1, 6c, 20a
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 190
G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987)
Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46 FACTS:
Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating that
“during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”, even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
HELD:
Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminution of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”. Endencia vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer.However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable.
LATIN MAXIM:
3, b1
Tañada v. Cuenco, et al Case No. 286
G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957) Chapter XI, Page No. 451, Footnote No.55 FACTS:
The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel, Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET.
Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel, Lopez, and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other Senators must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that six members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives”, is mandatory. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunaland this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE:
W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful.
HELD:
No. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted … except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case.” Hence, “if the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may be rejected.”
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 6b, 9b, 11a
Aratuc v. COMELEC Case No. 19
G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979) Chapter XI, Page 452, Footnote No.62 FACTS:
Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
ISSUE:
W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitioners.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court’s power over COMELEC decisions – in 1935, the Supreme Court may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respondent’s decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the 1973 Constitution’s intent to strengthen Respondent’s independence. Consequently, errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in certiorari.
LATIN MAXIM:
6a, 9a, 25a
In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Case No. 59
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (November 9, 1998)
FACTS:
Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998, within 2 months before the election. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. On the one hand, Art. 8, Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled within 90 days of such vacancy. On the other hand, Art. 7, Sec. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections, except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake.
ISSUE:
W/N the appointments were valid.
HELD:
No, the appointments were void. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days, but this does not apply in the special circumstance of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every six years.
Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. The prohibition is for public policy purposes, to prevent “midnight appointments” – which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a, 35, 36b, 38a, 50, b
Magtoto v. Manguera Case No. 159
G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.79 FACTS:
The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: “… Any person under investigation…shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right…. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudicial confession dated Nov. 15, 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is admissible as evidence.
2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively.
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioner’s confession is admissible. The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person under investigation, who has not been informed of his right to counsel, is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. Conversely, such confession is inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution.
2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor.
LATIN MAXIM:
12a, 46a
Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan Case No. 106
G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.80 FACTS:
Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed out as the mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a counsel. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel.
2. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively.
HELD:
1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible.
2. No. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 5a, 46a
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of Representatives Case No. 66
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.82
FACTS:
Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern Samar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.
ISSUE:
1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens.
2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively.
HELD:
Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. They need not perform any act of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not.
LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 9a, 42a
Sarmiento v. Mison Case No. 277
G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 458, Footnote No.84 FACTS:
Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The Court favored the Respondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 16, Art. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only provides for the appointment, by the President of
“heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” with the requirement of CA approval. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position “heads of bureaus” from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for “horse-trading”, and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. The word
“also” in the second sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed “in a like manner” as that of the first group.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b
Domingo v. Commission on Audit Case No. 37
G.R. No. 112371 (October 7, 1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle.
ISSUE:
W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle.
HELD:
The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 24a
Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar Case No. 112
G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3 FACTS:
Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar.
2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal.
HELD:
The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c
Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission Case No. 76
G.R. No. L-37661 (November 16, 1932)
FACTS:
Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. On May 9, 1932, Respondent required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with compensation as provided in Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law.
ISSUE:
W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 3108 by Act No.
3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner’s business, although it is not a common carrier.
HELD:
The omission from Sec. 13 of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. Public service is a service for public use. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” does not show the intent either. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. Also, notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term “public service” introduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations made in the basic provisions of the other sections. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 36b
ROUND 2
Aparri v. Court of Appeals Case No. 15
G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.4 FACTS:
R.A. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President.
On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA.
On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to March 31, 1962.
ISSUE:
W/N Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause.
HELD:
No, Petitioner’s term of office is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. The word ‘term’ describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the term of office is not fixed by law, but by the Board.
LATIN MAXIM:
6a, 6c
People v. Quijada Case No.
G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996)
FACTS:
Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was convicted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed:
1) Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC
2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866
Par 2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.”
ISSUE:
1) W/N the trial court’s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling, etc. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros.
2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single integrated offense.
HELD:
1) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. It does not use the clause “as a result” or
“on the occasion of ”to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c
Baranda v. Gustillo Case No. 30
G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 125, Footnote No.5
FACTS:
Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court, after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot, which the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court.
2. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title?
HELD:
1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. …”
2. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. If the instrument cannot be registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.”
LATIN MAXIM:
6c
Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice Case No.
G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
FACTS:
RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-in-law was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law.
RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-in-law was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law.