1. Director of Lands et.al vs Funtillar et. Al (GR 68533 May 23, 1986)
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the adjudication by the land registration court of a parcel of land in favour of the private respondents. The land was part of the property originally belonging to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until 1936 when she died. Sometime in1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favour of the government for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was redeemed in 1942 by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then the administrator of the property. A final deed of sale was executed by the Provincial Treasurer in favor of Vitaliano Aguirre. The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property among themselves. The particular lot now was adjudicated in favor of the applicants-respondents. In 1972, private respondents, who were the grandchildren of Fernandez, applied for the registration of a parcel of land. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have established possession for at least thirty years to entitle them to confirmation of imperfect title and registration under the law
HELD: Yes. Long before Candida’s death in 1936, she already possessed the disputed property. This possession must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through administrator Vitaliano Aguirre, and later to the possession of the private respondents themselves, who are Candida's grandchildren. The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in1940 of the land in favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the circumstances of this case to rule that the government would order the forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estate taxes if the property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida Fernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of the deceased in the possession of their family, thus continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more than the required period.
2. Arradaza et.al vs CA & Larrazabal (GR 50422 Feb. 8, 1989)
FACTS: The petitioners were the legitimate children of spouses Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino who died on August 31, 1974. In 1941, Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino purchased from spouses Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong a piece of land. The deed of sale was lost during the war and Original Certificate of Title No.35901 was therefore issued in the name of Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong but they recognized the vendee spouses as the real owners of the land. On October 21, 1947, Ignacio Arradaza sold the same land to Estelita Magalona Bangloy. She took over possession of the land, declared it for taxation purpose and paid taxes thereon. On February 13, 1963 while the land was still in the name of spouses Villas, Larrazabal purchased the property from Estelita Magalona Bangloywhich was evidenced by a "Deed of Sale of a Parcel of Land" executed in favor of Larrazabal. Original Certificate of Title No. 35901 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4581 was issued in the name of private respondent and the land was declared for taxation purposes. On January 18, 1975, petitioners filed an action against private respondent before the CFI of Leyte to recover their one-half (1/2) share of the land as heirs of Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino, and to
exercise the right of legal redemption over one-half (1/2) of the property sold by their deceased father while he was already a widower on October 21, 1947.Private respondent on the other hand, maintains that prescription has set in because the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were not registered owners protected by Act 496, He asserts that when the transaction occurred on October 21, 1947 the Code of Civil Procedure was still in force. The prescriptive period was only ten (10) years irrespective of the good or bad faith of Estelita M. Bangloy. The trial court rendered a Summary Judgment in favor of the private respondent which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the decision
RULING: No, decision of court of appeals is affirmed. Summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of action in which there is no genuine issue as to the existence of any material fact. The Record on Appeal clearly shows that petitioners and respondents submitted their respective lists of witnesses and their affidavits, and exhibits during the pre-trial, and memoranda. Private respondent, in particular, submitted among others, exhibits, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4581 in his name and that of his wife dated April 18, 1963, and tax declarations in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interests. From these affidavits, exhibits and other evidence, the trial court rendered its Summary Judgment. An examination of the record clearly and readily shows that the statute of limitation has stepped in and that the petitioners are guilty of laches and that the property has been in possession of private respondent who is a purchaser in good faith and for value. There is therefore, no genuine triable issue of fact.
3. David vs Bandin (GR 48322 April 8, 1987)
FACTS: During their lifetime, the spouses Juan Ramos and Fortunate Calibo, were the owners of two parcels of land; the Talon Property and Laong property. Both spouses died intestate, leaving as heirs two legitimate children, Candida and Victoriana Ramos, and grand-daughter, Agapita Ramos, daughter of their deceased Sora Anastacio. Candida and Victoriana died intestate on February 16, 1955 and December 12,1931, respectively. Candida Ramos; her niece, Agapita Ramos; and her nephew, Eulogio Bandin, sold a portion of the Talon property to the spouses Rufino 0. Miranda and Natividad Guinto. This portion was divided into three lots. Parcel 1 was subsequently sold to Narciso Velasquez and Albino Miranda. Parcels 2 and 3 were subsequently sold to Jose Ramirez and Sotero Ramirez, repectively, who registered these properties and obtained OCT Nos. 2027 and 2029 in their respective names. The remaining portion of the Talon property was extra judicially partitioned on September17, 1955 among the heirs of Candida Ramos and was subdivided in seven lots. Lot 5 was given to Victoria Martin, who was able to register the land and was issued OCT No. 3706. Lot 6 was given to Maximina Martin, who also was able to register the land and was issued OCT No. 3707. A portion of these lots were subsequently sold to Magno de la Cruz who was able to obtain TCT. The Laong property was sold by Candida Ramos and her children on December 19, 1943 to Hermogenes Lucena, husband of Juanita Martin, one of the daughters of Candida. On September 23, 1959, Juanita (then widowed) sold the property to the spouses Gregorio and Mary Venturanza. On January21, 1965, the Venturanzas, in a deed of sale also signed by Juanita Martin, conveyed a portion of the property to the spouses Felipe and Antonia David. Juanita Martin was able to register the property in her name and was issued OCT No. 8916 on July 1, 1971.On June 14, 1963, respondents, who were the heirs of Victoriana except for Agapita, filed a complaint for the recovery and partition of property. A decision was rendered by the trial court, in favor of the
plaintiffs,declaring, however, that certain properties could no longer be reconveyed to plaintiffs since they had been transferred to purchasers who bought them in good faith for value. Not satisfied with the decision, both plaintiffs and defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which nullified the transfers made to the defendants who were declared by the trial court as purchasers in good faith.
ISSUES: Whether or not private respondents' claim is barred by prescription2. Whether or not petitioners were buyers in good faith
HELD: No. Respondents’ claim is not barred by laches and prescription since it was not shown that they were guilty of negligence or slept on their rights. They sent a letter of demand to the heirs of Candida Ramos on April 23, 1963, and filed their complaint against them on June 14, 1963, or within a period of approximately eight (8) years from Candida's death.
Petitioners Felipe David and Antonia G. David were buyers in bad faith. They bought the property when it was still unregistered land. The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner. One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril His claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e. without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property, would not protect him if it turns out that the seller does not actually own the property.
4. Gallardo vs Intermediate Appellate Court (GR 67742 October 29, 1987)
FACTS: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977. The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio.
Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners.
HELD: No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated‖ was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 ―Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use.‖ It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.
5. Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura vs CA and Manotok Realty , Inc. (GR 50837 Dec. 28, 1992)
FACTS:
Petitioners' allegation in their complaint filed in the court of origin, that fraud was employed in the execution of a deed of sale and subsequently, in the issuance of a transfer certificate of title, renders their action for reconveyance susceptible to prescription either within 4 years or 10 years. In the present case, even if one bends backwards and considers the circumstances alleged as having created an implied or constructive trust, such that the action for reconveyance would prescribed in the longer period of 10 years, still petitioners' action is plainly time-barred. Considering that the deed of sale executed by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation in favor of Lorenzo Caiña and Francisca Caiña-Rivera was executed on November 4, 1965 and on the following day, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21484 was issued in favor of the vendees (private respondents), the party allegedly defrauded in the transaction, herein petitioners, had only 10 years or until September 5, 1975 within which to file the appropriate action. In the instant case, the action was filed only on December 28, 1976, which was beyond the prescribed period set by law. Aggrieved by the rules of the trial court, herein private respondents filed a petitioner with the Court of Appeals which later granted the petitioner and ordered the dismissal of the complaint of then private respondents, now herein petitioners, on the ground that their action has already prescribed. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Court of Appeals erred in the decision
RULING: No, The defendant-appellee purchased the parcel of land in question giving rise to the complaint of herein plaintiffs-appellants. The latter delayed the assertion of their supposed right to annul the sale for a period of over fifteen (15) years despite knowledge or notice of such sale. They had all the opportunity within that period of time to take action to set aside or annul the sale. Defendant-appellee was never apprised of any intention on the part of plaintiffs-appellants to annul the sale until this action was filed. Finally, the defendant-appellee stands to lose the property in question if the suit filed against him by plaintiffs-appellants shall be deemed barred.
6. Francisco v. CA, 122 SCRA 538 [1983]
FACTS: On February 6, 1966, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December 26, 1965 by Dr. Emiliano and Atty. Harry Bernardino. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against Francisco and Bernardino with the CFI of Rizal of the crime of grave oral defamation. Later, upon order of the court, the information was amended by adding statements allegedly uttered by the two accused constituting the crime of slander.
On Feb. 1, 1973, the trial court convicted Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave oral defamation and sentenced each of them the penalty of arresto mayor and was made to pay the complainant P10,000. Upon appeal in the Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision was modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. Bernardino passed away while this petition was instituted in the Supreme Court. Francisco, then argues that since the CA had found that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which under Art. 90 of the RPC, prescribes in two months, the CA should have dismissed the case. Further, Francisco claims that the CA should have acquitted him on the ground that the said crime had already prescribed as per evidence presented, the alleged defamatory remarks were committed on December 26, 1965, while the information charged against him was filed more than four months later.
The Solicitor General, however, contends that "for the purpose of determining the proper prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged in the information which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander". Since the prescription for grave oral defamation is six months, the crime has not yet prescribed when it the information was filed. Moreover, the Solicitor General argues that the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Only 39 days had passed from the time the offense was allegedly committed to the day of the filing of the complaint.
ISSUES: Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the CA to be the offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed.
Whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the prescription of an offense.
HELD:
1. Yes. An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser offense necessarily included in the crime charged if at the time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
2. Yes. Prescription is interrupted with the filing of the case even if the court is without jurisdiction, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. Thus, the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription.
7. Quirino Mateo & Matias vs Dorotea diaz et. al (GR 137305 Jan. 17, 2002)
FACTS: The land involved is registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioners’ father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised with respect to the validity of the title. Immediately after petitioners discovered the existence of OCT 206 in 1977 or 1978, they took
steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided the land between the two of them in an extrajudicial partition. Then petitioners filed the case below to recover ownership and possession as the only surviving children of original owners, the late Claro Mateo. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bulacan, at Malolos, ruled that prescription and laches are applicable against petitioners, that real actions over an immovable prescribe after 30 years, that ownership can be acquired thru possession in good faith and with just title for a period of 10 years, and that ownership may be acquired thru uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of just title or of good faith. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed that of the trial court, thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches may override a provision of the Land Registration Act on imprescriptibility of title to registered land. Otherwise put, the issue raised is whether prescription and the equitable principle of laches are applicable in derogation of the title of the registered owner.
HELD: A party who had filed immediately a case as soon as he discovered that the land in question was covered by a transfer certificate in the name of another person is not guilty of laches.(St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas, 92 SCRA 389 [1979]).An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribe in view of the provision of Sec. 44 of Act 496 (now Sec. 47 of PD 1529) to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
The Supreme Court thereupon reverses the CA’s decision. In lieu thereof, the Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the heirs of Claro Mateo in a proper proceeding.
8. Far East Bank & Trust Co. vs Estrella Q. Querimit (GR 148582 Jan. 16, 2002)
FACTS: Respondent deposited her savings with petitioner-bank. She did not withdraw her deposit even after maturity date of the certificates of deposit (CDs) precisely because she wanted to set it aside for her retirement, relying on the bank’s assurance, as reflected on the face of the instruments themselves, that interest would ―accrue‖ or accumulate annually even after their maturity. Petitioner-bank failed to prove that it had already paid respondent, bearer and lawful holder of subject CDs, petitioner failed to prove that the CDs had been paid out of its funds, since evidence by respondent stands unrebutted that subject CDs until now remain unindorsed, undelivered, and unwithdrawn by her.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is unjust to allow the doctrine of laches to defeat the right of respondent to recover her savings which she deposited with the petitioner?
RULING: Yes, it would be unjust not to allow respondent to recover her savings which she deposited with petitioner-bank. For one, Petitioner failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its business. Because the business of banks is impressed with public interest, the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of the family or of an ordinary business firm. The fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors requires banks to treat accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. Respondent is entitled to moral damages because of the mental anguish and humiliation she suffered as a result of the wrongly refusal of petitioner to pay her even after she had de-livered
the CDs. (Arts. 2217 and 2219). In addition, petitioner should pay respondent exemplary damages which the trial court imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (Art. 2229). Finally, respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees since petitioner’s act or omission compelled her to incur expenses to protect her interest making such award just and equitable.
9. Development Bank of the Philippines vs CA and Carlos Cajes (GR 129471 April 28, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against private respondent, claiming ownership of a parcel of land covered by a TCT, which included the 19.4 hectares being occupied by the latter. The trial court declared petitioner to be the owner of the land, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court. On appeal, petitioner claimed that its predecessor-in-interest had become the owner of the land by virtue of the decree of registra-tion in his name. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner be the owner of the disputed land
RULING: Taking into consideration the possession of his predecessor-in-interest, private respondent had been in uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. Such possession ripened into ownership of the land thru acquisitive prescription a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. A decree of registration cut off or extinguished a right acquired by a person only when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the land which was not annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon, but not to the right of ownership thereof. Registration of land does not create a title nor vest one. Accordingly, the 19.4 hectares of land being occupied by private respondent must be reconveyed in his favor.
10. Presidential Ad hoc fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs Aniano A. Desierto (GR 130340 Oct. 25, 1999)
FACTS: Behest loans, which are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies accumulated and which the Government thru the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) seeks to recover, have a prescriptive period to be counted from the discovery of the crimes charged, and not from the date of their commission. If the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.
ISSUE: Whether or not action may be barred by prescription
RULING: The prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Sec. 15, Art. XI of the Philippine Constitution of 1987 may be barred by prescription. Said provision applies only in civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases.
11. De Jesus et. al vs CA (GR 57092 Jan. 21, 1993)
FACTS: Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of adjudication in 1961, eleven years after the New Civil Code had taken effect, private respondent’s possession of the contested lot is far too short of the prescriptive period of 30 years, considering that her possession is in bad faith. The filing of the petition for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title by petitioners on Apr. 27, 1973 was well below the acquisitive prescriptive period for private respondent, which is 30 years under Art.1141 of the present Civil Code. In this case, the statutory period of prescription is deemed to have commenced when petitioners were made aware of a claim adverse to them, when the affidavit of adjudication was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds which, at the earliest may be considered to be in 1974, when private respondent was able to secure a tax declaration in her name.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in the decision in declaring the private respondents to be the absolute owner of the land
RULING: Prescription running even after the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, continued to be governed by Sec. 41 of the Old Civil Code. Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required for the acquisition of immovable property is 10 years if the possession is in good faith, and 30 years if in bad faith. Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed property for 30 years must be conclusively established.
12. G.R. No. L-28616 January 22, 1980
TOMAS RODIL and the deceased spouse CATALINA CRUZ, substituted by her heirs, namely: VIVENCIO RODIL married to ZUEKO MATSUO CONSOLACION RODIL married to FRANCISCO HEMEDES DOMICIANO RODIL married to VIRGINIA MARALIT, CLARITA RODIL married to JUAN ALGIER NATALIA RODIL married to SILVINIANO ATIENZA, LYDIA RODIL married to CARLOS HORILLENO VEDASTO RODIL married to TESSIE MANGUBAT and CELIA RODIL married to MACARIO TIU JR., petitioners, vs.
HON. JUDGE MARIANO V. BENEDICTO as Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH V-GAPAN and the heirs of ALEJANDRO ABES, namely: ALEJO ABES, BIENVENIDO ABES, ROSITA ABES, married to MATEO MALLARI, FIDELA ABES, married to PONCIANO ATENIDO, DAVID ABES, MARCELO ABES, NICANOR ABES, SEVERINO ABES, JOVITA ABES, married to GIL CABRETA EUFROCINA ABES, married to ROMULO BOTE; LOURDES ABES, married to ALIPIO TAGNIPIS LUZ ABES, TEODORA ABES, EMITERIO ABES, JR., GREGORIO ABES, ERLINDA ABES, married to LUIS TAAL, RENATO ABES, ESTRELLITA TALPLACIDO REYNALDO ABES, TERESITA ABES, CAROLINA ABES, and FERNANDO ABES; the latter four who are minors are represented by their mother CRISPINA DOMINGO, respondents.
Cadastre were claimed and applied for by the Spouse Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz. The claim was not contested. Afterwards, the cadastral court adjudicated the lots in favor of the applicant and the Original Certificate was issued also in favor of them. However, the heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition with the court for the review of the registration decree upon the ground that they are the true owner and in actual possession of the land and that the spouse-claimant was secured such land thru fraud. The cadastral court denied the petition for review that the heirs of Alejandro Abes failed to overcome the evidence of the above stated petitioner. The spouse filed a petition for the issuance of writ of possession asking that they be placed in possession of the lots and the private respondents be evicted.
The heirs of Alejandro Abes also filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the petition for the writ of possession was filed out of time and that there was no allegation in the petition and neither was it proved that the respondent were defeated in the registration proceeding. The respondent judge set aside the decision and ordered the dissolution of the writ of possession. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the petitioner for the petition of the issuance of writ of possession was filed out of time.
RULING
No. the decision in the land registration case has become final; it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. This is derived from the provision of the Ruled of Court and refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person or a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
13. G.R. No. 97332 October 10, 1991
SPOUSES JULIO D. VILLAMOR AND MARINA VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MACARIA LABINGISA REYES AND ROBERTO REYES,respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent was the owner of a 600-square meter lot and she sold a portion of 300 square meter of the said lot to the Spouses Villamor which is the petitioners. Private Respondent executed a ―Deed of Option‖ in favor of the Villamor in which the remaining 300 square meter portion would be sold to the petitioners under the conditions stated in the deed. In the deed, it stated that the private respondent and her husband agreed to sell and convey the remaining one-half portion whenever the need for that sale arises either on the part of the private respondents or the petitioners at the same price of 70.00 per square meter. However, after the husband of private respondent retired, they offered to repurchase the lot sold to the petitioners but they had refused and reminded about the deed of option. On the other hand, the petitioner’s contention that they had express their desire to the private respondent to purchase the remaining half portion of the lot but they are being ignored by the latter.
The petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance against the private respondent which was rendered by the trial court in favor of them and ordered the private respondent to sell unto them the lot. Not satisfied by the decision, the private respondent appealed to the Court of appeals which reversed the trial court’s decision on finding that the Deed of Option is void for lack of consideration.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Option is valid RULING
No. A contract of sale is, under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, "perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand perform of contracts." Since there was, between the parties, a meeting of minds upon the object and the price, there was already a perfected contract of sale. What was, however, left to be done was for either party to demand from the other their respective undertakings under the contract. It may be demanded at any time either by the private respondents, who may compel the petitioners to pay for the property or the petitioners, who may compel the private respondents to deliver the property.
However, the Deed of Option did not provide for the period within which the parties may demand the performance of their respective undertakings in the instrument. The parties could not have contemplated that the delivery of the property and the payment thereof could be made indefinitely and render uncertain the status of the land. The failure of either parties to demand performance of the obligation of the other for an unreasonable length of time renders the contract ineffective.
14. G.R. No. 139776 August 1, 2002
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
Sur, Branch 56, and EDUARDO Z. LUMANIOG, CELSO Z. LUMANIOG and RUBEN Z. LUMANIOG, respondents
FACTS
Faustino Lumaniog was insured by the petitioner under Life Insurance Policy with the face value of P50, 000.00 and he died of ―coronary thrombosis‖. His heirs, the private respondent which is his legitimate children filed before the RTC a complaint for the recovery of sum of money against the petitioner alleging that they continuously claimed for all the proceeds and interest under the life insurance policy and despite the repeated demands for payment and/ for settlement of the claim due for the petitioner, they finally refused or disallowed said claim after several years later. However, the petitioner counterclaim that the cause of action of private respondent had prescribed and they are guilty of laches, which the ground of concealment on the part of the deceased when he asserted in his application for insurance coverage that he had not been treated for indication of ―chest pain and other illness, well in fact he was known hypertensive. The RTC upholds the Order the claim of private respondents’ counsel that the running of the 10-year period was ―stopped‖ and when petitioner finally decided to deny their claim that the 10-year period it was only begun to run. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in Court of Appeals but it affirmed the decision of the RTC, stating that the 10-year period should instead be counted from the date of rejection by the insurer since this is the time when the cause of action accrues.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the 10-year period will start after the cause of action accrues.
2. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in its order that the 10-year period had not yet lapsed.
RULING
1. Yes. The 10-year period will be counted from the date of rejection by the insurer. The cause of action did not accrue until the claim was finally rejected by the insurance company. This is because, before such final rejection, there was no real necessity for bringing the suit. However, in this case, the denial of the claim had already been made by the petitioner through a letter and the private respondent did not gave rise the cause of action.
2. Yes. The RTC arbitrarily ruled in its Order that the 10-year period had not yet lapsed because it is based on the finding on mere explanation of the private respondents’ counsel and not the evidence presented by the parties as to the date when to reckon the prescriptive period. The ruling of the RTC that the cause of action of private respondent had not prescribed is arbitrarily and patently erroneous for not being founded by evidence on record and therefore, the same is void.
15. G.R. No. L-45277 August 5, 1985
AUGUSTO BASA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Solicitor General, and Judge GUILLERMO F. VILLASOR, Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondent. FACTS
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against the petitioners’ deficiency income taxes. The deficiencies were based on the taxpayer’s failure to report in full his capital gains on the sales of land. This result to justify the imposition of 50% surcharge, in which the taxpayer did not contest the assessment in the Tax Court. On the assumption that the assessment had final and incontestable, the Commissioner sued the taxpayer in Manila Court of First Instance for the collection of the amount which rendered their decision against the petitioner and ordered him to pay the surcharge. The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals and did not perfected his appeal within the reglementary period.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners’ cause of action has prescribed. RULING
Yes. The issue of prescription raised by him is baseless. The assessments were predicated on the fact that his income tax returns, if not fraudulent, were false because he under declared his income. In such a case, the deficiency assessments may be made within ten years after the discovery of the falsity or omission. The court action should be instituted within five years after the assessment but this period is suspended during the time that the Commission is prohibited from instituting a court action.
16. G.R. No. L-46893 November 12, 1985
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO RICARTE, defendant-appellee.
Francisco Ricarte filed his income tax return and the Office of the Collector of Internal Revenue made corresponding assessment and fixed at P222.00 the defendant’s income tax liability pursuant to the express provision of Section 51 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, then in effect. The defendant paid his income tax in two equal installment of P111.00. The R.A. 2343 took effect amending the old law which includes the Section 51(a). Under its amendatory, the taxpayer assess himself, files his return and pays the tax as shown in his return upon filing thereof. After investigation, it was found out that the defendant had a deficiency of P1, 136.87 in his income tax and a notice was issued and together with corresponding audit sheet and letter of demand, was emailed to the defendant. For the failure of the defendant to pay his deficiency in income tax liability, the petitioner filed a complaint for collection of taxes before the City Court of Cebu. After hearing and trial, the city court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription of action. The case was filed only more than the prescriptive period of five years. The issue was upheld to the Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered their decision dismissing the appellant’s complaint on the ground that the basis for the assessment are made under the provisions of a new law, R.A. 2343 which was not yet in effect at the time of the filing of the defendant’s income tax return and the action against the defendant had already prescribed. ISSUE
Whether or not the cause of action had already been prescribed. RULING
Yes. The lower court that the present action was filed after the prescriptive period of five (5) years provided for in Section 332(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:
(c) Where the assessment of any internal revenue tax has been made within the period of limitation above described such tax may be collected by distrait or levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if begun (1) within five years after the assessment of the tax,
Appellant asseverates that the present action was filed within the five-year prescriptive period provided for under the above quoted provision of the tax code; that the subsequent notice of assessment was made and appellee notified; that from January 19, 1961 up to the date this case was filed in court on January 14, 1966, only four years, eleven months and twenty-five days had elapsed.
Thus, the prescriptive period provided for in Section 332(c) of the tax code should be counted from April 6, 1959, the date when the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the income tax return of the appellant. From said date until the filing of this case on January 14, 1966, six years and nine months had elapsed. Verily, the action had already prescribed.
17. G.R. No. L-57493 January 7, 1987
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
FACTS
Two passenger bus lines with similar buses and similar routes were being operated by firm names ―Baliwag Transit‖ and ―Baliwag Transit, Inc‖ (BTI) in which the petitioner of this case. The former was owned by Pascual Tuazon who continued to operate it until his death while the latter was owned by Mrs. Victoria Vda. de Tengco, the niece of Mr. Tuazon which exist until the present time. Both bus lines operate under different grants of franchise by the Public Service Commission but were issued only one ID Number by the SSS. Private respondent claiming to be an employee of both bus lines with one ID Number filed a petition by the Social Security Commission to compel BTI to remit to SS private respondent’s SSS Premium contributions. He alleged that he was employed by petitioner as conductor and later as inspector with corresponding salary increases and the petitioner deducted from his salaries, premium contributions but was remitted to the SSS a lesser amount. On the contention of the petitioner, they denied having employed private respondent Ramon Martinez, the truth being the he employed by Pascual Tuazon who owned and operated buses which were separate and distinct from the buses of the petitioner. The employment of private respondent lasted until when his employer Pascual Tuazon became bankrupt. It was the moment when the deduction from the private respondent contributions for the years in question. Moreover, there were witnesses present which stated that the two buses has granted separate franchises to operate public utility buses, both operating between Manila and Baliuag routes. It was also being question that the private respondent brought the action which was already prescribed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the cause of action had already prescribed. RULING
Yes. Private respondent having allowed seventeen (17) years to elapse before filing the petition with the SSS has undoubtedly slept on his rights and his cause of action has already prescribed under Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code which states that ―The following action must be brought within ten-year period from the time the right of action accrues:
(2.) Upon and obligation created by law.
CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents FACTS
The petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, while Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino on February 8, 1931. Their marriage likewise produced children. The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce granted by the Court of First Instance of Manila on the ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife. The trial court granted the divorce on its finding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three (3) continuous years.
Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon after their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia. Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint. There was the issue raised that the petitioner’s cause of action had been prescribed because she then filed a complaint not upon knowing of the fact that private respondent are using the surname of Tolentino.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed RULING
Yes. The respondent Court of Appeals, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the period of prescription should be four (4) years, since it appears to be an action based on quasi-delict. — hatever the period, it cannot be denied that the action has long prescribed whether the cause accrued on April 21, 1945 when the petitioner and Arturo Tolentino got married, or on August 30, 1950, when the present Civil Code took effect, or in 1951 when Constancia Tolentino came to know of the fact that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription.
The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the private respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of the surname of her former husband. As it is, action was brought only on November 23, 1971 with only verbal demands in between and an action to reconstitute the divorce case. The petitioner should have filed her complaint at once when it became evident that the private respondent would not accede to her demands instead of waiting for twenty (20) years.
19. G.R. No. 72645 June 30, 1987
LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and EUGENIA G. PUYAT, GIL G. PUYAT, JR., ANTONIO G. PUYAT, VICENTE G. PUYAT, VICTOR G. PUYAT, JESUS-PUYAT-CONCEPCION, ALFONSO G. PUYAT, and EUGENIA PUYAT-JOSON, respondents.
FACTS
There was this case with the petitioner against the Material Distributor, Inc. and judgment was rendered against the defendants, including Gil Puyat, for the principal sum of P20,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% computed and compounded quarterly from June 25, 1958, and the further sum of P3,608.00 representing premiums and stamps. The judgment became final on April 13, 1967, but was not enforced. However, Gil Puyat died and there was a claim against his estate that was filed but his administrators oppose the claim for the reason that it is unenforceable and barred by laches for no steps were taken by the claimant to secure a writ of execution against defendant Gil Puyat during his lifetime to enforce the judgment. The RTC dismissed the case which was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court. The prescription of cause of action which was raised as an issue for the case at bar for the execution of the final judgment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners’ cause of action had been prescribed. RULING
Yes. This is whether the ten-year prescriptive period to file an action to enforce a judgment pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the New Civil Code commences to run from the finality of the original judgment or from the revived judgment. The 10-year prescriptive period must commence from the finality of the original judgment. However, the failure of the private respondents to raise prescription in their "Comment to Claim" does not imply the waiver of such defense. In the instant case, there is no new issue of fact that arises in connection with the question of prescription. All the pertinent dates showing that the petitioner's enforcement of the judgment has already prescribed can be found in the petitioner's allegations in the "claim" as well as its evidence. This removes the case from the general rule that prescription if not impleaded in the answer is deemed waived.
20. G.R. No. L-61352 February 27, 1987
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FACTS
The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the consignee. The corresponding claim for damages sustained by the cargo was filed by the petitioner with the respondent vessel. The petitioner brought an action with three (3) causes of action involving three separate and different shipments. The third cause is the main issue of the case. The RTC dismissed the complaint since there was already settlement and compromise happened but the third issue is not part of the compromise or settlement. The petitioner instituted the present complaint and the RTC granted moved for preliminary hearing but the respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. The RTC dismissed the complaint and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner cause of action had already prescribed. RULING
YES. No different result would obtain even if the Court were to accept the proposition that a written extrajudicial demand does toll prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The demand in this instance would be the claim for damage-filed by Dole with Maritime. The effect of that demand would have been to renew the one- year prescriptive period from the date of its making. Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse without filing action. It instituted an action for the new civil case more than one month after that period has expired and its right of action had prescribed. Well within the one-year prescriptive period in Sec. 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act." equates tolling with indefinite suspension. It is clearly fallacious and merits no consideration.
21. G.R. No. L-44338 April 15, 1988
ROSARIO C. BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LIBRADA ROSALES DISPO, Assisted by Her Husband PROCESO DISPO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS
The petitioner Rosario Buccat and respondent Librada Dispo entered into a contract of lease, the expiration date of which was August 31, 1967, over the former's 542-square meter lot situated at Bo. Catbangen, San Fernando, La Union. By virtue of the said contract, the respondent constructed the National Business Institute, a small vocational school on the parcel of land subject of the lease agreement. Afterwards, nine years before the expiration of the contract, the parties entered into another lease agreement over the same parcel of land substantially modifying the duration of the lease that the lease contract shall remain in full force and effect as long as the land will serve the purpose for which it is intended as a school site of the National Business Institute but the rentals now stipulated shall be subject to review every after ten (10) years by mutual agreement of the parties.
However, eight months after the supposed expiration date of the first contract, the petitioner filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against respondent, the basis of which was the expiration of the first lease contract, as the second agreement, according to petitioner, was null and void for being simulated and for want of consideration. The second contract was allegedly executed only after "respondent approached the petitioner and revealed to the latter their problems and difficulty in securing the official recognition by the government of the National Business Institute". The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner has the right of action in fixing the period of lease.
RULING
Yes. The cause of action for the fixing of the period of lease accrued. This is as it should be because prior to that, the validity of the second contract of lease was being challenged. The case for unlawful detainer filed by the petitioner became in fact a case questioning the validity of the second contract on the grounds that the said contract was simulated and that there was no consideration. The petitioner could not have been expected to file an action for the fixing of the period of the lease before the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision because she was not yet aware that the said paragraph of the second contract was a provision that called for an indefinite period. For the reason that the very existence, and subsequently, the interpretation of the second contract of lease, particularly par. 3 thereof, were put in issue in the unlawful detainer case, the court trying the case was required to interpret the provisions of, and consequently, rule on the validity of the said contract. The remedy or the cause of action for the filing of a case for the fixing of a period in the contract, therefore, only accrued when the court finally declared the second contract valid but that the provision as to the period was indefinite and hence, an action for the fixing of the period of the contract had to be filed.
22. [G.R. No. 73198. September 2, 1992.]
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ERNESTO C. DEL ROSARIO, Respondents. FACTS
Davao Timber Corporation, DATICOR for brevity, and the Private Development Corporation (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement 3 whereby PDCP extended to DATICOR a loan in foreign currency for the purpose of establishing a kiln drying and woodworking plant in Mati, Davao Oriental. It was stipulated in the loan agreement that the foreign currency loan was to be paid with an interest rate commencing on the several dates on which disbursements of the
proceeds of the loans were made.
attached to the land in Davao Oriental as added security for said loans. PDCP asked DATICOR to pay a service fee of one (1%) per cent per annum on the outstanding balance of the peso loan to cover the cost of administering DATICOR’s account and supervision of the project. PDCP initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings 12 against the parcel of land owned by Del Rosario in Manila and the five (5) parcels of land owned by DATICOR in Davao Oriental. DATICOR filed case in the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental seeking a writ of injunction to prevent PDCP from foreclosing its properties in Davao, and likewise praying for the annulment of the loan contract as it is in violation of the Usury Law and damages. They rendered decision dismissing the complaint. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision and rendered that the loan agreement is declaring void and no effect of stipulations of interest.
ISSUE
Whether or not the cause of action had prescribed RULING
NO. With regard to the first contention, Article 1957 of the Civil Code ". . . contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the
law against usury shall be void."
Furthermore, Article 1410 provides:
"The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe." The aforesaid articles therefore state that all usurious stipulations are void and as such, an action to annul such usurious stipulations does not prescribe. The aforesaid articles therefore state that all usurious stipulations are void and as such, an action to annul such usurious stipulations does not prescribe.
23. Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association vs Carlos Dimayuga and Juliana Diego Vda. De Gabriel (L-32049, June 25, 1984)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of preferential rights with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV alleging that the Contract of Sale executed by Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel with Carlos Dimayuga is expressly prohibited by law as it is mandated for the respondent to execute such sale to petitioners. Therefore said contract should be declared null and void. The lower court ruled in favour of the respondents, ordering the dismissal of the case on the ground that petitioners failed to state a cause of action. Thus petitioners resorted to the petition of certiorari for the review of the said order before the SC.
ISSUES:
2. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke their preferential rights as tenants HELD/RULING:
1. Yes. The R.A. 1162 as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516 set forth the following conditions that of offering first the sale of the land to petitioners and the latter's renunciation in a public instrument-were not met when the land was sold to respondent Dimayuga. Evidently, said sale is illegal and therefore void. The 1973 Constitution section 6, article II emphasizes the stewardship concept that such private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his right to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community. P.D. 1157 ―Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and providing for the Implementing Machinery thereof.‖ superseded R.A. 1152, 2342, 3516.
2. Yes. This decree is firmly based on sec. 6 of art. II of the 1973 constitution undoubtedly adopts and crystallizes the greater number of people criterion when it speaks of tenants and residents in declared urban land reform zones or areas without mention of the land area covered by such zones. The focus therefore, is on people who would benefit and not on the size of the land involved. Under section 6 of which also states that tenant-families have been vested the right of first refusal to purchase of the land within a reasonable time and reasonable price subject to the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Human Settlements. It is further supported by PD 1967 which evidently include Mataas na Lupa, the land in controversy within the Urban Land Reform Zone.
24. Leonides Pengson vs CA (GR L-65622 June 29, 1984) FACTS:
The defendant Pacific Merchandising Corporation is the owner of shares in the Aluminum Products (Alpro) to the extent of 96% of its capital (share) holdings. PMC was indebted to defendant Reynolds Philippines Corporation, in the sum of more than P800,000.00, because of which indebtedness its shares in the Alpro were pledged with Reynolds as a collateral of its loan. Because PMC needed some money, it decided to sell its shares with the Alpro to the herein plaintiff Leonides C. Pengson', the deed of sale being evidenced by Exhibit A. Among other things, the plaintiff assumed the obligation of PMC to Reynolds, which amount however was reduced from more than P800,000.00 to only P500,000.00. Since the certificates covering the shares were then held by Reynolds in pledge as security for PMC obligation, the former's consent to the sale with assumption had to be obtained. As a security for the payment to Reynolds of the aforesaid P500,000.00 in five (5) annual installments, the first installment being P125,000.00. Pengson mortgaged to Reynolds a parcel of land. While Pengson paid the first installment in the sum of P125,000.00 in three (3) installments and a bit late, the next in installments which fell due were not paid for in spite of demands. Consequently, Reynolds foreclosed by considering an unpaid installments due and demandable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reynolds Phil. Corporation is entitled to surrender the said certificates of stocks to Leonidas Pengson.
HELD/RULING:
No. Reynolds was not a party to the contract of sale between PMC and the herein plaintiff. This being so, it had no obligation whatsoever on the strength of the contract ii favor of the plain. Plaintiff, by the terms of the contract, however, since plaintiff undertook to pay PMC obligation to Reynolds, plaintiff was under obligation with the PMC on account of the said undertaking. Otherwise, there is absolutely no reciprocal obligation between the herein plaintiff and the appellant Reynolds. Otherwise said, the new debtor of Reynolds was the plaintiff and no longer PMC To argue now, as the plaintiff contends, that Reynolds was under an obligation to return the certificates of stocks pledged to it by PMC is to put the plaintiff in a better footing than PMC was with Reynolds. There is absolutely no agreement by Reynolds to that effect in the consent it gave to the sale by PMC of the said shares in favor of the plaintiff.
25. Phil. National Bank vs CA (SCAD, 1996)
FACTS:
Respondent Carmelo H. Flores purchased from petitioner at its Manila Pavilion Hotel unit, two (2) manager’s checks worth P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00, including the service charge. A receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner.
Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino unit of petitioner. Petitioner refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks. However, it deferred the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken down to five (5) manager’s checks of P 100,000.00 each. Petitioner refused to encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit. Having no other option, Flores agreed to such an arrangement. However, upon his return to Manila, he made representations to petitioner through its Malate Branch so that the check may be encashed but to no avail. Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter to his counsel informing the latter of the aforementioned events. A Formal Demand was made by private respondent’s counsel but petitioner persisted in its refusal to honor the check. Flores filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in law holding that the best evidence to show whether Mr. Flores paid the unit is the issuance of receipt worth P1, 000, 040
HELD/RULING:
No. A ―receipt‖ is defined as ―A written and signed acknowledgment that money has been paid or goods have been delivered‖. A receipt is merely presumptive evidence and is not conclusive. A written acknowledgment that money or a thing of value has been received. Since a receipt is a mere acknowledgment of payment, it may be subject to explanation or contradiction. A receipt may be used as evidence against one just as any other declaration or admission. A simple receipt not under seal is presumptive evidence only and may be rebutted or explained by other evidence of mistake in giving it, or of non-payment or of the circumstances under which it was given. A local bank, while acting as local correspondent bank, does not have the right to intercept funds being coursed thru it by its foreign counterpart for transmittal and deposit to the account of an individual with another local bank, and thereafter apply the said funds to certain obligations owed to it by the said individual.
26.Heirs of Luis Bacus et. al vs CA and Spouses Faustino and Victoriana Duray (GR 127695 Dec. 3, 2001)
FACTS:
On 1984 Luis Bacus leased to Faustino Duray a parcel of agricultural land with total land area of 3,002 of square meters, in Cebu. The lease was for six years ending in 1990, the contract contained an option to buy clause. Under the said option, the lessee had the exclusive and irrevocable right to buy 2,000 square meters 5 years from a year after the effectivity of the contract, at P200 per square meter. That rate shall be proportionately adjusted depending on the peso rate against the US dollar, which at the time of the execution of the contract was 14 pesos. Close to the expiration of the contract Luis Bacus died on 1989, after Duray informed the heirs of Bacus that they are willing and ready to purchase the property under the option to buy clause. The heirs refused to sell, thus Duray filed a complaint for specific performance against the heirs of Bacus. He showed that he is ready and able to meet his obligations under the contract with Bacus. The RTC ruled in favor of the Durays and the CA later affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Luis Bacus be compelled to sell the portion of the lot under the option to buy clause.
HELD/RULING:
Yes, Obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal obligations. The performance of one obligation is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfilment of the other obligation. In other words, in an option to buy, the payment of the purchase price by the creditor is contingent upon the execution and delivery of the deed of sale by the debtor. When the Duray’s exercised their option to buy the property their obligation was to advise the Bacus’ of their decision and readiness to pay the price, they were not yet obliged to make the payment. Only upon the Bacus’ actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale were they required to pay. The Durays did not incur in delay when they did not yet deliver the payment nor make a consignation before the expiration of the contract. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Only from the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, does delay by the other begin.
27. Canonizado vs Benitez (L-49315, L-60966 Feb. 20, 1984) FACTS:
The petitioner filed an action for support against her estranged husband, the private respondent in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. The trial court granted the claim but denied similar support for the petitioner on the ground that she was gainfully employed. The petitioner questioned this decision in a petition for certiorari with this Court. When the corresponding writ of execution was issued, the respondent filed an action in the Court of First Instance to restrain the sale by public auction of certain properties over which he claimed to have lost ownership. An alias writ of execution was issued but was not satisfied because of an order of the court. A decision on the merits was promulgated by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court awarding arrearages in support pendente lite to both the petitioner and her daughter, this decision was affirmed on appeal, with modification. This became final and executor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the implementation of Writ of Execution is valid. HELD/RULING:
Yes, the implementation is valid. The writ of execution ordered is not affected by that motion. Such support has already become due and has acquired the character of vested rights accruing to the petitioner and the daughter Christina.
The other possible reason for the respondent judge's delay in implementing the writ of execution is a second pending motion this time to restrain levy on the ground that the properties sought to be taken are the same properties declared exempt in the order of May 20, 1963. The court noted, though, that as worded the alias writ of execution issued by the respondent judge covers other properties of the private respondent that can answer for the payment of the support in arrears. While mandamus is not available to control discretion, it may nevertheless issue to compel the performance of a ministerial act, as in this case. The writ of execution having been authorized and directed by this Court, the only task of the respondent judge is to issue and enforce it. As the properties exempt from execution have already been determined, the respondent judge should now order the enforcement of the writ against the other properties of the private respondent not exempt from execution. That is a ministerial act that can be, as it is hereby, compelled.
28. Serrano vs Central Bank (L-30511 Feb. 14, 1980) FACTS:
Manuel Serrano made a time deposit, for one year with 6%interest of One Hundred Fifty Thousand pesos with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-1/2% interest, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos on the same respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Concepcion Maneja, the married, assigned and conveyed to petitioner Manuel Serrano, her time deposit of Php 200, 000. Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of theaforementioned time deposit from the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, not a single one of the time deposit certificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Respondent Central Bank dissolved and liquidated the Overseas Bank of Manila. The former denied that it is
