GOVERNMENT OF THE USA v. PURGANAN, 389 SCRA 623, September 24, 2002 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Notes accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.
The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before the Supreme Court. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, the Supreme Court issued its Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges:
1. Conspiracy to defraud the United States; 2. Tax evasion;
3. Wire fraud;
4. False statements; and
5. Illegal campaign contributions.
In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest". Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that Jimenez’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing.
Thereafter, the court issued its Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue:
WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Held:
Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favour of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis,and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
LEVISTE vs. CA, 615 SCRA 619, March 17, 2010
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail
is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility.
On this matter, Leviste questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of
Leviste.
Held: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the
same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other circumstances:
1. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
2. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
3. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
5. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that
CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
BONGGAC v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 588 SCRA 64, May 21, 2009
On the cancellation of petitioner’s cash bailbond as ordered in the Resolution of 10 January 2003 of the Sandiganbayan, the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction. Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides: SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail.—Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioner’s cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction became final and executory and its execution became ministerial.
NARCISO v. RAMONA – CRUZ, March 17, 2010
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts: After a preliminary investigation, Narciso Cruz was charged with the crime of parricide for allegedly killing his wife. He was thereby detained. He then filed a motion for reinvestigation and to lift warrant of arrest. Also, Cruz filed an ex-parte motion for bail. The prosecutor made no objection. The motion was granted on the same day, allowing the accused to post bail at P150,000. Flor Cruz, sister of the deceased wife, filed a Motion to lift order allowing accused to post bail.
Issue: Whether the grant of bail valid.
Held: No. Cruz was charged with parricide which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before the bail can be granted. Without such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, there was no basis for the granting of the bail. No hearing was conducted on the application for bail – summary or otherwise. The CA even found that only 10 minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion and the granting of bail. Such lapse of time could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. Even if the prosecutor did not object to the motion, the judge still had no basis to grant the bail. The judge had no reason to presume that that prosecutor knew what he was doing. It is the judge’s duty first to determine if evidence of guilt is strong before bail is granted.
GRAGEDA v. TRESVALLES, 421 SCRA 500, February 2, 2004
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority.
The Rules require the Judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.—The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty vis-à-vis the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous elements. The resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judge’s decision, the Rules require the judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.
Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles.—Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
When a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense or by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the required bail hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence.—It is already settled that when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the required [bail] hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.—When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and the prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SAR v. OLALIA, Jr., 521 SCRA 470, April 19, 2007
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition
proceeding.
Facts:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice. The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan
Antonio Muñoz.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage
as agent," in violation of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized
by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and
detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high
"flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Held:
No.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential lextraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
Ratio:
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty
of every individual is not impaired. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its objective is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extradite must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no
showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is
entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
RUIZ v. BELDIA, Jr., 451 SCRA 402, February 16, 2005
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority. BAIL
1. The authority of a judge merely designated as “assisting judge” in a particular court is limited and he could only act on an application for bail filed therewith in the absence or unavailability of the regular judge. 2. A person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged in court can seek his
provisional release through the filing of an application for bail.
3. The failure of a judge to grant bail in accordance with established rules and procedure subjects him to administrative liability.
4. Where a person has not yet been charged in court, the application for bail should be filed before the proper court where he is held.
5. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing must be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation on the matter must be sought.
6. A judge disregards basic procedural rules when he grants bail sans hearing and notice and without the person detained filing a formal petition for bail.
OKABE v. GUTIERREZ, 429 SCRA 685, May 27, 2004
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts:
Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was alleged in the complaint that Maruyama entrusted to Okabe a sum of money for the latter, who was engaged in the business of door to door delivery, to remit to the Philippines. Okabe failed to remit such amount.
The complaint for estafa was files with the 2nd assistant city prosecutor for preliminary investigation. During the preliminary investigation, both Okabe and Marumaya were given the chance to adduce evidence/affidavits on their behalf. The 2nd assistant city prosecutor found probable cause and issued a resolution and the corresponding information. Appended thereto was the Marumaya’s complaint affidavit. These documents were forwarded to the city prosecutor for approval.
Then the information was filed with the RTC of Pasay. A WoA was issued but Okabe was able to post bail in the amount of PhP 40,000 thereby allowing her to freely leave the Philippines for Japan. Upon the instance of the prosecution, a hold-departure order was issued by the court.
Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. She claims that the documents attached to the resolution of the investigating prosecutor were insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause. She contends that it behooved the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the trial court to enable it to determine the presence or absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant; (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses; (c) the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents presented during the said investigation. Issue:
Whether the trial court judge should have required the production of the affidavits of Maruyama’s witnesses, their documentary evidences, stenographic notes of the preliminary investigation and Okabe’s counter-affidavit for the purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest –YES.
Whether posting of bail bars the accused from questioning the legality of the arrest or the conduct of preliminary investigation ‐NO.
Held:
The case of Webb v De Leon and Ho v People say that for the purposes of determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a WoA, the judge should not rely solely on the said report. The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. This rule is now embodied section 8(a) of Rule 112 (but which is section 7 (a) in ourcodal) which mandates that an information filed in court shall be supported by affidavits and counter affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, other supporting documents and the resolution of the case. The reason for this rule is because the law aims not only to acquit the innocent but to like insulate the clearly innocent from false charges and from the strong arm of the law.
Section 26 of the Rule 114 says that an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. This is a curative rule because modified the previous rulings of the SC saying that posting of bail is a bar to challenging the validity of the arrest. Being curative and procedural in nature, it applies retroactively. It must favor Okabe. Besides, every waiver of a right to question the validity of an arrest must be unequivocally established by the conduct of the accused. In this case, the series of acts by Okabe point to the conclusion that she was insistent about the fact that the arrest was ordered with insufficient finding of probable cause. In fact, she immediately filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause.
BORLONGAN, Jr. v. PENA, 620 SCRA 106, May 5, 2010
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts: Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to
prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.
Petitioners filed a MD accompanied with documents as proof that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel by the Urban Bank or by the petitioners, but he was appointed by the ISCI.
Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.
The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre- Trial Brief.
Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus MQ. They insist that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondent’s affidavit was not based on the latter’s personal knowledge and therefore should not have been used by the court in determining probable cause. On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their arrest.
Upon arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.
MTCC upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.
Issue: Whether the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest. Held: The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:
“It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.”
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude
them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.
Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.
QUI v. PEOPLE, 682 SCRA 94, September 26, 2012
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; The allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.―Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. The Court held: Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
