1
PERALTA DOCTRINES 2013-2016 Cases POLITICAL LAW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; Locus Standi
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must be shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. (Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, 30 June 2015)
DUE PROCESS OF LAW; Issuance of Protection Order ex parte
Section 15 of RA 9262 or the Anti- Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004 is valid and constitutional. The issuance of Protection Order ex parte doesn't infringe the constitutional precept of due process of law. Nor it is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials. (Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, 22 January 2014)
EXPROPRIATION; Just compensation
When the government takes property pursuant to P.D. No. 27, but does not pay the landowner his just compensation until after R.A. No. 6657 (CARL) has taken effect in 1998, it becomes more equitable to determine just compensation using R.A. No. 6657 and not E.O. No. 223. (Heirs of Spouses Tria v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170245, 1 July 2013)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY; Single act which constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased else wise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. Thus, since the Informations filed against petitioner in this case were for separate and distinct offenses — the first against Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other. (Asistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465, 20 April 2015)
CITIZENSHIP; Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any
2
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. (Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R No. 209835, 22 September 2015)
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; Double jeopardy
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." Therefore, the judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in Rule 45 is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Instead, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 199151-56, 25 July 2016)
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; Speedy disposition
The constitutional right to speedy disposition is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 199151-56, 25 July 2016)
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 199151-56, 25 July 2016)
POLITICAL LAW; Power of the President
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent
3
President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief,150 a legislator,151 a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered. Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since it is not a trier of facts (Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016).
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS; Local autonomy
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. (League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, 11 April 2013)
PUBLIC FUNDS; Availing services of private legal counsel or law firm by gov’t agencies, when allowed
COA Circular No. 95-011 stresses that public funds shall not be utilized for the payment of services of a private legal counsel or law firm to represent government agencies in court or to render legal services for them. Despite this, the same circular provides that in the event that such legal services cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, the written conformity and acquiescence of the OSG or the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. The prohibition covers the hiring of private lawyers to render any form of legal service - whether or not the legal services to be performed involve an actual legal controversy or court litigation. The purpose is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the government, which is in line with the COA's constitutional mandate to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. The Court has invariably sustained the statutory authority of the OSG and the OGCC as well as the necessity of COA concurrence in the cases of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, local
4
government units, and even a state college like the CNSC. (Dr. Wenifredo T. Oñate v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213660, 5 July 2016)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Quasi-judicial functions
The DENR Secretary’s power to review and, therefore, decide the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB), is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. (League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, 11 April 2013)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Administrative decisions
Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisprudence that administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts. Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under its special and technical training and knowledge, for the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the concerned government agency and not by the courts. More so where, as in the present case, the prime consideration is the interest of the public at large on the issue of basic water need. (GEMASCO v. NHA, G.R. No. 175417, 9 February 2015).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal. This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. In this case, the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought. (Adoracion Caro Lino v. Gen.Senga, G.R. No. 189649, 20 April 2015)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Appeals
The period to appeal the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President has long been settled to be fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof pursuant to Section 15 of PD No. 957 and Section 2 of PD No. 1344 which are special laws that provide an exception to Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18. Said administrative order allows an aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law. (Swire Realty Development Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 207133, 9 March 2015)
ELECTION LAW, Concurrent jurisdiction in prosecuting and investigating election offenses Under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the COMELEC, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the COMELEC. The prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals, prosecutors and their assistants and staff members, and
5
of the state prosecutors of the DOJ. Instead of a mere delegated authority, the other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. (Arroyo v. DOJ, G.R. No. 199082, 23 July 2013)
ELECTION LAW, Material misrepresentation in the COC
False representation in the contents of the COC must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refers to qualifications for elective office. The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as "material misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office." Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." (Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014; see also Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R No. 209835, 22 September 2015)
*** LABOR LAW
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; Evidence to prove the relationship
There is no particular form of evidence required to prove the existence of the employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove such relationship may be admitted. This may entirely be testimonial. If only documentary evidence would be required to demonstrate the relationship, no scheming employer would be brought before the bar of justice. (Hacienda Cataywa/Manuel Villanueva v. Lorezo, G.R. No. 179640, 18 March 2015)
The issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents is essentially a question of fact. The factors that determine the issue include who has the power to select the employee, who pays the employee’s wages, who has the power to dismiss the employee, and who exercises control of the methods and results by which the work of the employee is accomplished. Although no particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of the relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must nonetheless rest on substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, G.R. No. 189255, 17 June 2015)
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT; Law between the parties
It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. (Goya, Inc. v. Goya, Inc. Employees Union-FFW, G.R. No. 170054, 21 January 2013)
6 LABOR UNIONS; Disaffiliation
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interests of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the federation which it belongs when circumstances warrant, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association (National Union Of Bank Employees [Nube] v. Philnabank Employees Association (Pema) And Philippine National Bank, G.R. No.174287, 12 August 2013)
BARGAINING UNIT; Defined
A bargaining unit has been defined as a “group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.” (Holy Child Catholic School v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 179146, 23 July 2013)
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS; Effect of commingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees/ Remedy of employer in case of inclusion of disqualified employees in a union The commingling of supervisory employees and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization does not affect the latter’s legitimacy and its right to file a petition for certification election. In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended. (Holy Child Catholic School v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 179146, 23 July 2013)
INDEPENDENT JOB CONTRACTORS; Substantial capital
The Court categorically stated that the actual paid-in capital of P75,000.00 could not be considered as substantial capital. (First Philippine Industrial Corporation v. Calimbas, G.R. No. 179256, 10 July 2013)
REGULAR EMPLOYEES; Applicable Test
In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The standard, supplied by the law itself, is whether the work undertaken is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, a fact that can be assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its relation to the general scheme under which the business or trade is pursued in the usual course. It is distinguished from a specific undertaking that is divorced from the normal activities required in carrying on the particular business or trade. But, although the work to be performed is only for a specific projector seasonal, where a person thus engaged has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or is merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as being sufficient to indicate the necessity or desirability of that activity to the business or trade of the employer. The employment of such person is also then deemed to be regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. (Basan v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, G.R. Nos. 174365-66, 4 February 2015)
REGULAR EMPLOYEES; Repeated rehiring of employees
For years, petitioners were repeatedly engaged to perform functions necessary to respondent’s business for fixed periods short of the six-month probationary period of employment. If there was really no intent to circumvent security of tenure, respondent should have made it clear to
7
petitioners that they were being hired only for fixed periods in an agreement freely entered into by the parties. Respondent’s act of hiring and re-hiring petitioners for periods short of the legal probationary period evidences its intent to thwart petitioner’s security of tenure, especially in view of an awareness that ordinary workers, such as petitioners herein, are never on equal terms with their employers. It is rather unjustifiable to allow respondent to hire and rehire petitioners on fixed terms, never attaining regular status. Hence, in the absence of proof showing that petitioners knowingly agreed upon a fixed term of employment, petitioners are, indeed, regular employees, entitled to security of tenure. (Basan v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, G.R. Nos. 174365-66, 4 February 2015)
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES; Security of tenure
A probationary employee does not enjoy permanent status. Nevertheless, he is accorded the constitutional protection of security of tenure which means that he can only be dismissed from employment for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the time of his engagement. (Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 182072, 19 June 2013)
SEASONAL EMPLOYEES; When they may be considered as regular employees
It was also consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees when they are called to work from time to time. They are in regular employment because of the nature of the job, and not because of the length of time they have worked. However, seasonal workers who have worked for one season only may not be considered regular employees. (Hacienda Cataywa/Manuel Villanueva v. Lorezo, G.R. No. 179640, 18 March 2015)
SEASONAL EMPLOYEES; Farm workers as seasonal employees
Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. (Hacienda Cataywa/Manuel Villanueva v. Lorezo, G.R. No. 179640, 18 March 2015)
CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES; Seafarers
It is a settled rule that seafarers are considered contractual employees. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. (Unica v. Anscor Swire Ship Management Corp., G.R. No. 184318, 12 February 2014) MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES; Test of status
The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. (Cruz v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 173357, 13 February 2013)
SEAFARERS’ CONTRACT; Standard provisions by POEA
The terms and conditions of a seafarer's employment is governed by the provisions of the contract he signs with the employer at the time of his hiring, and deemed integrated in his contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA, called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which provisions are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels. (Sy v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 191740, 11 February 2013)
8
SEAFARERS’ CONTRACT; Claims for death and disability benefits
It is settled that the terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment, including claims for death and disability benefits, is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by the contract he entered into with his employer and the law which is deemed integrated therein. (Wallem Philippines Services, Inc. v. Heirs of Padrones, G.R. No. 183212, 16 March 2015)
For the death of a seafarer to be compensable, the same must occur during the term of his contract of employment. If the seaman dies after the termination of his contract, his beneficiaries are not entitled to death benefits. (Wallem Philippines Services, Inc. v. Heirs of Padrones, G.R. No. 183212, 16 March 2015)
For the death of a seaman to be compensable should occur during the term of his employment contract and must be the result of a work-related illness or injury. In the present case, it is not disputed that Awatin died on July 12, 2002, almost a year after the termination of his last employment contract on July, 2001. It must be remembered that Awatin was repatriated not because of any illness but because his contract of employment expired. There is no proof that he contracted his illness during the term of his employment nor that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death. While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the Standard Employment Contract, we cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates compensability, we have no choice but to deny the claim, lest we cause injustice to the employer. (Awatin v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179226, 29 June 2015)
SEAFARERS’ CONTRACT; Principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer
While the Supreme Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the Standard Employment Contract, it cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates compensability, the courts have no choice but to deny the claim, lest injustice is caused to the employer.
The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer - there may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted as to result in an injustice to the employer. (One Shipping Corp. v. Penafiel, G.R. No. 192406, 21 January 2015; Awatin v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179226, 29 June 2015)
ILLNESS; Entitlement of claimant to benefits
It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death. (Manota v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179607, 24 July 2013)
DEATH BENEFITS; Seafarers
To be entitled for death compensation benefits from the employer, the death of the seafarer (1) must be work-related; and (2) must happen during the term of the employment contract. Under the Amended POEA Contract, work-relatedness is now an important requirement. The qualification that death must be work-related has made it necessary to show a causal connection between a seafarer’s work and his death to be compensable. (Sy v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 191740, 11 February 2013; Awatin v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179226, 29 June 2015)
9
The employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. In this case, since petitioners were able to substantially prove that the seaman’s death is directly attributable to his deliberate act of hanging himself, his death, therefore, is not compensable and his heirs not entitled to any compensation or benefits. (Unicol Management Services, Inc. v. Malipot, G.R. No. 206562, 21 January 2015)
In labor cases, as in all cases which require the presentation and weighing of evidence, the basic rule is that the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.47 In particular, in a case of claims for disability benefits, the onus probandi falls on the seafarer as claimant to establish his claim with the right quantum of evidence; it cannot rest on speculations, presumptions or conjectures. Such party has the burden of proving the said assertion with the quantum of evidence required by law which, in a case such as this of a claim for disability benefits arising from one's employment as a seafarer, is substantial evidence. (Cagatin v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 175975, 22 June 2015)
DISABILITY BENEFITS; Company-designated physicians
While it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered a permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek a second opinion. The Court upheld the findings of the independent physician as to the claimant’s disability. (Nazareno v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc., G.R. No. 168703 26 February 2013)
BENEFITS; Principle of non-diminution of benefits
Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is actually founded on the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers, to promote their welfare, and to afford them full protection. To be considered as a regular company practice, the employee must prove by substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit is done over a long period of time, and that it has been made consistently and deliberately. The principle against diminution of benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time which is consistent and deliberate; it presupposes that a company practice, policy and tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly established; and that the payments made by the company pursuant to it have ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. (Vergara, Jr. v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 176985, 1 April 2013)
ABANDONMENT; Elements
The filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of abandonment. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, to wit: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause, and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal. (Concrete Solutions, Inc./ Primary Structures Corp. v. Cabusas, G.R. No. 177812, 19 June 2013)
10
In case the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss. (MZR Industries v. Colambot, G.R. No. 179001, 28 August 2013)
JUDGMENT; Final and executory; Judicial review
The NLRC becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. In exercising the expanded judicial review over labor cases, the Court of Appeals can grant the petition if it finds that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence which is material or decisive of the controversy which necessarily includes looking into the evidence presented by the parties. (Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 182072, 19 June 2013)
APPEALS;
The period or manner of “appeal” from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65, pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), in light of Section 4 Rule 65, as amended, which states that the “petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or resolution sought to be assailed. (Cervantes vs, City Service Corporation, G.R. No. 191616, 18 April 2016)
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decisions of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly intended to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer as inferred from the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected “only upon the posting of the word “only” makes it clear that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer is the essential and exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. Moreover, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory, but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Noncompliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful claims. (Olares v. Manila Doctors College, G.R. No. 201663, 31 March 2014)
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; Bystander rule
It has been consistently held in a number of cases that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification process ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly lacks the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all therein. (Holy Child Catholic School v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 179146, 23 July 2013)
LABOR STANDARDS; Termination of employment
The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. Moreover, the act of assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the termination of employment. (Naguit v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 188839, 22 June 2015) Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, the employer must furnish him two written notices: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his side; and (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
11
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. The employer must inform the employee of the charges against him and to hear his defenses. A full adversarial proceeding is not necessary as the parties may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memorandum or oral argument. (Alilem Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Bandiola, Jr., G.R. No. 173489, 25 February 2013; see also: First Philippine Industrial Corporation v. Calimbas, G.R. No. 179256, 10 July 2013, Noblado v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 189229, 23 November 2015)
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; Closure of business
Unlike retrenchment, closure or cessation of business, as an authorized cause of termination of employment, need not depend for validity on evidence of actual or imminent reversal of the employer’s fortune. Article 283 authorizes termination of employment due to business closure, regardless of the underlying reasons and motivations therefore, be it financial losses or not. (Manila Polo Club Employees' Union (MPCEU) FUR-TUCP v. Manila Polo Club, Inc., G.R. No. 172846, 24 July 2013)
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; Retrenchment
Essentially, the prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees' livelihood. It is justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or inadequate. Corollary thereto, the employer must prove the requirements for a valid retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees. These requirements are:
1. That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; 2. That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
3. That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
4. That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and
5. That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers. (Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products. Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 176908, 25 March 2015; see also: Beralde v. G.R. Nos. 205685-86, 22 June 2015)
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; Gross negligence / Loss of trust and confidence
Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. On the other hand, the basic premise for dismissal on the ground of
12
loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold a position of trust and confidence. It is the breach of this trust that results in the employer's loss of confidence in the employee. (Cruz v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 173357, 13 February 2013)
The filing of the complaint by the public prosecutor is sufficient ground for a dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence. The evidence supporting the criminal charge, found sufficient to show prima facie guilt after preliminary investigation, constitutes just cause for termination based on loss of trust and confidence. Additionally, an employee's acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically preclude a determination that he has been guilty of acts inimical to the employer's interest resulting in loss of trust and confidence. An acquittal in criminal prosecution does not have the effect of extinguishing liability for dismissal on the ground of breach of trust and confidence. (Matis v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 206629, 14 September 2016)
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; Recomputation
A recomputation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law — specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision — that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. (Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, 13 August 2013)
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; Burden of proof
Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof. (MZR Industries, Marilou R. Quiroz and Lea Timbal v. Majen Colambot, G.R. No. 179001, 28 August 2013) It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. The test for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as to which party would be successful if no evidence of such matters were given. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. Thus, in filing a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he was an employee of respondents, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence. (Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, G.R. No. 189255, 17 June 2015)
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL; Defined
Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's
13
position would have felt compelled to give up his employment/position under the circumstances. (Gan v. Galderma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177167, 17 January 2013; see also Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184397, 9 September 2015)
RESIGNATION; Defined
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment. (Gan v. Galderma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177167, 17 January 2013)
We held that the act of the employer moving the effectivity of the resignation is not an act of harassment. The 30-day notice requirement for an employee’s resignation is actually for the benefit of the employer who has the discretion to waive such period. Its purpose os to afford the employer enough time to hire another employee if needed and to see to it that there is proper turnover of the tasks which the resigning employee may be handling. Such rule requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30-day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation becomes discretionary on the part of management as an employee who intends to resign may be allowed a shorter period before his resignation becomes effective. (Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184397, 9 September 2015)
DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS
Absent any showing that there is strained relationship between petitioner and respondents, the order of reinstatement shall stand. The doctrine of strained relations is not applied indiscriminately as to bar reinstatement, especially when the employee has not indicated an aversion to returning to work or does not occupy a position of trust and confidence in or has no say in the operation of the employer's business. In this case, there was no evidence that respondents disliked returning to their former posts and that they occupy a position of trust and confidence. (Tri-C General Services, Inc. v. Matuto, et al., G.R. No. 194686, 23 September 2015) ATTORNEY’S FEES
Anent the issue on the award of attorney's fees, Article 111 of the Labor Code provides that in cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees, equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of wages recovered. Likewise, we have recognized that "in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable. (Tri-C General Services, Inc. v. Matuto, et al., G.R. No. 194686, 23 September 2015)
SOCIAL JUSTICE
We held that the law and jurisprudence guarantee security of tenure to every employee. However, in protecting the rights of the workers, the law does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer. Social justice does not mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. Thus, the Constitution and the law equally recognize the employer’s right and prerogative to manage its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play. (Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184397, 9 September 2015)
14 *** CIVIL LAW HUMAN RELATIONS; Principle of abuse of rights
Article 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. (Ardiente v. Pastorfide, G.R. No. 161921, 17 July 2013)
DAMAGES; Damnum Absque Injuria
“One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a person’s exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.” In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that there is fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige them to pay for the alleged damage sustained as a result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly, membership in the Club is a privilege. Regular members are entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and regulations. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental anguish respondents experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon them by themselves for deliberately and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that respondents were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate them. (The Orchard Gold & Country Club, Inc., et al vs. Ernesto Yu and Manuel C. Yuhico, G.R. No. 191033, 11 January 2016)
FUNERALS; Death
It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct. (Lim vs. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 188539, 12 March 2014)
EASEMENTS; Servient estate
While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title Title VII on Easements or Servitudes." (Pilar Development Corporation v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013)
PROPERTY; Properties of public dominion
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Otherwise,
15
essential public services would stop if properties of public dominion would be subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. (GEMASCO v. NHA, G.R. No. 175417, 9 February 2015).
PROPERTY; Regalian Doctrine
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. (Republic v. Lualhati, G.R. No. 183511, 25 March 2015)
PROPERTY; Accion Reivindicatoria
The MTCC and the CA are correct that the meat of the controversy between herein parties is the actual boundaries or the metes and bounds of their respective lots. On this matter, Manalang v. Bacani, 745 SCRA 27 (2015), is quite instructive: x x x a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. (Javier v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186204, 2 September 2015)
Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising from claims of ownership thereof, cannot be resolved in a summary action such as an ejectment suit. The issues involved in such a controversy should be fully threshed out in an action like accion reivindicatoria, especially when plaintiff fails to establish actual prior possession. In a much earlier ruling of this Court, it was already held therein that “[i]f [a party] is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.” (Javier v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186204, 2 September 2015)
PROPERTY; Estoppel against tenants
Article 1436 of the Civil Code provides that “[a] lessee or bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.” In addition, the conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court known as estoppel against tenants provides as follows: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: x x x x (b) the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. It is clear from the above quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is
16
one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
PROPERTY; Ownership and possession
At the outset, the Court notes that both parties anchor their right to possess the disputed property on their supposed ownership of the same. Thus, the courts are left with no recourse but to resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining as to who between the parties is entitled to possess the subject condominium unit. However, as held by the CA, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
The resolution of the issue of ownership, however, would entail going into factual matters. Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Doubtless, in the instant case, the issue of whether respondent possesses the subject property as owner, or whether she occupies the same as a lessee, is a question of fact. Thus, as a rule, it is not reviewable. Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the above restriction. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
The fact that the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights was put in writing and notarized does note accord it the quality on incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the Parole Evidence Rule. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Thus the second paragraph of Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions, to wit: Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – x x x However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection on the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
IMPLIED TRUST
As to whether or not an implied trust was created in respondent’s favor, the first sentence of Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]here is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.” This is sometimes referred to as purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. The principle of a resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration, not legal title, determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015) IMPLIED TRUST; Intent
Intention – although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of the transaction or from the facts and circumstances accompanying the transaction, particularly the source of the consideration – is always an element of a resulting trust and may be inferred from
17
the acts or conduct of the p[arties rather than from direct expression of conduct. Certainly, intent as an indispensable element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even circumstantial, of statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes. Because an implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be evidenced in writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole evidence to prove their existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
RECONVEYANCE OF TITLE; Better right
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim. (VSD Realty & Development Corporation v. Uniwide Sales, Inc, G.R. No. 170677, 31 July 2013)
CONTRACTS; Stipulations of the parties
Parties are free to enter into agreements and stipulate as to the terms and conditions of their contract, but such freedom is not absolute; Hence, if the stipulations in the contract are valid, the parties thereto are bound to comply with them, since such contract is the law between the parties. (Mallari v. Prudential Bank (now BPI), G.R. No. 197861, 5 June 2013)
A contract of adhesion is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely. Contrary to petitioner's contention, not every contract of adhesion is an invalid agreement. (Cabanting vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 201927, 17 February 2016)
CONTRACTS TO SELL; Stipulation by the parties
The two conditional deeds of sale entered into by the parties are contracts to sell, as they both contained a stipulation that ownership of the properties shall not pass to the vendee until after full payment of the purchase price. In a conditional sale, as in a contract to sell, ownership remains with the vendor and does not pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. The full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, and non-fulfillment of the condition prevents the obligation to sell from arising. To differentiate, a deed of sale is absolute when there is no stipulation in the contract that title to the property remains with the seller until full payment of the purchase price. (Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. v. Valbueco, Incorporated, G.R. No. 179594, 11 September 2013)
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CONTRACTS; Compensation
The act of withholding service fees/commissions and applying them to the outstanding obligation with the former obligation is merely an acknowledgment of the legal compensation that occurred by operation of law between the parties. Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the obligations of persons who in their own right and as principals are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other. Legal compensation takes place by operation of law when all the requisites are present, as opposed to conventional compensation which takes place when the parties agree to compensate their mutual obligations even in the absence of some requisites. Legal compensation requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at
18
the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) That the two debts be due; (4) That they be liquidated and demandable; (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. (Mondragon Personal Sales, Inc. v. Sola, Jr., G.R. No. 174882, 21 January 2013)
SUCCESSION; Donation Mortis Causa
It is not amiss to point that the execution of Pardo of donation mortis causa in favor of petitioner does not immediately transfer title to the property to the latter. Considering that the alleged donation is one of mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provision.29 As such, said deed must be executed in accordance with the requisites on
solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 80530 and 80631 of the New Civil Code;
otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.32 Unless and until the alleged
donation is probated, i.e., proved and allowed in the proper court, no right to the subject property has been transmitted to petitioner. (Bascara v. Javier, G.R. No. 188069, 17 June 2015) SALES; Contract to Sell vs. Contract of Sale
In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold whereas in a contract to sell, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In a contract of sale, the vendee's non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition, while in a contract to sell, the vendee's full payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition to the coming into effect of the agreement. In the first case, the vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property unless he takes action to set aside the contract of sale. In the second case, the title simply remains in the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of making payment at the time specified in the contract. Verily, in a contract to sell, the prospective vendor binds himself to sell the property subject of the agreement exclusively to the prospective vendee upon fulfilment of the condition agreed upon which is the full payment of the purchase price but reserving to himself the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer. (Danan v. Spouses Serrano and Reyes, G.R. No. 195072, 1 August 2016)
MACEDA LAW; cancellation of contract to sell
When there is failure on the part of the seller to comply with the requirements prescribed by RA No. 6552 insofar as the cancellation of a contract to sell is concerned, the Court shall not hesitate in upholding the sale, albeit being subject to the full payment by the buyer of the purchase price. (Danan v. Spouses Serrano and Reyes, G.R. No. 195072, 1 August 2016)
SALES; Redemption
Redemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a question of payment or valid tender of the full redemption price. It is irrelevant whether the mortgagor is diligent in asserting his or her willingness to pay. What counts is that the full amount of the redemption price must be actually paid; otherwise, the offer to redeem will be ineffectual and the purchaser may justly refuse acceptance of any sum that is less than the entire amount. (GE Money Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Dizon, G.R. No. 184301, 23 March 2015)
There is no cogent reason for requiring the vendee to accept payment by installments from the redemptioner, as it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of the redemption period. (GE Money Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Dizon, G.R. No. 184301, 23 March 2015, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Spouses Tan, et al. 590 Phil 827, 843 [2008])
