ministers should be conclusive in the promotion of the ranking officers within the military.

• The Military High Court of Appeals and the Military High Administrative Court of Appeals which was made a part of the judicial system as a result of the 1961 Constitution and the changes made in this constitution after the 1971 military intervention are the guardianship institutions which should not be included in the new constitution. First instance military criminal courts and first instance military disciplinary tribunals are seen in some democratic countries, but none of these countries has high courts of appeals belonging only to the military. In a legal system which has courts of appeal operating in the criminal judiciary and the administrative judiciary, creating a separate system for the military personnel is

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unacceptable since it violates the unity in the judiciary and since it provides a separate autonomous judicial system for a certain group of bureaucrats. Such an arrangement can be made only with the concern to protect the autonomy of the military field. The functions of the Military High Court of Appeals and the Military High Administrative Courts of Appeal should be transferred to the Supreme Court and the Council of States.

• The constitutional character of the National Security Council which has been regulated as a constitutional organ since the Constitution of 1961 should be ended and it should be regulated with the law as an advisory body which will work in issues related to the defense of the country against the outside threats. The National Security Council should be made an organ which will be used by the Council of Ministers in case of need and should not include military bureaucrats other than the Chief of the General Staff. Assigning jobs to the Council, which will enable it to intervene in daily politics, should be avoided.

• The Ministry of Internal Affairs should be responsible from all issues of security outside the defense of the state against the foreign threats. Internal security units which have military character and operate in the fields of border and internal security should be removed; a separate security unit should be created for border security; and, as it is done in democratic countries, the gendarmerie should be restructured to act as “rural police” or its functions should be transferred completely to the police. The principles and rules which will allow all these arrangements and changes of law should be included in the constitution.

• In Turkey, the government (the political power) nearly does not have any role in shaping the senior command level of the military. The military plans its own command structure within its hierarchy and the government approves it. However, it is unthinkable in a democratic regime that the government will not be a part of the process of determining the officers who will command the military. Therefore, the main determinant actor in this process should be the political authority and the appointments which will be made in the senior command level should be made by the political authority according to the criteria determined by the law.

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• The provision that the Chief of General Staff and the commanders of the main military forces shall be tried in the Supreme Court for offences related to their function, which has been introduced with the constitutional amendments in 2010, should be abolished and these kinds of offences should be brought before the first instance courts within the judicial system.

• The expenses of the military organs should be made transparent and auditable. The areas of inspection of all state bodies which review administrative and financial actions within the state structure should be determined in such a way to cover actions of the military organs; while the inspection organs having the constitutional character are regulated, auditing military organs should be stated clearly among their functions. The functions of the TGNA, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers in planning military expenses and in determining strategies for them should be included in the articles of the constitution on these organs.

• No provision should be included in the constitution concerning the schools under the supervision of the military and the police.

• Article 72 of the Constitution includes a general provision stipulating that national service shall be performed either in the Armed Forces or in public service. Acting in accordance with this provision, the Legislative body can enact the laws which will allow performing national service not only as military service but also as other public services. However, the legislative has not benefited so far from such an opportunity provided by the constitution. The new constitution should provide the right of conscientious objection and should include clear provisions stating that national service can be performed in public services.

3. Other Institutions of Guardianship

The guardianship institutions which are included in the Constitution of 1982 are not limited with the military. The guardianship is not maintained only through military organs; in the 1982 Constitution, there are many guardianship institutions which narrow the political sphere, which consider the elected people behind the appointed people, which restrict the freedom of movement of political authorities and which keep the social sphere as well as the political sphere under their guardianship. The steps should also

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be taken on the guardianship institutions outside the military while a new constitution is prepared. In this context;

• There is no need to include in the new constitution the State Supervisory Council, which was created in the 1982 Constitution in accordance with the model of powerful president and whose decisions are not binding.

• The arrangements which are called as the Reform Laws and regulated in Article 174 of the 1982 Constitution should not be included in the new constitution. Any provision stating that the Reform Laws cannot be claimed to conflict with the Constitution should not be included in the constitution.

In the same way;

• The Higher Education Council is an institution which has the real guardianship role over universities and which prevents academic freedom. This institution should be removed from the constitution and a new institution which will serve planning and coordination among universities and which will guarantee academic freedom and autonomy of universities should be established by law.

• Nearly all countries need an institution which will organize and supervise radio and television broadcasts. However, the Radio and Television Supreme Council, which has been established in Turkey for this purpose, gives the impression of being an actor imposing its guardianship on radio and television broadcasts by acting on the restrictive principles existent in the law. It should be stated in the first place that an institution organizing and supervising radio and television broadcasts does not have to be a constitutional institution. An institution established by law can meet the need. In addition, the law regulating such an institution should aim to expand freedom rather than to impose restrictions.

• As an institution which contradicts with the ideological impartiality of the state, the Atatürk High Institution of Culture, Language and History should not be included in the new constitution.

• The Presidency of Religious Affairs is an institution providing services by taking a certain religious understanding as its basis. The constitutional character of this institution should be ended. The

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thing which is ideal is that such an institution should not exist within the state structure. However, if this institution should be maintained because of the enforcing conditions, the two things should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the Presidency of Religious Affairs should be regulated in the form of an autonomous structure which will not undermine the religious impartiality of the state. Secondly, the organizations of the religious societies and groups of belief which cannot benefit from the services of the Presidency of Religious Affairs should be recognized as public legal entities.

B. Strengthening Decentralization: Proximity to People and the Principle of Locality

Centralism has been one of the basic characteristics of all the constitutions in Turkey’s constitutional history. The related provisions of the 1921 Constitution, which was the most powerful constitution in terms of the principle of decentralization, were not implemented. The founders of the Republic adopted a centralist understanding and could not accept that the organs of local administration would have administrative and financial autonomy. The organs of local administration were perceived as technical and administrative units serving the central government rather than as the area of local politics open to the participation of citizens. The Law of Municipalities, which was enacted in 1930 and had been in force until 2004, adopted an understanding of local administration depended on centralist politics and political guidance with the mentality of the one-party period.

1. Strengthening Local Administration

Today, regardless of being federal or unitary, all democracies are distinguished with their administrative structures rested on decentralization and participation. In order to reach a more advanced level of democracy, Turkey, which has presently the most centralist administrative structure in Europe, needs to start implementing the principle of locality and proximity to people at the possible shortest time. This principle is regulated in the third paragraph of Article 4 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.

In this context,

• Article 123 of the 1982 Constitution states that the administration is based on the principles of centralization and decentralization

New Constitution Based on Human Dignity

For a Fully Democratic Turkey

Not Constrained by Guardianship

New Constitution

Based on Human Dignity

SDE THEMATIC WORKSHOPS

OF CONSTITUTION

PARTICIPANTS and CONTRIBUTORS

Contents

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Introduction

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I. THE VISION OF NEW

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II. HUMAN DIGNITY

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III. RULE OF LAW

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IV. FULL DEMOCRACY

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