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How  to  Prevent  DDOS  Attacks  by  

Blocking  Phish  and  Malware  Hosts  

Gary  Warner,  CTO  of  Malcovery  Security  

Malcovery  Threat  Intelligence  Links  Attacks  to  Unsafe  Web  Servers  

08  

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White  

         

IN T R O D U C T IO N  

The  purpose  of  this  White  Paper  is  to  demonstrate  how  the  Malcovery  Cyber  Intelligence  &  

Forensics  architecture  (MCIF)  can  be  used  to  analyze  external  threat  data  and  show  correlations  to   spam,  phishing,  and  malware  events.      

Malcovery  Threat  Intelligence  can  prevent  DDOS  attacks  by  blocking  phish  and  malware  hosts.  

 

MALCOVERY’S  EMAIL-­‐BASED  THREAT  INTELLIGENCE  COLLECTION  

 For  years  we  have  known  that  the  primary  way  Phishing  sites  are  created  is  through  a   compromised  web  server.    In  fact,  the  Anti-­‐Phishing  Working  Group’s  Global  Phishing  Survey   1H2013  documents  that  more  than  77%  of  phishing  sites  that  used  a  domain  name  were  hosted  on   hacked  or  compromised  web  servers.i        The  Malcovery  PhishIQ  system  provides  our  customers  

with  the  ability  to  review  the  stored  forensic  evidence  of  more  than  600,000  confirmed  phishing   websites.      

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Because  the  database  contains  information  about  the  Domain  Name,  IP  Address,  full  URL  and  other   information  about  the  phish,  including  statistics,  hashes  and  samples  of  all  of  the  content  files  used   to  make  the  phishing  webpages,  queries  can  be  made  against  the  database  to  identify  common   attributes  that  reveal  information  about  the  hosting  location  and  method  of  the  phish,  and  to   identify  “favorite  hosts”  for  phishing.  

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  Malcovery  Security  also  reviews  nearly  a  million  spam  messages  per  day  to  identify  newly   emerging  attack  vectors.      These  new  malicious  spam  campaigns  are  documented  in  our  Today’s   Top  Threats  (T3)  reports.    The  data  in  these  reports  answer  the  questions:  

– What  is  the  spam  subject?  

– What  hostile  URLs  are  advertised?  

– What  hostile  attachments  are  present?  

– What  network  touches  does  the  malware  make?  

– What  additional  malware  drops  if  executed?    

Quite  often  the  malicious  links  advertised  in  email  messages  documented  in  the  T3  reports  will   contain  strings  of  text  in  the  path  portion  of  the  URLs  that  help  us  to  understand  the  method  by   which  a  webserver  has  been  compromised.    One  common  example  would  be  the  string  “/wp-­‐ content/”.  

In  the  3rd  Quarter  of  2013,  more  than  200  compromised  web  servers  were  used  in  17  major  

malware  distribution  spam  campaigns  to  deliver  malicious  content  via  URLs  stored  in  the  “/wp-­‐ content/”  directory  of  a  webserver.    This  content  placement  indicates  that  the  criminal  has  the   ability  to  upload  content  into  a  WordPress  server,  either  through  a  vulnerability  in  an  outdated   version  of  WordPress,  or  by  compromising  the  userid  and  password  of  a  WordPress  account  holder   on  the  server.  

The  Malcovery  PhishIQ  system  documents  that  in  more  than  51,000  cases,  a  Phishing  URL  has   contained  the  “/wp-­‐content/”  string,  indicating  that  these  phishing  sites  were  also  created  via  a   WordPress  hack  or  account  compromise.  

INTERSECTION  OF  PHISHING  AND  MALWARE  DISTRIBUTION  

The  T3  report  also  documents  IP  addresses  and  URLs  of  computers  that  infected  computers  call  out   to.    We  call  these  “Indicators  of  Compromise”  and  document  them  with  the  <BLOCK>  tag  in  the  XML   Version  of  our  T3  reports.      When  we  chart  the  relationship  between  these  Indicators  of  

Compromise  computers  and  the  Spam  Campaigns  they  originate  from,  we  find  that  many  

computers  are  re-­‐used  for  numerous  malware  campaigns.    Certain  of  those  IP  addresses  have  been   identified  that  are  able  to  link  together  many  seemingly  disparate  attacks,  where  the  primary  link   between  the  attacks  is  not  in  the  spam  subject,  or  the  URL  advertised  in  the  email,  or  even  the  IP   addresses  that  sent  the  spam,  but  based  on  the  fact  that  a  computer  infected  by  the  malware   associated  with  that  campaign  will  communicate  with  a  Command  &  Control  server,  or  attempt  to   download  additional  malware,  from  a  computer  that  is  also  used  as  a  C&C  or  malware  distribution   point  in  other  campaigns.  

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  In  the  chart  above,  we  see  that  the  IP  address  64.50.166.122  is  associated  with  many  malicious   spam  campaigns  including:  an  August  29th  eFax  campaign,  a  September  10th  Better  Business  Bureau  

campaign,  Her  Majesty’s  Revenue  &  Customs  campaigns  from  September  10th  and  12th,  QuickBooks,  

Royal  Bank  of  Scotland,  and  UK  Companies  House  campaigns  on  September  12th,  Dun  &  Bradstreet  

on  September  23rd,  and  RBS  again  on  October  15th.  

“But  are  those  Indicator  of  Attack  IP  addresses  ALSO  associated  with  phishing?”  

We  next  used  the  Malcovery  threat  collection  to  ask  the  question,  “how  often  has  an  IP  address  that   was  used  in  phishing  attacks  also  listed  in  a  recent  T3  report  as  an  Indicator  of  Compromise  IP   address?”    We  used  IP  addresses  found  in  the  T3  XML  reports  for  the  previous  120  days  and  

compared  them  to  phishing  IP  addresses  from  January  1,  2012  to  present.      (Note  that  the  AVERAGE   phishing  IP  address  in  the  Malcovery  PhishIQ  database  has  been  used  for  phishing  on  more  than   eight  separate  URLs,  so  600,000+  phishing  URLs  reduces  to  about  68,000  phishing  IP  addresses.)  

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We  then  asked  the  Malcovery  collective  if  there  were  certain  IP  addresses  among  the  Indicators  of   Compromise  for  our  T3  Reports  that  were  abused  for  phishing  more  than  others.    Many  of  the  IP   addresses  found  were  used  dozens  of  times  for  phishing  and  several  were  used  more  than  100   times!    The  table  below  shows  the  Phishing  x  Malware  IP  addresses  that  were  abused  most  often.     Column  #1,  “Days  of  New  Phish”  are  the  number  of  days  when  a  new  URL  was  found  for  phishing  on   that  IP  address.    

Days  of   New  

phish   IP  Address   NetBlock   ASN  Organization  Name   ASN  #  Country  

337   213.186.33.19   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

224   213.186.33.2   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

216   213.186.33.4   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

189   213.186.33.3   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

179   64.29.151.221   64.29.144.0/20  

INFB2-­‐AS  -­‐  

InternetNamesForBusiness.com   30447   US  

167   213.186.33.87   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

Phish  IPs  

(68000)  

Block  

IPs  

(1200)  

27%

 

of  the  IP  

addresses  tagged

 as  

<BLOCK>  by  

Malcovery  T3  ALSO  

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166   66.175.58.9   66.175.0.0/18  

INFB2-­‐AS  -­‐  

InternetNamesForBusiness.com   30447   US   78   80.150.6.138   80.128.0.0/11   DTAG  Deutsche  Telekom  AG   3320   DE  

65   94.136.40.103   94.136.32.0/19  

AS20738  Webfusion  Internet  

Solutions   20738   GB  

46   205.251.152.178  205.251.152.0/22  

DALLASNAP-­‐AS  -­‐  Global  Net  Access,  

LLC   27413   US  

 

Clearly  some  computers  that  host  malware  related  content  are  also  being  used  quite  frequently  for   phishing!  

THE  IZZ  AD  DIN  AL  QASSAM  DDOS  ATTACKS  

From  the  early  days  of  the  al  Qassam  DDOS  Attacks,  researchers  at  Malcovery  and  elsewhere  have   been  documenting  that  most  of  the  attacking  bots  are  actually  hosted  on  high  bandwidth  web   servers.ii        

DDOS  Attacks  from  the  days  of  Mafia  Boy  vs.  eBay  in  2000  until  September  2012  were  largely  the   same.    A  criminal  would  plant  malware  on  many  thousands  of  home  computers  and  then  cause   those  computers  to  generate  traffic  against  the  target  of  his  choice.    All  of  that  changed  with  the  al   Qassam  DDOS  attacks  against  the  major  American  banks.    More  than  200  separate  DDOS  attacks   have  been  documented  by  the  Iranian-­‐based  hackers  behind  “Operation  Ababil”  as  these  attacks  are   sometimes  known.      

  On  several  occasions,  the  FBI  was  able  to  share  a  list  of  attacking  addresses  used  in  Operation   Ababil  with  the  security  community.    We  applied  a  similar  technique  to  determine  what  the  overlap   was  between  some  of  these  groups  of  attacking  computers  and  the  Phishing  and  Malware  data   stored  at  Malcovery.      We  compared  three  different  data  sets,  one  from  March  2013,  one  from   September  2013,  and  one  from  October  30th  2013.    The  March  and  September  datasets  contained  

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What  we  found  was  a  very  significant  overlap  in  computers  used  to  participate  in  the  Operation   Ababil  DDOS  attacks  and  computers  used  to  host  phishing  websites.      Nearly  25%  of  the  March   2013  IP  addresses,  and  more  than  1/3rd  of  the  September  addresses  were  also  phishing  hosts!  

Malcovery  

Phishing  Data  

(68,000+  confirmed  

phishing  IPs  used  in  

566,000  a@acks)  

Brobot  

September  

Nearly  5,000  

a@acking  IPs  

Brobot  

March  

10,000+    

DDOS  IPs  

24.4%  of  March  

BroBot  DDOS  IPs  

were  also  used  for  

phishing

33.4%  of  September  

BroBot  DDOS  IPs  were  

also  used  for  phishing

Of  the  350  IPs  found  

on  BOTH  DDOS  lists,  

183  were  used  for  

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    The  world-­‐wide  dataset  provided  in  late  October  also  showed  an  astonishing  overlap  between   DDOS-­‐attacking  computers  and  Phish-­‐hosting  computers,  though  not  quite  as  high  as  the  US-­‐only   datasets.      

While  there  have  been  a  variety  of  techniques  used  to  compromise  the  webservers  used  in   Operation  Ababil,  several  of  the  known  techniques  are  similar  to  the  techniques  used  by  both   website  defacers,  phishers,  and  malware  distributors,  including  scanning  for  vulnerable  websites   through  the  use  of  “Google  Dorks”  (search  engine  terms  that  can  be  used  to  suggest  that  a  particular   vulnerable  PHP  Application  may  be  present  on  the  target  webserver)  as  well  as  password  brute   forcing  techniques.    A  partial  list  of  known  “Brute  Force”  passwords  used  by  the  Operation  Ababil   hackers  to  create  DDOS  websites  is  listed  below:  

$passwords  =  array('porsche',  'firebird',  'prince',  'rosebud',  'guitar',  'butter',  'beach',  'jaguar',   'chelsea',  'united‘  ,'amateur‘,  'great‘,  'black',  'turtle',  '7777777',  'cool',    'steelers',  'muffin',  'cooper',   'nascar',  'tiffany',  'redsox','jackson','zxcvbn',    'star',  'scorpio',  'cameron',  'tomcat',  'mountain',  'golf',   'shannon',  'madison',  'bond007',  'murphy',  '987654',  'amanda',  'bear',  'frank',  'brazil',  'wizard',   'tiger',  'hannah',  'lauren',  'doctor',  'dave',  'japan','money',  'gateway','eagle1',  'naked'  ,  'phoenix',   'gators',  'squirt',  'mickey',  'angel',  'stars',  'bailey',  'junior','nathan',  'knight','thx1138','raiders',   'alexis','iceman','porno',  'steve','tigers'  ,  'badboy',  'forever',  'bonnie',  'purple',  'debbie',  'angela',   'peaches',  'andrea','  spider',  'viper',  'jasmine',  'melissa',  'ou812',  'kevin',  'ranger',  'dakota  ','booger',   'jake',  'matt',  'iwantu',  'lovers',  'qwertyui',  'player','flyers',  'danielle',  'hunter',  'sunshine',  'fish',   'gregory',  'morgan  ',  'buddy','matrix',  'whatever',  '4128',  'boomer',  'teens',  'runner  ','batman',  

Malcovery  

Phishing  Data  

(68,000+  confirmed  

phishing  IPs  used  in  

600,000+  a@acks)  

October  

Brobot  

20,000+    

DDOS  IPs  

Of  the  20,000  

un

ique  Brobot  IPs  

world-­‐

wide  

3,987

 of  

them  were  used  for  

Phishing  as  well

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current  dataset,  it  was  no  surprise  that  many  of  the  same  systems  appeared  on  the  list.   Days  of  

New  

phish   IP  Address   NetBlock   ASN  Organization  Name   ASN  #  Country  

337   213.186.33.19   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

224   213.186.33.2   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

216   213.186.33.4   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

198   213.186.33.17   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

189   213.186.33.3   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

167   213.186.33.87   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

113   81.88.48.95   81.88.48.0/20   REGISTER-­‐AS  Register.IT  S.p.A.   39729   IT  

99   89.31.143.116   89.31.136.0/21  

QSC-­‐AG-­‐IPX  QSC  AG  /  ehem.  IP  Exchange  

GmbH   15598   DE  

97   88.190.253.248   88.176.0.0/12   PROXAD  Free  SAS   12322   FR  

81   213.186.33.16   213.186.32.0/19   OVH  OVH  Systems   16276   FR  

 

Seven  of  the  Top  Ten  IP  addresses  used  for  both  Phishing  and  Malware  were  ALSO  found  to  be  used   for  both  Phishing  and  DDOS  attacks!  

As  we  consider  the  implications  of  this  information,  we  conclude  that  a  new  urgency  may  be  in   order.  Using  threat  intelligence  from  Malcovery,  we  can  easily  identify  which  compromised  

computers  are  being  compromised  for  the  first  time  and  which  have  been  compromised  repeatedly,   even  dozens  or  hundreds  of  times.      As  a  Network  Defender  considers  the  appropriate  stance   towards  a  new  threat  to  his  or  her  network,  we  hope  that  this  form  of  valuable  cyber  intelligence   will  become  part  of  the  threatscape  and  be  used  to  drive  change  in  the  behavior  of  website  owners   and  hosting  companies.  

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  We  have  long  known  that  there  was  value  in  storing  attack  attributes  for  future  analysis.    The   Operation  Ababil  attacking  IP  addresses  provides  just  one  example  of  the  way  third  party  data   sources  can  be  compared  against  the  intelligence  found  in  the  Malcovery  Cyber  Intelligence  &   Forensic  Systems  to  bring  additional  knowledge  to  an  investigation.  

Some  final  thoughts  

We  hope  you  have  found  the  information  in  this  paper  useful  and  informative.  Here  are  a  couple   final  thoughts  regarding  phishing  and  malicious  spam  as  a  result  of  what  sis  presented  in  this   paper:  

1.)  Phishing  -­‐  if  you  are  about  to  do  a  take-­‐down  on  a  site  that  has  hosted  100  phishing  sites  this   year,  don't  waste  your  time-­‐-­‐-­‐or  your  money.    Demand  that  someone  find  out  what  is  really  going   wrong  with  the  site  and  actually  fix  it.      

2.)  Malicious  spam—If  you  are  using  a  service  such  as  Malcovery’s  T3,  because  these  sites  are   blocked  in  T3  already,  you  are  protected  from  FUTURE  attacks.    Is  it  wrong  to  block  a  website  that   has  500  organizations  hosted  on  the  same  IP?    Yes,  there  could  be  collateral  damage  -­‐  but  if  a  

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 APWG  Global  Phishing  Survey,  1H  2013  –  Rod  Rasmussen  

ii  “Bank  DDOS  Attacks  Using  Compromised  Web  Servers  as  Bots”,  Michael  Mimoso,  January  11,  2013.  

http://threatpost.com/bank-­‐ddos-­‐attacks-­‐using-­‐compromised-­‐web-­‐servers-­‐bots-­‐011113                                                                                                  

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A B O U T  G A R Y  W A R N E R  

CHIEF  TECHNOLOGIST,  CO-­‐FOUNDER    

Gary  Warner  is  a  world-­‐renowned  researcher  and  speaker  on  the  subject  of  catching  cyber   criminals.  Gary,  a  seven-­‐time  Microsoft  Most  Valuable  Professional,  is  the  visionary,  inventor,  as   well  as  patent  holder,  for  much  of  the  technology  that  drives  the  Malcovery  solutions.  In  his  role  of   Chief  Technologist  for  Malcovery  Security,  Gary  drives  technical  product  direction,  architecture,   and  definition  and  development  of  security  application.    In  addition  to  his  Malcovery  role,  he   remains  the  Director  of  Research  in  Computer  Forensics  at  the  University  of  Alabama  at   Birmingham  (UAB).  In  this  role,  which  brings  together  the  Computer  and  Information  Science   department  with  the  Justice  Science  department,  he  is  doing  research  that  helps  law  enforcement   and  other  security  professionals  identify,  apprehend,  prosecute,  and  convict  cybercriminals,  and   spreads  information  to  victims  and  potential  victims  about  cybercrime  issues.  Gary  was  the   founding  president  of  the  Birmingham  chapter  of  the  FBI’s  InfraGard  program,  has  served  on  the   boards  of  the  InfraGard  National  Members  Alliance  and  the  National  Board  for  the  Energy  ISAC.  He   has  been  recognized  by  FBI  Director  Robert  Mueller  for  “Exceptional  Service  in  the  Public  Interest”   and  received  the  IC3  and  NCFTA’s  Partnership  Award  “in  recognition  of  his  outstanding  support  in   the  ongoing  battle  against  cybercrime.”

   

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