Private respondent, Aurora Gutierrez, instituted an unlawful detainer case in the City Court of Manila against petitioners Arturo P. Santos and Adelina Y. Santos on grounds that she needs the premises for her personal use and that the petitioners were delinquent in the payment of rentals of the subject apartment.
Petitioners admitted that they are the legitimate tenants and/or lessees of the subject apartment with the present rental rate of P250.00 a month on a month-to-month contract of lease.
The City Court decided and ordered the defendants to vacate the premises in question and surrender its possession to the plaintiff. They were also ordered to pay plaintiff for the delinquent rental fees. Petitioners appealed to the CFI which found the instant decision as in accordance with the law. Petitioners then went to the CA on a petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the lessor may judicially eject the lessees even when the contract of lease is said to be month-to-month‖
HELD:
Yes. The judicial ejectment lies when the lease is for a definite period or when the fixed or definite period agreed upon has expired. A ―month-to-month‖ period expires each month and may be terminated at the end of each month. The lease as agreed upon by the parties is a lease with a definite period which follows that the private respondent can enforce the right to judicially eject the petitioners from the premises. The petition is hereby dismissed.
80. BALUCANAG VS JUDGE FRANCISCO GR NO. 33422
MAY 30, 1983 FACTS:
Charvet owns a lot in Pandacan, Manila. In 1952, the said lot was leased to respondent Stohner for a period of 5 years at the monthly rental of 2140.00. Stohner made fillings on the land and constructed a house. On 1966, Charvet sold the lot to petitioner Balucanag. For Stohner’s failure to pay the rents, Balucanag, thru counsel, wrote Stohner a letter demanding that he vacate the premises. Stohner claimed that he was a builder in good faith.
Balucanag instituted in the City Court of Manila an ejectment suit against Stohner which rendered a decision in favor of Balucanag. On appeal by Stohner, the CFI of Manila, presided by Judge Francisco set aside the decision and held that Stohner was a builder in good faith because he had constructed the residential house with the consent of the original lessor, Charvet. And that after expiration of the lease contract on 1957, Charvet did not order for Stohner’s ejectment nor removal of the house.
Balucanag filed petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether Balucanag can terminate the lease considering that the contract between Stohner and Charvet had already expired on 1957
HELD:
Yes. An implied new lease was created between Balucanag and Stohner, the period of which is established by Art. 1687 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly: from week to week, if the rent is weekly: and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. ...
Under the above article, the duration of the new lease must be deemed from month to month, the agreed rental in the instant case being payable on a monthly basis. The lessor may thus terminate the lease after each month with due notice upon the lessee. After such notice, the lessee's right to continue in possession ceases and an action of unlawful detainer may be brought against him.
81. Ace-Agro Development Corp. vs CA GR 119729
January 21, 1997 FACTS:
Ace-Agro had been cleaning soft drink bottles and repairing wooden shells for Cosmos within its company premises in San Fernando, Pampanga. On April 25, 1990, a fire broke out in the Cosmos plant. As a result, Ace-Agro’s work stopped. On May 15, 1990, Ace-Agro requested Cosmos to resume its services but they were advised that on account of the fire destroying nearly all the bottles and shells, Cosmos was terminating their contract. Ace-Agro requested Cosmos to reconsider its decision but upon receiving no reply, they informed the employees of the termination of their employment, which led the employees to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against both Ace-Agro and Cosmos. Ace-Agro sent another letter for reconsideration to Cosmos to which they replied that they could resume work but outside company premises. Ace-Agro refused the offer, claiming that to work outside would incur additional transportation costs. Cosmos then advised Ace-Agro that they could resume work inside the company premises but then Ace-Agro unjustifiably refused because it wanted and extension of the contract to make up for the period of inactivity.
ISSUE:
Because the suspension of work under a contract has been brought about by force majeure, is the period during which work has been suspended justify an extension of the term of the contract?
HELD:
No. The suspension of work due to fire does not merit an automatic extension. The stipulation that in the event of a fortuitous event or force majeure the contract shall be deemed suspended during the said period does not mean that it stops the running of the period the contract has been agreed upon to run. The fact that the contract is subject to a resolutory period, which relieves the parties of their respective obligations, does not stop the running of the period of their contract.
82. Millare vs Hernando GR NO. 55480
JUNE 30, 1987
FACTS:
On June 17, 1975, a five-year Contract of Lease was executed between Pacifica Millare and Elsa Co married to Antonio Co. Co would rent the ―People’s Restaurant‖ at P350 per month. In May to July 1980, a dispute arose when Millare informed the Co spouses that they would continue leasing the restaurant as long as they were amenable to paying P1200 per month. A counter-offer of P700 was made by Co, to which Millare allegedly stated that the amount of monthly rentals could be resolved at a later time which Co took to mean that the Contract of Lease had been renewed. In contrast, Millare flatly denies ever having considered or offered a renewal of the Contract of Lease. On July 22, Millare requested them to vacate the premises, and Co reiterated her unwillingness to pay P1200 for being excessive and their intention to deposit the rentals in court, as Millare refused to accept their counter-offer. Co spouses filed a complaint with the CFI of Abra claiming that renewal of the Contract of Lease stated a valid cause of action. Millare filed an ejectment case against Co. The judge ordered the renewal of the Contract of Lease and allowed Co to deposit the rentals in Court following Art.1197 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the private respondents, Co spouses, have a valid cause of action against the petitioner
(2) Whether Art.1197 of the Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar HELD:
(1) No. Paragraph 13 of the Contract of Lease can only mean that the lessor and lesee may agree to renew the contract upon their reaching agreement on the terms and conditions to be embodied in such renewal contract. Failure to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of the renewal contract will prevent the contract from being renewed at all. In the instant case, the lessor and the lessee conspicuously failed to reach agreement on both the amount of the rental and on the term of the renewed contract.
(2) No. Article 1197 of the Civil Code provide as follows:
If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may, under the circumstances, have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them. (Emphasis supplied.)
The first paragraph of Article 1197 is clearly inapplicable, since the Contract of Lease did in fact fix an original period of five years, which had expired. It is also clear from paragraph 13 of the Contract of Lease that the parties reserved to themselves the faculty of agreeing upon the period of the renewal contract. The second paragraph of Article 1197 is equally clearly inapplicable since the duration of the renewal period was not left to the will of the lessee alone, but rather to the will of both the lessor and the lessee. Most importantly, Article 1197 applies only where a contract of lease clearly exists. Here, the contract was not renewed at all, there was in fact no contract at all the period of which could have been fixed.
83. JEREOS VS CA GR NO. 48747
SEPTEMBER 30, 1982