Stefan Strauß
Privacy vs. security – a given trade-off?
Joint conference on SurPRISE, PRISMS and PACT: Citizens’ Perspectives on Surveillance, Security and Privacy: Controversies,
Alternatives and Solutions. Vienna, 13-14 November 2014
”Surveillance, Privacy and Security: A large scale
participatory assessment of criteria and factors determining acceptability and acceptance of
security technologies in Europe”
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 285492.
Privacy and security – a trade-off?
Privacy=state free from interference, a form of liberty
Intrusion is the exception not the norm
Trade-Off reflects a constructed “neither-nor” situation without considering complementarity
(cf. Solvove 2006, 2011)
Trade-off not inherent, results from surveillance as security practice
reinforced by technology
Security gain?
In the fundamental rights liberty is the defining value: „democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are designed to protect the liberty of the individual within the society.”
Thus, security is neither analogous nor opposed to liberty. (cf. Guild et al 2008)
EU Fundamental Rights Charter:
Art. 6 – Right to liberty and security
Art. 7 – Respect for private and family life Art. 8 – Protection of personal data
How the tradeoff occurs
• Technological – „disclosure by default“ (Strauß/Nentwich 2013) • diminishing boundaries between personal and
non-personal information
• Economic – security as business model (security economy)
• Political – securitization and increasing pre-emption/vention • Societal – decreasing privacy awareness and
Securitization – Security as
continuing process
Security becomes a quasi-central virtue
and vehicle for political priorities and actions
Securitization: “the very political act of defining what counts as a threat … through the label ‘security’ problems are turned into existential threats that require exceptional, emergency measures, which may include breaking otherwise binding rules or governing by decrees rather than by democratic decisions.” (Trombetta 2009)
“… sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept … the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it” (Balzacq 2005)
“… conceputalizes security not as an objective condition but rather as a process marked by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with sufficient saliency to have political effects” (Watson 2011)
Transformation from traditional to
human-centered security
EU-Security policy – Overview
• Broad range of threats
• Terrorism, cybercrime, poverty, hunger, disease, international conflicts, climate change, lack of resources, state failure, etc. • But measures mainly focus on fighting crime and terrorism,
border control, cyber-security
• Security as economic factor “Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, (including social infrastructure); it also
encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible.” (ESS 2003)
Paradigm shifts in security policy
• Extended security framing and calls for holistic approach
• Security as economic driver – “Security economy” (OECD 2004) • Changing relation between security and liberty in the EU
• The Hague Programme, continued with Stockholm Programme (2010-14)
• Overlap between internal and external security (civilian, police and military activities)
• Blurring boundaries between “normal”/rule-based and exceptional states • Inherent logic of prevention and pre-emptive security measures
• Gaps between security threats and measures • Individual partially becomes suspicious and
turns from protected object into the threat
• Increasing surveillance tendencies in law enforcement
• + information exchange and connectivity
Citizens’ perceptions – General attitudes and concerns
If you have done nothing wrong you do not have to worry about SOSTs The use of SOSTs improves public security
SOSTs are only used to show something is being done to fight crime
Once SOSTs are in the place, they are likely to be abused
I am concerned that too much information is collected about me
I am concerned that my personal information may be shared without my permission
I am concerned that my personal information may be used against me
21 8 14 35 40 36 66 43 18 20 35 30 33 25 18 21 14 16 14 17 5 10 30 23 11 11 10 3 7 20 27 2 4 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 100% 0% N=1772
18,5% 29% 52% 85% 6% 8,5% agreers (N=549) opposers (N=804)
Citizens’ perceptions – tradeoff
Contradictions in opinions of nothing to hide agreers: Nothing to hide but …
Concerned Not concerned Neither nor NA 54% 23% 23% 7% 12% agreers (N=541) opposers (N=807) „concerned that my personal information might be used against me“ „concerned that too
much information is collected about me“
80% 83% agreers (N=549) opposers (N=803) 96% 8% 9%
„concerned that my personal information may be shared
Effectiveness vs. intrusiveness
23 12 19 0 18 34 18 0 15 2 5 0 38 64 40 41 31 36 0 21 32 27 0 28 10 22 22 23 28 18 24 25 0 20 16 24 0 25 25 29 16 7 14 10 18 12 0 24 11 22 0 16 27 25 14 3 11 7 14 8 16 6 9 0 16 34 18 9 2 5 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLTIn my opinion, … is an effective national security tool
The idea of … makes me feel uncomfortable
I feel that … Is forced upon me without my permission I feel more secure when … is in operation
Major concerns about SOST usage
41 55 37 0 28 50 28 0 42 46 32 0 33 44 38 0 34 51 38 0 33 50 37 26 29 28 0 24 30 32 0 25 31 34 0 24 29 30 0 22 28 31 0 25 32 34 13 9 18 0 15 10 20 0 13 12 16 0 16 14 16 0 16 10 15 0 17 9 15 12 5 11 0 21 7 13 0 13 7 12 0 16 8 12 0 17 5 11 0 14 5 8 7 2 6 0 11 3 6 0 6 3 5 0 10 4 4 0 9 4 5 0 10 3 4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLThow usage may develop in future
it can reveal sensitive information about me
it can reveal strangers where I am (or was)
it can lead to misinterpretations of my behaviour
it can violate my fundamental human rights
Intrusiveness and acceptability
24 59 51 48 19 48 71 35 24 59 51 48Laws and regulations ensure that
SOST
is not misused
SOST improves public security
SOST is privacy intrusive
the level of intrusiveness is
acceptable given the public security
benefits it offers
Trust in security authorities
8 7 12 0 7 4 9 0 10 6 8 0 5 3 5 28 29 34 0 26 23 30 0 29 28 36 0 17 11 24 32 26 32 0 35 35 35 0 30 29 33 0 29 28 33 16 19 10 0 17 19 11 0 17 19 13 0 23 25 20 13 15 9 0 11 11 8 0 12 15 7 0 23 27 14 3 3 3 0 5 7 6 0 2 4 4 0 4 6 4 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLT smart CCTV DPI SLTsecurity authorities which use … are trustworthy
… are competent in what they do
… do not abuse their power
Summary and conclusions
• Securitization vs. „Privatization“ of privacy and loss of its public value
• Extended security concept partially plausible due to complex global challenges
• Vague effectiveness with gaps between measures and threats
• Pre-emption and mass surveillance create new insecurities and reinforce the (alleged) security/privacy tradeoff and vice versa
How far can/should pre-emption and prevention go?
• Increasing dynamic of security while privacy remained relatively static
• Overcoming the tradeoff fallacy by asking the right questions: not whether but how privacy should be protected (cf. Solove 2011) • Reconsidering privacy as a form of autonomy and liberty
with multiple dimensions towards more systematic privacy impact assessments and effective privacy by design
• Enhancing transparency, accountability and oversight of SOSTs+practices to revitalize the public value of privacy
Thank you for your interest!
Stefan Strauß
Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA) Austrian Academy of Sciences
A-1030 Vienna, Strohgasse 45/5 Tel: +43 (1) 51581 6599
Fax: +43 (1) 7109883
Email: [email protected]
