Combined Arms

MCI 8205

MARINE CORPS INSTITUTE

STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS

ADVANCED DISTANCE EDUCATION

PROGRAM

COMBINED ARMS

MARINE BARRACKS

WASHINGTON, DC

COMBINED ARMS (8205)

Course Introduction

Scope

MCI 8205, Combined Arms, is the last course you will take in the Staff

Noncommissioned Officers Advanced Distance Education Program (8200

Program). This course is designed to enhance your understanding of the

theories, methods, and assets related to combined arms.

Combined Arms covers many subjects that will enhance your ability to assist

junior Marines in their quest to be better Marine leaders. This course is

merely a starting point for what a Marine SNCO needs to know concerning

combined arms. One key to leadership is knowledge. You must be able to

answer junior Marines’ questions on weapons employment, show them how

to verify the information, and train them to become knowledgeable leaders.

Prior Reading

You should already have studied examples of combined arms in the

Introduction to Warfighting Tactics (8203) course. You learned that a

combined arms team has all elements necessary for sustained combat and

noncombat operations. However, simply bringing the assets of this team to

the battlefield does not constitute the fundamental definition critical to

maneuver warfare:

Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himself vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but also with a dilemma—a no win situation.

FMFM 1

Purpose

This course will teach you how to fight combined-arms style. As you have

seen, the basic concept is simple, but putting it into practice takes some

study, thought, and imagination.

MCI Course 8205

ii

Course Introduction,

Continued

Table of

Contents

This course contains the following study units:

Study Unit

Title

Page

i Course

Introduction

i

1

Role of Fire in Modern Tactics

1-1

2

Cooperation: “putting the Bull in the Horns”

2-1

3 Indirect

Fire

3-1

4 Anti-armor

Assets

4-1

Estimated

Study Time

You will spend about 2 hours, 30 minutes completing this course.

Reserve

Retirement

Credits

You will earn one retirement credit for completing this course.

Note: Reserve retirement credits are not awarded for the MCI study you do

during drill periods if awarded credits for drill attendance.

CHAPTER 1

ROLE OF FIRE IN MODERN TACTICS

Overview

Estimated

Study Time

30 minutes

Scope

In your PME studies, you should have learned that a combined arms team has

all the elements necessary for sustained combat and noncombat operations.

However, simply bringing the assets of this team to the battlefield does not

constitute the fundamental definition critical to maneuver warfare.

In this chapter, you will have a clear understanding of the essential elements

that make combined arms effective and the key elements of combined arms;

fire limitations; and effects of fire, techniques, and purpose of combined

arms.

Learning

Objectives

After completing this chapter, you should be able to

•

Identify combined arms tactics.

•

Identify combined arms techniques.

•

Identify the three effects of fire.

In This

Chapter

This chapter contains the following topics.

Topic See

Page

Overview 1-1

Limitations of Fire

1-2

Combined Arms Tactics

1-4

Combined Arms Techniques

1-5

Effects of Fire

1-12

Chapter 1 Exercise

1-19

Appendix A

A-1

MCI Course 8205

1-2

Limitations of Fire

Limitations of

Firepower

Almost all Marines have witnessed impressive demonstrations of firepower

at resident schools, combined arms exercises, or even in combat. However,

most do not always remember that the limitation of firepower is generally

ineffective when used alone. The most remarkable aspect about modern

firepower is not its destructiveness but the ability of humans to counteract

their effects.

Success of

Expedients

Example such as microterrain, overhead cover, and fighting holes can protect

the modern infantryman from almost all types of conventional munitions.

Such simple expedients can deprive weapons of their effect. This is well

illustrated by the experience of a tiny French village of Fleury.

Fleury Scenario

Fleury was located in the middle of the battlefield at Verdun during World

War I. On 22 June 1916, 26 batteries of German heavy artillery reinforced

by nine light batteries fired more than 100,000 high-explosive and poison gas

shells between the village, German lines, and French batteries supporting the

defenders.

Note: Johnson, Douglas, Battlefields of the World War: Western and

Southern Fronts. A Study in Military Geography. Oxford University

Press: New York, 1921, p. 365.

Limitations of Fire,

Continued

Lessons of

Fleury

Because of the ferocity of the bombardment, one observer described Fleury

as one of the few towns that in the course of the war was literally pulverized

and blown off the face of the earth by long-continued, concentrated artillery

fire (ibid., p. 366). A large number of French machinegunners, sheltering in

cellars beneath the ruins of the village not only survived the bombardment

but also retained the will to fight. The Germans had to clear the cellars one

by one with hand grenades and flamethrowers before all resistance ceased in

the ruins of Fleury.

What happened in Fleury has happened repeatedly in modern history. Large

amounts of firepower were employed against defenders who were well

dug-in, succeeded in killing a few of them and wounding others. However, in

most cases, the trenches or cellars were strong enough to allow some of the

enemy to survive the bombardment and to come out fighting once it stopped.

In the words of a Marine who experienced this phenomenon first hand in

Vietnam: They may have been bleeding from the ears, but they were still

shooting at us (Pers. comm. between Capt Bruce Gudmundsson, USMCR,

and LtCol Ray Cole, USMC; June 1989).

Note: Gudmundsson, Bruce, Stormtrooper Tactics: Innovation in the

German Army, 1914–1918, Chapter 4, Praeger: New York, 1989.

MCI Course 8205

1-4

Combined Arms Tactics

Theory

The phenomenon of men in battle surviving massive bombardments should

remind you of a key concept of maneuver warfare. The point of tactics is

not just to do enough damage to the enemy to cause him to retrograde but

to maneuver the enemy into an inescapable trap that forces him to act to

your advantage. The idealist theory of maneuver warfare is that when

faced with combined arms and maneuver warfare tactics, the enemy will

simply give up the fight! This worked in Desert Storm; however, Iwo Jima

and Tarawa should serve as reminders that Desert Storm was the exception,

not the rule. It does not matter how difficult a position you place your

enemy in, he may never lose his will to fight but fight until the bitter end.

Such a trap or dilemma is the key to combined arms warfare. Combined

arms is the use of two tactical actions (each of which alone is relatively less

effective) that places the enemy in a situation where he is left with no

alternative but to submit to your will. Let’s look at some common

techniques that achieve this effect.

Combined Arms Techniques

Mutual

Support

The simplest technique to achieve combined arms tactics is mutual support.

Consider the case of an infantry platoon in the attack using squad rushes.

One squad rushes while the other two provide support by fire, protecting

the advancing squad. For the enemy troops to engage the on-rushing squad,

they must expose themselves to the covering fire of the other two squads.

If they remain “hunkered” down, they are protected from the supporting fire

but will be overwhelmed by the advancing Marines.

An even simpler example would be the use of hand grenades or M203s to

cover dead space. To return fire, he must face the incoming direct fire. Yet

if he remains in his protected position, he is vulnerable to indirect fire.

When a foe chooses to counter one action, he exposes himself to another.

Example

The effective nature of these simple examples is well illustrated by the

experience of 3rd Platoon, Company A, lst Battalion, 8th Marines, during

Operation Desert Storm:

... the 3rd Platoon was ordered to secure a building, surrounded by a chain-link fence, located 800 meters to the east. The platoon was mounted in assault amphibious vehicles. As they came within 300 meters of the building, Iraqi soldiers inside it opened fire with rocket-propelled grenades. The platoon dismounted, and under the cover of the vehicle .50-caliber machine guns, attacked through volleys of grenades. Within 100 meters of the building, the platoon was pinned down by automatic weapons fire. The 3d squad was ordered to attack the building while the rest of the platoon laid down covering fires ...As the squad entered the building, the remaining shaken Iraqi troops f led from it, seeking escape across the desert.

Mutual support creates a dilemma of space; any way the enemy turns, he

makes himself vulnerable to fire from the other direction.

Note: Mroczkowski, Dennis P. USMC (LtCol), Marines in the Persia Gulf,

1990-1991: With the 2

Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert

Storm. History and Museums Division, HQMC: Washington, DC,

1993, p. 47.

MCI Course 8205

1-6

Combined Arms Techniques,

Continued

Fire and

Maneuver

The classic application of combined arms tactics is the technique of fire and

maneuver. To apply this technique, a force divides itself into two elements.

The first element is called the support by fire element, and the second element

is called the maneuver element. The support by fire element takes up a

position from which it can deliver enough fire to keep the enemy suppressed.

The maneuver element takes advantage of that suppression to move close

enough to the enemy's position to deliver a decisive blow.

Since the decisive blow almost always takes the form of some sort of fire,

whether it’s automatic rifle fire, rocket fire, or hand grenades, the technique

of fire and maneuver is really a form of mutual support. If the enemy

responds to the action of the supporting fires, either by trying to reply with

fire of its own or simply by taking cover, he exposes himself to the action of

the maneuver element. On the other hand, if the enemy tries to move into a

position from which he can counteract the fire of the maneuver element, he

makes himself vulnerable to the fire coming from the support-by-fire

position.

Suppression

Suppression fires create a dilemma of time. First used in the Russo–

Japanese War (1904–1905) and perfected during the Persian Gulf War,

suppressive fire exploits the short period of time that it takes a military unit

to switch from one activity to another. To create a dilemma using this

technique, the support-by-fire element, which historically in most cases

consisted of fire from artillery or mortars, fires on the enemy positions and

forces the enemy to take cover.

When the maneuver element closes on the enemy position, the base of fire

“lifts” its fire by either shifting it to another target or ceasing fire altogether.

Then the maneuver element assaults through the enemy’s position. The

enemy, who just moments earlier was concerned only with avoiding the fire

coming from the supporting element, now tries desperately to get into firing

position.

Combined Arms Techniques,

Continued

Timing Is

Everything

U.S. forces have used suppressive fires with varying degrees of success

since World War I. When the timing was right and the maneuver element

literally followed the last salvo of shells into the enemy trench, the technique

worked well

. However, when the timing was off and more than a few

seconds had passed between the lifting of fire and the break-in of the

maneuver element, the maneuver element found itself exposed to the

undivided attention of an enemy firing at point-blank range. This timing is

best exemplified by the following passage from We Were Soldiers Once...

And Young

.

The hairiest part of any operation was the air assault. We had to time the flight and the artillery so close. When the choppers were one minute out the last artillery rounds had to be on the way or you get Hueys landing with shells. We always sweated because if you shut down the artillery too soon the enemy could be up and waiting when the choppers came in.

Notes:

Wynne, G.C., If Germany Attacks, Greenwood Press:

Westport CT, 1976.

2

Moore, Harold G., USA (LtGen) (Ret), and Joseph L. Galloway,

We Were Solders Once…And Young. Harper Collins: New York,

1993, p. 68.

Combining

Different Types

of Fire

Different types of fire have different effects on the enemy. For example,

direct horizontal fire; such as fire from an M-16, forces the enemy to the

ground. Plunging shells force him to take cover. By combining different

types of fire, you place the enemy on the horns of a dilemma once again.

A simple example of this technique is pinning an enemy soldier behind a

log or boulder with direct fire weapons while rolling hand grenades down

the hill at him. While the boulder may provide frontal cover against your

M-16s or M240Gs, it won’t protect the enemy soldier from the grenade if it

explodes behind him. With the variety of weapons available to small unit

leaders today, you can combine many different types of fires in an almost

unlimited number of ways.

MCI Course 8205

1-8

Combined Arms Techniques,

Continued

Devastating

Effects

Screams, shouts, and whistles split the night as the NVA swept down the mountain, straight into the smoke-clouded killing ground. Now all the mortars of my battalion and Tully’s were turned loose, adding their 81 mm high explosive shells to the general mayhem. Rifleman John Martin, who was in Diduryk’s lines, says: ‘We kept pouring rifle and machine gunfire and artillery on them and then they broke and ran. I don't think we had any casualties but they were catching hell (ibid., p. 219).

Note: Moore, Harold G., USA (LtGen) (Ret), and Joseph L. Galloway,

We Were Solders Once…And Young. Harper Collins: New York,

1993, p. 219.

Fire and

Obstacles

Fire and obstacles are used together to create a combined arms dilemma for

the enemy in the same way as fire and maneuver. Consider, for example, a

barrier such as a combination of logs and barbed wire covered by

machinegun fire. To dismantle the barrier, the enemy must stand up or at

least expose the upper part of his body. When he does this he makes himself

vulnerable to the fire of the machineguns. If he takes cover, he cannot

dismantle the obstacle, which he must do to move forward.

Antitank

Minefield

Obstacle

Consider the example of an obstacle in the form of an antitank minefield

covered by fire from TOWs and Javelins. To avoid the mines, enemy tanks

must move slowly and carefully and keep visibility clear. To avoid the fire of

the TOWs and Javlins, the tanks need to move rapidly and turn frequently,

while making smoke to block the antitank gunner’s vision. Whatever threat

the tanks take action against, either the mines or the antitank weapons, they

make themselves more vulnerable to the other threat.

Indirect Fire

Weapons

Obstacles

Another way of combining fire and obstacles is to use obstacles covered by

indirect-fire weapons. An excellent example was the dilemma faced by the

2nd Marine Division during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. U.S. intelligence

reported that Iraqi brigades to the division’s front and flanks could reach the

area of the proposed breach point with about 500 guns. Many out-ranged the

10th Marines’ M198 155mm howitzers, range of which was a little over 30

kilometers using rocket-assisted projectiles.

Combined Arms Techniques,

Continued

Use of One

Element

Up to this point, all elements mentioned presented a real danger to the

enemy. However, there are cases when one element can exist primarily in

the enemy’s mind. An enemy force that has experienced a real minefield

once or twice will take the trouble to avoid an area it believes is mined.

Thus, in the right circumstances, a dummy minefield might be as good as a

real one.

General Hermann Balck, Germany's foremost Panzer commander in

World War II, explained how he used dummy mines effectively:

The minefields consisted of a few real mines and lots of dummy mines. Using the dummy mines, and the otherwise useless troops from the hospital, I was able to keep the whole defense together and to seriously slow down Patton.

It all worked beautifully. After all, when a tank moves out and sees signs of mines, he can't know whether they're fake or real. So he's got to stop and get the minefield cleared, even if it has lots of dummy mines. Of course, the dummies have to have a bit of metal in them in order to ring the mine detectors.

It worked brilliantly. I would never have been able to slow the American attack--and consequently our own Ardennes offensive would never have taken place--if I had not used mines in this way.

Note: Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann Balck

Battelle Columbus Laboratories: Columbus Ohio, 1979, p. 11.

MCI Course 8205

1-10

Combined Arms Techniques,

Continued

Forms of

Deception

Some forms of deception can serve to encourage the enemy to make himself

vulnerable to your fire. For example, you might feign a withdrawal, leading

the enemy to assault into an ambush that you have prepared for him. You

might be able to cause the enemy to shift his reserve by making a

demonstration, then call “air” in on his reserve as it moves out in the open.

Other forms of deception make the enemy vulnerable to your maneuver. An

example of this form of deception is the artillery raids mounted by the

Marine Corps before the “G” day invasion of Kuwait. These raids were

designed as part of a deception plan aimed at confusing the Iraqis on the

position and intentions of allied forces. Anything that causes the enemy to

expose himself to your fire can create a combined arms effect. Whenever

deception can do that, it is one of the arms you are combining. Deception

itself becomes a weapon

Massed-Surprise Fires

There are occasions where fire alone can be effective. One such occasion

is massed-surprise fire. Troops caught in the open by such fires suffer

horrible casualties. Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., recorded an

extreme case of this sort of fire in his report about the effectiveness of the

then experimental variable time (VT) fuze.

. . . The other night, we caught a German battalion, which was trying to get across the Sauer River, with a battalion concentration and killed by actual count 702.

Note: Baldwin, Ralph B., The Deadly Fuze. Presidio Press: San Rafael,

CA, 1980, p. xxxi.

Combined Arms Techniques,

Continued

Summary

This lesson covered many techniques for achieving combined arms. The

concept in each case is the same: two or more weapons or tactical actions

(including deception and surprise) make the enemy vulnerable regardless of

what he does. Whatever action he takes to counter one makes him more

vulnerable to the other.

This concept should be your guide in every tactical action. Whenever you

can achieve combined arms, you get far more effect on the enemy from

your weapons and your actions than when you simply “hit” the enemy in an

uncoordinated fashion. Your goal should always be to put the enemy on

the horns of a dilemma, not simply to give him a problem that he can solve.

Remember, in maneuver warfare you always try to achieve a decision not

just hurt the enemy. Combined arms turn your combat power into

MCI Course 8205

1-12

Effects of Fire

Sufficient

Strength

Although combined arms tactics are a powerful idea that is central to

combined arms, just merging two arms is not sufficient. If the dilemma or

trap created is going to have a decisive effect on the enemy, all elements

must be of sufficient strength to make the trap work. Since one or both

elements are often made up of fire, you can’t have much of an idea of

whether your “trap” will work unless you know what kinds of effects to

expect from your fire. In general, fire has three effects.

•

Physical

•

Moral

•

Tactical

These effects are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the moral effect of

the fire results from fear of its physical effects. Similarly, the tactical effect

of fire is often a result of a combination of its physical and moral effects.

Physical Effects

Physical effect of fire, what your fire does to people, vehicles, buildings,

ground, and trees results from the interaction of a given projectile with its

target and the environment. Different projectiles have different physical

effects.

•

A rifle bullet hitting a vehicle has a different effect from an AT-4 hitting a

vehicle.

•

A grenade bursting on the ground among enemy infantry has a different

physical effect from a 155mm howitzer shell bursting above them.

•

A shell that comes down on top of the enemy from a high angle has a very

different result from one that comes at him horizontally.

Learn Effects

of Projectiles

To employ combined arms effectively, you need to know the physical effects

of each type of projectile you use. You need to know what the projectile can

penetrate, what its bursting radius is, and how much damage it will do within

that radius. You should know this for each of the weapons you will use or

control. You can find this information in various technical manuals (TMs),

instructional publications (IPs), school handouts, and other various

weapons-related publications.

Effects of Fire,

Continued

Target Identity

You also need to know your targets. The ability of a T-80 tank to resist your

weapons is different from that of a BMP or a truck. The ability of an enemy

soldier in the open to escape the effect of your weapons is different from that

of a soldier under cover. Various types of cover also have different effects; a

man hastily dug in has different vulnerabilities to your weapons from one

who is in carefully prepared entrenchments.

Environmental

Factors

The environment also influences the physical effects of your weapons. A

shell bursting in the jungle has different physical effects on enemy troops

nearby than does a shell bursting in an open area. Terrain plays a major

role in the effect of weapons. Irregular terrain makes machinegun fire much

less effective than it is in open terrain. The condition of the ground, wet or

dry, has a major effect on the results of shell fire.

In every engagement, you need to consider these influences on the effect of

weapons. What has a strong effect on the enemy in one situation may have

only a weak effect in another. You must evaluate weapons’ effect carefully

in setting up your combined arms engagement. If the effect of your weapons

is less than you expect, the enemy may not suffer decisively from your

combined arms, and you may fail in what you are trying to accomplish.

Moral Effects

Moral effect, what your fire does to the enemy’s will to resist, is less

obvious but powerful. On June 30,1942, the 3rd South African Brigade,

fighting on the side of British Commonwealth forces and reinforced with a

24-gun field artillery regiment, found itself defending the El Alamein station

on the coastal railroad to Alexandria, Egypt.

The station itself had no great military value, but the land corridor

immediately south of El Alamein did. Bounded on the north by the

Mediterranean Sea and on the south by the impassable Quattara Depression,

the 40-mile wide corridor was the last place short of the Nile River itself

where the British 9th Army could make a stand."

Note: Bidwell, Shelford, Gunners at War: A Tactical Study of the Royal

Artillery. Arms and Armour: London, 1979, pp. 178-179.

MCI Course 8205

1-14

Effects of Fire,

Continued

Moral Effects,

continued

The narrow corridor gave the South Africans an unexpected opportunity to

rectify the British “habit” of mishandling their artillery. The two sister

brigades of the El Alamein garrison (the 1st and 2nd South African

Brigades), each reinforced with a 24-gun field artillery regiment, were

located less than six miles south of the railroad station.

The standard artillery piece--the 25 pounder--had an effective range of 13,500

yards (about 7 miles). Each artillery regiment could effectively cover an arc

of 60 degrees, and the overlapping arcs created a 20 square-mile “shooting

gallery,” every point of which could be reached by the concentrated fire of 72

field guns. (To add insult to injury, the South Africans were reinforced by a

British medium artillery regiment of sixteen 4.5-inch guns, which brought the

total number of guns to 88.)

Note: ibid., pp. 178-179.

Lure and Trap

On the afternoon of the 1 July 1942, the German 90th Light Division found

itself trapped in this “shooting gallery.” True to the German tradition of

Lucken and Flachen Taktik (“tactics of gaps and surfaces”), the 90th had been

probing for gaps in the South African defense with the intention of bypassing

the islands of resistance and cutting off the El Alamein garrison (W.G.F.

Jackson, pp. 252–253).

However, the veteran Panzergrenadiers failed to realize that the convergence

of 88 artillery pieces had turned the gap into a surface far deadlier than the

infantry and armored brigades whose direct fire weapons they were trying to

avoid.

Note: Jackson, W.G.F., The Battle for North Africa. Mason/Charter: New

York, 1975, pp. 252-253.

Effects of Fire,

Continued

Germans

Devastated

British artillery shells began falling about 1600. At first the fire was

desultory, serving mainly to slow down the attacking Germans. However,

within an hour all 11 of the British and South African batteries were in

action with devastating effect.

The artillery of the 90th Light Division was paralyzed

. The infantry was

pinned down. Some German units, both infantry and supply troops, were

driven to panic

. Energetic leadership by German battle group commanders

kept the panic from turning into a rout, but nothing, not even Rommel

himself, could induce the men of the 90th Light to resume their forward

movement

.

Notes:

Rommel, Erwin, The Rommel Papers, Harcourt Brace and

Company: New York, 1965, p. 246.

2

Von Mellinthin, F.W., Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of

Armor in the Second World War. University of Oklahoma Press:

Norman, Oklahoma, 1978, p. 132.

3

"War Diary of the 90

Light Division. " Quoted in Barrie Pitt, The

Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942. Jonathan Cape: London,

1984, p. 139.

Acting on Their

Own

The South African artillerymen had little knowledge of the effect that their

fire was having on the unfortunate Germans. Each of the three regiments had

been acting on its own without any sort of centralized fire control. Thus,

although the battery and troop commanders acting as forward observers could

see the sooty smoke produced by the burning German trucks, they failed to

realize that their inadvertent cross fire had stopped a whole division

Note: Hamilton, John A.I. and L.C.F. Turner, Crisis in the Desert. Oxford

University Press: Capetown, 1952, p. 296.

MCI Course 8205

1-16

Effects of Fire,

Continued

Moral effects

The history of war is full of similar examples of the moral effect of fire. For

instance, sniper teams in Vietnam proved very effective in “destroying” the

enemy’s will to fight by presenting a constant threat. Cases range from the

South African Brigade example, where the will-to-attack of a whole division

was broken, to individual soldiers who were so affected by the enemy’s

force that they cowered on the ground, unable to move or even think.

Sometimes, the moral effect is direct; soldiers see their comrades being

killed by fire and they panic. At other times, it may be indirect. In the 1940

campaign against France, the Germans fitted sirens on their Stuka

dive-bombers. At times, the mere sound of the sirens of the diving Stukas was

enough to panic Allied units.

Consider Both

Moral and

Physical

You must consider both the probable moral and physical effects of fire when

you plan an action. Consider the effect of your fire on the enemy and on

yourself. Consider the moral and physical effects of his fire on your own

Marines. There is no formula for doing this; it varies with such factors as

whether the unit is green or veteran, whether the men are tired or fresh, and

whether it is day or night. Here you, the leader, must exercise your own

judgment.

Tactical effect

The most important effect of fire is its tactical effect. If fire contributes to

the trap or if it works as one “horn” of the dilemma, it is tactically effective.

If it does not, it has no tactical effect, no matter how much ground it churns

up or how much noise it makes.

Effects of Fire,

Continued

Battle of

Somme

A good example of the massive use of fire that had no tactical effect were the

Allied bombardments that proceeded attacks in World War I. At the battle of

the Somme in 1916, the British fired 4,000,000 shells over a seven-day

period. It would be difficult to imagine a more massive display of firepower.

The tactical effect was zero. The Germans were not destroyed. When the

British troops went “over the top” in their attack, 60,000 were killed or

wounded on the first day alone, and the attack failed.

Pillboxes and

Bunkers

A good example of fire used with tactical effect was the Marine technique for

destroying Japanese pillboxes and bunkers in the Pacific campaign in World

War II. First, the Marines used smoke to suppress the Japanese in their

pillboxes or bunkers so the Marines could maneuver in close to them. Then

the Marines used flamethrowers (fire) to force the Japanese defenders away

from their firing ports so they could not see or shoot.

Finally, using the fire from the flamethrowers to neutralize the enemy, the

Marines closed with the pillbox or bunker to where they could throw satchel

charges in and kill the Japanese defenders. They effectively used combined

arms; the Japanese could not meet one threat, the satchel charge, without

making themselves vulnerable to the other, the flamethrower.

Need for All

Three

Both physical and moral effects contribute to tactical effect. If your fire has

neither physical nor moral effect, it is unlikely to have any tactical effect.

MCI Course 8205

1-18

Effects of Fire,

Continued

Summary

From his campaign in North Africa, Rommel tells of courageous Italian

antitank gunners vainly firing their guns at British tanks until the tanks

rolled over and crushed them. Unfortunately, the Italian guns could not

penetrate the British tanks; they had no physical effect.

And once the British realized this, the Italian guns also had no moral

effect. Therefore, they had no tactical effect either. The British simply

continued their attack.

To have tactical effect, your fire must have either physical or moral effect, or

both. But unless the physical and/or moral effects are used correctly, they

will not add up to tactical effect. How you use them as an element within

combined arms depends on the situation. You learn by doing. In map

problems and field exercises, you must practice calculating the probable

effects of your fire, and then see how to best use those effects. There is no

formula; there is only practice.

Chapter 1 Exercise

Directions

Complete the following items. Check your answers against those listed at the

end of this chapter. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page

listed for each item.

Item 1

The use of two tactical actions that places the enemy in a situation where he is

left with no alternative, is the definition of

a. mutual

support.

b. combined

arms.

c. joint

operations.

d. fire and maneuver.

Item 2

What is the simplest technique of combined arms tactics?

a. Mutual

support

b. Fire and maneuver

c. Suppression

d. Combined

assault

Item 3

What are the individual elements required to achieve fire and maneuver?

a. Support-by-fire

and

maneuver

b. Maneuver and mutual support

c. Support-by-fire and mutual support

d. Suppression and maneuver

Item 4

What two elements are used to create a dilemma for the enemy in the same

way as mutual support?

a. Fire

and

deception

b. Fire and suppression

c. Time and delay

d. Fire

and

obstacles

MCI Course 8205

1-20

Chapter 1 Exercise,

Continued

Item 5

What are the three effects of fire?

a. Physical, moral, and tactical

b. Mutual, psychological, and tactical

c. Combined, maneuver, and destructive

d. Psychological, physical, and moral

Chapter 1 Exercise,

Continued

Answers

The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any

questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item.

Item Number

Answer

Reference

1 b

1-4

2 a

1-5

3 a

1-6

4 d

1-8

5 a

1-12

MCI Course 8205

1-22

(This page intentionally left blank.)

APPENDIX A

Readings

Articles

•

_{Draude, Thomas V. USMC (Col), Charles C. Krulak USMC (Col), Russell}

E. Appleton USMC (LtCol), Duane V. USMC (Major), William S. Lind,

“Combined Arms Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1989.

•

Dearth, Rodney L. USMC (Major), “Microterrain – A Small Unit Leader’s

Ally,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1993.

•

Trainor, Bernard E., USMC (LtGen) (Ret), “The Artillery Raid

Technique,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992.

•

Armstrong, Charles L. USMC (LtCol), “Ambushes – Still Viable as a

Combat Tactic,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1990.

MCI Course 8205

A-2

(This page intentionally left blank.)

Combined Arms Warfare

Col Thomas V. Draude, Col Charles C. Krulak,

LtCol Russell E. Appleton, Maj Duane V. Hegna, and William S. Lind

warfare. Many Marines pay lip service to this truth, but few actually understand what the term “combined arms” means. Fewer still are the field exercises in which Marines actually practice combined arms operations.

What does the term, “combined arms” mean? It is not merely a matter of using more than one combat arm say, tanks and artillery. Rather, it is a specific way of using them together. Combined arms means using two or more different combat arms in such a way that the actions the enemy must take to avoid one combat arm make him more vulnerable to another. In other words, combined arms puts the enemy on the horns of a dilemma. From the enemy's standpoint, there is no “good answer,” whatever he does, he gets hurt. This means he faces not only physical but also psychological pressure. Combined arms helps de-stroy the enemy mentally as well as physically.

History offers some good illustra-tions of combined arms. Many have read about Wellington's squares of British infantry standing off the French cavalry at Waterloo. Fewer people are aware of how some Dutch/Belgian squares at Waterloo were chopped to pieces by the French using a standard 18th century combined arms technique. In that technique, cavalry charged the infantry, forcing it to form squares. The cavalry drew off a short distance and horse artillery was brought up to fire into the squares. As Dutch/Belgian forces soon learned, the squares were largely impervious to cavalry, but they were wonderful targets for artillery.

The infantry were presented with a dilemma: if they maintained the squares, they were decimated by the artillery; if they broke their squares, the cavalry overran them. That is combined arms warfare.

World War I offers another good example. While the Allies, especially the French, relied on artillery to

destroy German infantry positions, the Germans used artillery more for suppression. They found that if their infantry arrived at the enemy trenches just as the artillery lifted, the Allied infantry would often still be in their bunkers, from which they could not fight effectively. To avoid the artillery, they had sought refuge in the bunkers, but to fight the German infantry, they had to come out of them. To take best advantage of this effect of combined arms, the Germans were willing to accept some casualties from their own artil-lery, bringing their infantry in while the last of the artillery was still falling.

Combined arms is the reason minefields must be covered by fire to be effective. The actions the enemy must take to avoid the mines-moving slowly in the open-make him more vulnerable to the fire. The actions he must take to avoid fire-moving covertly and rapidly-make him more likely to hit a mine. That is combined arms; the enemy faces not just a problem, but a dilemma.

Why are combined arms important? Because they get far more effect per unit of firepower-both physical and psychological effect. In that sense, combined arms is a major “force multiplier.” For example, if you combine artillery and air simply by having both bombard the enemy's positions, you may get some attrition from using both that one alone would not have given you. But that attrition is not likely to be decisive. On the other hand, if you use your artillery to support an assault while the air concentrates on attacking the enemy's reserves as they move up to counter your attack, you get a combined arms effect that may be decisive. If the enemy seeks to avoid your air by keeping his reserves stationary or at least off the roads, you may make a breakthrough because those reserves were not where they were needed. If the reserves are moved forward, especially on roads, they may be

destroyed from the air. Again, the enemy faces a dilemma.

Where does the understanding and practice of combined arms warfare currently stand in the Marine Corps? As noted at the outset, not many Ma-rines understand what the term means. It is used loosely, to mean anything where more than one combat arm is employed. Because of this imprecision in language, Marines usually miss what the term really means, and therefore also miss the powerful effect of combined arms.

Combined arms practice is a ques-tion of training. The Marine Air Ground Combat Center at Twenty-nine Palms is the principal location for combined arms training. Here, Marines participate in what are called Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs). Unfortunately, until recently, the CAX did not reflect real combined arms warfare. It was too canned, too reflective of arcane techniques. It stifled initiative and forward thinking.

However, major and very positive changes in the CAX are now under-way. A five-phase program of revision has already begun. The exercise has moved beyond the narrow limits of the Delta corridor. After the first day, the situation is different in each CAX,

making it unpredictable for the unit going through. In order to accommodate innovative maneuvers by the unit, the exercise will go non-live fire if and when necessary, for brief periods. Units may now bypass strongpoints if they think it tactically advisable. All orders after the first day are frag orders.

Other improvements are also in-volved. Safety requirements are being changed, permitting firing and clearing by grid square so as to diminish the linear nature of safety rules and thus tactics. Commencing with CAX 2-89, the live fire segment of the CAX has been followed by a non-live-fire, aggressed, free-play segment emphazing MILES (multiple integrated laser en-gagement systems).

Draude et al., Combined Arms,

continued

MCI Course 8205

A-4

This permits real maneuver, similar to that practiced by Army units at the National Training Center. (See “The Enhanced Combined Arms Exercise,” by LtCol Charles M. Lohman, MCG, Mar89.)

All of these changes are moves in the right direction. They deserve and need strong support. The Marine Corps must provide sufficient resources to support the new plan, especially an adequate aggressor force (the current plan is for an operational force of only a mechanized infantry company and a tank platoon, which is insufficient). The control group must be manned by people who understand maneuver war-fare and can critique it with a view to maneuver and combined arms. The principle of combined arms must be correctly explained and its application rigorously critiqued. With this support, there is no question that the CAX can become a major force in moving the Marine Corps toward true combined arms warfare.

Three other actions are needed to make combined arms a reality in the Marine Corps. First, the term must be understood and used precisely in our schools and in our doctrinal publica-tions.

Second, we need to rethink our cur-rent approach to fire support coordi-nation. Many doctrinal techniques of fire support coordination are essen-tially valid. Valid techniques are those that are not overly complex or difficult to employ and that work in a fast-paced, fluid environment. Unfortun-ately, our overall fire control proce-dures have become so slow that they make true combined arms warfare dif-ficult or impossible.

The fact that the Marine Corps does not yet have a useful automated fire support coordination process in the field is a major hindrance to combined arms. It is not a difficult challenge. Perhaps some day we will learn that hanging every bell and whistle we can think of on a good idea usually dooms that idea to failure. What we need is a simple, robust system that displays real-time fire support coordination information where and when it is needed.

Finally, we need to look at the size of the CAX. The battalion CAX cre-ates a false impression of the role of the infantry battalion commander on the combined arms battlefield. By dedicating a full plate of fire support, assets to a battalion commander, we provide him a combat capability far in excess of what he is likely to have in the “real thing.” This is not just a mat-ter of teaching him more than he needs to know. It fails to teach him how to conduct combined arms warfare with the assets he is likely to have. Battalion CAXs should be scaled back- perhaps battalion special operations exercises would be more productive-and replaced with brigade CAXs.

Today, Marines are generally inef-fective at combined arms warfare. But they can surely learn. USMC

>Cols Draude and Krulak have both been selected for brigadier general. Col Draude is attending CAPSTONE; Col Krulak continues in his assignment to the Military Office at the White House. LtCol Appleton is the deputy executive Secretary in the Office of Secretary of Defense. Maj Hegna is a military aide to President Bush. Mr. Lind, a frequent contributor to these pages, is the director of the Institute for Cultural Conservatism, Free Congress Research and Education Foundation in Washington, DC

Microterrain-A Small Unit Leader's Ally

by Maj Rodney L. Dearth

The outcome of ground combat can easily turn on the use of terrain-on the ability of frontline troops to use the ground to their advantage. Success goes to those who exploit it best.

Many years ago, before maneuver warfare was really in vogue, when we spoke of terrain we were mainly con-cerned with the high ground. As Marines, we were told to occupy it whenever possible, take it from the ene-my when he had it, never skyline our-selves when crossing it, and never let the enemy take it from us. In fact, I would say those four maxims just about sum up everything many Marines knew or cared about the military aspects of terrain.

With the Corps' adoption of maneu-ver warfare doctrine, we have become more interested in the military aspects of all terrain, not just the high ground. Marines are more sensitized to the ef-fects of the different types of terrain on our ability to fight and take advantage of enemy weaknesses. We are no longer concerned only with taking the high ground. This interest in terrain extends down to the lowest levels of command, and now we have a new kind of terrain especially for fire team leaders and squad leaders. It's called microterrain.

What is microterrain, you ask? As defined in Chapter 3 of MCI 7304,

Combat Techniques, microterrain is

small folds in the terrain that can provide concealment or cover. It may be a simple depression in the ground only inches deep, or it may be some other irregularity of the terrain or vegetation. It is important because the proper use of it may allow one Marine, a fire team, a squad, or even a whole platoon to go around or through the enemy without being seen or hit by direct fire.

This may all be very obvious and simple sounding, but it is not so simple when you try to put it into practice. It is hard to recognize usable microterrain sometimes, and our peacetime training does not require us to use it routinely. Recognition and use of microterrain is a skill that requires considerable practice. Not every little ditch or hill is usable in the fashion that we desire, and only ex-perience will tell us which ones are.

In trying to recognize good, usable microterrain it's important to realize it involves much more than just small de-pressions or elevations. Microterrain can be as simple as a line of thick weeds growing across an opening that must be crossed. It could be small piles of bricks and concrete rubble cluttering the streets of an urban area. It might be something as obvious as a tree filled draw, or it could be more subtle like the small buildup of soil along a fence bordering a plowed field. The key to selecting microterrain is deciding whether or not it will conceal and whether or not it will provide protection from direct fire as well. Obviously, a line of thick weeds may conceal, but it won't prevent the enemy from killing troops if he conducts a reconnaissance with ma-chinegun and rifle fire. In some cases, neither would a berm of earth or even a wall of sandbags. Learning these dis-tinctions is why choosing good mi-croterrain takes practice.

Each geographical area will offer different types of microterrain that need to be analyzed according to the tactical situation. It is the "level playing field" available to both sides. The small unit leader and individual Marine must be adaptable, imaginative, and able to identify usable terrain in whatever locale he finds himself.

Here in west Texas where I'm stationed, the terrain is gently rolling or flat, interspersed with buttes and minor ridge lines. The vegetation is sparse and consists mostly of grasses and widely scattered, stunted mesquite trees. Stand ing on any significant elevation ("signif-icant" being defined as anything greater than 10 feet) gives one the impression that the terrain is barren of any real cover and concealment. Most casual ob-servers would think a horned toad would have difficulty moving without being detected. Yet, there are enough variations of microterrain to let a Marine move practically anywhere, in

broad daylight, and not be observed or hit by rifle fire.

As an example, immediately in front of my command post is a field a few hundred acres in size. It appears to be pancake flat. What few trees grow there are no taller than a man and have no concealing vegetation. The weeds and grasses are sparse and less than knee high in most areas. A good machinegun crew should easily be able to establish grazing fire across its surface, but what I find most intriguing about this field is the fact that white-tailed deer frequent it. I have never seen one there, but I know they come and go by the proliferation of tracks they leave.

Since I have routinely observed this field at all hours of the day and night and have never seen a deer coming or going, I was curious as to how they did it. I couldn't for the life of me figure out how an animal as large as a deer could get in and out of the field without my spotting one of them. I began to examine their tracks and soon found why I never saw their comings and goings. On the south side of the field there was a small draw, no more than 12 inches deep, that originated at the edge of the field and then meandered out towards the middle. It was bordered by somewhat thicker weeds than average and a few sagebrush plants, but not enough to be noticeable unless you knew what you were looking for. I found that the bottom of this little draw was well trampled by the deer. Ob-viously, this was their route of ingress and egress. When they were in its "depths," the line of their backs was just barely below the tops of the bordering grass and weeds. This coupled with their natural camouflage made them extremely difficult to detect. I'm sure the deer didn't know it, but they were

R.L. Dearth, Microterrain, continued

MCI Course 8205

A-6

instinctively using the available microterrain to its best advantage.

Now, of course, whitetails aren't like Marines, and what may be good enough for deer could be disastrous for men in combat. Nevertheless, a lot can be learned about the use of microterrain by observing the paths whitetails follow as they go about their daily lives. I'm sure there are many Marines who hunt deer who will heartily agree with me on this point. What this example demonstrates is that casual observation of the ground or a map may not reveal microterrain of value to Marines. Maps do not show mi-nor draws and impressions, although they may reveal small bends in contour lines that can lead to identifying useful microterrain. Also, observing the move- ments of larger animals can provide hints. Only constant observation and practice will teach individual Marines what to look for and what is usable. I learned my lesson well from the deer, and now I am constantly evaluating dif-ferent pieces of terrain, searching for those small folds and bumps that could keep a Marine out of the enemy's sight or line of fire.

As a result of continuing observa-tions, and strong convictions about the importance of microterrain to small-unit leaders, I have instituted a teaching process within my unit training program that incorporates a study of such terrain and a practical application of what is learned. The process is done in steps as follows: • First, I develop a set of map quizzes that build and test a Marine's basic map reading knowledge. Each quiz has a variety of questions that require a Marine to identify every kind of terrain feature shown on a given map, as well as determine distance, grid coordinates, elevations, water depth, current direction, etc. The quizzes start with basic stuff and grow progressively harder. The more challenging ones in-volve questions that require consider-able map analysis. The quizzes are de-signed to be done on a Marine's off time and turned in later.

• Next, similar map quizzes are provid-ed to test the Marine's ability to analyze the military aspects of terrain. To achieve success on this series of

quizzes, a Marine must know the, ranges and terminal effects of weapons and ordnance associated with the in-fantry company as outlined in the Battle Skills Training Manual. These quizzes are designed to force the student to analyze terrain for its impact or application to various tactical situa-tions. All of the map work up to this point is done in garrison using topographical maps from various sources, not just the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), as experience has shown that DMA maps are not always available during real world operations. After the map work in garrison, we apply what has been learned to our practical land navigation exercises. During these exercises, terrain associa-tion is emphasized and Marines will often be given a problem that requires them to navigate between points with-out a compass using only their map. They may be asked to find a specific terrain feature that could be used by them to move from one area to another without being seen or shot by a notional enemy. I try to reinforce what they have learned via the quizzes, and at the same time, get the Marines to continually compare actual terrain features to what is depicted on their map.

• Later, back in garrison again, we have map exercises in the traditional sense, involving notional units and equipment, which must be employed under certain tactical scenarios. • Finally, we go out and do the same thing on the ground, conducting class-es that rclass-esemble tactical exercisclass-es without troops that are used in many Marine Corps schools.

Throughout all of this study, the Marines are drilled about various terrain features and their impact on the situation and on how those features could be employed to assist in mission accomplishment. Included with this is constant instruction in the recognition and practical use of microterrain.

All of our efforts have been oriented, as you might imagine, at the company level and below. Of course, none of the foregoing instruction requires any sig-nificant assets only the time involved, an area to train, and a few maps.

These efforts are not designed to produce Marines who are geniuses in the tactical use of terrain. They are intended simply to instill an awareness and an appreciation in them for the military aspects of terrain, particularly microterrain.

In today's modern world of high technology night observation and heat imaging devices, as well as battlefield surveillance radars and daylight optical devices, the small unit leader needs to know more than ever how to use both macroterrain and microterrain in his op-erating area. If the fire team or squad leader is to keep himself and his men out of the beaten zone of the enemy's weapons, he will also need to know ex-actly what effects different weapons will have on a given piece of terrain. Our Marines will lack the necessary skill unless they practice analyzing, selecting, and using microterrain on a regular basis. Only in this fashion will such terrain become their ally, instead of an obstacle.

>Maj Dearth is an intelligence/electronic warfare officer. He wrote this article while commanding Marine Corps Detachment, Goodfellow AFB, TX. He is currently a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

The Artillery Raid Technique

by LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret)

weaken the numerically stronger Iraqi artillery forces before the launch of the ground war.

It is universally acknowledged that air power crippled the Iraqi army's ability to resist in the days leading up to the ground offensive in Operation DESERT STORM. But plain old artillery also played an important role.

In conjunction with air strikes, U.S. forces used their outnumbered artillery guns in an innovative way that had a great payoff when the armor and infan-try went on the offensive.

Known as artillery raids, American gunners would sneak up to the border of occupied Kuwait at night and suddenly pound critical Iraqi targets only to disappear in the darkness before the Iraqis could react. When they did react, attack aircraft waiting in the vicinity for just that purpose, would scream in to drop bombs and fire rockets at the Iraqis involved.

The Marines made most use of the technique, because it was their job to occupy the Iraqis along the Kuwaiti border so they would be unaware that the bulk of the allied forces were poised well to the west preparing for Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf's now famous “Hail Mary Pass” around the flank of the Iraqi defenses.

The Marines had another incentive for conducting artillery raids. Their job on G-day was to attack into the teeth of the Iraqi defenses, and they were anxious to gain every advantage before they did so. The artillery raid provided them a “force multiplier” as it is euphemistically known.

At the time, coalition intelligence sources indicated that the Iraqis were in well prepared defensive positions and outnumbered the Marines. To offset this disadvantage the Marine commander decided to deceive and demoralize his opponent.

He would deceive the Iraqis by con-ducting artillery raids at arbitrary points along the battlefront to confuse the Iraqis as to where he was going to attack. By conducting the raids un-expectedly with maximum speed and

violence in the middle of a quiet night, he hoped to unnerve the Iraqis.

Air attacks against Iraqis who at-tempted to fire artillery at the Marines in return was designed to convince the Iraqis that, manning their guns would be hazardous to their health. The Marine general hoped that when the ground offensive was launched Iraqi gunners would fear being in the vicinity of their artillery and rocket systems.

The raids were a huge success, and the Marines suffered no casualties during them. When the Marines went over to the offensive, the Iraqis were thrown into confusion at the points of attack, and their feared massive barrages of artillery ended up being desultory and inaccurate random shots.

The first artillery raid was on 23 January, less than a week after the air war started and over a month before the ground campaign began. At this time the bulk of Marine forces was still 75 miles south of the Kuwaiti border. The last thing the Iraqis expected as they watched American aircraft heading north for Baghdad was to be hit by artillery.

The initial target was an Iraqi infantry brigade headquarters near Al Manaqish, 10 miles behind their frontlines. The raid was to test the feasibility of the “shoot and scoot” raids before the gun-ners tackled more formidable targets.

A battery of six 155mm self-propelled guns protected by a company of light armored infantry moved to with-in 25 miles of their firwith-ing position. There they prepared to dash through the desert night for the raid.

Radio silence was maintained, and at their assembly point the artillerymen disconnected wires to head, tail and brake lights of their vehicle as well as those to the horns so there would be no accidental light or noise to give them away when they moved forward.

The Marines sought first round hits when they fired. Meteorological data was collected to get accurate ballistic data. A combination of satellite global

positioning, and computer-assisted ce-lestial fixes were taken on the stars to ensure l0-meter accuracy of both the locations of the firing batteries and their target.

Silent, pilotless planes, known as re-motely piloted vehicles, similar to a model airplane equipped with low light television, flew over the target to confirm its location. An electronic jamming aircraft was also airborne to shut down Iraqi surveillance and counterbattery radars. Attack aircraft and medical evacuation helicopters were on call in case the artillerymen got into trouble.

The raid was a complete surprise to the Iraqis and a complete success for the Marines. The small artillery task force and its armored infantry escort dashed across to their firing positions in the dead of night, fired 15 rounds per gun in rapid succession, and were headed south before the Iraqis knew what hit them. Aerial observation at daylight confirmed that the command post had been destroyed.

With a victory under their belts, the Marine artillerymen subsequently con-ducted a series and a variety of artillery raids until the start of the ground offensive. On some raids, the armored infantry would attack an Iraqi strong-point or border post with machinegun fire in what was known as "drive-by shootings." When the Iraqis responded with their carefully camouflaged artil-lery, the "shoot and scoot" gunners would pummel them with 155mm shells.

At other times, the artillerymen would set themselves up as decoys. They would not jam Iraqi radars. The Marines stayed in position firing for an extended period of time and chattered on their radios so that the Iraqis could get a good fix on their location. All of this was to allow the Iraqis to respond. However, unknown to them, multiple launch rocket systems were positioned nearby,

B.E. Trainor, Artillery Raid, continued

MCI Course 8205

A-8

or F/A-18 attack aircraft were loitering overhead. When the Iraqis turned on their electronic systems and unlimbered their guns and rocket launchers, they were hit immediately with overwhelming firepower.

By the time the ground war started, this one-two punch of artillery and air attacks had done much to take the fight out of Iraqi frontline units.

>Gen Trainer is Director, National Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Article is printed with permission of The New York Times Syndicate.