China and Shanghai 5
Teemu Naarajärvi NACS Conference Paper Helsinki, 8.6.2005 [email protected]
Abstract
In this paper I discuss China’s aims and objectives with Shanghai 5. I argue that Shanghai 5 is not only an agreement to control border skirmishes and ethnic uprisings in Chinese Central Asia, but also a tool for power in the region in general, and undoubtedly a way to boost China’s international prestige. There are also economical factors involved, for example China’s need for Central Asian energy and the development of the Xinjiang province.
1. The Origin of Shanghai 5
The Shanghai 5 (hereafter S5, later Shanghai Cooperative Organisation, SCO) was originally established as a joint border agreement between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the 26th of April 1996, but the origin of this kind of cooperation can be traced back to
1964 border negotiations between China and Soviet Union.1 The collapse of the Soviet Union had
revived some old questions concerning the western borders of China, and as Michael Clarke has pointed out, China had been focusing on that issue already at the beginning of the 1990s, whereas for example Kazakhstan was more interested in trade.2 Although the agreement was at that time by
no means restrictive and its focus was mainly in economics, it had a clause that “entrusted the members to stand against stirring up ethno-religious nationalism”.3 All of the member states had
their own problems with different ethnic or religious groups, although in different forms and scales. Russia’s problems in Chechnya were by far the most severe, and sometimes even reaching open warfare. Although the conflict is ethnic by nature, Russia has sometimes linked it with Islamic extremism and international terrorism. On the other hand, Northern Caucasus is far away from the Chinese borders and the conflict caused no problems whatsoever to the other member states. But China has always had its own problems with the Sufi-Islamic Uyghur separatists of Xinjiang (which the separatists themselves call East Turkistan) and has cracked down on them on several occasions during the 1990s and later. One can also argue that China's Uyghur-related problems have nothing to do with religion and more with other factors such as Uyghur ethnic identity and growing immigration of Han-Chinese as well as the example of nearby and newly independent ex-Soviet Central Asian states.
Unlike most other states, China has always supported Russia’s actions in northern Caucasus and that has been rewarded by Russia turning a blind eye to China’s “Strike Hard” –
1 Xia 2001: 7
2 Clarke 2003: 212-213
campaign against (among many others) the “East Turkistan terrorists”. The campaign, started in late 1990s, has at times severely restricted the life of Uyghur residents of the province. According to Marika Vicziany and Amnesty International, capital punishment is by far more common in the Xinjiang province than in other parts of China.4 Although situations in Chechnya and Xinjiang have
only little in common, they both have conflicts that are difficult to observe. Therefore it is difficult to obtain objective information of the situation in Xinjiang, but China is adamant in its accusations that “East Turkistan” terrorists are acting together with Al Qaeda and international terrorism.5
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are maybe the most “Russianized” ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, and certainly the most secular ones. Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbaev has been described as “one of the strong men like Gorbachev and Yeltsin”.6 Kyrgyzstan’s president
Askar Akayev was, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, praised as a Western-oriented and democratic leader. Nevertheless both countries face severe problems with ethnic minorities, as there are large numbers of Russians and Uzbeks in both countries. On the other hand, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are official minorities in China. Kazakhstan has had its problems with nationalist Kazakhs and Russians, and Kyrgyzstan’s secular attitude has already caused problems between the government and different religious movements. Like China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan also look askance at their Uyghur minorities promoting anindependent East Turkistan.
Kyrgyzstan also has a large Uzbek minority that is actually a majority in southern Kyrgyzstan and would like to join neighbouring Uzbekistan. Southern Kyrgyzstan is notorious for the Ferghana valley in the Osh region (extending to both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), which is often mentioned as a haven for international terrorists. As the Ferghana valley is not just a remote border between states but also one of the most fertile areas in the Central Asia it cannot be dismissed by local authorities. Nevertheless, it still seems that government representatives in the area have little to say compared to local religious leaders who are sometimes accused of promoting jihad, the Islamic holy war. The situation in Kyrgystan is even more unstable after the riots and dismissal of president Akayev in the spring of 2005, and although the new government seems to have the situation in control, it is good to remember that the uprisings started in the Osh region and the Uzbek minority will hardly see the new rulers as representing their interests.
In Tajikistan a conflict between radical Islamic elements and former Communist leaders led to a full scale civil war between June 1992 and January 1993. Both Uzbeks and the Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan got involved in fighting against Islamic opposition.
4 Vicziany 2003: 246
5 HQSB 16.11.2001, 28.1.2002 6 Capisani 2000:3
Eventually the opposition lost the war, but continued to fight guerrilla war through the 1990s.7
Although the civil war in Tajikistan has now ended, the situation is still extremely delicate, and less visible disturbances continue to occur. The existence of large Uzbek minority in Tajikistan does not make the situation any easier to control.
With such a situation it is understandable that the ruling administrations in the region want to synchronize their efforts in order to prevent the development of any large-scale crisis. If the countries in the region have problems enough inside their own territories, the last thing they want is an international incident. It is difficult to say just how security-oriented the S5 was originally, but it is clear that it was not established just for the sake of economics.
2. Economics, anti-terrorism or more?
It seems that the motives behind the S5 are as numerous as there are member states, but China seems to be the most active member with the most ambitious aims. As the examination of specific actions by the S5 is beyond the scope of this essay, I will concentrate in describing the course of events on a more abstract level. I here list China’s aims in three different groups: economic, political and symbolic. Each of these groups overlaps with the others and may also contain subgroups.
Firstly, China has a keen economic interest in Central Asia. This means trade and possible energy resources. Xinjiang is one of the poorest provinces in China and has received much attention in Chinese administration during recent years. Xinjiang also has a history as a one of the most active trade routes in the history of mankind, as the ancient Silk Route passed through the province for several hundred years. Until recently the development in the area dragged behind the rest of the country and slowed down the booming Chinese economy. Although China has rich oil and gas fields in its territory they are not enough for its growing need for energy. Kazakhstan has huge oil resources and other states (mainly Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have natural gas. China has already bought pumping rights to the oil fields in Kazakhstan and is planning a billion-dollar oil pipe-project from Central Asia to eastern China.8 The gas from Turkmenistan has even larger
political implications, since the other routes for Turkmen gas go through Afghanistan or Iran. In some ways a new Great Game of Central Asia has begun, only this time the players have changed and they have to operate in a more complex situation. The Chinese have been keen to observe the actions of United States especially when there is the question of oil involved.9
7 Capisani 2000: 167-173 8 HQSB 19.9.2003 9 HQSB 9.11.2001
Secondly, if China can tie the Central Asian states closer itself with trade it does so politically at the same time. The geopolitical situation near Western China is delicate, as even before the events of 2001 the whole region was afflicted by various crises. Xinjiang province shares a border with half a dozen different countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and most of the members of the S5. Many of those countries have both internal and external security problems. Since China’s own problems in Xinjiang are apparently ethno-religious, it is clear that China is wary of the disturbances involving people of the same religion or ethnic origin as its own Uyghur minority. On a larger perspective one can also find traces of China’s so-called anti-hegemonistic policy clearly pointed against United States. If the countries of Central Asia can solve their problems themselves, there will never be a need for U.S. presence in the region; a cause shared by both China and Russia.
In the matter of global politics, China and Russia have never accepted (although acknowledged) the status of the United States as the sole remaining superpower. The two great powers in the S5 have had their disagreements in the past, but since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 they have had quite notable rapprochement. And as far as the earlier disagreements between China and Russia are concerned, at least now they have a common forum where they can settle their differences concerning Central Asia without ignoring the other states of the region or having to bring the issues on the larger stages such as United Nations or Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Third, for the first time in its history China is actually leading an international coalition. This leadership is not officially recognized, but according to Yitzchak Shichor “there are some indications” that this is the case.10 If nothing else, the budding leadership can be seen in
China’s role as an initiator of the coalition and in the name: Shanghai 5. If China truly has such a leading position, it must give this coalition some additional importance in the eyes of the Chinese leaders. China has for already more than two decades tried to be a rational and trustworthy player in international arena, and having such a strong position in an international organisation is one of the best ways to prove it. Shanghai 5 can be seen as proof that at last China is “presentable at court”. And although the S5 is only a regional organisation, nobody can deny its importance when it comes to stability in Central Asia. The importance of the S5 seems even larger when compared to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or the OSCE: the former has made its point very clear in case of Afghanistan and the latter has mainly a monitoring role.
On the other hand, China is playing a dangerous game. If it becomes too active in its new role it might cause suspicion among other states and itself become accused of pushing for
hegemony. Since the ex-Soviet states in the region are understandably sensitive to threats to their sovereignty this kind of development could lead to total collapse of the S5, which would jeopardize not only China’s future prospects in the region, but the peaceful development of the whole of Central Asia. But it is clear that China is prepared to take the risk: the symbolic value of the S5 is worth it.
3. The changes brought by 2001
The end of the millennium was rather peaceful for the S5. Although almost all of the countries had their own internal problems, the coalition itself was never threatened. The single most significant event was the Dushanbe meeting in Tajikistan in the summer of 2000. There the S5 states decided to open a joint anti-terrorism centre in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The main targets of this centre would be Islamic extremism and the smugglers of narcotics.11 Problems with drug trafficking
have always been severe in the region, since it is one of the most important trade routes for example for opium grown in Afghanistan. The lumping together of Islamic extremism with international terrorism is even more momentous, since all the Central Asian states have strong Islamic tradition. Some of them, like Uzbekistan, are officially Islamic. Although some of Central Asian states are quite secular, it is unlikely that the initiative for this kind of declaration would have risen from those countries.
The other significant achievement for the Dushanbe meeting was a statement in which, according to the Chinese newspaper People’s Daily, the member states “vowed to defend sovereignty under the Charter of the United Nations and not to interfere in others [sic] internal affairs under the pretext of ‘humanitarianism’ or ‘human rights.’”12 This kind of statement was
probably released due to the demands of China and Russia, who are often accused by the international community of human rights violations in Chechnya and Xinjiang. The statement condemned also the theater missile defence (TMD) system planned by the USA. According to Shanghai 5 this would “lead to an escalation of arms race” and to the destruction of stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region.13 Again, this can be seen as an achievement for China and
Russia, since they have been against the TMD plan ever since the day of its release.14
In June 2001 Shanghai 5 became Shanghai 6, when Uzbekistan, already an observer in the organisation, became a full member. At the same time the name of the organisation was changed
11 Mackerras 2001: 295
12 http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200007/06/eng20000706_44803.html 13 ibid. (the internet-site visited on 19th of January 2004)
to Shanghai Cooperative Organisation, SCO.15 The absence of Uzbekistan had been a major
shortcoming in the S5, since it is the most powerful and well-administrated state in Central Asia. Due to its large population and pro-Islamic government, Uzbekistan has played a key role in the game for peace and stability in Central Asia.16 This is one of the reasons why the centre for fight
against terrorism was opened in Tashkent instead the originally decided Bishkek. Uzbekistan’s entry to the S5 changed the whole geographical arena for the organisation: instead of covering just the Chinese borderlands the SCO encompasses the whole of Central Asia. But only a few months after Uzbekistan joined the SCO, the whole strategic value and meaning of the organisation experienced a major change.
After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th 2001, the attention of
the whole world turned towards Central Asia. It soon became clear that the attacks were supported by Taliban-led Afghanistan. USA started to gather a coalition for a punishing attack and needed help from the surrounding countries. For China and the SCO this was a difficult question. All SCO states condemned the attacks and China was especially active: for once its long fight against “Islamic terrorism” in the region seemed just. On the other hand, China most certainly did not want US troops on its backdoor fighting, flying, observing and possibly “containing” China; a scenario that Chinese strategists have feared the most.17 But as it had no way whatsoever to prevent it from
happening, China could do nothing but comply, especially since it wanted to be seen to be in the frontline of the global war against terrorism.
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan gave in quickly to US demands for providing space for military bases. They had nothing to lose, on the contrary: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan already had Russian troops inside their territory because of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.) agreements. Some Western troops would bring balance and, most importantly, money to the hosting countries. Uzbekistan had already for a long time tried to establish good relations to the United States, since it was more afraid than others of both China and Russia.18 Being
the most powerful of the Central Asian states, it has more to lose should China or Russia become regional hegemons. Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov has managed to convince Western politicians to favour him instead of Kazakhstan’s Nazarbaev.19 Nevertheless, none can claim
Karimov to be more democratic than other Central Asian leaders, on the contrary.
The uprisings in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during the spring of 2005 have been too recent to see the impact on the SCO, but it would be highly unlikely that any possible new
15 Hu 2001: 29 16 Misra 2001: 316. 17 HQSB 18.5.2001 18 Misra 2001: 316 19 Capisani 2000: 88
regime in the region wouldn’t like to continue the cooperation, especially when the SCO itself has not tried to intervene during the unrests. This way the organisation has actually proved that it does not want to undermine the sovereignty that it has pledged to uphold, even when there might have been possibility for that during riots and uprisings.
4. Current prospects and problems of the SCO
At the same time, the SCO has developed as an organisation. During the year 2003 the secretariat of the SCO became a full-fledged body.20 With this kind of permanent, active branch, the SCO has
taken another step towards being a fully operative international organisation. Now it can act with swiftness not seen before, which gives it more opportunities for action for example during states of emergency. The secretariat can also ease the SCO’s own, otherwise quite inflexible decision-making process, as more daily routines can be handled immediately. The secretariat is based in Beijing, location which undoubtedly pleases China more than the other members.
Of course there are other means of developing the SCO than just expanding its borders. There has been discussion of a large free trade area between the member states, but apparently this is advancing very slowly.21 As far as the development of Xinjiang is concerned, the
free trade between it and its neighbours could be a major boost for the economic situation in the province, but the Central Asian states might be too careful to protect their internal markets against their large neighbours to allow the importing of both Chinese and Russian products without any restrictions. On the other hand, China might not be willing to allow its western citizens travel freely to the neighbouring states to learn how to create independent Islamic states.
At the moment the SCO faces the normal problem of an international organisation: whether to stay put and take it easy or expand. The situation in Afghanistan is still chaotic and fighting could at any moment spread across the borders to Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan’s enormous reserves of natural gas might make it a tempting new member, but apart the economic factors, this country, led as it is by the authoritarian “Turkmenbashi” (the Head of the Turkmen) Separmurad Nyazov, is not too inviting. In this situation it is unlikely that either of these countries would become a member of the SCO in the near future. Pakistan is sometimes mentioned as one of the countries interested in the SCO, but like Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, it suffers both from internal and external instability.
There has also been discussion about India’s possible involvement in the SCO. This
20 http://www.eurasia.org/departments/business/articles/eav012104_pr.shtml (the internet-site visited on 20th of January 2004)
kind of development would probably please the other members more than China, since its stance in the India-Pakistan conflict has traditionally favoured the latter one. The current warming of
relations between India and China has probably only little effect in this matter, as the SCO serves Chinese purposes better with only few strong member states. Nevertheless, India is an emerging power that might have plans for the Central Asian oil and gas, as its energy situation resembles the one in China.
5. Conclusions
As the principal, original reason for the SCO was trade, it is essential to see this organisation first from the point of view of economics. In the area of trade the SCO has been successful, if not in the scale that China, for example, originally hoped. During the SCO summits there has been
development in several areas, including the promotion of trade expectations and especially the connections between China and energy-rich states like Kazakhstan. Although we should not expect the SCO to become as effective as the North American NAFTA or other regional trade
organisations, it is clear that it does give Central Asian trade a considerable boost. This is even more likely if the possible India-treaty is realised.
In the field of “anti-terrorism” or opposing “ethno-religious nationalism” there has been success, especially from the Chinese perspective. The neighbouring countries have condemned Uyghur nationalism and China doesn’t have to fear any official help for the separatists of the
Xinjiang. The centre for thefight against terrorism in Tashkent has organised joint exercises between China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but nothing more concrete. From the point of view of stability and human rights this might be just as well, as sometimes the members of the SCO seem very keen on praising each others for cracking down on minorities. It is also good to keep in mind that the China's Central Asian neighbours do not sympathise with all of its actions against Uyghurs, and therefore it is a good thing to have also non-Chinese or non-Uyghur actors in the area.
As the Great Game 2 moves on, it is still open for new players. It is possible that there will be no real game, especially if there will be too many players. With China, Russia, the United States and possibly India as major rivals, and Central Asian republics as minor ones (or pawns), the stakes may rise too high. The role of the SCO is directly related to its members and they have competing aims. Therefore the SCO might want to cancel the whole game before it even starts, and try to settle affairs in the inner circle, as the other option might be war and the collapse of the careful regional development in the whole of Central Asia.
References:
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