G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez, Fernando Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, residents of the town of Bulacan, province of the same name, filed a written complaint against Higino Meneses, alleging that they each owned and possessed farm lands, situated in the places known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that the defendant is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the other; that from time immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of water over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip River. From that year however, the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through said place into the Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters, there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan; that their plantation were destroyed, causing the loss and damages to the extent of about P1,000, which loss and damage will continue if the obstructions to the flow of the water are allowed to remain, preventing its passage through said land and injuring the rice plantations of the plaintiffs. They therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring that the said tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of water from the property of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the defendant be ordered to remove and destroy the obstructions that impede the passage of the waters through Paraanan, and that in future, and forever, he abstain from closing in any manner the aforesaid tract of land; that, upon judgment being entered, the said injunction be declared to be final and that the defendant be sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs in the proceedings; that they be granted any other and further equitable or proper remedy in accordance with the facts alleged and proven.
In view of the demurrer interposed by the plaintiffs to the answer of the defendant, the latter, on the 29th of August, 1904, filed an amended answer, denying each and everyone of the allegations of the complaint, and alleged that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of the lands described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that he, together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were stated by him, and which he and his brothers had inherited from their deceased mother. Apolinara de Leon; that the same had been surveyed by a land surveyor in September, 1881, he also denied that he had occupied or converted any land in the barrio of Bambang into a fishpond; therefore, and to sentence the plaintiffs to pay the costs and corresponding damages.
Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th of March, 1907, entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in their favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy the obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the strip of land in Paraanan; to abstain in future, and forever, from obstructing or closing in any manner the course of the waters through the said strip of land. The request that the defendant be sentenced to pay an indemnity was denied, and no ruling was made as to costs.The defendant excepted to the above judgment and furthermore asked for a new trial which was denied and also excepted to, and, upon approval of the bill of
exceptions, the question was submitted to this court.
Notwithstanding the defendant's denial in his amended answer, it appears to have been clearly proven in this case that the lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as well as the small adjoining lake, named Calalaran, are located in places relatively higher than the sitio called Paraanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant are situated, and which border on the Taliptip River; that during the rainy season the rain water which falls on he land of the plaintiffs, and which flows toward the small Calalaran Lake at flood time, has no outlet to the Taliptip River other than through the low land of Paraanan: that the border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has existed from time immemorial a dam, constructed by the community for the purpose of preventing the salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of Paraanan; but when rainfall was abundant, one of the residents was designated in his turn by the lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the sluice gate in order to let out the water that flooded the rice fields, through the land of Paraanan to the above-mentioned river, that since 1901, the defendant constructed another dam along the boundary of this fishpond in
Paraanan, thereby impeding the outlet of the waters that flood the fields of Calalaran, to the serious detriment of the growing crops. According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate. The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in the altitude of the lands in the barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides: Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them. Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this easement, nor the one of the higher estate works increasing the burden. Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to which this section refers shall be governed by the special law relating thereto in everything not provided for in this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural easements relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands together with the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or prevent such an easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners; neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend the easement.
According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant, Meneses, had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the passage, through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which protects and guarantees the respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the fields in Calalaran and Paraanan. It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by means of walls, ditches fences or any other device, but his right is limited by the easement imposed upon his estate. The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the strict and necessary obligation to respect the statutory easement of waters charged upon his property, and had no right to close the passage and outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the plaintiffs.
It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other owners of high lands in Calalaran, in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, to have another made by the defendant at the border of Paraanan adjoining the said river, for the purpose of preventing the salt waters of the Taliptip River flooding, at high tide, not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake, since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water; but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands to the Taliptip River during the heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby impairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates. For the above reasons, and accepting the findings of the court below in the judgment appealed from in so far as they agree with the terms of this decision, we must and do hereby declare that the defendant, Higino Meneses, as the owner of the servient estate, is obliged to give passage to and allow the flow of the waters descending from the Calalaran Lake and from the land of the plaintiffs through his lands in Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip River; and he is hereby ordered to remove any obstacle that may obstruct the free passage of the waters whenever there may be either a small or large volume of running water through his lands in the sitio of Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip River; and in future to abstain from impeding, in any manner, the flow of the waters coming from the higher lands. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, in so far as it agrees with decision, and reversed in other respects, with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal
ISSUE:Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?
RULING:YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of ―forcible entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from another person who possesses the land.When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. IBRAHIM
Facts:Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, without respondents' knowledge and consent, constructed underground tunnels in the sub-terrain areas of the lands of the latter.These tunnels were discovered only in 1992. The tunnels were being used by the NAPOCOR in their operations Because of the said tunnels, the respondents were denied application of construction of deep well because it would pose a health hazard to the community. RTC decided in favor of the respondent and ordered NPC to pay the market value and damages. Petitioner asserts: the right to the subsoil does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such property can normally give petitioners were still able to use the subject property even in the existence of the tunnels underground tunnels are easements because there is no loss of title or possession
Issue:W/N respondents are owners of the sub-terrain, thereby entitling them to just compensation
Held:YES, they are still the owners of the sub-terrain portion of their land - the ownership of land extend from the surface to the subsoil According to
Art 437The owner of the parcel of land is the owner of its surface and everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make ay plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. Contrary to the claim of petitioners, respondents were not able to enjoy the use of their property because: they were not allowed to construct deep well in their lands because the tunnel may cause hazard in the community
the value of the land was reduced and owners were even denied loan application because of the tunnels
The manner of the easement violates due process rights of the respondents as it did not go through proper expropriation proceedings
JUST COMPENSATION
General Rule: value of the property is based on the date of the filing of the complaint.The time of the taking must coincide with the filing of the complaint.
Exception: value of the property is based on the date when it was taken and not the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings:This is only applied to avoid giving undue incremental advantage.Must be based on a legal taking
.Absent the consent, the taking during 1978 is not considered legal and to follow the 2nd rule would be to agreeing with the scheme that was made by the petitioner.The basis of the computation must be based on the value of the property in 1992 – when the tunnels were discovered.
G.R. No. 158385 February 12, 2010
MODESTO PALALI, Petitioner, vs.
JULIET AWISAN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact GREGORIO AWISAN, Respondent.
A person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and through his
predecessors-in-interest, enjoys the presumption of ownership. Anyone who desires to remove him from the property must overcome such presumption by relying solely on the strength of his claims rather than on the weakness of the defense.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the September 27, 2002 Decision2 and the April 25, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52942. The
challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court dated May 24, 1996 is herebyREVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered:
1. Awarding the subject land in favor of the [respondent] with the exclusion of the area where the residential house of the [petitioner] is erected. 2. Ordering the [petitioner] to vacate the rootcrop land and surrender its possession in favor of the [respondent], and enjoining the [petitioner] to refrain from doing any act disturbing the *respondent’s+ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. 3. Cancelling Tax Declaration No. 31297 of the [petitioner] insofar as the rootcrop land of .0648 hectares is concerned, with the exclusion of his residential land. All other reliefs and remedies prayed for are DENIED, there being no sufficient evidence to warrant granting them SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Juliet Awisan claimed to be the owner5 of a parcel of land in Sitio
Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mountain Province, allegedly consisting of 6.6698 hectares6 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 147 in her name.7 On March 7, 1994, she filed an action for quieting of title against petitioner Modesto Palali, alleging that the latter occupied and encroached on the northern portion of her property and surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes.8 We shall refer to this land occupied by petitioner, which allegedly encroached on the northern portion of respondent’s 6.6698-hectare land, as the "subject property". Respondent prayed to be declared the rightful owner of the northern portion, for the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration, and for the removal of petitioner and his improvements from the property.9
Respondent’s (Plaintiff’s) Allegations
According to respondent, the 6.6698 hectare land was originally owned by her father, Cresencio Cadwising. The latter testified that he and his wife were able to consolidate ownership over the land by declaring them from public land as well as by purchasing from adjoining landowners. He admitted including in his tax declaration a communal sacred lot (patpatayan) even if he did not acquire free patent title over the same. As for the properties he bought, these were generally purchased without any documentation, save for two.10
Cadwising also claimed having introduced improvements on the subject property as early as the 1960s.11 The 6.6698 hectare land was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which acquired it in the foreclosure sale. DBP then sold the land to one Tico Tibong, who eventually donated the same to respondent.
Petitioner’s (Defendant’s) Allegations- In his defense, petitioner denied the encroachment and asserted ownership over the subject property. He maintained that he and his ancestors or predecessors-in-interest have openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time immemorial. He and his siblings were born on that land and, at that time, the area around the house was already planted with bananas, alnos, and coffee.12 When his mother died, he buried her in the lot beside the house in 1975; while his father was buried near the same plot in 1993.13 His own home had been standing on the property for the past 20 years. Petitioner insisted that during this entire time, no one disturbed his ownership and possession thereof.14
Sometime in 1974, petitioner declared the said land in his name for taxation purposes.15 The said Tax Declaration indicates that the property consists of 200 square meters of residential lot and 648 square meters of rootcrop land (or a total of 848 square meters).
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
It is worth mentioning that both the complaint16 and the pre-trial brief17 of
respondent alleged encroachment only on the northern portion of her 6.6698-hectare land. During trial, however, respondent’s attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Awisan,18 and respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Cresencio
Cadwising,19 both alleged that there was an encroachment in the southern portion also. This was done without amending the allegations of the complaint.
Confronted with this new allegation of encroachment on the southern portion, petitioner tried to introduce his tax declaration over the same (in the name of his deceased father), but was objected to by respondent on the ground of immateriality.20 After such objection, however, respondent surprisingly and inconsistently insisted that the ownership of the southern portion was included in the complaint and was an issue in the case. The ensuing confusion over the subject of the case is revealed in the following exchange between the parties’ lawyers:21
Atty. Awisan: Where is the land in question located? Palali: In Tapapan, Bauko, sir.
Atty. Awisan: Where is that situated in relation to your house? Palali: It is near my house which is enclosed with fence. Atty. Awisan: How about the land in question situated in the southern portion, do you know that?
Palali: That is the land our parents gave to us as inheritance. There are terraces there.
Atty. Awisan: So, the land in question [is] located below your house and on the southern portion?
Atty. Bayogan: As far as the southern portion is concerned, it is not included in the complaint.
Atty. Awisan: It is included.
Atty. Bayogan: The southern portion refer[s] to Lot 3 and it is not included in the complaint. In fact when I started asking question regarding this land, the counsel objected.
Atty. Awisan: This land indicated as Lot 3 is the southern portion.
The trial court, apparently relying on the allegations of the complaint, ruled on the northern portion as the subject property of the case.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After due trial, the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35, dismissed22 the complaint. It based its decision on respondent’s failure to prove her allegation of physical possession of the land. Going by the results of its ocular inspection23 of the land in question, the trial court noted that
Cadwising (respondent’s predecessor-in-interest) could not pinpoint and the court did not see any of the improvements that Cadwising had allegedly introduced to the land.24 Thus, the trial court held that respondent’s claim of
ownership was supported solely by her tax declarations and tax payment receipts which, by themselves, are not conclusive proof of ownership.25 In contrast, the trial court duly verified during the ocular inspection the existence of the improvements introduced by petitioner and his
predecessors on the subject property.26 Moreover, the trial court observed
that the witnesses for the petitioner all lived continuously since their births within or near Sitio Camambaey in Tapapan and that they knew the land very well. They knew petitioner and his predecessors, as well as the
improvements introduced by them to the land. Thus, the trial court found that the petitioner presented overwhelming proof of actual, open, continuous and physical possession of the property since time immemorial. Petitioner’s possession, coupled with his tax declarations, is strong evidence of ownership which convinced the court of his better right to the property.27 For purposes of clarity, we cite the dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant Modesto Palali and against the plaintiff Juliet C. Awisan, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Gregorio B. Awisan, as follows:
a) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint and costs against the plaintiff;
b) Adjudging the defendant Modesto Palali as the owner and lawful possessor of the subject property; and
c) The court cannot however grant the counterclaim of defendant for lack of evidence to prove the same.
SO ORDERED.28
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, which reversed the same. The CA found that petitioner failed to prove actual possession of the entire 6.6698 hectare land, which the CA believed to be the subject of the case. According to the appellate court, petitioner was only able to prove actual occupation of the portion where his house was located and the area below where he had planted fruit-bearing plants.29
The CA also ruled that based on the ocular inspection report of the trial court, petitioner’s possession did not extend to the entire 6.6698 hectares. In its own words:
Likewise, the report on the ocular inspection of the land in question divulges that the alleged possession of the land by [petitioner] Modesto Palali does not extend to the entire 6.6698 hectares of the subject land. Not even in the sketch plan of the land does it illustrate that the possession of the
[petitioner] refers to the entire subject land. Instead, the possession of [petitioner] merely points to certain portions of the subject land as drawn and prepared by the tax mappers.
From the foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be inferred that the possession of the [petitioner] refers to the entire portion of the land.30 The appellate court also refused to give credence to petitioner’s tax declaration. The CA held that petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 31793, which covers only an 848-square meter property, is incongruous with his purported claim of ownership over the entire 6.6698-hectare land.
Proceeding from this premise, the CA gave greater weight to the
documentary and testimonial evidence of respondent. The presumption of regularity was given to the public documents from which respondent traced her title to the subject property.
Thus, the CA awarded the entire 6.6698-hectare property to respondent and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration (except for the
200-square meter residential lot thereof which was not being claimed by respondent).31
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the unfavorable Decision, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Preliminary Matter
The CA Decision is based on a mistaken understanding of the subject property
It is apparent that the CA Decision proceeded from an erroneous understanding of what the subject property actually is and what the trial court actually ruled upon. The CA was under the mistaken impression that the subject property was the entire 6.6698 hectares of land allegedly owned by respondent under her Tax Declaration No. 147. Because of this, the CA ruled against petitioner on the ground that he failed to prove possession of the entire 6.6698 hectares. The CA also disregarded petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 31793 (despite being coupled with actual possession) because the said tax declaration covered only an 848-square meter property and did not cover the entire 6.6698 hectare property. This is clear from the following text lifted from the CA Decision:
The trial court’s finding that the defendant-appellee had acquired the subject land by virtue of acquisitive prescription cannot be countenanced. At the outset, the subject land being claimed by the plaintiff-appellant as described in the complaint is the 6.6698 hectares land [boundaries omitted]. The said description is with the exclusion of the portion of land where the residential house of the defendant-appellee is erected. However, the adverse and exclusive possession offered by the defendant-appellee, which includes his tax receipt, does not refer to the entire land consisting of 6.6698 hectares being claimed by the plaintiff-appellant. x x x The witnesses for the defendant-appellee testified that indeed Modesto Palali’s predecessors-in-interest have once built a house in Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mt. Province, but whether or not the defendant-appellee or his predecessor-in-interest have actually, exclusively, notoriously, and adversely possessed the entire 6.6698 hectares of land could not be deduced from their testimonies. It could be gleaned from the testimony of Consigno Saligen, that what the defendant-appellee actually possessed and claim as their own is merely that portion where the house is erected and that portion of land below the house where Modesto Palali planted fruit-bearing plants. x x x
Likewise, the report on ocular inspection of the land in question divulges that the alleged possession of the land by defendant-appellee Modesto Palali does not extend to the entire 6.6698 hectares of the subject land. Not even in the sketch plan of the land does it illustrate that the possession of the defendant-appellee refers to the entire subject land. Instead, the possession of the defendant-appellee merely points to certain portions of the subject land as drawn and prepared by the "tax mappers".
From the foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be inferred that the possession of the defendant-appellee refers to the entire portion of the land.32
This was perhaps not entirely the appellate court’s fault, because a reading of the issues presented by respondent to the CA gives the wrong impression that the subject property is the entire 6.6698 hectares:
x x x [T]he plaintiff-appellant elevated the matter on appeal assigning the following errors committed by the trial court:
I
The trial court erred in failing to consider the overwhelming superior documentary and oral evidence of the plaintiff Juliet C. Awisan showing her ownership on (sic) the land in question consisting of 6.6698 hectares described in her complaint
II
The trial court erred in adjudicating the land in question to the defendant Modesto Palali who is a squatter on the land whose tax declaration merely overlapped or duplicated that of the plaintiff and which covered only a small portion of 200 square meters of residential portion [sic] and 648 square meter of rootcrop land.
x x x x33
The foregoing formulation of the issues presented by respondent before the CA erroneously described "the land in question" as "consisting of 6.6698 hectares" and erroneously stated that the trial court "adjudicated the land in question to [petitioner]". Said formulation is very misleading because the case before the trial court did not involve the ownership of the entire 6.6698 hectares, but merely the northern portion thereof – the property actually occupied by petitioner and much smaller than 6.6698 hectares. Even if we go back to the respondent’s complaint, we would find there that respondent is claiming encroachment merely of the "northern portion" of her 6.6698-hectare property, and not of the entire 6.6698 property.34
Neither did the trial court adjudicate to petitioner the entire 6.6698-hectare land; it simply upheld petitioner’s right to the property he is actually occupying. It only declared petitioner as the lawful owner and possessor of the "subject property", which is the property to the north of the 6.6698-hectare land and occupied by petitioner. This is evident from the trial court’s summary of the facts established by the respondent and her witnesses, to wit:
During the hearing of the case, plaintiff and her witnesses established and disclosed: x x x that only a portion of the entire 6.6 hectares in its northern portion located below and above the residential house of the defendant Modesto Palali is now the land in question as properly shown in the sketch of the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 147 in the name of Juliet Awisan x x x.35
Proceeding from a wrong premise as to what is the subject property, the CA utterly failed to appreciate the evidence as they relate to the parties’ claims. Thus, while the general rule is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised, the Court is behooved to admit the instant case as an exception.36
Issue
The issue in this case is who between the parties has the better right to the subject property.
Our Ruling
Having gone over the parties’ evidence before the trial court, we find adequate support for the trial court’s ruling in favor of petitioner. The CA erred in reversing the trial court’s findings, particularly because, as discussed above, such reversal was premised on the CA’s erroneous understanding of the subject property.
As found by the trial court, petitioner was able to prove his and his predecessors’ actual, open, continuous and physical possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-war era (aside from petitioner’s tax declaration over the subject property). Petitioner’s witnesses were long time residents of Sitio Camambaey. They lived on the land, knew their neighbors and were familiar with the terrain. They were witnesses to the introduction of improvements made by petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest.
From their consistent, unwavering, and candid testimonies, we find that petitioner’s grandfather Mocnangan occupied the land during the pre-war era. He planted camote on the property because this was the staple food at that time. He then gave the subject property to his daughter Tammam, while he gave a separate one to his son Pacolan Mocnangan. In the 1960s, Tammam and her husband Palalag cultivated the land, built a cogon home, and started a family there. Palalag introduced terraces and, together with his sons, built earth fences around the property. Palalag’s family initially planted bananas, coffee, and oranges; they later added avocadoes, persimmons, and pineapples. When Tammam and Palalag died, their son, petitioner herein, buried them in the subject property and continued cultivating the land. He also constructed a new home.
On the other hand, respondent relied merely on her tax declaration, but failed to prove actual possession insofar as the subject property is concerned. To be sure, respondent attempted to prove possession of the subject property. Her predecessor-in-interest, Cadwising, had allegedly introduced improvements like a piggery, poultry, terracing, plantings, and a barbed wire fence. However, not one of these alleged improvements was found during the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court. The absence of all his alleged improvements on the property is suspicious in light of his assertion that he has a caretaker living near the subject property for 20 years. Cadwising did not even bother to explain the absence of the improvements. The trial court’s rejection of Cadwising’s assertions regarding the introduction of improvements is therefore not baseless.1avvphi1 Thus, respondent having failed to prove possession, her claim rests solely on her tax declaration. But tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.37Respondent’s tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war . Neither can respondent rely on the public instruments dealing with the 6.6698-hectare property covered by her tax declaration. Such public documents merely show the successive transfers of the property covered by said documents. They do not conclusively prove that the transferor actually owns the property purportedly being transferred, especially as far as third parties are concerned. For it may very well be that the transferor does not actually own the property he has transferred, in which case he transfers no better right to his transferee. No one can give what he does not have – nemo dat quod non habet.38 Thus, since respondent’s predecessor-in-interest Cadwising
appeared not to have any right to the subject property, he transferred no better right to his transferees, including respondent.
All told, we hold that as between the petitioner and the respondent, it is the petitioner who has the better claim or title to the subject property. While the respondent merely relied on her tax declaration, petitioner was able to prove actual possession of the subject property coupled with his tax declaration. We have ruled in several cases that possession, when coupled with a tax declaration, is a weighty evidence of ownership.39 It certainly is more weighty
and preponderant than a tax declaration alone.
The preponderance of evidence is therefore clearly in favor of petitioner, particularly considering that, as the actual possessor under claim of ownership, he enjoys the presumption of ownership.40 Moreover, settled is the principle that a party seeking to recover real property must rely on the strength of her case rather than on the weakness of the defense.41 The
burden of proof rests on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. For he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact. Having failed to discharge her burden to prove her affirmative allegations, we find that the trial court rightfully dismissed respondent’s complaint.
A final note. Like the trial court, we make no ruling regarding the southern portion of the property (or Lot 3, as referred to by the parties), because this property was not included in respondent’s complaint. Although the Rules of Court provide that "when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings,"42 such rule does not
apply here. Respondent objected43 when petitioner tried to prove his ownership of Lot 3 on the ground of immateriality, arguing that ownership of Lot 3 was not an issue. Respondent cannot now insist otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 27, 2002 Decision as well as the April 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52942 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 24, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondent.
REPUBLIC VS HOLY TRINITY
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated 21 April 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90981 which, in turn, set aside two Orders[2] dated 7 February 2005[3] and 16 May 2005[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000.
The undisputed factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners. On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties, in the total amount
of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974[5] in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC. The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, as well as the Writ of Possession itself. HTRDC thereafter moved for the reconsideration of the 19 March 2002 Order of the RTC. On 7 October 2002, the Sheriff filed with the RTC a Report on Writ of Possession stating, among other things, that since none of the landowners voluntarily vacated the properties subject of the expropriation proceedings, the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) would be necessary in implementing the Writ of Possession. Accordingly, TRB, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying for an Order directing the PNP to assist the Sheriff in the implementation of the Writ of Possession. On 15 November 2002, the RTC issued an Order directing the landowners to file their comment on TRB’s Omnibus Motion.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent or its duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00, out of TRB’s advance deposit of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which accrued thereon. Acting on said motion, the RTC issued an Order dated 21 April 2003, directing the manager of LBP-South Harbor to release in favor of HTRDC the amount of P22,968,000.00 since the latter already proved its absolute ownership over the subject properties and paid the taxes due thereon to the government. According to the RTC, “(t)he issue however on the interest earned by the amount deposited in the bank, if there is any, should still be threshed out.”[6]
On 7 May 2003, the RTC conducted a hearing on the accrued interest, after which, it directed the issuance of an order of expropriation, and granted TRB a period of 30 days to inquire from LBP-South Harbor “whether the deposit made by DPWH with said bank relative to these expropriation proceedings is earning interest or not.”[7]
The RTC issued an Order, on 6 August 2003, directing the appearance of LBP Assistant Vice-President Atty. Rosemarie M. Osoteo and Department Manager Elizabeth Cruz to testify on whether the Department of Public Works and Highways’ (DPWH’s) expropriation account with the bank was earning interest. On 9 October 2003, TRB instead submitted a Manifestation to which was attached a letter dated 19 August 2003 by Atty. Osoteo stating that the DPWH Expropriation Account was an interest bearing current account.
On 11 March 2004, the RTC issued an Order resolving as follows the issue of ownership of the interest that had accrued on the amount deposited by DPWH in its expropriation current account with LBP-South Harbor:
WHEREFORE, the interest earnings from the deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting one hundred (100%) percent of the zonal value of the affected
properties in this expropriation proceedings under the principle of accession are considered as fruits and should properly pertain to the herein defendant/property owner [HTRDC]. Accordingly, the Land Bank as the depositary bank in this expropriation proceedings is (1) directed to make the necessary computation of the accrued interest of the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the time it was deposited up to the time it was released to Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corp. and thereafter (2) to release the same to the defendant Holy Trinity Development Corporation through its authorized representative.[8]
TRB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted RTC Order, contending that the payment of interest on money deposited and/or consigned for the purpose of securing a writ of possession was sanctioned neither by law nor by jurisprudence.
TRB filed a Motion to Implement Order dated 7 May 2003, which directed the issuance of an order of expropriation. On 5 November 2004, the RTC issued an Order of Expropriation.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC likewise granted TRB’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC ruled that the issue as to whether or not HTRDC is entitled to payment of interest should be ventilated before the Board of Commissioners which will be created later for the determination of just compensation.
Now it was HTRDC’s turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the latest Order of the RTC. The RTC, however, denied HTRDC’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 16 May 2005. HTRDC sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90981. In its Decision, promulgated on 21 April 2006, the Court of Appeals vacated the Orders dated 7 February 2005 and 16 May 2005 of the RTC, and reinstated the Order dated 11 March 2004 of the said trial court wherein it ruled that the interest which accrued on the amount deposited in the expropriation account belongs to HTRDC by virtue of accession. The Court of Appeals thus declared:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 07 February and 16 May 2005 respectively of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 85) are hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order dated 11 March 2004 is hereby reinstated.[9]
From the foregoing, the Republic, represented by the TRB, filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, steadfast in its stance that HTRDC is “entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.”[10] According to the TRB, the owner of the subject properties is entitled to an exact amount as clearly defined in both Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, which reads:
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. – Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one
hundred (100%) percent of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof.
and Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. – Upon the filing of the complaint or at anytime thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
The TRB reminds us that there are two stages[11] in expropriation proceedings, the determination of the authority to exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. The TRB argues that it is only during the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlement to interest, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco[12] and National Power Corporation v. Angas.[13]
The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account includes the compensation for the other landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to respondent. At the outset, we call attention to a significant oversight in the TRB’s line of reasoning. It failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon,[14] we held:
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
x x x x
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property “for national government infrastructure projects.” Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic.
The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as to the ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount.
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on the determination of who actually owns the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized representative. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already deemed a constructive delivery thereof to HTRDC:
When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a “constructive delivery” of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and undisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by [herein petitioner] TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited.[15]
Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount, then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.
We agree with the Court of Appeals, and find no merit in the instant Petition.
The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR, to the property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v. Gingoyon[16]:
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The following portion of the Senate deliberations, cited by PIATCO in its Memorandum, is worth quoting to cogitate on the purpose behind the plain meaning of the law:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). “x x x Because the Senate believes that, you know, we have to pay the landowners immediately not by treasury bills but by cash.
Since we are depriving them, you know, upon payment, ‘no, of possession, we might as well pay them as much, ‘no, hindi lang 50 percent.
x x x x
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Accepted.
x x x x
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Oo. Because this is really in favor of the landowners, e.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). That’s why we need to really secure the availability of funds.
x x x x
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). No, no. It’s the same. It says here: iyong first paragraph, diba? Iyong zonal – talagang magbabayad muna. In other words, you know, there must be a payment kaagad. (TSN, Bicameral Conference on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill 1422 and Senate Bill 2117, August 29, 2000, pp. 14-20)
x x x x
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Okay, okay, ‘no. Unang-una, it is not deposit, ‘no. It’s payment.”
REP. BATERINA. It’s payment, ho, payment.”
The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery.[17] The intention of the TRB in depositing
such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure
a writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to HTRDC’s Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner thereof.[18]
A close scrutiny of TRB’s arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the Court of Appeals’ determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is “entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.”
We agree in TRB’s statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be determined in accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated properties. However, TRB already complied therewith by depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB is already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC, and HTRDC became the owner thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is already determined as HTRDC. The interest is paid byLBP-South Harbor on the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so by law.
Nonetheless, we find it necessary to emphasize that HTRDC is determined to be the owner of only a part of the amount deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum of P22,968,000.00. Hence, it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only.
We are not persuaded by TRB’s citation of National Power Corporation v. Angas and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of the determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the proceedings only. We find that neither case is applicable herein. The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation.
The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account.
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the
value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).[19]
HTRDC never alleged that it was seeking interest because of delay in either of the two payments enumerated above. In fact, HTRDC’s cause of action is based on the prompt initial payment of just compensation, which effectively transferred the ownership of the amount paid to HTRDC. Being the owner of the amount paid, HTRDC is claiming, by the right of accession, the interest earned by the same while on deposit with the bank.
That the expropriation account was in the name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of no moment. We quote with approval the following reasoning of the Court of Appeals:
Notwithstanding that the amount was deposited under the DPWH account, ownership over the deposit transferred by operation of law to the [HTRDC] and whatever interest, considered as civil fruits, accruing to the amount of Php22,968,000.00 should properly pertain to [HTRDC] as the lawful owner of the principal amount deposited following the principle of accession. Bank interest partake the nature of civil fruits under Art. 442 of the New Civil Code. And since these are considered fruits, ownership thereof should be due to the owner of the principal. Undoubtedly, being an attribute of ownership, the *HTRDC’s+ right over the fruits (jus fruendi), that is the bank interests, must be respected.[20]
Considering that the expropriation account is in the name of DPWH, then, DPWH should at most be deemed as the trustee of the amounts deposited in the said accounts irrefragably intended as initial payment for the landowners of the properties subject of the expropriation, until said landowners are allowed by the RTC to withdraw the same. As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof.[21] The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. Article 1187[22] of the Civil Code provides that the
“effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation.” Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given conditions, as determined by the RTC in its Order[23] dated 21 April 2003, the effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 April 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90981, which set aside the 7 February 2005 and 16 May 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
BACHRACH v TALISAY SILAY (1931; Romualdez)
Facts:Talisay-Silay was indebted to PNB. To secure the loan, Talisay induced its planters one of whomwas Mariano Lacson Ledesma to mortgage their land. The central, to compensate the planters for mortgagingtheir property, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation… every year with a sum
