April 27, 2015
THACKRAY SEASONAL TRADE
— EXTENDED VERSION —
Stock Markets are in for a Cold Summer!
Authored by: Brooke Thackray
Introduc on
It is a good thing that collec vely people are generally op mis c about the future– it makes life more enjoyable. Some mes, our propensity for op mism causes us to ignore possible dire outcomes that might lie ahead. There are countless examples of people living in the shadow of volcanoes, on earthquake fault lines and at sea level. A volcano, an earthquake and fl ooding are not inevitable. There is no surety that these events will happen. There are only probabili es that they may occur. Given that these events may happen some me in the distant future, we tend to behave as if the events will not occur. Miami, Florida is a thriving city, and yet it is in dire danger of be-ing submerged in the future. Currently, nearly half of Miami’s popula on is livbe-ing four feet above sea level or lower. By 2060, it is es mated that sea level along Florida’s coastline could rise between 9 inches and 2 feet1. The problem with a rising sea level is not just that Florida will one day be submerged, but that Florida is fast becoming more suscep ble to fl ood damage in the not too distant future. Miami is not alone, as many major ci es are facing an increased risk of fl ood damage from a rising sea level, including New York.
Just as people tend to ignore the probabili es of increasing risk when a nega ve event is more likely to occur, investors tend to ignore condi ons that make the stock market more suscep ble to a correc on. Our ac ons are not much diff erent than a frog who is placed in a pot of water that is slowly brought to a boil. Just as the frog does not react to incremental changes in temperature and the inevitable happens, investors tend not to see the incremental changes that make the stock market more suscep ble to a correc on, and therefore do not take ac on.
The condi ons in the stock market at this me make it suscep ble to a correc on as the stock market is overvalued, has li le poten al addi onal support from central banks, corporate earnings that are star ng to fade, and a looming period of weak sea-sonality. Inves ng in an overvalued stock market that lacks support can s ll be fruit-ful, as the market can con nue to move up on strong momentum for a long period of me. The potent cocktail of less than desirable ingredients measuring the stock markets valua on has one “kicker” that pushes the probability of a correc on to the
pping point - a weak six month seasonal period from May 6th to October 27th. The stock market does not always correct in its unfavorable six month seasonal pe-riod which historically has fewer large gains and more large losses than the other six months of the year (the favorable period from October 28th to May 5th). If there is one me of the year that makes sense for investors to lower the risk in their por o-lios, it is the approaching six month unfavorable period for stocks. This is especially per nent this year as there is a lack of catalysts to propel the market higher. A six month period of reduced risk is not a forever alloca on. It may be a cold summer for the stock market ahead, but there is warmer shelter elsewhere. All is not lost, as there are investments that tend to perform well in the six month unfavorable period, including certain sectors of stock market and fi xed income.
...condi ons in the stock market at this me make it suscep ble to a correc on
...one “kicker” that pushes the probability of a correc on to the pping point - a weak six month seasonal period from May 6th to October 27th.
Current Bull Market is Long in the Tooth
The length of a bull market does not tell an investor if a stock market is going to cor-rect in the next month or two. A bull market can keep going a lot longer than inves-tors an cipate. Despite the lack of immediate predic ve power, the length of a bull market can s ll provide a sense of whether the stock market is suscep ble to fading in strength.
Historically, since 1929, S&P 500 bull markets have averaged 31 months and have produced an average gain of 107%. The current bull market that started with the bo om on March 9, 2009 has so far been running for seventy-three months and has produced a gain of 211%. Both measurements have approximately doubled the long-term averages. The only three bull markets that have produced greater gains are the 1949 to 1956, 1982 to 1987 and the 1987 to 2000 bull markets.
Although the current bull market stands out against the average since 1929, the results are not quite so stellar when compared to the average bull market since 1949, but s ll above average. Post WWII, on average, bull markets have lasted longer and produced greater returns. There are a host of reasons of why this phenomenon may have occurred, including: the rapid rise of U.S. industry, technological advancements, the advent of the do-it-yourself investor and Federal Reserve suppor ve ac ons for the stock market. Even compared to the more recent bull markets since 1949, the current bull market has grown “long in the tooth” and is suscep ble to a correc on. Exhibit 2: S&P 500 Bull Market (20%+) Performance Since 1929
1929 to 2015 1929 to 1948 1949 to 2015 Current Bull Mkt
Length Avg. (months) 31.2 9.6 54.7 73
% Gain Avg. 107% 67% 154% 211%
Source Data: Bloomberg Even compared to the more
recent bull markets since 1949, the current bull market has grown “long in the tooth” and is suscep ble to a
on.
Historically, since 1929, S&P 500 bull markets have aver-aged 31 months and have produced an average gain of 107%.
Stock market valua on– stretched on the upside
There are many ways to slice and dice the value of the stock market. Valua on mod-els can produce results that can vary signifi cantly, with some models poin ng to an undervalued market and others an overvalued market. Everyone has their favorite models. At this me, I am having trouble fi nding any models that point to the stock market being undervalued. Most investors would agree that either the stock market is either fairly valued or it is overvalued. And in the la er group, most investors would agree that the stock market is on the “rich” side.
Stock market valua on metrics should not be used for short-term market ming: some stock market measurements can be undervalued/overvalued for years. Nev-ertheless, the indicators do have value in indica ng that the market is suscep ble to a rally/correc on, especially at the extremes. When the indicators are at extreme overvalued levels, they imply that returns over the long-term are either going to be miniscule compared to past averages, or even nega ve. They do not provide
on on when the markets may turn down, just that long-term expecta ons should be reduced.
Pre-1990’s, the price to earnings ra o (P/E) was a favorite indicator of many investors to determine if the stock market was undervalued/overvalued. Investors measured the trailing twelve month price of the S&P 500 to its earnings and compared it to the long-term average. In the late 1990’s investors became frustrated with this measure-ment as the P/E resided for an extended period of me, at a much higher value than its long-term average. At the end of December 2014, the trailing twelve month P/E ra o was 20 (Exhibit 3), which is not signifi cantly above its long-term average of 15.3 (since 1880), but nevertheless is s ll above average.
Wall Street has managed to convince investors that the forecasted twelve month P/E is more relevant than the historical earnings. A er all, it was Wall Street’s job to forecast the earnings, so they should know (sarcasm intended). Even the forecasted twelve month forward P/E has lost favor as investors have been unable to envision its usefulness and do not fully trust the abili es of Wall Street analysts to forecast based upon informa on from the companies they are covering.
More recently, the Shiller Cyclical Adjusted Price to Earnings ra o (CAPE) has a racted a en on. The ra o uses smoothed real per share earnings over a ten year period and helps to adjust for cyclical eff ects. It is an indicator that helps to value the likelihood of stock markets returns over the long-term. The higher the ra o, the more likely that the next ten year returns in the stock market will be lower and vice versa. The ra o does not predict impending stock market crashes, but in the past, high P/E values have coincided with major stock market correc ons.
A er all, it was Wall Street’s job to forecast the earnings, so they should know (sarcasm intended).
Professor Shiller made his mark with the investment community a er he wrote a book published in March 2000, tled: IrraƟ onal Exuberance. The book hit the book-stores just as stock markets were peaking. The tle of the book was an echo of “ir-ra onal exube“ir-rance” statement that the Fede“ir-ral Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan made in late 1996, as he commented on the valua on of the stock markets at the
me. Coincidentally, Professor Shiller has just released the third edi on of his book (revised and expanded) in January 2015, claiming that stock markets in the U.S. and other countries are overvalued once again, just not to the same degree as the me when his fi rst edi on was released. In addi on, Shiller has also been credited with correctly predic ng that house prices were too high before the 2007 crash.
A er a string of Shiller correct major predic ons, investors have been paying more a en on to the recent high values of the Shiller P/E ra o. Looking at the data since 1880, the Shiller P/E is currently at an all- me high, except for the 1929 and 2000 bull market peaks (Exhibit 4) and it is signifi cantly above its 1 standard devia on range. Accordingly, the indicator is poin ng to an overvalued stock market.
Many investors respect Warren Buff et for his successful common sense approach to inves ng. In 2001, Warren Buff e revealed his favorite stock market valua on indica-tor as the stock market capitaliza on to GDP ra o. If the ra o is signifi cantly below the long-term average, then it refl ects that the stock market is cheap to buy and vice versa. At the macro level, it makes sense that the U.S. stock market should not have a substan ally high value rela ve to GDP (value of all of the goods and services pro-duced in the U.S.). As of March 2015, the indicator was registering 1.2, represen ng a stock market valua on of 120% of the economy (Exhibit 5). Since 1970, this is the highest level other than the year 2000. In other words, according to the Buff e indi-cator, the stock market is extremely overvalued and is suscep ble to a correc on. So why are investors s ll in the game pushing the stock market up when they real-ize that the stock market is not a bargain? It mainly comes down to fear– the fear of missing out. The music is s ll playing and there is s ll some dancing to be done. With interest rates around the world at record lows and o en at nega ve rates, investors feel they have no alterna ve but to invest in the stock market. This “group think” has produced stock markets that have reached giddy levels and the party goes on. It is important to note that stock market valua on metrics used above should not be used as market ming tools. They are broad trend indicators that can stay overvalued or undervalued for a long me, much longer than what most investors would expect. Nevertheless, they do have value by indica ng if the stock market us suscep ble to a correc on or rally. When the valua on metric is stretched to the extreme upside, the stock market is suscep ble to a correc on.
There are diff erent ways to measure investor enthusiasm for the stock markets, but one indicator that is registering extreme over op mism is the level of real investor debt margin. Exhibit 6 shows the posi ve rela onship of real margin debt to real S&P 500 levels from 1985. The real margin debt level is at its highest level in the last thirty years. Low interest rates can explain part of this extreme level, as investors can bor-row money cheaply to invest, but it does not account in total for the extreme level. The problem is that if investors are already borrowing heavily to invest, where are addi onal funds going to come from for inves ng? It is true, that the average person is not ac vely inves ng in the stock markets like they were in the late 1990’s, but they may not be coming into the stock market this me around. The stock market has bought some me, with corpora ons buying their stock back at higher than average levels. Companies with extra cash have not been using it for expansion, but instead having been buying back their own stock. This can keep going on for a while, but it is hard to keep a stock market supported on this ac on.
...one indicator that is regis-tering extreme over op mism is the level of real investor debt margin
...according to the Buff e indicator, the stock market is extremely overvalued and is suscep ble to a correc on
One of the reasons that corpora ons have been able to buy back their own stock has been the extremely high profi t margins that U.S. corpora ons have been earning. Exhibit 6 shows that profi t margins are at the highest level since 1945. Although, it is possible that the high profi t margins are some what derived from structural changes, there is no ques on that the ra o is at elevated levels.
Expanding profi t margins have been able to support an expanding P/E ra o. Many in-vestors argue that profi t margins tend to regress to their mean over me. When and if profi t margins regress to their mean, the eff ects would nega vely impact the P/E ra o and consequently stock prices.
In the end it is hard to argue that profi t margins can be sustained at the current his-toric levels over the long-term. A lot of the profi t margin growth has been driven by aggressive cost cu ng, something that is not sustainable over the long-term.
Corporate Earnings– Star ng to Fade?
Corporate earnings have been strong in the most recent bull market, quarter a er quarter. Companies have slashed their costs and increased their profi t margins to record levels (Exhibit 7) and have maintained a pa ern of earnings expansion. For the fi rst me since 2009, Q1 earnings for 2015 are expected to contract 2.9% (Thomson Reuters April 10). If earnings con nue to contract, this will not be a good backdrop for a rising stock market.
With U.S. corporate profi t margins above 10% and well above their standard devia on range, they are poised to correct and move back to their long-term average. There is no reason for U.S. corpora ons to make substan al profi t margins above their aver-age over the long-term. Nothing has changed over the last few years for this to be jus fi ed. In fact, over me, it would be expected that compe on would bring down profi t margins to adjust for the proper risk adjusted returns for owners of businesses. The very high levels of profi t margins are temporary and have been largely driven by cost cu ng, share buy-backs and low interest rates.
No Help from Central Banks
Bull markets are o en driven by some fundamental factor of improvement, such as the 1990’s bull run which was driven by improvements in technology and increasing produc vity. The most recent bull market has been powered by the Federal Reserve s mula ng the economy through loose monetary policy.
In the end it is hard to argue that profi t margins can be sus-tained at the current historic levels over the long-term.
Given that the s mulus that has been driving the current bull market is now being removed and the Federal Reserve is trying to prepare investors for a possible rise in interest rates, it is diffi cult to envision the bull market roaring higher. Some may argue that the s mulus has done its job, and the economy is picking up on its own voli on, but this is debatable.
In the current bull run, when the stock markets corrected severely, the Federal Re-serve stepped in to rescue the economy/stock markets, par cularly in the summers of 2011 and 2012. In both of these years the Federal Reserve stepped in with, or rumors of quan ta ve easing programs.
At this juncture, it is going to be diffi cult for the Federal Reserve to step in with a quan ta ve easing program. The best investors can hope for is for the Federal Re-serve to con nue to push out its interest rate increase date further into the future. As
me goes on, and investors become desensi zed to the topic of rising interest rates, pushing out the fearful date will have less of an impact. Also, once the date gets too far in the future, it will not register on the investors psyche. Does it really ma er if the poten al date is nine months or a year into the future? The end result is that the Fed-eral Reserve has a very limited arsenal to step in and help the stock market if it gets into trouble. The days of the Federal Reserve stepping in to save the day are fading... and fast.
In more recent years, the ECB’s monetary policies have had an impact on providing support for stock market rallies. Ironically, it was more of the promise to do “whatev-er it takes”, rath“whatev-er than the ac ons themselves that helped to drive the stock markets higher. Mario Dhragi the president of the European Central Bank seemed to get away with avoiding the quan ta ve easing programs of the U.S., at least up un l recently when the ECB announced a quan ta ve easing program to the tune of 60 billion euros per month.
Like the U.S. Federal Reserve, the ECB is also in a diffi cult spot to release another major quan ta ve easing program. It would be diffi cult to jus fy another ini a ve when one has just been released. The excep on to this would occur if Greece were to default on its bond payments and the stock market reac on got out of hand. Under this scenario, most investors would understand this ac on to be congruous to the circumstances.
The last two central banks that have the power to move the stock markets reside in Japan and China. Japan has been constantly been implemen ng itera ons of loose monetary policy. Although they have had a posi ve impact on the stock markets around the world, the marginal eff ect of the latest itera ons have been decreasing and somewhat ephemeral. The Chinese economy has been struggling and on April 20th, China reduced the banks’ reserve ra o by 1% (the biggest cut since December 2008) in order to s mulate the economy. The ac on had a posi ve impact on world stock markets....for a day.
Overall, despite loose monetary policy from China and Japan, investors should not expect their ac ons to drive the global stock markets signifi cantly higher.
Stock Markets– Vulnerable in Six Month Unfavorable Season
May 6th to October 27th
In recent years, “Sell in May” has become a hot topic, par cularly in 2011 and 2012 when the S&P 500 corrected sharply in the summer months. A lot of investment gu-rus do not really understand the signifi cance of the six month unfavorable period for stocks that lasts from May 6th to October 27th.
The best investors can hope for is for the Federal Reserve to con nue to push out its interest rate increase.
Exhibit 8: S&P 500 Avg. % Cumula ve Yearly Gain
In past presenta ons, I have shown the average seasonal performance of the S&P 500 (Exhibit 8), and asked the audience their thoughts on inves ng in the favorable seasonal period (shaded grey) and the unfavorable seasonal period. A large por on of the audience o en responds that the unfavorable season has on average produced a “fl at” return and so why not just hold the market during this me and benefi t from the next strong seasonal period.
This is not the best way to look at this seasonal trend as it does not refl ect the true risk/reward rela onship between the favorable six month period for stocks from October 28th to May 5th compared to the unfavorable six months. It is not a mat-ter of whether the stock market is posi ve on average in the unfavorable six month period (since 1950, the S&P 500 has been posi ve 63% of the me in the unfavorable period), but rather how much risk is incurred during this period.
In the same presenta on, I would then go on and show the table in the side bar, Exhibit 9, (from Thackray’s 2015 Investor’s Guide, page 57) and ask: if you could only choose one six month period in which to invest, which period would you choose? I would then give the audience a few minutes to analyze the data and discuss the re-sults amongst themselves. The answer is almost unanimous, as they would choose to invest in the six month favorable period.
The audience’s viewpoint on inves ng during the year changed when they had to make a decision between two alterna ves. They were forced to include risk into their analysis. Average “buy and hold” investors do not have to make the decision about being in or out of the stock market. They are already in the stock market and ra onal-ize why they should stay invested. The bias is the result of investors fearing that they will miss out on large returns if they exit the stock market during the unfavorable six month period.
So what did the six month seasonal numbers from Exhibit 9 reveal? The most obvious metric is that the favorable seasonal period outperforms the unfavorable seasonal period more than half the me; in fact 70% of the me (number of YES’s in far right hand column). Not as easily seen, but important are the other metrics:
• The unfavorable seasonal period produces an average geometric loss of 0.6%, compared to the average geometric gain of 7.8% in the favorable period (Exhibit 10).
• The frequency of losses equal to or greater than 10% is substan ally higher in the unfavorable period versus the favorable period, 10.9% and 3.1% respec vely (Exhibit 11). Exhibit 9: S&P 500 Unfavorable vs. Favorable Period Performance (1950-2014) Unfavorable Period May 6 to Oct 27 Favorable Period Oct 28 to May 5 Oct28-May5> May6-Oct27 1950/51 8.5 % 15.2 % YES 1951/52 0.2 3.7 YES 1952/53 1.8 3.9 YES 1953/54 -3.1 16.6 YES 1954/55 13.2 18.1 YES 1955/56 11.4 15.1 YES 1956/57 -4.6 0.2 YES 1957/58 -12.4 7.9 YES 1958/59 15.1 14.5 1959/60 -0.6 -4.5 1960/61 -2.3 24.1 YES 1961/62 2.7 -3.1 1962/63 -17.7 28.4 YES 1963/64 5.7 9.3 YES 1964/65 5.1 5.5 YES 1965/66 3.1 -5.0 1966/67 -8.8 17.7 YES 1967/68 0.6 3.9 YES 1968/69 5.6 0.2 1969/70 -6.2 -19.7 1970/71 5.8 24.9 YES 1971/72 -9.6 13.7 YES 1972/73 3.7 0.3 1973/74 0.3 -18.0 1974/75 -23.2 28.5 YES 1975/76 -0.4 12.4 YES 1976/77 0.9 -1.6 1977/78 -7.8 4.5 YES 1978/79 -2.0 6.4 YES 1979/80 -0.1 5.8 YES 1980/81 20.2 1.9 1981/82 -8.5 -1.4 YES 1982/83 15.0 21.4 YES 1983/84 0.3 -3.5 1984/85 3.9 8.9 YES 1985/86 4.1 26.8 YES 1986/87 0.4 23.7 YES 1987/88 -21.0 11.0 YES 1988/89 7.1 10.9 YES 1989/90 8.9 1.0 1990/91 -10.0 25.0 YES 1991/92 0.9 8.5 YES 1992/93 0.4 6.2 YES 1993/94 4.5 -2.8 1994/95 3.2 11.6 YES 1995/96 11.5 10.7 1996/97 9.2 18.5 YES 1997/98 5.6 27.2 YES 1998/99 -4.5 26.5 YES 1999/00 -3.8 10.5 YES 2000/01 -3.7 -8.2 2001/02 -12.8 -2.8 YES 2002/03 -16.4 3.2 YES 2003/04 11.3 8.8 2004/05 0.3 4.2 YES 2005/06 0.5 12.5 YES 2006/07 3.9 9.3 YES 2007/08 2.0 -8.3 2008/09 -39.7 6.5 YES 2009/10 17.7 9.6 2010/11 1.4 12.9 YES 2011/12 -3.8 6.6 YES 2012/13 3.1 14.3 YES 2013/14 9.0 7.1
• The frequency of gains equal to or greater than 10% is substan ally less in the un-favorable period versus the un-favorable period, 12.5% and 42% respec vely (Exhibit 12).
In the end, it is easy to see why the audience of the presenta ons would choose the six month favorable period over the six month unfavorable period in which to invest, as the favorable period on average produces more gains, bigger gains more o en, fewer losses and fewer large losses.
Technically, the S&P 500 is sound, but it is stretched to the Upside
It is hard to say anything nega ve about the price ac on of the S&P 500. It has been a series of higher highs and higher lows and is currently trading above at the top end of its trading channel between 2000 and 2100 (at the me of wri ng this report). The market can move higher from this point and may in fact do so, but as we transi on into the six month unfavorable season for stocks, the likelihood of a strong rally will fade.Exhibit 13: S&P 500 Technical Price Ac on
At the me of wri ng this report, the 200 day moving average for the S&P 500 is 2022. A lot of traders track the movement of the S&P 500 rela ve to the 200 day moving average and if the S&P 500 falls below the 200 day moving average, there is a good chance that the 2000 level will be tested. If the S&P 500 breaks below 2000, especially on heavy volume, the stock market will have turned and will have a bearish bias.
...as we transi on into the six month unfavorable season for stocks, the likelihood of a strong rally will fade
...the favorable period on average produces more gains, bigger gains more o en, fewer losses and fewer large losses
Prac cal strategies for the unfavorable six month period
The stock market can rally in the unfavorable six month period, par cularly in a strong bull market. Seasonal investors should adjust their por olios to refl ect the increased risk to reward ra o at this me. At this me of the year, seasonal investors should be looking to follow the Seasonal 3 R’s.
(1) Reduce Equi es
It is fairly standard in the investment industry to operate a por olio with an Invest-ment Policy StateInvest-ment (IPS) that states a percentage range for diff erent asset classes, depending on risk tolerance and other factors. The overall equity alloca on to the stock market, typically has a 10-20% range around a specifi ed target value in an investment por olio. Based upon seasonal trends demonstra ng lower expected risk adjusted returns in the unfavorable six month period for stocks, seasonal investors may want to lower their equity holdings within their risk parameters and equity al-loca on range for their por olios.
Within the six month unfavorable seasonal period for stocks, there are shorter-term opportuni es in the broad stock markets for more ac ve investors. For example, the stock market tends to rally from the end of June, into the fi rst half of July (see Thack-ray’s 2015 Investor’s Guide, page 43 and page 73 for details). This “summer rally,” tends to be ephemeral and it might be wise for seasonal investors to use ght stops on their posi ons.
(2) Reduce Beta
At mes of expected lower returns, generally it makes sense to reduce risky invest-ments. If the market corrects, riskier investments tend to correct more, especially if the market suff ers a major correc on.
(3) Reallocate into Seasonally Strong Sectors
Not all sectors are seasonally equal. Some sectors perform be er at certain mes of the year. In fact, seasonal inves ng is primarily a sector rota on strategy, favoring diff erent sectors at diff erent mes of the year when they tend to outperform. Al-though the unfavorable six month period may not be kind to the broad stock markets on average, some sectors tend to underperform and others outperform. To state the obvious, investors should favor the sectors that tend to outperform. In general, it is the defensive sectors that tend to outperform in the six month unfavorable period for stocks, including the health care, u li es and consumer staples sectors. The defensive sectors have diff erent seasonal periods within the unfavorable period (see Thackray’s 2015 Investor’s Guide for details). Naturally, if the stock market has a major
on, the defensive sectors will s ll be expected to correct, but typically not by as much as the cyclical sectors.
There are other sectors of the market that tend to perform well in the six month unfavorable period for stocks, such as gold and the agriculture sector. Both of these sectors tend to perform well at diff erent mes within the unfavorable period, based upon supply and demand rela onships within their sectors.
Investors also have the op on to invest in government bonds from May 6th un l the beginning of October. Government bonds tend to perform well at this me of the year as investors look for a place to park their money during the six month unfavor-able period for stocks. For more informa on see Thackray’s 2013 Investor’s Guide, page 55.
This “summer rally,” tends to be ephemeral and it would be wise for seasonal investors to use ght stops on their
ons.
There are other sectors of the market that tend to perform well in the six month unfavor-able period for stocks
Conclusion
No one can tell you if the stock markets are going to go up or down this summer– no one! That is true for all forecasts, as they are only forecasts based upon probability. Diff erent investment methodologies assign diff erent probabili es to diff erent events in order to forecast an outcome. This is true, even for fundamental analysts.
Seasonal analysis looks at historical trends in the market over the long term in order to develop an investment strategy. Exogenous events can have an impact on any well founded investment strategy, both posi vely and nega vely. Seasonal analysis is not immune from these eff ects. Currently, this year, there is a lack of apparent catalysts to drive the stock market higher during the six month unfavorable period for stocks: the bull market is “long in the tooth”, the stock market is richly valued, central banks have limited ability to increase liquidity and corporate earnings are fading. Given the nega ve backdrop over the next six months (from May 5th to October 27th), stock markets are probably in for a cold summer.
All the best seasonal inves ng. Brooke Thackray
Disclaimer: Brooke Thackray is a research analyst for Horizons ETFs (Canada) Inc. All of the views expressed herein
are the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of Horizons ETFs (Canada) Inc., although any of the recommendations found herein may be refl ected in positions or transactions in the various client portfolios man-aged by Horizons ETFs (Canada) Inc. HAC buys and sells of securities listed in this newsletter are meant to highlight investment strategies for educational purposes only. The list of buys and sells does not include all the transactions undertaken by the fund.
While the writer of this newsletter has used his best efforts in preparing this publication, no warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness is given. The information presented is for educational purposes and is not investment advice. Historical results do not guarantee future results
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