The complete version of this issue

Religious Inquiries

A Biannual Journal of the University of Religions and Denominations Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer and Autumn 2013

ISSN: 2322-4894

Proprietor: University of Religions and Denominations Director in Charge: Seyyed Abolhasan Navvab Editor-in-Chief: Mohsen Javadi

Executive Manager: Ahmad Aqamohammadi Amid Editorial Board

Mohammad Taqi Diari Bidgoli

(Associate Professor, University of Qom and University of Religions and Denominations, Iran)

Seyyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani

(Associate Professor, University of Religions and Denominations, Iran)

Mohsen Javadi

(Professor, University of Qom, Iran)

Pierre Lory

(Professor, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Sorbonne, France)

Ahmadreza Meftah

(Assistant Professor, University of Religions and Denominations, Iran) Seyyed Abolhasan Navvab

(Assistant Professor, University of Religions and Denominations, Iran) Joseph A. Progler

(Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan) Hasan Qanbari

(Associate Professor, University of Ilam, and University of Religions and Denominations, Iran)

Mohammad Ali Shomali

(Associate Professor, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, Iran)

Klaus Von Stosch

(Professor, University of Paderborn, Germany)

Copy Editor: Hamed Fayazi

Address: P.O. Box 37185-178, Qom, Iran

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Note

The journal of Religious Inquiries accepts papers on religious studies, the comparative studies of the Western and Islamic theology, mysticism and ethics. The papers received will be published provided that they are written according to the house style of the journal. The authors will bear responsibility for their own papers.

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Referencing

Sadr (2003, 69-71) discusses metaphorical and literal meaning in lesson ten of his Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence.

It is argued that Islamic social customs can only be fully appreciated when sympathy is given to the context within which they occur (Smith 1998).

Griffel (2009) is a study of the classical Islamic theologian, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. The study includes both biography and philosophical analysis.

‗Ibid.‘ is not used in citations. Full details of all references cited should be listed at the end of the manuscript in the references section. If a number of works by the same author in the same year are cited a letter should be used to distinguish the different works (e.g. 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, and so forth). References should be formatted according to the examples below.

Books: Locke, John. 1975 [1690]. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Edited books: Clarke, P., ed. 1988. Islam. London: Routledge.

Translated books: Tabataba‘i, Muhammad Husayn. 2003. The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics. Translated by Ali Quli Qara‘i. London: ICAS Press. Chapter in edited books:Gould, Glenn. 1984. "Streisand as Schwarzkopf." In The Glenn Gould Reader, edited by Tim Page, 308-11. New York: Vintage.

Articles in journals: Gilliat-Ray, S. 1998. ―Multiculturalism and Identity: their Relationship for British Muslims.‖ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17(2): 347-54.

Webpage: Losensky, Paul. 2012. Sa‘di. Accessed January 1, 20014. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/sadi-sirazi.

CONTENT

5 Moral Repair and the Moral Saints Problem Linda Radzik

21 Epistemic Virtue from the Viewpoints of Mulla Sadra and Zagzebski Zahra Khazaei

41 Religion and Ethics Jan Narveson

55 Psychoanalytic Theories of Religion in Protestant Contexts Fatima Tofighi

75 God in Sikhism

Mohammad Mehdi Alimardi

91 Meaningfulness of Religious Language Javad Taheri, Mahshid Alvandi

Religious Inquiries

Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer and Autumn 2013, 5-19

Moral Repair and the Moral Saints Problem

Linda Radzik1

This article explores the forms of moral repair that the wrongdoer has to perform in an attempt to make amends for her past wrongdoing, with a focus on the issues of interpersonal moral repair; that is, what a wrongdoer can do to merit her victim‘s forgiveness and achieve reconciliation with her community. The article argues against the very general demands of atonement that amount to an obligation to stop being someone who commits wrongs—to become a ―moral saint‖—and suggests a new form of atonement that is more practical and useful in our everyday life.

Keywords: Moral repair, moral saints, forgiveness, atonement.

1

Following Margaret Urban Walker, we can use the term ―moral repair‖ to refer to efforts that are made to respond in a morally appropriate way to wrongdoing (Walker 2007). One form of moral repair that has received a lot of attention in recent years is forgiveness.2 _{Victims are often able to resolve the lingering effects of} past conflicts by forgiving the people who have mistreated them. Others, who were bystanders or witnesses to a wrong, can also contribute to moral repair, as when the neighbors of a victim tend to his injuries or join in the call for justice. States and other authoritative bodies contribute to moral repair by punishing wrongdoers or compelling them to pay restitution. The forms of moral repair that I will explore here, however, are those that the wrongdoer herself performs in an attempt to correct her own misdeeds. I use the term ―atonement‖ to stand for the transgressor‘s efforts to make amends for past wrongdoing. Atonement is discussed most frequently in specifically theological contexts, where the question is how a sinner is

1. Professor of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, email: [email protected]

to become reconciled with God. However, my attention will be restricted to issues of interpersonal moral repair. What can a wrongdoer do to merit her victim‘s forgiveness? How can she achieve reconciliation with her community?

In this essay, I will summarize the account of atonement that I have developed in more detail elsewhere (Radzik 2009). Then I will explain a worry I have about the account: the scope of the obligation to atone threatens to become unwieldy, such that it appears that we can atone for our past misdeeds only by becoming morally perfect people, or ―moral saints.‖ I do not have a solution to this problem as much as a general strategy for living with it. While I remain committed to the importance of the wrongdoer‘s contribution to moral repair, the problem of defining the scope of the obligation to atone indicates that moral repair requires the cooperation and good will of all the parties to a conflict—wrongdoers, victims, and sometimes communities as well.

2

In atoning, then, the wrongdoer works to repair his wrongful actions. In this essay, my concern is not with the entire class of wrongful actions, but only those in which there is an identifiable human victim (i.e., in which one person or group has wronged another person or group).3 _{The intuition that the wrongdoer must do something to} respond to his misdeed is strong. He should feel sorry about what he has done. He should apologize. He should try to make amends to his victim. These moral claims are familiar, and we feel quite confident in asserting them. The challenge for the philosopher is to explain why these sorts of responses are morally required of the wrongdoer and to explore more fully the appropriateness of particular forms of responses.

In my study of this topic, I found that accounts of the wrongdoer‘s obligation usually fit one of three basic patterns. Atonement is generally conceived of as either the repayment of a debt, a moral transformation of the wrongdoer, or the reconciliation of relationships. While proponents of these different perspectives often agree about the steps that wrongdoers should take (e.g., apologizing), they differ in their understandings of why such steps are necessary. These differences are rooted in even deeper disagreements about the nature of the problem that atonement must solve. In other words, proponents of these competing models of atonement have different views of what

stands in need of repair. In this section, I will summarize the repayment and the moral transformation models of atonement and briefly indicate my worries about them. Section 3 will defend a reconciliation account of atonement.

The repayment model takes seriously the economic imagery that is so common in the language of morality. When I mistreat another person, I fail to pay her the respect that is her due. In damaging her dignity, her belongings, or her body, I place myself in her debt. The size of the debt corresponds to the severity of the wrong. Wrongdoing is conceived of as a kind of wrongful taking; it follows, then, that atonement is a matter of repaying that debt.

This conception of atonement as a form of repayment is usually developed in two distinct but related ways: as restitution or as retribution. Restitution requires a transfer to the victim of something of value that is intended to replace or compensate for what was lost.4 For example, if I wrongfully damaged my friend‘s computer, then I must repair or replace the computer. If I wrongfully caused her a bodily injury, then I may try to settle the debt by paying her doctor‘s bills, performing services that she can no longer perform for herself (such as housework), or offering a cash payment for her pain and suffering. On a restitution model, apologies are often interpreted as valuable gestures of respect offered in compensation for earlier harms. The second way in which the repayment model of atonement is commonly developed is in terms of retribution or punishment.5 Whereas the language of restitution calls for the victim to receive something of value in compensation for what she lost, the language of retribution emphasizes the importance of the wrongdoer personally losing something of value in order to negate his wrongful taking. The wrongdoer must repay the debt with his own suffering, loss, or sacrifice. Atonement requires the wrongdoer to punish himself or submit to punishment at the hands of others. He might do this by suffering the pangs of guilt, by humbling himself through apology, or, in the case of crimes, by turning himself over to the authorities. The historical link between the concept of punishment and the concept of repayment appears in the etymology of the word ―retribution‖; ―re‖ plus ―tribuo‖ is Latin for ―pay back‖ (Cottingham 1979).

I have described restitution and retribution as two ways in which the repayment model of atonement is made more precise. The

differences between them are worth noticing. For example, someone other than the wrongdoer can compensate a victim for a loss. The wrongdoer‘s friend could step in to pay medical bills. If what we really care about is just that the victim receive compensation, then it would appear that the work of moral repair could be completed without the wrongdoer‘s participation. Yet, surely the wrongdoer himself has an obligation to respond to the wrongful act. So, a major flaw in the restitution version of the repayment model is that it fails to explain why the wrongdoer‘s participation in moral repair is so important.

In response to this problem with the restitution model, defenders of retribution often draw a distinction between harms and wrongs. Restitution is owed as a response to the causing of harm, but not all harms are wrongful. Suppose I must break into your mountain cabin in order to take shelter from a life-threatening winter storm. My action is justified; I have not wronged you. However, I have damaged your property. Restitution must be paid for that harm, but whether it is paid by me or by a friend of mine makes no difference. Wrongs, on the other hand, are a different matter. Suppose I broke into your cabin wrongfully, simply to amuse myself. My friend might be able to pay for the damage I cause to the door, but he cannot repair the wrong for me. Repairing the wrong, claim the retributivists, requires the punishment or self-punishment of the wrongdoer. A moral debt can only be repaid with the coin of the wrongdoer‘s own suffering.

Retributivists say that the suffering of the wrongdoer is necessary to repay the moral debt. But, again, what good is that suffering to the victim? Are we meant to believe that victims find the suffering of their abusers intrinsically pleasing? Some retributivists embrace this result (Hershenov 1999). Others deny that such a vengeful, bloodthirsty image of the victim must be part of the retributivist picture; they try to develop some other account of why retribution is intrinsically valuable for the victim (Murphy and Hampton 1988; Hampton 1992). I cannot pursue this line of debate in sufficient depth here, but elsewhere I argue that these attempts do not work (Radzik 2009). While punishment is sometimes (but not always) instrumentally valuable to victims, victims should not intrinsically value the suffering of their abusers.

While both restitution and punishment have a role to play in the story of atonement, neither one seems to provide on its own a fully satisfactory guide to the wrongdoer‘s obligations in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Nor can we simply add the two principles together. Even if a wrongdoer has both paid compensation to his victim and submitted to punishment for his misdeed, this does not provide everything that we care about in the aftermath of wrongdoing. After all, this same wrongdoer could perform these actions without ever giving up his contemptuous view of his victim or his intention to repeat his transgression at the first opportunity. What is missing, it seems, is repentance.

This brings us to the second of the three main approaches to atonement—the moral transformation model.6 _{Whereas the repayment} model conceives of wrongdoing as the incursion of a debt, the moral transformation model depicts wrongdoing as a problem within the wrongdoer‘s soul or mind. She has taken the wrong path; she has turned away from the right and the good. In order to make amends, she needs to reorient herself. Atonement requires repentance. The wrongdoer must accept that her past action was wrong and that she was responsible for it. She must regret her transgression. Further, she must sincerely commit herself to living according to proper values in the future.

The claim that repentance is necessary for atonement is a compelling one. However, repentance seems not to be sufficient for atonement. After all, the wrongdoer could regret her past and recommit herself to better values while failing to apologize to her

victim or to compensate him for the harms she caused him. Defenders of moral transformation models of atonement tend to argue that, when repentance is sincere, the wrongdoer will be motivated to actions such as apology and compensation as well. But we are unable to explain why these actions are required, or to give a satisfactory account of why some forms of apology or compensation are preferable to others, with the materials that are generally provided by moral transformation accounts of wrongdoing. When the problem that wrongdoing poses is represented exclusively as a problem in the transgressor‘s soul or mind, we fail to properly acknowledge the stake that other parties (especially the victim) have in the aftermath of wrongdoing.

3

While there is much to be learned from repayment and moral transformation models of atonement, I find both alternatives lacking. As the discussion above emphasizes, the different versions of these models threaten to leave out one of the important stakeholders in the aftermath of wrongdoing. We can improve upon the repayment and moral transformation accounts of atonement by turning to the third general model of atonement: reconciliation.

Like the other accounts of atonement we have seen, the reconciliation model has at its heart a metaphor.7 _{Here, wrongdoing is} represented not as the incursion of a debt or as the losing of one‘s path but as a rending of the social fabric. Wrongdoing tears at the threads of mutual respect and trust that properly bind us to one another. Atonement aims to mend that fabric. In atoning, the wrongdoer works to reconcile her relationships with those people who have been alienated from her by her wrongful actions.8

A reconciliation model of atonement is supported by the observation that wrongs are events that do not stay neatly isolated in the past. As Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton have argued, this is because wrongful actions have a kind of expressive content (Murphy and Hampton 1988). To wrong someone is to send the message that one does not find his value sufficiently high so as to preclude such an action. The wrongdoer may not intend to communicate such a message, but actions are taken as evidence of attitudes. In this way, wrongful actions insult their victims. Furthermore, because past actions and attitudes are indications of future behavior, wrongdoing

7. Works that emphasize something like reconciliation in the aftermath of wrongdoing include Morris (1976), Swinburne (1989), Harvey (1995), Walker (2007), and Bennett (2008). 8. While most speakers of English associate ―atonement‖ with self-punishment, the etymology of

generally suggests a threat of future mistreatment. In these ways, wrongful acts poison the future relationship between the victim and the wrongdoer.

Wrongs may also damage the relationships among both the victim and the wrongdoer and members of their communities. People who were privy to the wrong, and to the insulting messages that it communicated, might be led to see the victim as unworthy of better treatment. Alternatively, these witnesses may take a lower view of the wrongdoer, regarding her with indignation and mistrust. Additionally, the experience of being mistreated can lead the victim to feel degraded and low. We can say that his relationship with himself has been damaged. Similarly, in doing wrong, the wrongdoer may damage her relationship with herself. She may feel corrupted and untrustworthy. In sum, we have a myriad of relationships among victims, wrongdoers, and their fellows that may be damaged or threatened by wrongdoing. In order to atone, the wrongdoer must repair these relationships to the best of her ability.

In talking about relationships, I mean to bring attention to the ways in which people interact, their expectations of one another, and the attitudes and emotions they hold toward one another or toward themselves. Different kinds of relationship are distinguishable by different sets of interactions, expectations, attitudes and emotions. One‘s relationship with one‘s child differs in many ways from one‘s relationship with one‘s co-workers. But whatever our particular, personal relationships to other people, we also always stand in another sort of relationship to other human beings. We stand in what I will call the ―moral relationship.‖ Even wrongs that take place between strangers passing one another on the street can be described as damaging relationships, because even strangers are bound by moral norms in their interactions, expectations, and attitudes toward one another.

matters. The repair and maintenance of such relationships is the goal of atonement.

When reconciliation has been made, the victim, who was denigrated by the wrongful action, can now be confident that he is being granted proper respect by the wrongdoer, in the view of the community that is privy to the wrong, and in his own eyes. The wrongdoer will be regarded by her victim and community as someone who is not only capable of moral action but also worthy of a normal degree of trust with respect to the type of interaction in question. She will also be able to regard herself as valuable and trustworthy once more, and feelings of guilt may permissibly subside.

In addition to the moral relationship, victims and wrongdoers also occupy all sorts of more particular, personal relationships. Unfortunately, even if a wrongdoer responds to her transgressions in a fully morally satisfactory way, this will not always be sufficient to repair the personal relationship. Friends who have been separated by a serious betrayal of trust might never again achieve the level of personal intimacy they had before the wrongful action. Still, I believe that the wrongdoer should be counted as having satisfied her moral obligation to atone to her friend when she has given him good reason to accept that she is once again reasonably trustworthy in the domain of friendship. That is, even though their own friendship is over, the victim recognizes that the wrongdoer has shown herself to be someone who can be trusted in the role of friend (to someone else) in the future. The wrongdoer‘s obligation to atone consists in an obligation to create the conditions in which this more modest sort of reconciliation can take place.

good reason to accept that she will not repeat this sort of misdeed. Through this process the wrongdoer provides her victim, her community, and herself with good reason to reestablish the respect and trust that are distinctive of relationships in a moral community.

I believe that the reconciliation model of atonement has many advantages over the repayment and moral transformation models. First, unlike those alternatives, the reconciliation model never loses sight of the fact that the wrongdoer and the victim are both central to the project of atonement. Furthermore, the reconciliation model recognizes that wrongdoing between individuals can infect larger communities. Proper atonement requires a response to that sort of damage as well. The reconciliation model includes the insights of the moral transformation model, in that atonement requires the wrongdoer to make herself morally trustworthy once more. Restitution has a place as well. Since unaddressed harms damage relationships of mutual respect and trust, relational repair requires restitution. The reconciliation model can even incorporate what is worth preserving in the retribution model. Practices of self-punishment or submission to punishment sometimes have a role to play in the aftermath of wrongdoing. But whereas the retribution model claimed that these responses were intrinsically valuable, the reconciliation model values them only insofar as they are instrumental to rebuilding relationships of trust among the parties to wrongdoing.

4

discourages improvement. But when I start dealing with particular cases, I find that the slopes can get rather slippery.

Let‘s imagine a particular wrongdoer, named Don. At first it seems intuitive that Don can right the particular wrongful act of cheating on his wife, Betty, while failing to repair misdeeds in other parts of his life, such as bullying his co-workers.He could work hard to repair his relationship with Betty and count as having atoned to her, even though his relationship with his co-workers remains problematic and calls for other, separate acts of atonement. In favor of this position, we could argue that moral improvement is something that admits of degrees. Celebrating the advances Don makes would encourage him to address his other moral failings. This suggests that we should believe that a wrongdoer is capable of successfully atoning for one act without addressing all of the moral failings in his life.

But has Don successfully atoned for one act of marital infidelity when he later has another affair with a different woman? The second affair is evidence that the degree of moral improvement required for the former atonement failed. The later wrong so closely matches the earlier one, being the same type of wrong committed against the same victim, Betty, that it seems to invalidate Don‘s first attempt at atonement. Again, this seems to be the right answer. Don‘s affairs are connected with one another and with deeper issues in his relationship with Betty and in his character. Even if Betty has signaled a willingness to forgive the former affair, she would be gullible indeed if that forgiveness were left unshaken by the revelation of the latter affair.

Notice, however, that in other, less serious cases of wrongdoing, this principle seems too severe. Don forgets his lunch appointment with his friend Roger and sincerely apologizes. Six months and many lunches later, he forgets again. Here, the repetition of wrong and victim probably does not invalidate Don‘s earlier apology.

Let us inquire a little further. Is there anything Don can do to count as atoning to Betty for his multiple affairs if he continues to deceive her about their finances? One might argue that, in order to atone for his marital infidelity, Don must come to recognize that Betty deserves better than to be deceived. How can he achieve this goal if he continues to deceive her in other ways? His lies about their finances undermines the claim that he has morally improved himself in one of the aspects of his character that is directly relevant to the transgression of adultery.

be described as involving the same sort of moral failing as the marital infidelity. Both are cases of treating Betty unfairly, or, even more generally, of failing to respect Betty as an equally valuable moral person. If this line of reasoning is plausible, then we must reconsider Don‘s bullying demeanor at the office, where, in different ways and to different degrees, there are many people whom he fails to treat as equally valuable moral persons. If we diagnose Don‘s marital infidelity as a failure to recognize the dignity of other persons, then, to repair that wrong, he will have to stop doing that sort of thing; he will have to reform his character so that he stops doing that sort of thing. Now it looks like we are requiring Don to become a moral saint in order to atone for his affair.

The moral saint problem can be classified as a ―slippery slope‖ objection. The reconciliation model of atonement appears to be unacceptable because it seems unable to draw a line between the reasonable and the unreasonable demands that we might place on a wrongdoer. What makes this slope slippery? I have argued that to atone for a wrong, a wrongdoer has to reform himself, including the relevant part of his character that led to the wrongful act, so as to become morally trustworthy in the future with respect to the sort of wrong in question. However, any particular case of a wrongful action can be described in multiple ways. The transgression that was Don‘s having a romantic liaison with another woman can be described as a case of marital infidelity towards Betty, as deceiving Betty, as being unfair towards Betty and, yet more generally, as violating the moral value of another person (without even specifying Betty as the victim). The character flaw that the transgression revealed could be described as infidelity, deceptiveness, unfairness, or as immorality in the fully general sense of not regarding other people as equally deserving of respect. Don‘s transgression can be accurately labeled at each of these levels of description. This is what seems to lead us to the conclusion that, in order for Don to repair any particular wrong, he will have to become a moral saint.

5

articulate a conception of the obligation to atone that we can live with, one that offers a principled way to stop short of demanding moral saintliness as necessary for righting the wrongs of everyday life.

The conception of moral repair as the reparation of relationships is helpful here. When we ask how Don is to repair his misdeed, the demands of atonement tend to scale up because the misdeed can be accurately described at so many different levels of abstraction. Let‘s instead ask how Don is going to repair the damage his misdeed did to his relationship with Betty. To answer this question, we have to consider not (or not primarily) how Don is going to satisfy the demands of an abstract principle, but how Don is going to satisfy Betty. Betty‘s view of the wrong—her own description of the transgression, why it was objectionable and harmful, and how it has affected her ability to trust Don—will play the major role in defining for Don what he needs to do in order to make amends. Depending on Betty‘s point of view, she may be more disturbed by the fact that he had a sexual encounter with someone else, or by the lying, or by the fact that the affair is just one more example of how Don has maintained his own life, independent of her and the children, while her own life has been entirely subsumed to the family. She probably does not care about the affair as an immoral act per se. All of these characterizations of the misdeed are true, but not all of them are equally crucial to Betty and her relationship with Don—to her ability to see him once more as a reasonably trustworthy partner, whether or not their marriage survives.

Betty‘s role in the project of moral repair can keep the moral saint problem at bay in another way as well. Betty has reason not to demand moral saintliness from Don as a condition for her forgiveness or reconciliation, because she knows that she will not be able to live up to that standard when she will someday need Don‘s (or someone else‘s) forgiveness. If the goal of atonement is moral reconciliation, then the victim‘s own standards for atonement might help to keep the slope from getting too slippery.

A more difficult problem with letting Betty set the standards for Don‘s atonement has to do with the limits of her knowledge, limits that are themselves the results of Don‘s lies. Her standards for an acceptable atonement will surely be lower if she falsely believes that this is the only affair Don has ever had. Also, whether Betty sees the sexual infidelity or the lying as the more important aspect of Don‘s transgression would likely change if she found out that Don has been lying to her about their finances as well. Even if Betty does not have all the facts, Don does. He cannot honestly take Betty‘s particular demands as authoritative—as defining the extent of his obligation to atone to her—when he knows that she would set other standards if only he was not deceiving her. But, still, we need not conclude that Don must become a moral saint in order to make amends with Betty.

A related point that will help us avoid demanding moral saintliness has to do with the nature of trust and trustworthiness. Recall the example of Don forgetting his lunch appointment with Roger. Roger accepts his apology. When Don forgets again six months later, Roger does not take this as a reason to revoke his earlier forgiveness. In forgiving, Roger re-accepted Don as a trustworthy lunch companion, but the bar for being a trustworthy lunch companion does not require infallibility. In judging someone to be morally trustworthy, we are always judging relative to the particular kind of interaction in question. A friend remains trustworthy though he forgets a lunch date every once in a while, in part because so little is at stake. In trusting a spouse to be faithful much more is at stake. Betty is justified in wanting a greater degree of assurance that Don will not repeat his infidelities. By attending to the particular relationship that needs to be repaired, and to the kind of trust that is necessary to keep that relationship healthy and morally acceptable, we will find standards of atonement that are appropriate to the case yet stop short of a demand for saintliness.

6

someone who commits wrongs.‖ If atonement requires moral perfection, it forfeits its usefulness as a guide to our thinking about everyday life. In this essay, I have argued that we can avoid this problem by conceiving of atonement, not as the demand of an abstract morality, but as a demand that we make of one another within the context of real, imperfect relationships.

One consequence of this move is that the project of atonement becomes intertwined with other forms of moral repair. The scope of Don‘s obligation to atone to Betty is set by the demands she makes of him—but only insofar as Betty‘s demands are reasonable and morally permissible. To fully think through the ethics of moral repair, we must also think of the moral obligations that victims, and perhaps communities as well, have the aftermath of wrongdoing. Genuine moral repair may only be possible when each of these parties plays their role properly.9

Bibliography

Barnett, R. E. 1977. "Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice." Ethics 87(4): 279-301.

Bennett, C. 2008. The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Canterbury, A. o. 1998. ―Why God Became Man.‖ In Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, edited by B. Davies and G. R. Evans, 260-235. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cottingham, J. 1979. "Varieties of Retribution." Philosophical Quarterly 29: 238-246.

Ellin, J. 2000. "Restitutionism Defended." Journal of Value Inquiry 34: 299-317.

Griswold, C. L. 2007. Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. New York, Cambridge.

Hampton, J. 1992. "Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution." UCLA Law Review 39: 1659-1702.

Harvey, J. 1995. "The Emerging Practice of Institutional Apologies." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 9(2): 57-66.

Hershenov, D. B. 1999. "Restitution and Revenge." Journal of Philosophy 96(2): 79-94.

Hieronymi, P. 2001. "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 529-554.

Holmgren, M. 1983. "Punishment as Restitution: The Rights of the Community." Criminal Justice Ethics 2: 36-49

Kant, I. 1996. ―Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.‖ In Practical Philosophy, edited by Mary J. Gregor,41-108. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Moore, M. S. 1987. ―The Moral Worth of Retribution.‖ In Responsibility, Character, and the Moral Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, edited by F. Schoeman, 179-219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, H. 1976. Guilt and Suffering. On Guilt and Innocence. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Murphy, J. G., and J. Hampton. 1988. Forgiveness and Mercy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Radzik, L. 2009. Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Swinburne, R. 1989. Responsibility and Atonement. Oxford; Oxford University Press.

Religious Inquiries

Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer and Autumn 2013, 21-39

Epistemic Virtue from the Viewpoints of Mulla

Sadra and Zagzebski

Zahra Khazaei1

This paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. Zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. She sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendent Philosophy, considers knowledge as an outcome of intellectual virtues without which there would be no knowledge. The role these two philosophers ascribe to moral and intellectual virtues and vices in forming the identity makes it possible to compare their interpretation of epistemic virtues. As a virtue responsibilist, Zagzebski sees epistemic virtue as a character trait and explains its nature by its different components. Sadra as well, sees epistemic virtue as a character trait. Evidence shows that Sadra‘s definition of intellectual virtues is similar to that given by Zagzebski in many respects. Examining Zagzebski‘s viewpoint on epistemic virtue, this paper will discuss Sadra‘s viewpoint on epistemic virtue as well as its contribution to knowledge. In conclusion the similarities of the two viewpoints will be delineated.

Keywords: Epistemic Virtue, Knowledge, Zagzebski, Mulla Sadra.

Introduction

Epistemic virtue is a fundamental concept underlying the justification of beliefs as well as the interpretations of knowledge given by virtue epistemologists. Virtue epistemology is defined as a set of recent approaches to epistemology, focusing on epistemic evaluation of agent rather than on that of his beliefs. Introduced in Ernest Sosa‘ paper ―the Raft and the Pyramid‖ (1980) and as a theory competing with analytic epistemology, virtue epistemology was intended to solve

the problems of epistemology. Aiming to solve Foundationalism and Coherenticism disputes as well as internalism and externalism, Sosa offered the idea of an upheaval in epistemology, shifting from the belief-centered epistemology to an agent-centered epistemology (Sosa 1980). This constitutes the basics of virtue epistemology. Endorsed by philosophers such as Greco, Lorrain Code, James Montmarquet, Zagzebski, Fairweather, and Baehr, epistemic virtue was nevertheless interpreted in different ways.

Although epistemologists unanimously endorsed the idea of epistemic virtues as a solution to problems emanating from classic and analytic epistemology, they have not given a unified and consented account of epistemic virtue. These divergent accounts led to two approaches, namely Reliabilism and Responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists define epistemic virtue as a reliable belief- producing faculty. In contrast, virtue responsibilitists define epistemic virtue as a character trait.

As a virtue reliabilist, Sosa conceives of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or powers and describes an intellectual virtue as ―a quality bound to help maximize one‘s surplus of truth over error‖ (Sosa 1991, 225).

To Sosa, memory, introspection, sense perception, and the like are the properties required for meeting this condition. In his view, the beliefs of a person who uses his faculties aptly in appropriate conditions are true and justified, and he can be said to have gained knowledge (Sosa 1991, 271).2

In the same way, Greco finds intellectual virtues as a reliable cognitive power that contributes to truth achievement. According to him, intellectual virtues are ―innate faculties or acquired habits, leading the individual to truth and to keep away from the false‖ (Greco 2002, 287). Greco names perception, reliable memory, and various good reasoning as intellectual virtues. He gives an account of knowledge based on which one knows a given proposition only when one‘s belief in the truth of that proposition is based on an intellectual virtue (Greco 2002, 311).

Zagzebski gives the most effective neo-Aristotle interpretation of intellectual virtue. She believes it is not of any use to interpret the nature of virtue in terms of a power to endorse having the proper knowledge as well as to justify its value over true belief.3 _{Thus, she}

2. Also see Sosa (2007).

introduced an approach to epistemology that is intended to justify the believer‘s responsibility concerning intellectual virtue and its resulting beliefs. She introduced the first systematic theoretical approach to virtue with regard to epistemology, laying the grounds for the so-called virtue epistemology, which she believes to be based on Aristotle‘s approach to virtue.4

This paper aims to explore the nature of epistemic virtue from Zagzebski‘s view, followed by an examination of Sadra‘s approach to the nature and contributions of intellectual virtue.

The author aims to determine the extent to which the interpretations of epistemic virtue given by the two philosophers are similar.

Avoiding detailed description of all the elements of Zagzebski‘s or Sadra‘s epistemological theory, this paper focuses on the nature of epistemic virtue and its contributions to the materialization and interpretation of knowledge. To this end, chapter one explores epistemic virtue from the viewpoint of Zagzebski and chapter two deals with Sadra‘s definition of epistemic virtue. This study examines the relationship between moral virtues and epistemic virtues, as well as the contributions of virtues and vices to knowledge acquisition. There is evidence that Sadra‘s interpretation of epistemic virtue is in keeping with responsibilism and though apparently he endorses a foundationalist approach in epistemology, his view has the potential to offer a virtue epistemology.

Zagzebski’s View on Epistemic Virtue

In her book Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski prefers Aristotle‘s happiness-based approach and Slote‘s agent-based approach over other forms of virtue ethics. She believes, thanks to end-orientation in Aristotle‘s interpretation as well as the centrality of motives found in agent-based interpretation given by Slote (2001), her theory has the potential to delineate the various elements, including epistemic virtues incorporated in her theory. Aristotle sees moral and intellectual virtues as requirements for achieving eudaimonia (happiness), believing that happiness underlies the virtues both conceptually and existentially. In Slote‘s theory, motive plays the essential part in the definition of virtue. That is why some components given by Zagzebski for virtues make sense in terms of motivation-based theory and the others in terms of happiness-based theory (Zagzebski 1996, 82).

Aristotle‘s happiness-based approach takes virtues as either constituents of good life or the means for achieving happiness. Thus, Zagzebski considers virtues as character traits which are required for self-accomplishment or living a good life (Zagzebski 1996, 216).

Zagzebski, like Aristotle, defines moral virtue as a state of soul that is acquired and derived from habits.5 _{On the other hand, like Slote,} Zagzebski believes that virtues are connected to motives and are innately valuable (Zagzebski 1996, 82-84). Here is the final definition Zagzebski gives of the components of virtue: ―A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 135).

This definition consists of several important elements: enduring and continuous excellence, being acquirable, motives, success, reliability, and end or goal. Zagzebski has borrowed some of these components from Aristotle and some from Slote. Yet, this is Aristotle‘s theory that underlies her theory. As a result, most components have been modeled on the basis of Aristotle‘s theory. As Zagzebski takes epistemic virtues as a form of moral virtues (Zagzebski 1996, 82), the qualities characterizing epistemic virtue are similar to those characterizing moral virtues.

Virtue is a sort of soul habit that is not characterized by emotions and feelings, nor by power, skill, or flair (natural ability); it is not deed or habit either. Though all these elements contribute to the materialization of virtue and one needs them in practice, none of them amounts to virtues.

Virtue is an acquired excellence of soul, achieved through incessant efforts; that is, character traits result from habit, turning into a part of our identity through practicing them (Zagzebski 1996, 116) and ―that in part defines a person's identity and that leads us to think of her as responsible for it‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 135) . To Zagzebski, moral virtues and epistemic virtues are important mainly due to the role they have in developing the identity.

Zagzebski substantiates each quality, giving a set of reasons similar to those given by Aristotle.

Virtue differs from natural ability in that we are not considered as good or bad because of our nature and we are not praised for having power, while we are praised for having virtues. This is the argument shared by Aristotle in Nicomachean ethics (1105a, 1106b). However, considering moral virtues as powers, reliabilists such as Greco and Sosa must take virtues (at least some of them) as natural. Zagzebski, on the one hand, finds this argument right. This is because considering virtue as an excellence requires one to consider all excellences as virtue. This includes not only good faculties such as good eyesight but also properly functioning, natural, cognitive processes such as valid, deductive reasoning and natural capacities such as native intelligence and skills (Zagzebski 1996, 102). On the other hand, Aristotle believes that virtue is acquired, rendering acquisition and naturalness of virtue vague. This is because if virtue is considered a power, it is natural. To take account of this vagueness, Zagzebski considers only those acquired excellences for which we bear responsibility as virtue (Zagzebski 1996, 103, 116, 136). Consequently, natural powers are not subsumed in perimeter of virtue.

Since virtues and vices are acquired, individual is held responsible for his traits. Zagzebski gives a tenable argument, explaining how it is possible for an expansive virtue or vice to infiltrate one‘s trait and to become somehow his second nature and an indicator of his identity (Zagzebski 1996, 116).

She explicates that traits constitute the individual‘s identity and that we are responsible for things shaping our identity. In the same vein, she explains the permanence or endurance of virtue, saying that ―[t]he fact that a trait is among the more permanent of a person‘s qualities means that she bears a fuller responsibly for it than she does for qualities that are more fleeing. So a person's responsibility for her virtues and vices is connected with the fact that they are gradually acquired and are relatively permanent, and these two properties of permanence and gradual acquisition are not independent‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 117).

She examines how epistemic evaluation depends on human agency in a paper entitled "Should Believers Be Agents?‖ (2001). Zagzebski elaborates on how and why are we responsible for our beliefs in this paper and in her book Virtues of the Mind.

An argument given by Zagzebski to justify why we are responsible for our beliefs is that knowledge is not merely something that happens to us but is something to which we contribute through our own efforts and skills,6 _{and this leads us to think, like Zagzebski, of ourselves as} being responsible for having or not having knowledge (Zagzebski 2001, 261).The following remark made by Zagzebski are very valuable in this regard: ―It seems to me that the concept of the self constitutes as much by what we know as by what we do‖ (Zagzebski 2001, 261).

Given the above-mentioned, the responsibility we bear for knowledge is as important as the responsibility we bear for what we do. Consequently, we are praised or blamed for what we do. We also deserve to take credit or blame for our knowledge.

As such, Zagzebski prefers responsibilism over reliabilism with respect to epistemic virtue.

Epistemic virtues are not skills, as moral virtues are not skills either. Verbal skills, logical skills, mathematical skills, and explanatory skills are not virtues (Zagzebski 2001, 114). Yet these skills contribute to one‘s performance. Virtues and skills are mutually exclusive.

It is obvious that Zagzebski does not take virtue as a sort of emotion (Zagzebski 2001, 104). However, as motive is a component of virtue, and motive is a sort of directing emotion, it follows that these virtues are related to emotions, though the former is not a sort of the latter (Zagzebski 2001, 126).

However, in effect, virtue and emotions cannot be separated. This is because virtue implies overcoming emotions, so there will be no virtue as long as there is no emotion.

Thus, if motives, as Zagzebski says, are considered as a sort of emotion directing the activities, then, all virtues include a motivational component.

Though, motive existentially is the willing to do a characteristic

deed, it is not merely a willing, having a quality relatable to character traits (Zagzebski 2003, 146). It is important to note that according to Zagzebski, motive is not the end to which actions are directed, but it is a sort of emotion or feeling that excites and directs action toward an end (Zagzebski 1996, 130-31).

Moreover, each virtue is driven by a goal which an individual tries to achieve. Thus, a virtue includes two elements: intentional and emotional. The same holds true for epistemic virtues. Inspired by a desire to discover facts and truth, an open-minded person is encouraged by enlightening thinking. These feelings and emotions are strong enough to rid him of old beliefs, leading him to explore the previously forgotten probabilities. To this end, he is motivated by the desire to form more true beliefs or at least to approach the truth (Zagzebski 1996, 131).

The last component is the element of success and accomplishment, which differs from motive component yet is connected to it. The relation between motive and success varies by the virtue. To Zagzebski, having virtue requires one to have reliable success in attaining the ends of the motivational component of the virtue; that is, the agent should succeed in employing the skills and cognitive activities associated with the application of the virtue in his circumstances. To this end, a virtuous man should understand some aspects of the world, among other things, very well (Zagzebski 1996, 134).

As the difference between moral virtue and intellectual virtues are reduced to the difference between two moral virtues, and intellectual virtues are best viewed as forms of moral virtue, this definition of epistemic virtue is similar to that of moral virtue (Zagzebski 1996, 139).Thus, the components she suggests as constituting the virtue are the same. Both are acquired by habituation; ―both also involve handling certain feelings and acquiring the ability to like acting virtuously‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 158); and both are voluntary and we bear responsibility for them.

Overall, all virtues, whether moral or intellectual, require phronesis, which is very important to Zagzebski, elaborating on the contribution of phronesis to intellectual virtue.

Moral virtue can influence the intellectual virtue, inspiring one to put the latter into action. The same is true for a moral vice. That is, a moral vice can influence the intellectual virtues and make them ineffective. For example, an egoist researcher, seeks to get access to those materials that support his ideas and are in keeping with his interests.

The two sets of virtues are essentially different in that all intellectual virtues are inspired by the same motive (i.e., knowledge), while moral virtues are inspired by different motives. All intellectual virtues are aimed at one goal (i.e., knowledge). Yet, each virtue is driven by a specific motive as each moral virtue has its specific goal. For example, the motive for charity is different from the motive for bravery. This difference distinguishes the two virtues. Ultimately, she concludes that ―a wide range of intellectual virtues arise out of the same general motivation, the motivation for knowledge, and have the same general aim, knowledge‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 176).

Zagzebski believes that motivation for knowledge is more dominant than the desire for truth. She argues that ―the goodness of the motivation for knowledge is not derived from its connection with any other good, not even the good of knowledge.‖ Since she had already mentioned that ―the motivational components of the various intellectual virtues arise out of the motivation for knowledge and are specifications of it,‖ she concludes that ―the value of the motivational components of the intellectual virtues are also independent of any good outside the agent‖ (Zagzebski 1996, 203).

The intellectual virtues are useful as they lead the agent to guide her belief-forming processes in certain ways. The accomplishment of such a goal (i.e., the agent's knowledge) requires the reliability of the process that will be acquired through intellectual virtues.

categorizes knowledge into two groups. However, to him, both levels of knowledge share intellectual virtue when knowledge signifies intellectual power. But, through this categorization, Zagzebski has confined low-grade knowledge to the knowledge gained through cognitive ability and has based the high-grade knowledge (reflective knowledge) on traits or intellectual properties such as open-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual courage, and so forth.

The individuals lacking intellectual virtues (such as youths and animals) can also have sensory knowledge. In contrast, only the individuals having intellectual qualities can have reflective knowledge, including understanding and wisdom (Zagzebski 1996, 274). This is why Zagzebski says that individuals lacking intellectual virtues can also have sensory knowledge, doing what the individuals enjoying intellectual virtue can do. This inspires Zagzebski to suggest that we label perceptual and memory beliefs as low-grade knowledge as long as they satisfy certain conditions. (Zagzebski 1996, 280). For example, the statement ―this paper is white‖ is correct under certain perceptive conditions. Only the individual believing so should have virtually intellectual motive so as to be inclined to the truth. The way in which belief is formed should be such that the individual having intellectual virtue can form his belief in this way (Zagzebski 1996, 281).

Mulla Sadra's Perspective on Epistemic Virtue

It is obvious that no Muslim philosopher has proposed an epistemological theory on virtue, though they have given full accounts of the contributions of intellectual virtue to the intellectual life. However, Sadra, as other Muslim philosophers (Ibn Sina, Khwajah Nasir, Ibn Miskawayh, Ghazali, etc.), has supported virtue ethics and elaborated on the role of virtues in happy life. Yet, their point of view is not the same as that of Aristotle.

Like Aristotle, Sadra divides virtue into two categories: moral, and rational. Sadra maintains that both moral virtue and rational virtue are necessary for a happy life, with intellectual virtue playing the main part in achieving happiness.

Muslim philosophers see virtue or settled inner disposition as a habit of soul, leading the individual to do the action in line with that virtue.

Disposition is a habit of the soul, necessarily effecting the easy procession of an action therefrom, without need of any reflection or deliberation. (Mulla Sadra 1981, 4:114; Khwajah Nasir 1373, 101; Wickens 1964, 74; Naraqi n.d., 1:55; Kashani 1339, 5:95)

Virtue is both a habit of soul, and, at the same time, it falls between the two extremes. (Aristotle 1378; 1107a; Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:127)

This definition is characterized by several elements that should be taken into account for a better understanding of Sadra's stance on intellectual virtues. The term ―habit of soul‖ makes it clear that firstly, virtue is not a sort of temporary emotion but an enduring and constant state, empowering one to make immediate decision followed by his/her quick action. Secondly, unlike Socrates' view, virtue does not signify knowledge though the former is not void of the latter and that the virtuous individuals should be knowledgeable for what they are going to do. Moreover, it is implied that virtue is considered as neither the ability to act nor the action itself (Mulla Sadra 1981, 4:114). However, it leads to action and the action void of virtue is not considered a virtuous action. Thus, if one‘s good deeds are driven by temporary emotions, such as benevolence or generosity, the deed is not considered a virtuous one in Islamic ethics. Yet it is proper and motivated by good temporary motives.

It was mentioned that virtue is an enduring quality which is different from temporary states or emotions. However this does not imply that they are not connected. Considering virtue as a balance of anger and passion (from which emotions originate) sheds light on how these habits are related to emotions. Without such emotions, no virtue would be necessary. That is why a virtuous agent should strike a balance between his emotions. The balance of pleasure is called temperance, and the balance of fear is called courage. Aristotle has categorized moral virtuous similarly.

The motives inspired by moral virtues for doing moral actions are also emphasized by Zagzebski. Due to its emotional component, moral virtues inspire one as an agent to do an action. By saying that virtues lead one to do an action easily and impulsively, Sadra means that virtue inspires an individual to do an action he needs to do impulsively and easily. Without this motive, the individual would not do the action quickly, and if there were no virtue, the individual would not have this motive. In fact, the motive component shared by virtue inspires the virtuous individual to properly do the action. As long as the virtue is existent, the requirements for the accomplishment of deeds are met. Consequently, bravery inspires one to bravely do an action. The same holds true for chastity.

Intellectual Virtues

Sadra divides virtues into two categories: moral and intellectual. He categorizes intellectual virtues into theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. As moral virtues are derived from striking a balance between emotional powers, intellectual virtues are derived from striking a balance between rational powers.

Theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom are not of power sort. Being balanced, rational power can be interpreted as wisdom. Sadra calls such a wisdom as ―the head of virtues,‖ which is gained through efforts and practice. Thus, it is called acquired wisdom (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:89; 1363, 180). Therefore, Sadra does not see intellectual virtues as reliable truth-producing powers. He takes them to be character traits, leading one ―to perceive the difference between truth and falsehood in speech, between real and futile in convictions, between beauty and ugliness in deeds‖ (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:89; 2008, 420). Like moral virtues, intellectual virtues fall between two extremes (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:127, 4:114; Khwajah Nasir n.d., 119; Miskawayh n.d., 46-47).

knowledge, which is derived from the wisdom of the first sense (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9, 89). That is to say, having wisdom amounts to having a sort of knowledge that can be divided into practical and theoretical. This is similar to the categorization of virtue into practical and theoretical. Theoretical knowledge—namely, philosophy which is derived from theoretical wisdom—is interpreted as knowledge concerning the true nature of objects as they are. Practical wisdom is interpreted as knowledge concerning human deeds. By saying that one having wisdom can perceive the difference between truth and falsehood, Sadra is referring to the virtue of wisdom, which brings knowledge to the individual. The understanding coming from the application of such a virtue is, in fact, the knowledge gained through intellectual virtues. Therefore, a balanced rational power has two qualities called practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom. This is because rational power has two functions: (1) knowing the true nature of objects and (2) perceiving beautiful deeds and ugly deeds. Theoretical wisdom is only responsible for perceiving the true nature of objects. However, practical wisdom has two functions: perceiving the details and controlling the emotions. Sadra assigns these two functions to practical wisdom, even though some philosophers do not share this view.

If intellectual or epistemic virtues are confined to such wisdom, it follows that Sadra considers them as a character trait falling between two extremes. Being too much, rational power is considered as smartness or cunning. Being two low (the other extreme), rational power is considered foolishness (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:91; 2008, 421; Khwajah Nasir 1373, 87; Miskawayh n.d., 46). However, intellectual and moral virtues are not confined to these four characteristics. Muslim philosophers have subsumed a group of virtues in each of the above-mentioned main virtues. Vices have been categorized similarly (e.g., Khwajah Nasir 1373, 108-09; Miskawayh n.d., 46-47; Farabi 1405, 30; Mulla Sadra 1981, 4:116).

Sadra has subsumed the following in the virtue category: beautiful justice and management, quick wit, sagacity, correct opinion, and astuteness for minute details of actions and hidden calamites of the soul (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9; 2008, 421).

Being too much, Intellectual power takes on the following forms: craftiness, cheating, cunning, swindling. Being too low, intellectual power takes on the following forms: dull witness, foolishness, stupidity (Mulla Sadra 1981, vol.9; 2008, 421).

Quick-wittedness: the individual can derive the results from the premises immediately.

Clarity of mind: the individual is not anxious or mentally agitated while making decision. In other words, the individual‘s understanding is not deterred by illogical dilemma.

Ease of learning: the individual avoids the unrelated issues and concentrates on what he needs to by not letting his mind getting distracted.

Excellence of intellection: the individual identifies all the relevant facts and anything irrelevant is excluded from his mind (Khwajah Nasir 1373, 112; Miskawayh n.d., 41).

Explaining about the factors contributing to proper thinking, Sadra elaborates on the qualities one needs in order to know the truth. Prejudice, fanaticism, being in rush, being materialistic, and predominance of lust and improper emotions are the main obstacles in the way of proper thinking. Carefulness, fairness, patience, and authenticity are the virtues required for acquiring knowledge (e.g., Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:91).

Sadra’s Responsibilism

As implied by the foregoing definitions, virtues fall somewhere between the two extremes. For example, excellence of learning requires one to be moderate while learning the facts and not to be distracted by irrelevant issues. This shows that unlike reliabilists, Sadra does not see epistemic virtues as a sort of faculty. Sadra considers these virtues as character traits, and thus one is responsible for having or lacking them. These traits can be understood by drawing on Sadra‘s principles. Though many philosophers have elaborated on human responsibilities, Sadra‘s philosophical remarks on soul and ethics can better do justice to explaining these concepts. Overall, since behaviors and knowledge are acquired, the individual is responsible for them. In turn, one can acquire these virtues because he has free will. These virtues are important as they contribute to identity development.

the most essential element contributing to identity development. This is made clearer by exploring his view on the role of knowledge in achieving happiness. Thus, Sadra attaches enormous importance to knowledge, the proper type of which requires one to be virtuous.

To better understand the status of epistemic virtue in Sadra‘s works, two very important issues will be discussed briefly:

Unlike famous philosophers such as Avicenna, Sadra believes that human beings do not have a constant identity (Mulla Sadra 1382, 128; 1981, 8:343; 1373, 7:181). In other words, human beings make their own identity. The definition given by philosophers of human identity as a rational animal is used in logics and is applied to all humans (Mulla Sadra 1382, 223).

However, existentially, each individual has a unique identity, to which no one has made any contribution (Mulla Sadra 1382, 223). Making the individual distinct, such an identity is the specific existence of that individual (Mulla Sadra 1382, 128, 262; 1981, 9:185-88; 1363a, 596; 1380, 479).

The factors contributing to one‘s identity development include thoughts, habits, and deeds, which are sometimes interpreted by Sadra as intents, habits, and deeds (Mulla Sadra 1981, vol.9). As the individual has free will, he can acquire them. Given the free will, one can be said to have built his own identity and is responsible for it. As a matter of fact, an agent is responsible for the factors contributing to the development of his identity. Knowledge, deed, habit, and intent show that all internal and external factors somehow influence the individual, making him responsible. Sadra never states in his works that one should be held responsible and therefore acclaimed or blamed for having or lacking the perception faculty. However, he believes that perception faculties are necessary for creating perceptional forms and how these faculties are used. Moreover, the characteristics of the agent willing to acquire these sensory perceptions make him responsible for the beliefs he has gained. On the other hand, the agent‘s perception powers should be sound and the conditions should be met so that the forms can be perceived correctly. (To Sadra, perception powers are tools, and it is the soul that creates the forms of the known object. However, the creation requires the tools to be sound and the conditions to be met. One needs them to perceive correctly. However, Sadra does not present them as epistemic virtues).

Sadra interprets identity development based on his philosophical principles such as trans-substantial motion and the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible. Sadra‘s philosophy of mind and philosophical theology maintains that in the other world, one is responsible for what he has created.

Given the triple components discussed above, one can observe that Sadra, like Zagzebski, has incorporated all the factors contributing to human‘s identity development in evaluation, punishment, and rewards. All moral virtues and thoughts and hence intellectual virtues have a part to play in this process. Thus, intellectual virtues cannot be evaluated separately from moral virtues. However, the following points need to be clarified: the relation between moral virtues and intellectual virtues, and the contributions of these virtues to the epistemological, material and other-worldly life. Sadra opted for an end-oriented approach involved in both his moral view and epistemological view. To Sadra, all human activities are aimed at achieving happiness. This is an end that is valuable by itself. If one interprets happiness in terms of moral and intellectual life, living a moral life is not on par with having real felicity, even though living a moral life is a requirement for living an intellectual life. Sadra considers one‘s knowledge as his real felicity and believes that though moral life, sometimes interpreted as justice, is valuable, it is not to be taken as real human perfection. He maintains that moral life results in being saved from hell, but it does not guarantee heaven. Real felicity is dependent on the knowledge gained by the agent. Having more knowledge and knowing higher beings lead to more happiness. To have such knowledge, the agent needs to have intellectual virtues. However, Sadra does not take sensory knowledge as real knowledge, and does not explicitly mention the requirement of intellectual virtues for acquiring such knowledge. Yet, given the interpretation Sadra gives about sensory knowledge (Mulla Sadra 1981, 26; 1382, 25-26), it follows that virtues are required in this case as well.