People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219
G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3
FACTS:
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
HELD:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM:
35
Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244
G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14
FACTS:
Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid.
HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31
FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.”
ISSUE:
W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.
HELD:
The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a Astorga v. Villegas Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.”
LATIN MAXIM: b2
Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133
G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws
ISSUE:
W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD:
RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181
G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD:
RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law.
LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d
People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje
Case No. 203
G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46
FACTS:
Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject.
ISSUE:
W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code.
HELD:
Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title,” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of the law.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation
Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121”. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121” does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.”
HELD:
Section 3 is constitutional.
Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act.
LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d
Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81
G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission.
ISSUE:
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” HELD:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional.
The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d
Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291
G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII, Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.
ISSUE:
W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675.
HELD:
RA 7675 is constitutional.
Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
LATIN MAXIM: 20a, d
Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)
FACTS:
The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing, with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos,’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government, after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three months.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid.
HELD:
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill.
The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, “An Act amending the Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law, which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill,” because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.
LATIN MAXIM: 37
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 148
G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51
FACTS:
Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato, violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.
ISSUE:
W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD:
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
LATIN MAXIM: d
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes
Case No. 169
G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No. 53
FACTS:
Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to Respondent’s indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47 with interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122.
ISSUE:
W/N Act No. 4122, entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,” is valid.
HELD:
Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments.
The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 37
People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 208
G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.50
FACTS:
Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were dismissed, to which the Government appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD:
Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d
Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.
Case No. 33
G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)
FACTS:
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.”
ISSUE:
W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. HELD:
No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions.
The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself, whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230
G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55
FACTS:
Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was “an Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act,” did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
ISSUES:
1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.
HELD:
No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only, and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. LATIN MAXIM:
People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Case No. 204
G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63
FACTS:
The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. HELD:
No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 210
G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83
FACTS:
In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37–1. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration.”
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was invalid. HELD:
Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37–1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission.
LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a
KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.
Case No. 68
G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)
FACTS:
DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase.
ISSUES:
1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase.
2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court.
HELD:
1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP.
2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase.
LATIN MAXIM: None
Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank
Case No. 57
G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)
FACTS:
Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%.
ISSUE:
W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995.
HELD:
Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law, the basic law prevails. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law.
LATIN MAXIM: 9c
China Banking Corp. v. CA
Case No. 59
G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.84
FACTS:
Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching, in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties.
2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. HELD:
1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties.
2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive.
LATIN MAXIM: None
Santos v. Honorable Estenzo
Case No. 140
G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)
FACTS:
The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company, of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother of the decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in attorney’s fees.
HELD:
Petition was dismissed.
1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress. Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case.
2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court.
LATIN MAXIM: 30, 35, 46a
Grego v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 120
G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98
FACTS:
One of the Respondents was elected for his 3rd and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner, who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31, 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively.
ISSUE:
W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording.
HELD:
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively.
The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, this does not fall under the scope of the term.
LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46c
Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan
Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)
FACTS:
Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees,” “meat inspection fees,” “corral fees,” “and internal organ fees,” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655.
HELD:
Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees.” One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains, if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others.”
LATIN MAXIM: 15a, 37
National Housing Authority v. Reyes
Case No. 85
G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
FACTS:
Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00, but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower. ISSUE:
W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation.
HELD:
Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is granted.
LATIN MAXIM: 37
Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 73
G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)
FACTS:
Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises, and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res
judicata? HELD:
This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties.
On the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res judicata does not apply.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 11a, 26,
Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;
Case No. 74
G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai-Alai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit.
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions.
LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
Case No. 169
G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)
FACTS:
Petitioner, an “Iglesia ni Cristo”, was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement “
RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service.
ISSUE:
1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional?
3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee.
HELD:
The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b
Tañada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUE:
W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication.
HELD:
No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a Gutierrez v. Carpio Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929) FACTS:
The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13, 1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had already elapsed.
ISSUE:
W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. HELD:
No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month” now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 39a
Guzman v. Lichauco
Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”, the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment.
ISSUE:
W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month. HELD:
The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term “month” must now be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days.
LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c U.S. v. Paniaga Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914) FACTS:
This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, the principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale.
ISSUE:
W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. HELD:
Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded.” This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named future date. The sale here of the property must stand.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c
PNB v. CA
Case No. 238
G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195
FACTS:
To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.
The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
HELD:
It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 9a, 9b
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124
G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19
FACTS:
Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so.
ISSUE:
W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants.
HELD:
Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a
U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300
G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20
FACTS:
They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that they owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the Appellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of the assessed value of P500.
ISSUE:
W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof.
HELD:
It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualifications are under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market value, it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine.
LATIN MAXIM:
10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149
G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22
FACTS:
Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD:
Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a
Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255
G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote No.25
FACTS:
Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931, Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office.
ISSUE:
W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65.
HELD:
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. 3899).
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26
G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27
FACTS:
On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction.)
ISSUE:
W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee. HELD:
PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as unjust eviction.
LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 25a
Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84
G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 29
FACTS:
Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of 1942
ISSUE:
W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD:
These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations were also terminated.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a
Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98
G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33
FACTS:
RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD:
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84
G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50
FACTS:
Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy.
ISSUE:
W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD:
No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77
G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55
FACTS:
In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-28644) respectively.
ISSUE:
W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests.
HELD:
The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26
Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53
G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56
FACTS:
Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962
ISSUE:
W/N the distraint and public auction were valid. HELD:
Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260
G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD:
The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248
G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE:
W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law.
W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953.
HELD:
RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66
G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
FACTS:
The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
LATIN MAXIM: 7a