PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 Facts:
Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a “Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee who’s having a maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was to immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods, this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The reliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said discrepancy and she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that she wasn’t aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadn’t deliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remained unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances. Issue:
Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace’s illegal dismissal due to certain company policy.
Ruling:
Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Where’s a company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the fundamental policy of the State toward marriage.
The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace’s illegal dismissal and the latter shall claim for damages.
Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Ruling:
Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.
The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these
distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. 252 Facts:
Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of marriage certificate.
Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid.
Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez 185 SCRA 425 Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.
Ruling:
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).
Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 Facts:
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
2. Falsification of the monthly reports of cases 3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court 4. Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received 5. Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and 6. Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.
Ruling:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.
Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648 Facts:
Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiff-appellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note to Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due to opposition of defendant’s mother and that he will be leaving. But on September 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be returning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the defendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a “petition for relief from orders, judgments and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration.” Beatriz moved to strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement. Defendant wasn’t able to appear but instead on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s petition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed
to appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court but this time defendant’s counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff damages.
Ruling:
The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.
Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 Facts:
Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the respondent’s residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,
confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC. Ruling:
The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.
A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore there is an irregularity.
Arañes vs. Judge Occiano A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002 Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Vda. De Chua vs. CA G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998 Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.
Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994
Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas. Ruling:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio.
Garcia vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided.
In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign
law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts:
Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.
Ruling:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 Facts:
Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no “community property”.
Issue:
Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as
petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were married with two children. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son and 1st became a naturalized American citizen, 2nd obtained a valid divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry, and 3rd contracted a marriage with Innocent Stanley, an American.
Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law, they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or Annulment instead.
Issue:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling:
YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a
valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her to remarry.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law, (3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse.
Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies for such would be in the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible, and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties.
Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting
of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Issues:
1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249
Facts:
Same. Article 27-34; Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriage with the exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code is valid.
Ruling:
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate.
Mariategui vs. CA
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 Facts:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. On his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four children, Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children, namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his death, descendants from his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children on Lupo’s third marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were owned by their common father. The petitioners, children on first and second marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents, children on third marriage.
Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in holding respondents are not legitimate children of their said parents. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to equal shares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession rights over the said estate.
Ruling:
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572 Facts:
Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in his possession.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts:
Same. Article 35 Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio.
Ruling:
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Republic vs. CA and Molina February 13, 1997 Facts:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
Leouel Santos vs. CA G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 Facts:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20, 1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young spouses’ family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents.
On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S., where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the FC.
Ruling:
The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Facts:
Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
Issue:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
Choa vs. Choa
G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002 Facts:
Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The case went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent. Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must present evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation.
The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.
Antonio vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. From the totality of the evidence, however, the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 Facts:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy, normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent.
The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husband’s
