Biocarbon
projects
in
agroforestry:
lessons
from
the
past
for
future
development
Kristi
Foster
and
Henry
Neufeldt
Biocarbonprojectscanconnectclimatefinancetosmallholder farmersandcanprovideconsiderablebenefitstoimproved productivity,landhealthandincome,marketaccess, institutionalstabilityand,ultimately,foodsecurityandreduced povertyforasset-poorruralcommunities.Whilemost biocarbonprojectsfocusonforestedlandortree
plantations,thispaperexploresthepotentialforconnecting agroforestryapproacheswithcarbonbenefits.Drawingon experiencesinAfrica,weidentifythemajorchallengesand opportunitiesfordevelopingandrollingoutbiocarbon projectsinagroforestrysystems.Wehighlighttheneedfor external,up-frontfundingtoovercomehighproject
establishmentcostsandtheneedforinnovativesolutionsto minimizetrade-offsbetweenlivelihoodandenvironmental goals.Wecontendthatresourceconstraints,flexibility, technicalcapacity,tenureandinstitutionalframeworksmustbe addressedforsmallholderstoinvestinandbenefitfrom carbonprojects.Lastly,wearguethatprojectsshould emphasizenon-carbonbenefits,usingcarbonrevenueasa tooltohelpfarmerstransitiontomoresustainableand productivepracticesontheirland.
Addresses
WorldAgroforestryCentre(ICRAF),P.O.Box30677,Nairobi00100, Kenya
Correspondingauthor:Neufeldt,Henry([email protected])
CurrentOpinioninEnvironmentalSustainability2014,6:148–154 ThisreviewcomesfromathemedissueonSustainabilitychallenges EditedbyCheikhMbow,HenryNeufeldt,PeterAkongMinang, EikeLuedelingandGodwinKowero
ForacompleteoverviewseetheIssueandtheEditorial
Received11June2013;Accepted17December2013 Availableonline15thJanuary2014
1877-3435#2014TheAuthors.Publishedby ElsevierLtd.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2013.12.002
Introduction
Agriculture, together with agriculture-driven conversion ofland,contributes between7.3and12.7Gigatonnesof carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) globally per year—
approximately 15–25% of total global anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions [1]. Agroforestry, a land-use systemthatincorporatestree-growingonagriculturalland, offersanopportunitytoremoveCO2fromtheatmosphere
bystoringitin treebiomass andsoil organicmatter [2]. This, coupled with agroforestry’s potential to deliver a rangeof benefitsto someof the world’spoorest people, including improved productivity, greater food security, reduced poverty and increased resilience to climate change,hasgarnereditincreasinginternationalattention (e.g. [3–6]). Worldwide, agroforestry comprises approxi-mately1billionhectares,withroughly560millionpeople indevelopingcountriesrelyingdirectlyontheservicesand productsagroforestryprovides[7,8].Oneoptionfor incen-tivizingtheadoptionofagroforestrytechnologiesin devel-oping countries is through biocarbon projects, in which local land users receive payments through international carbon markets in exchange for carbon sequestered on theirland.Despiterisinginterestinagroforestry,however, themajorityofbiocarbonprojectstodatehavefocusedon ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandforest Degra-dation(REDD)[9],where projectscan generate carbon creditsrelativelyrapidly.Withintheagriculturalsector,our knowledgebaseislimitedtoahandfulofprojects (Peters-Stanleyetal.[9]reportonlysixagriculturalprojects world-widethattransactedcreditsin2011),themajorityofwhich have been implemented recently and whose long-term viabilityisuncertain.
Nevertheless,theinformationthatcanbegleanedfrom projectexperiencestodate,coupledwithdatagenerated bytheresearchcommunity,makeanencouraging learn-ingbaseforfutureprojectdevelopmentand implementa-tion.Mostoftheevidenceforthisreviewwasderivedby synthesizing the white and grey literature on existing biocarbonprojects,themajorityofwhichhappentobein EastAfrica.Thispaperbringstogetherthechallengesand opportunities for implementing biocarbon projects in agroforestry,drawinguponourknowledgeofagroforestry, biocarbon projects and experimental research, focusing primarilyonAfrica.Wepresentmajorconstraintsfromthe projectandfarmerperspectives,highlighttheimportance of non-carbon benefits, institutional capacity and land tenure, and offer innovative opportunities to improve projectoutcomesfor farmersandproject developers.
From
the
farmer
perspective
—
challenges
and
opportunities
Constraintstofarmerparticipation
Up-frontfinancialandlabourcostsareamajorconstraint to farmer participation in payments for environmental
services(PES)schemes,1especiallyforpoorhouseholds [10]. Agroforestry practices can take years to yield net benefits, ranging from one to two years in the case of improved fallows, to decadesin thecase of indigenous hardwood systems. Within the N’hambita Community CarbonProject,whichofferssevenagroforestryland-use options to farmers and provides carbon payments up front, only one option is estimated to provide annual positive net benefits to the farmer before year five (Figure1)[11].Thedelayinprojectbenefitscombined with afrequentlackofaccess tocreditmarketsin rural agriculturalareastohelpfarmersoffsetcurrentcosts(e.g. [12]),createsignificantinvestment barriers.
Evenwherenewlandmanagementpracticesmakegood economic sense as they leadto higherincome, farmers may be unable to adopt them due to resource poverty [13].Financialconstraints,labourscarcity,landshortage, household size, off-farm income, gender and access to roads can all restrict farmer participation in projects
[14,10,15]. Playing by the stringent rules of carbon
accounting2canalso beprohibitively difficultfor small-holder farmerswho require flexibilityin planting, man-agement andharvesting[16].Forthose farmerswho do manage toadoptagroforestrypractices,projectsrun the risk of becoming unsustainable if farmers do not fully understand the duration of their contracts [17,10]. Particularly,ifcarbonpaymentsceasebeforethecontract ends,farmersmayhavelittleincentivetomaintain prac-tices[18]anditmaybedifficultto ensuretheir compli-ance [10].
Carbonistherealco-benefit
Despitedifferinginregion,paymentschemeandcontract timeline, several project experiences to date share a striking theme: carbon payments appear to be insignif-icantto farmers comparedwith thenon-carbonbenefits derived fromparticipation.Modelsimulationsofcarbon projectsintheSahelshowthatfarmerNetPresentValue (NPV), or the perceived sum of revenue over 25 years, would be between US$36 and US$71 for smallholder farmers atacarbon priceof US$20 pertonne (t)CO2e,
assumingadiscountrateof12%[19],whichishardlyan incentive. Similarly, Foster et al. [16] show farmers’ expectedcarbonrevenuetobeonlyUS$77over25years in westernKenya,basedonacarbonpriceof$8/tCO2e.
Evenunderthemostliberalcontractconditions,inwhich carbonrevenueispaidinthefirstsevenyearsassuminga
project lifespan of 100 years, carbon has only a minor impactoncashincomes[11,15].Ontheirown,carbon payments areoftenfarbelowfarmers’opportunitycosts [10] and are unlikely to motivate farmers to engage in projects[19].
Meanwhile, agroforestrycanofferasuiteof non-carbon benefits tofarmers,includingincreasedagricultural pro-ductivityperunitland;incomediversificationfrom mar-ketable tree products; improved family health and nutrition from medicinal tree products and essential vitaminsinfruits;availabilityoffuel,firewoodand build-ingmaterials;reducedwomen’slabourincollecting fire-wood; and erosion control, soil fertility, and increased waterandnutrientavailability.Manyofthesenon-carbon benefitscanreducefarmers’foodinsecurityandtherefore their vulnerability to climate variability, change and shocks [20].
The income-generating potential that non-carbon benefits offer in many cases greatly exceeds that from carbon revenue. The total carbon payments over 100 years for the N’hambita Community Carbon Project range from US$209 to US$1,047 per hectare at US$6.72/tCO2,whiletotalrevenuesfromthesaleoftree
cash crops over the same period are estimated to be
Figure1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 0 1000 500
Net Benefit [US$/ha]
0
-500
5 10
Year after Establishment
15 20
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability
Projectedannualnetbenefitstofarmers(US$/ha)forsevenagroforestry systemswithintheN’hambitaCommunityCarbonProject,Mozambique. Dottedlinesindicatesystemsthatincludecashcropcultivation:(1)fruit orchard(mango);(2)homesteadplanting;(3)fruitorchard(cashew). Solidlinesrepresentsystemswithoutcashcrops:(4)dispersed interplanting(faidherbia);(5)boundaryplanting;(6)dispersed interplanting(gliricidia);(7)woodlot.Theanalysisisbasedonacarbon priceofUS$6.72/tCO2,adiscountrateof10%andcarbonrevenuepaid
inthefirstsevenyearsoftheprojectfora100yearprojecttimehorizon. TakenfromPalmerandSilber[11].
1Biocarbon projects can be considered part of a larger group of
market-basedmechanismsknownasPaymentsforEnvironmental Ser-vices (equally Payments for Ecosystem Services, or PES). These schemesofferincentivestolandownersandusersforlandmanagement practicesthatprovideanecologicalservice,forexamplewater provi-sioning,climateregulationorbiodiversityconservation.
2Carbonaccountingreferstothemeasuring,reportingandverifying
process usedto determine theamount ofCO2ethatis sequestered
between US$31,728 and US$97,125 per hectare [11]. Moreover, cash crop systems can continue to provide significantincome benefits to farmers after carbon pay-ments cease (Figure 1) [11]. Within the Sustainable AgricultureinaChangingClimate(SACC)project, farm-ers’incomefromfuelwood,polesandtimberisestimated to reach US$3,850 over the project’s 25 year lifespan, comparedtoanestimatedUS$77incarbonrevenueover the same period [16]. In the highlands of Ethiopia, Duguma [14] estimated that households could obtain net discounted revenues between US$532 and $2,342 in15yearsfromagroforestrypracticesusingminimalland and without any carbon payment. In the Maradi and ZinderRegionsofNiger,non-carbonbenefitsare motiv-ating the large-scale establishment of parklands [21], agroforestry systemsin which crops are planted among scatteredtrees,boostinggrossannualincomeby approxi-mately18–24%[22].
Helpingfarmersinvest
Projectsadvocating the adoptionof new land-use prac-ticesmustrecognizethevariationinfarmers’interestin andabilitytoinvestinnew practicesand provide short-andlong-termbenefitsthatareofgreatervaluethanthose offeredbyalternativelanduses[23].Firstandforemost, projects can and should give farmers significant non-carbonincentivestomaintainpracticesandensureproject sustainabilityinthelongrun [24,25].
Despite the compelling evidence that non-carbon benefitsaremorebeneficialtofarmersthancarbon pay-ments, these payments still have an important role to play. Distributed up-front, carbon revenuecan provide the cash needed for poor farmers to make a long-term investment where they would otherwise be unable to adopt[11,10].Insomecases,incentiveschemesmaybe neededtoconserveexistingagroforestrysystems,suchas inTanzania’sEastUsambaraMountains,wheredeclining soilfertilityisdrivingfarmerstoshiftfromconversionof spice agroforestry systems to higher-profit sugarcane monocultures[26,27].Othersarguethatcarbonpayments arebestsuitedwhencombinedwithnon-carbonbenefits, to boost profitability enough to encourage participation [17,10]. In scaling up current schemes, financial incen-tiveswillneedtoalignwiththechallengesfarmersfaceby providingsufficientincomes relative to implementation costs, allowing arangeof locally suitableactivities, and timedtoassistfarmerswithup-frontcostsandinnovation risks[28].
Providingsignificantnon-carbonbenefitsearlyon,suchas fodderandfirewood,candemonstratetofarmersthatthey aretheintendedprojectbeneficiariesandthereby encou-rageparticipation,asevidencedbytheHumboProjectin Ethiopia[29].Offeringarangeofagroforestryoptionsthat includenativeandnon-nativetreescanallowhouseholds tomeettheirindividualtimberandnon-timberneedson
theirownfarms,asopposedtoextractingresourcesfrom forests [15]. Such amenu should include species that meet farmers’ preferences, including fruit trees with income-generating potential [30]. According to Jindal
etal.[17],weneedtobetterunderstandfarmers’ percep-tionsofcarbonsequestration,marketsandcontractsand ensurethattheseconceptsaredistinguishedfrom finan-cial support for development. Extension services are necessary to increase farmers’ understanding of the income benefits associated with trees and improve la-nd-useplanning[14].Trainingstaff,partnerorganizations andcommunitiesinthepracticesbeingimplementedis criticalfor projectsuccess[29].
Ensuringbenefitsforfarmers:landtenureand institutionalframeworks
Itiscrucialthatprojectproponentsunderstandthelocal landtenurecontext,assecurelandandtreeuserightsare essentialforbiocarbon projectsto beimplemented suc-cessfullyaccordingtoallliteraturereviewed[17,11,31]. Securetenureencouragesinvestment[32],decreasesthe riskthatlocalcommunitieswillloseaccesstolandtomore powerfulinterests[17,32,23]andhelpsdeliverequitable carbonbenefits to farmers,includingwomen [17,32,33]. While private ownership is preferable, in areas with customarylandrights,projectscanfunctionbyusingland heldascommonpropertyandcommunity-basedcontracts ifaccessanduserightsareclearlyregulated[17,10].For example,withintheN’hambitaCommunityCarbon Pro-ject,carbonpayments forREDD activitiesin commun-allyownedwoodlandsarehandledbyalocallymanaged communitytrustfundtosupportactivitieswhichbenefit theentirecommunity [15].Similarly,carbon payments from the Humbo Project in Ethiopia are used to fund activities as determined by the local community [34]. Countries will need to strengthen theirmonitoring and enforcementsystemsin ordertodefendrightstolandif contested[17].
Clear institutional frameworks are a prerequisite for effective,efficientandequitableprojectsandareneeded to scale up early project successes [20]. Building on previous developmentwork and a foundationof estab-lishedtrustisimportantforprojectimplementationboth fromtheprojectandfarmerperspective[29,25]. Partner-ingwithstrong,well-establishedgroupsthatunderstand localconditionscanensurethatfarmers’ needsare con-sideredthroughoutprojectimplementationand develop-mentandthatthey haveaccesstoproject benefits[32]. Workingwithpre-existinggroupsoffarmerscanconserve timeandmoneythatdeveloperswouldotherwiseneedto establish critical relationships [32]. Such groups could include local agricultural cooperatives, farmer associ-ationsor othercommunity-basedorganizations.Shifting governance to local communities and partnering with otherinstitutionsorprojectscanalsohelpincreaseproject viability[25]. Brown et al. [29] have demonstrated that
establishing local cooperatives with the legal authority and governance capacity to manage common resources can aid implementation and empower communities to sustainably manage resources in the long term. It is imperative that local institutions have transparent and accountablebenefitsharingmechanisms inorderto dis-tribute revenueequitably to communities [25]. Kaczan
et al.[27]postulatethatpoortrustin villagelevelfunds managementmightexplainfarmers’strongpreferencefor individual over group contractsshownby recent exper-imental evidence from the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania.
From
the
project
perspective:
challenges
and
opportunities
Whencarbonisnotenough:theneedforexternal, up-frontfunding
High transactioncosts,particularlyduringthe establish-mentphase,areafundamentalconstrainttothefinancial viabilityofbiocarbonprojectsinagroforestry.Thesecosts includecontractnegotiation,projectimplementationand management,extensionservicesandtraining,monitoring reporting and verification(MRV)of sequesteredcarbon and distribution of carbon revenue to farmers [17,19,35,25].Transactioncoststypicallyrise when con-tracting many individual smallholder farmers [17], and whenprojectsoffergreaterflexibilitytofarmersinterms of the species they select [15]. Within theN’hambita CommunityCarbonProjectinMozambique,the combi-nation of local transaction costsand payments to inter-national brokers and commission agents together consume two-thirds of all carbon revenue [15]. These costscandeterinvestmentinsmallholderprojectsandcut intothecarbonrevenue thatfarmersreceive[11].
Hightransactioncostsmeanthat,atcurrentcarbonprices, projects are likely to run at or below the margin of profitability,ifrelyingsolelyonthesaleofcarboncredits. ThisisespeciallyapparentinAfrica’sDrylands: Luedel-ing and Neufeldt [19] estimated that smallholder-tar-geted projects in the Sahel would generate negative NPVs atcurrentcarbonprices, makingthem financially unviable.Giventhehighestablishmentcostsinvolvedin biocarbon projectsandthesignificanttimegapbetween investment and break-even,up-front external fundsare necessarytomakeprojectsfinanciallyviable[15,35,25]. Overthe long-term,fundingfrom privateand/or public sourcesisalsonecessarytobuildinstitutionalcapacityin developing countries and to drive demand for carbon credits [20].Nevertheless,fundingfromcarbonfinance is important to help projects overcome high establish-ment andmaintenancecosts[19].
Trade-offsbetweenenvironmentalgoalsandpoverty alleviation
Trade-offs in agroforestry biocarbon projects may arise from the need to efficiently sequester carbon while
simultaneously addressing development goals in some of the world’s poorest countries and communities. For example, agroforestry systems that offer high income generation potentialthroughcash crop production have beenshowntohavealowercarbonsequestration poten-tial[11].
Particularly hightrade-offs mayexistbetween pro-poor targetingandprojectcost-efficiency[36].IntheUluguru Mountains of Tanzania, it is estimated to cost roughly US$61percontracttoenrolonethirdofthepotentialarea in tree-planting contracts,versusUSD$122 percontract toenrol80percentofthearea,duetothehigher oppor-tunitycostsofpoorhouseholds[36].Specificallytargeting poorfarmerswouldatleasttriplecosts,makingit challen-ging toachieve povertyand environmentalgoalswithin thesameproject [36].
Evenwhereprojectsaresuccessfulinreachingthepoor, theimpactonfarmerincomescanstillbeminimal[15]. Within the N’hambita Community Carbon Project, at discount rates of 30% or greater, only one agroforestry optionoutofamenuofsevenmakeseconomicsensefor farmers[11].Atcurrentcarbonprices,carbonpayments aloneareunlikelytoalleviatepovertyamongsmallholder farmers [15,19].
Fast-growing non-native tree species represent the majorityof treesplantedintropicalagroforestrysystems [37].Theseexotictreescanprovidesuppliesoffodderand woodfueltolocalcommunitiesandspeciesthatgrowina rangeofenvironmentalconditionsmayhelpbuffer small-holderagriculturalsystemsagainstclimatechange[38,39]. Yet, the negative environmental, economic and social effects of introducing non-native species are well-docu-mented(e.g.[38]).Theycanpotentiallydisruptbreeding andfeedingsitesforlocalfauna[39],impairthegrowthof native species [40], reduce biodiversity (e.g. [41,42]), decrease water availability (e.g. [43,42]) and introduce weeds and pests [41].For instance, exotic tree species, suchasGrevillearobusta,compriseeightoutofthe10most frequentspeciesonfarmsaroundMountKenya,reducing thepotentialofmanyofthesefarmstoconserveindigenous treegeneticresources[44].Todate,considerable contro-versy remains regarding the trade-offs between the positiveandnegativeimpactsassociatedwithintroduced treespecies(e.g.[39];see[45–47]foropposingviews).
Opportunitiestoimproveprojectoutcomes
Using collective rather than individual contracts where appropriate [17,10], developinginexpensive monitoring systems [17] and partnering with intermediary organiz-ations,otherinstitutionsandprojectstogainexpertiseor resources[17,25]canallhelptoreducetransactioncosts. Remotesensingsystemspresentanopportunitytoreduce monitoring costs, though their costs of establishment would be high (e.g. [17,23]). Peer-monitoring schemes
offer another option that could reduce the transaction costs associated with project monitoring and increase measurement accuracy [48]. Within The International SmallGroupTreePlantingProgram(TIST),localpeople use bicycles and GPS to check compliance [17]. The inclusion of below ground carbon in project payment schemescouldbenefitfromsimplified monitoring tech-nologyforsoilorganiccarbon,whichshouldbepractical foruse bylocal communities[49].
Byestablishinglegallyrecognizedcommunityownership of common forest resources, managed by community institutions, the Humbo project in Ethiopia bypassed thecostsof individualcontracting[29].The N’hambita CommunityCarbonProjectinMozambiquesuccessfully reducedtransactioncostsinrelationtoprojectbenefitsby groupingcarbonoffsetsfromindividualagroforestry con-tractswithoffsets fromREDDactivitiesoncommunity forests[15].AccordingtoAndersonandZerriffi[4],one approachto minimizetrade-offsand setrealistic expec-tationsisto approachagroforestrybiocarbonprojectsby focusing on a primary goal, and maximizing ancillary benefitstoothergoalswherepossible.Onesuchexample is aproject aimed atimproving the livelihoods of local farmers, which views carbon payments as a source of supplementary,up-frontincomeforparticipating house-holds [4]. It is important that an ancillary benefits approach still recognize any negative impacts; for example,exotictreespeciesthatofferstronglivelihoods benefits may have detrimental effects on water avail-abilityandotherecosystemservices.
Pilot auctions,a research tool in which farmers bidthe amountofmoney theywouldneedto compensate tree-planting,presentapromisingoptiontoestimatecontract paymentlevelsbasedonfarmers’ trueopportunitycosts [36]. This can contribute to greater social welfare by finding an efficient cost to achieve environmental ser-vices,givingparticipantsanincentivetolowertheircosts, and providing community members with flexibility in how they manage their land [50]. Moreover, auctions have been shown to provide greater transparency in contractallocation,andfarmersappreciatedthatcontracts were granted to prominent and non-prominent com-munitymembersalike[36].
Engaging a range of private- and public-sector actors along thevaluechain, fromfarmer aggregationthrough tothepurchaseofoffsets,isanimportantrequirementin scaling up project successes [20]. Notonly do govern-ment agencies provide the necessary facilitation and regulationneededtostructuretheoffsetsystem, compe-titionbetweenprivateinterestsshouldenhanceservices andtheperformanceofthebiocarbonvaluechain.Rather thanleavingfarmers reliantonlyonprojectproponents, thiscanpromotehigherreturnsandmayevenoffersome protectionagainstfraudulentmarketactors,whilefarmers
benefitfromadditionalco-benefitssuchasimprovedfarm information services and market linkages [20]. African governmentagenciesshouldencouragetheinvolvement of private sector interests and universities in biocarbon projectsinordertoboostinvestors’confidenceandattract internationalinvestment [20]. Importantly, appropriate governmentlegislationshouldbeinplace,togetherwith theregulatory capacity necessaryto upholdthese stan-dards,toensurethatfarmersarenottakenadvantageof. Capacity-buildingofAfricanpublicagenciesand univer-sitiesisalsoneededtoensurethatinitiativesare sustain-ableand canbescaledup [20].
Conclusion
As agroforestry continues to gain international atten-tion, development programs and research institutions alike strive to capitalize on the development, adap-tation andmitigation opportunities it presents. Realiz-ingthepotentialofbiocarbonprojectsinagroforestryto deliver multiple benefits will require learning from projectexperiencesastheyunfoldontheground.While examples are limited to a handful of working models andthelong-termimpactsofprojectsremainuncertain, important lessons can be taken from projects that are currently underway, in addition to experimental models:
From the project perspective, up-front, external fundingisneeded toovercome initialcosts;
Trade-offs between pro-poor targeting and project cost-efficiency canbeminimizedby evaluating farm-ers’trueopportunitycosts;
Non-carbonbenefitsshouldbeemphasizedtoincrease long-term project sustainability, while carbon pay-ments are best viewed as an aid to help farmers transitiontomoresustainableandproductivepractices ontheirland;
Providing carbonand non-carbonincentivesearly on, addressing resource constraints and allowing farmers flexibilityinland managementcanallaidadoptionof newpractices;
Strengtheninglocalinstitutionalcapacityandsecuring land use rights are essential to ensure that project benefits reach farmers and that they are distributed equitably.
Asprojectevidencecontinuestobuildonthegroundand researchfillsinknowledgegaps,proponentsofbiocarbon projects in agroforestry will need to continuously learn fromemerging lessonsso that Africanand other devel-opingnationscantake advantageof thisopportunity to engagediverseinterestsandaddressdevelopment, adap-tationand mitigationgoals.
Acknowledgement
WegratefullyacknowledgefinancialsupportthroughtheCGIARResearch ProgramonClimateChange,AgricultureandFoodSecurity(CCAFS).
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