ScienceDirect
ReviewofDevelopmentFinance6(2016)82–90
Financial
development
and
poverty
reduction
in
developing
countries:
New
evidence
from
banks
and
microfinance
institutions
Ficawoyi
Donou-Adonsou
a,∗,
Kevin
Sylwester
baDepartmentofEconomicsandFinance,JohnCarrollUniversity,1JohnCarrollBoulevard,UniversityHeights,OH44118,UnitedStates bSouthernIllinoisUniversity,Carbondale,UnitedStates
Availableonline3August2016
Abstract
Theliteratureonfinancialdevelopmentandgrowthhasreceivedalotofattentionoverthe pasttwodecades.Unlikegrowth,notmuchof considerationhasbeengiventopovertyreduction.Moreover,mostofthepaststudiesfocusonbankandstockmarketdevelopment.Theadventof microfinanceinstitutions(MFIs)letstothinkaboutthepotentialroleMFIscanplayinacountrywideeconomy.Inthisstudy,weconsidertowhat extentbanksandMFIsreducepoverty.Weapplytheinstrumentalvariablesapproach,namelythefixed-effectstwo-stageleastsquares,toapanel of71developingcountriesovertheperiod2002–2011.UsingcredittoGDPasthemainfinancialdevelopmentindicator,theresultsindicatethat banksreducepovertywhenpovertyismeasuredbytheheadcountratioandpovertygap.Asforthesquaredpovertygap,thereisnosignificant effectofbanks.Ontheotherhand,MFIsdonotappeartohaveanyimpactonpovertyregardlessofthemeasureofpovertyemployed.Theseresults implythatwhilebankshavesomeabilitytoreducepoverty,MFIsdonot,atleastattheaggregatelevel.Ourresultsarerobusttotheuseofassets toGDPasanalternativemeasureoffinancialdevelopment.
©2016AfricagrowthInstitute.ProductionandhostingbyElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.
JELclassification: O11;G21
Keywords: Banks;Microfinance;Poverty;Developingcountries
1. Introduction
Numerous studies have considered interactions between
financial development and economic growth, including the
directionofcausalitybetweenthetwo.Someresearchhasalso
considered poverty and financial development. These studies
includeHonohan(2004),Becketal.(2007),Odhiambo(2010),
and Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011). Studies such as Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002) consider a “trickle-down” approach.
BuildingupontheframeworkofBecketal.(2000)andDollar
andKraay(2002),JalilianandKirkpatrick(2002)firstconsider
how financialdevelopmentaffects economicgrowthandthen
examine to what extent growth reduces poverty. A common
elementofthesestudiesisthattheyhaveconsideredeconomy
∗Correspondingauthor.Tel.:+12163974970;fax:+12163971728.
E-mailaddresses:[email protected](F.Donou-Adonsou), [email protected](K.Sylwester).
PeerreviewunderresponsibilityofAfricagrowthInstitute.
wide measures of financial development, such as money and
quasi money, market capitalization, or private credit in their
empirical work. Suchindicators failtocapture how different
institutionswithinthefinancialsectorinfluencepoverty.
Thisomissioncouldbeespeciallyimportantwhenexamining
microfinanceinstitutions(MFIs)sincetheywerepromotedfor
thespecificpurposeofprovidingfinancialservicestothepoor,
especiallycredit,inordertoalleviatepoverty.Microfinancefirst
gained prominenceduring the1970s withorganizations such
as the GrameenBank in Bangladesh and the work of
advo-cates like Mohammad Yunus. The scope of MFIs has since
grownmanifold.From 2002to2011,thegrossloanportfolio
ofMFIsindevelopingcountriesincreasedbymorethan1700%
anditsnumberofactiveborrowersincreasedby400%.1MFIs
havebeenmostprevalentinSouthAsia,especiallycomparedto
otherpoorregionssuchasAfricaandLatinAmericaalthough
theyhavegrownintheseregionsaswell.Theyalsooftenserve
1MIXMarketdatafromwww.mixmarket.org.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2016.06.002
ruralcommunitieswherebanksoftencannotbefound.Although
MFIs also make loansfrom their deposits as do banks,their
financingcanalsocomefrominvestorborrowing,fromequity,
andfromgrants.Sincetheyoftenservepoorcommunities,loans
toindividualsaregenerallymuchsmallerthantypicalbankloans
andoften not collateralized. Therefore,given that banks and
MFIsservedifferentclienteles,makedifferenttypesofloans,
andare financedfromdifferent sources,theycapturedistinct
aspects of financial developmentand so could havedifferent
impactsuponpovertyalleviation.
Theobjectiveofthispaperistocomparetraditionalbanks
tomicrofinanceinstitutionsastowhatextenteachcontributes
topovertyreduction.Inthissense,wecoincidewithJeanneney
andKpodar(2011)inthatwecharacterizefinancialdevelopment
as access tofinancial services inthe “banking system”
com-posedoftraditionalbanksandMFIs.StudiessuchasKhandker
(2005)andMahjabeen(2008)haveconsideredtowhatextent
microfinance has lowered poverty at the local level. More
recenttheoreticalwork(AhlinandJiang,2008;Yusupov,2012;
Bueraetal.,2012)hassuggestedthepotentialfor
macroecono-miceffectsofmicrofinance.Forexample,Donou-Adonsouand
Sylwester(2015)findthatmicrofinanceloangrowthincreases
economic growth and total factor productivity indeveloping
countries.Inthispaper,wetakethepotentialforMFIstohave
macroeconomic impacts seriously, especially giventhe rapid
growthinMFIs,andexaminetowhatextentthisrisehasbeen
abletoreducepovertyatanationallevel.Comparingthiseffect
tothatfromtraditionalbankshelpstoplaceanyimpactinbetter
contextaswellastoseeifMFIsdo,indeed,playanenhanced
roleinreducingpoverty.
AnexampleofsuchacomparisoncomesfromThanvi(2010)
for the Cooch Behar District of WestBengal, India. Thanvi
describesashiftfrombankstoMFIsduetotheunavailability
(inpartortotal)ofloansfrombanks.ForThanvi,MFIs
supple-menttheroleofbanksbyreachingtheunreached.Inthisway,
onemightinferthatMFIsshouldbeabletoreducepovertytoa
largerextentthanbanks.However,Thanvialsodocumentsthat
MFIschargehigherinterestrates.OneMFI,Bardhan,charges
aneffective rate of 24%,twice that chargedby banks.These
higherratesraisequestionsregardinghoweffectiveMFIsareat
reducingpoverty.
Thisstudyemploysaninstrumentalvariablesapproachtoa
panelof 71developing countriesoverthe period2002–2011.
The results indicate that banks reduce poverty when poverty
is measured by the headcount ratio or the poverty gap but
not when poverty is measured by the squared poverty gap.
On the other hand, MFIs do not appear to have any impact
on poverty regardless of the measure employed. While the
results suggest that banks play a role in reducing poverty,
MFIsdonotappeartohavedoneso,atleastatthe aggregate
level.
Thepaperisstructuredasfollows:Section2providesamore
detaileddescriptionoftheliterature.Section3describesthedata
andoutlinesthemethodology.Section4presentsandexplains
theresults.InSection5,weprovidearobustnesscheckusing
analternativemeasureoffinancialdevelopment,andSection6
offersconcludingdiscussion.
2. Literaturereview
Greenwoodand Jovanovic(1990) develop amodel where
financial intermediaries analyze imperfect information and
channelfundsfromsaverstoborrowers.Theirmodelincludesa
participationcost,alump-sumfeethatagentsmustpayto
partic-ipateinthefinancialsector.Thisfeeeffectivelykeepsthepoor
fromtakingadvantageof opportunitiesinthefinancialsector.
Notonlywouldthepoornotbenefit,buttheincomedistribution
could evenwidenbetweenlowandhighincomeagents.This
implicationisendorsedbyStiglitz (1993)for whomfinancial
marketfailureisthefundamentalcauseofpovertyin
develop-ingcountries.Applyingthismodeltoourcase,theparticipation
feewouldlikelybelowerforMFIsandsotheywouldbe
bet-terabletoobtaincredit,invest,andescapepoverty.Ofcourse,
whetheritissufficientlylowsoastobenefitthepoorisanother
question.
Such considerations have not been examined at a
macro-economic level where, as stated,economy wide measuresof
financialdevelopmentareused.JalilianandKirkpatrick(2002),
Beck et al. (2008), and Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) have
usedthetrickle-downapproach–anindirecteffectoffinancial
developmentonpovertyreductionthrougheconomicgrowth–
toinvestigate financialdevelopment andpovertyreduction in
developingcountriesandfindthatfinancialdevelopmentfosters
growthwhichthenreducespoverty.Forinstance,Jalilianand
Kirkpatrick (2002) argue that by widening financial services
access to the poor,their income will grow, whicheventually
will reduce poverty. For example, an insurance service
pro-videdtothepoorcanbetterprotectthemagainstincomeshocks.
Otherstudieshaveinvestigatedthedirectrelationshipbetween
financialdevelopmentandpovertyreductionortheincome
dis-tribution.Thesestudiesinclude Honohan(2004),Jalilianand
Kirkpatrick(2005),Becketal.(2007),Perez-Moreno(2011),
JeanneneyandKpodar(2011),andSehrawat andGiri(2015)
although theydiffer bothinterms of what proxies for
finan-cialdevelopmenttheyuseaswellasintheiroutcomevariable
(headcountratio,povertygap,Ginicoefficient,etc.).
GiventhepurportedroleofMFIsinassistinglowerincome
households,variousstudieshavefocusedupontheseinstitutions
andexaminedtowhatextenttheycanhelpraiselivingstandards
amongthepoor. Severalstudieshavefoundbeneficialeffects
uponconsumption or income(Khandker,2005; Kondoet al.,
2008;Berhane,2009;Collinsetal.,2009;ImaiandAzam,2011; BerhaneandGardebroek,2011),housingconditions(Berhane, 2009;BerhaneandGardebroek,2011),village-levelwagesand
investmentinagriculture(KaboskiandTowsend,2012),savings
(Kondo etal., 2008; Dupas andRobinson, 2009),andhealth
andfoodsecurity (Stewartetal.,2010).Otherstudiesremain
skeptical.Forinstance,Chowdhury(2009)castsdoubt onthe
effectivenessofmicrofinanceasapovertyalleviationtoolgiven
theprofit-seekingnatureoffinancialinstitutions.Hearguesthat
microfinance,thoughitprovidesasafetynetandcanhelpsmooth
consumption, needsits borrowers tohavebusiness skillsand
marketinginformationforloanstoexpandbusinessesandcreate
jobs.Likewise,CopestakeandWilliams(2011)arguethatMFIs
povertyasobstaclessuchasselectionbiasweakenthepositive
effectsofMFIsonhouseholds’welfare.
Theseempirical studiesexaminetheeffectsof MFIsatthe
local level, butto what extent might MFIs influencepoverty
at the national level? Even if the effects of any one MFI
are only felt locally, countrywide effects could still arise if
MFIswerelocatedinmanycommunitiesasinmany
develop-ing countries.Another possibility for macroeconomic effects
could occur through spillovers, especially if increasing
con-sumption or investment spurs additional job creation. Buera
et al.(2012) build an economy-wide model of
entrepreneur-shipwhereinMFIsservicethepoorwhocannotborrowinthe
“traditional”financialsector.Theythenexploretowhatextent
MFIsinfluenceoutput,capital,totalfactorproductivity,wages,
andinterestrates,findinginsomecasesthatMFIsnotonlyraise
outputbutdecreasedisparitiesbetweenrichandpoor.Ahlinand
Jiang(2008)andYusupov(2012)alsofindthatMFIspromote
developmentonawiderscale.
3. Dataandmethodology
3.1. Data
Banksaredefinedasfinancialinstitutionsthatacceptdeposits
andmakeloans.Inthisstudy,weconsiderdepositmoneybanks
commonlystudiedinthefinance-growthliterature.Thesebanks
accept demand deposits, saving deposits, and time deposits
(Beck et al., 2013), andare composedof commercial banks
and otherfinancial institutions such as thrift institutions and
credit unions.Microfinance, on the other hand, isdefined as
institutionsthatprimarilyprovidefinancialservicestothepoor.
They maybecomparedtocreditunionsinterms ofstructure
andactivities. However, microfinance institutions differ from
banks in that they receivemost of their funding from
exter-nal loans, grants, or investors. They also differ from banks
in that they mostly make small loans called “microcredit”
tothe poor. Referringto MicrofinanceInformation Exchange
(MIX),amicrofinanceinstitution“can be anonprofit
organi-zation,regulatedfinancial institutionor commercialbankthat
provides microfinance products and services to low-income
clients.” Microfinancedatacomesfrom theMFIProfilesand
Reports from MIX. MIX recognizes six legal statuses for
microfinanceinstitutions:banks,credits/cooperatives,non-bank
financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, rural
banks,andothers.Dataregardingtraditionalbankscomesfrom
Becketal.(2013).
Our mainmeasure capturing the rolesof banks andMFIs
aretheirrespectiveprivatecreditasapercentageofGDPsince
loansrepresentthekeyfinancialserviceofferedbymost
insti-tutions,especiallyindevelopingcountries.Thus,higherlevels
ofcreditimplyhigherlevelsoffinancialservices,andtherefore
higher levelsof financial intermediation. LookingatTable1,
bankcreditaverages27.34%ofGDPwhereasthatfor
micro-finance credit is 1.12%. The reason for this largedifference
liesinthe differencebetweenthe twoinstitutions’customers.
Banksgenerallyfundlargerenterpriseswithmuchhigher
lever-ageabilities, whileMFIs fund smallerenterpriseswithmuch
lower leverage abilities. Although we focus upon credit, we
willalsoconsideranotherfinancialmeasure,namelytheratioof
assetstoGDP,asarobustnesscheck.AssetstoGDP,contraryto
privatecredittoGDP,includecredittothepublicsectoraswell.
Alltwofinancialdevelopmentvariableshavebeenextensively
usedintheliterature.2Foreachofthesevariables,weconsider
onemeasureforbanksandanothermeasureforMFIs.
Compar-ingresultsbetweenthetwomeasurescanprovidebettercontext
forwhatextentMFIsinfluencepovertycomparedtotraditional
banks.Giventhatbanks’dataaredeflated,wealsodeflatethe
microfinancedataasdescribedinBecketal.(2013).3
Aweaknessofourapproachisthatloansfromwhatone
gen-erallylabelsasmicrocredit–and,hence,–loansfromMFIs–are
combinedwithloansfromtraditionalbanksasMIXreliesupon
thecharacteristicsoftheborrowertodenotealoanas
“micro-credit”andnotthelender.Thisshortcomingisnotfatalforour
purposes becausewe wanttoexamine towhatextent finance
directedtowardthepoor(regardlessfromwhatsource)lowers
poverty.
Asforvariablescapturingtheextentofpoverty,weconsider
the povertyheadcount ratio,thepovertygap, andthe squared
poverty gap. The first two variables come from Poverty and
Equity Database published by the World Bank and the last
variable comes fromPovcalNet,also published bythe World
Bank.TheWorldDevelopmentIndicatorsprovidesdataforthe
GinicoefficientandrealGDPpercapita($PPP).InTable3,we
providemoredetailsonallthesevariables.
Thedatacovers71developingcountriesfrom2002to2011.
Theinitialyearischosenduetodataavailability.Thesummary
statisticsareprovidedinTable1,thecorrelationcoefficientsin
Table2,andthecountriesinthesamplearelistedinappendix.
An important feature of these correlation coefficientsis that
thepovertymeasuresareweaklynegativelycorrelatedwiththe
financialdevelopmentvariables.Itisalsoimportanttopointout
thatthemagnitudesofthecorrelationsarehigherforthe
meas-uresof bankactivity. Onelastfeatureof thecorrelationtable
istheweaknegativecorrelationbetweenbanksandMFIswith
respecttotheirrespectivecreditandassets.
3.2. Theempiricalmodelandmethodology
We usethe growth-poverty model suggested by Ravallion
(1997)andRavallionandChen(1997).AdamsandPage(2005)
haveusedthismodeltoinvestigatetheimpactofinternational
migrationandremittancesonpovertyindevelopingcountries.
Weadopt asimilarapproachthatcontrols for incomeandits
distributiontoinvestigatetheimpactoffinancialdevelopment
onpoverty.Theempiricalmodelisgivenby:
logpovit=αi+β1 logμit+β2loggit+β3logxit+εit (1)
2SeeforinstanceLevineetal.(2000)andBecketal.(2013).
3Beck et al. (2013) provide the following deflation method:
{(0.5)*[Ft/Pet+Ft−1/Pet−1]}/[GDPt/Pat], where F is credit or assets; Pe
Table1
Descriptivestatistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Povertyheadcountat$1.25adayPPP(%) 324 14.30 18.59 0.00 87.72
Povertygapat$1.25adayPPP(%) 324 5.22 8.26 0.00 52.76
Squaredpovertygapat$1.25adayPPP(%) 314 3.67 6.97 0.00 52.76
PercapitaGDP($PPP-constant2011) 700 6088.77 4794.86 492.61 22,569.81
Giniindex 325 42.05 9.71 16.23 67.40 Creditbank(%GDP) 710 27.34 22.51 0.55 121.49 CreditMFI(%GDP) 710 1.12 1.87 0.00 13.70 Assetbank(%GDP) 687 35.24 25.98 0.63 131.49 AssetMFI(%GDP) 709 2.09 4.22 0.00 48.58 Ruleoflaw 620 3.14 1.08 1.00 6.00 Ethnictensions 620 3.72 1.24 0.00 6.00 Table2 Correlationcoefficients.
Creditbank Assetbank CreditMFI AssetMFI Headcount Pov.gap Sq.pov.gap Gini index P.c.GDP Ruleof law Ethnic tensions Creditbank 1 Assetbank 0.93 1.00 CreditMFI −0.03 −0.12 1.00 AssetMFI −0.04 −0.11 0.97 1.00 Headcount −0.10 −0.12 −0.04 −0.08 1.00 Povertygap −0.10 −0.12 −0.02 −0.05 0.96 1.00
Squaredpovertygap −0.23 −0.24 −0.06 −0.06 0.86 0.93 1.00
Giniindex 0.08 0.11 0.02 −0.05 0.39 0.43 0.19 1.00
PercapitaGDP 0.11 0.19 −0.33 −0.28 −0.52 −0.44 −0.47 −0.15 1.00
Ruleoflaw 0.05 0.02 −0.04 −0.02 −0.14 −0.14 −0.16 −0.67 0.18 1.00 Ethnictensions 0.09 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.23 −0.05 0.08 −0.19 −0.26 1
Table3
Variabledescriptionandsource.
Variable Description Source
Povertyheadcount Povertyheadcountratioat$1.25aday2005$PPP.Itisthepercentageofthepopulationlivingonless than$1.25adayat2005internationalprices
Povertyandequitydatabase Povertygap Povertygapat$1.25aday2005$PPP.Itisthemeanshortfallfromthepovertylineexpressedasa
percentageofthepovertyline
Povertyandequitydatabase Squaredpovertygap Squaredpovertygapat$1.25aday2005$PPP,definedasa%ofpovertyline.Itisanindicatorof
povertyseverity.
PovcalNet
PercapitaGDP PPP(constant2011international$) Worlddevelopmentindicators Giniindex Measuresincomeinequality.Anindexof0representsperfectequality,whileanindexof100implies
perfectinequality
Worlddevelopmentindicators Creditbank Depositmoneybankscredit,definedasa%ofGDP Becketal.(2013)
CreditMFI Measuredbythegrossloanportfolio,definedasa%ofGDP Marketinformationexchange Assetbank Depositmoneybanksassets,definedasa%ofGDP Becketal.(2013)
AssetMFI Definedasa%ofGDP Marketinformationexchange
Ruleoflaw Measureslawandordertraditionofthecountry.Itrangesfrom0(weaktradition)to6(strong tradition)
Internationalcountryriskguide Ethnictensions Measuresthedegreeoftensionwithinacountryattributabletoracial,nationality,orlanguage
divisions.Itrangesfrom0(hightensions)to6(minimaltensions)
Internationalcountryriskguide
Note: We use the deflation method proposed by Beck et al. (2013) to deflate MFI credit and assets. The deflation formula is given by {(0.5)*[Ft/Pet+Ft−1/Pet−1]}/[GDPt/Pat],whereFiscreditorassets;Peisend-of-periodCPI,andPaisaverageannualCPI.
where pov is the measure of poverty in countryi at time t;
μ represents the mean per capita income measured by per
capitaGDP ($PPP);g is incomeinequality measured by the
Ginicoefficient;xdenotesafinancialdevelopmentindicatoras
measuredbybankdevelopment(bankcredit)andmicrofinance
development (MFI credit); αi denotes country fixed-effects;
and ε is the error term. In Eq. (1), the coefficients (βi) are
Table4
OLSestimatesoftheeffectsoffinancialdevelopment(measuredbyprivatecredit/GDP)onpoverty.
Povertyheadcount Povertygap Squaredpovertygap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 PercapitaGDP −1.732*** −2.396*** −1.707*** −2.444*** −2.907*** −2.449*** −2.006*** −1.753** −1.992** (−4.17) (−4.32) (−3.46) (−6.45) (−5.70) (−5.49) (−3.77) (−2.17) (−2.63) Giniindex 4.593*** 4.516*** 4.581*** 4.245*** 4.098*** 4.247*** 3.374*** 3.444*** 3.366*** (4.24) (3.88) (4.18) (4.87) (4.63) (4.84) (3.60) (3.63) (3.60) Creditbank −0.531** – −0.529** −0.326* – −0.326* 0.151 – 0.154 (−2.61) (−2.57) (−1.67) (−1.66) (0.61) (0.64) CreditMFI – −0.026 −0.006 – −0.009 0.001 – 0.010 −0.005 (−0.45) (−0.12) (−0.18) (0.03) (0.09) (−0.04) Constant 1.157 5.498 0.974 6.787 10.308* 6.827 4.277 2.301 4.170 (0.19) (0.8) (0.16) (1.42) (1.75) (1.32) (0.72) (0.28) (0.56) WithinR2 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.22 0.22 0.22 #ofcountries 68 68 68 68 68 68 66 66 66 #ofobs. 309 309 309 299 299 299 270 270 270
Note:Allvariablesareexpressedinlogs.Theestimationisbasedonthefixed-effectsmethodforwhichwereportthewithinR-squared.t-statisticsinparentheses arebasedonstandarderrorsthatarerobusttoheteroskedasticity.***,**,and*denotesignificanceat1%,5%,and10%,respectively.Thenumberofobservations isreducedinthetablebecauseofmissingvaluesforpovertyvariables(seesummarystatisticsfordetails).
InEq.(1),andconsistentwithRavallion(1997),percapita
incomeoreconomicgrowthisexpectedtolowerpovertywhile
income inequality is expected to have a positive effect on
poverty. Asfor the financial developmentindicator, which is
theadditiontothismodel,itsrelationshipwithpoverty isnot
clear-cutinthe literature.Nevertheless,followingJalilianand
Kirkpatrick (2002), Beck et al. (2008), and Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), who find that financial development fosters
growthwhichthenreducespoverty, weexpect financial
indi-catorstoreducepoverty.
Tomitigateendogeneityconcerns,onesometimestakesfirst
differencesasinRavallionandChen(1997)sincedifferences
arelesspersistentovertimethanarelevels.However,werefrain
fromdoingsoas needingtwoobservationsfor povertyorthe
Ginicoefficientwouldgreatlyreducethesamplesize.Despite
thisconcern,wefirstestimateequation(1)usingthefixed-effects
technique(OLS),whichassumesthatourindependentvariables
areexogenous.Tothenaddressendogeneityconcerns,wealso
useinstrumentsandestimateviatwo-stageleastsquares(2SLS).
Thefirstinstrumentweuseisethnictensions.4Becketal.(2003)
haveusedthisvariableandfindsignificantnegativecorrelation
betweenethnicfractionalizationandprivatecredit.This
corre-lationcouldbeexplainedbythefactthatgreaterethnicdiversity
impliestheadoptionofpoliciesandinstitutionsgearedtoward
powerandcontrolandnottowardcreatinganopenand
compet-itivefinancialsystem.Thesecondinstrumentweuseistherule
oflawusedbyLevineetal.(2000).Bankssignalotofcontracts,
andacountryhavingatraditionofestablishinglawandorderis
likelytoboostitsfinancialsectordevelopment.Bothethnic
ten-sionsandruleoflawrangefromzerotosixpointsaccordingto
theInternationalCountryRiskGuidedatabase.Ethnictensions
measurethedegreeoftensionwithinacountryattributableto
4 Ethnictensionsdiffersfromethnicheterogeneityinthattheformertakesinto
accountactualeventsanddisturbanceswithinthecountryarisingfromethnic heterogeneity.
racial,nationality,or languagedivisions.Lowerratingsimply
hightensions,whilehigherratingsaregiventocountrieswhere
tensions are minimal.Higher values for therule of law
vari-abledenoteagreateradherencetolawandorder.Inadditionto
thesetwoinstruments,wealsoincludethefirstandsecondlags
of financialdevelopmentindicatorasinstruments.Singhetal.
(2011)usethefirstandsecondlagsofmoneyandquasimoney
measuredas(M2)/GDPanddomesticcredit/GDP,respectively,
whenanalyzingthedeterminantsandmacroeconomiceffectsof
remittances.
To gauge the validity of the aforementioned instruments,
we runtheSargan-Hansentestofoveridentifyingrestrictions.
Underthenullhypothesis,theinstrumentsarevalid.Wewillalso
includethesesixinstrumentsintheregressionmodeland
esti-matebyOLS.Iftheinstrumentsarevalid,thentheircoefficient
estimatesshouldbezero.
4. Results
Webeginwiththefixed-effectsresultswithoutusing
instru-ments.TheresultsarereportedinTable4.Column(1)reports
the resultswithbankcreditonly,column(2) withMFIcredit
only,andcolumn(3)withbothvariablesincludedinthesame
model. Controlling for per capitaincome andthe Giniindex
that arenegativelysignificantasexpected,theresultsindicate
bankcreditreducespovertyasfarasthepovertyheadcountand
povertygapareconcerned.Asforthesquaredpovertygap,we
donotseeanysignificanteffectofbankcredit.MFIcredit,on
the otherhand,does notappeartohavesignificanteffects on
povertyreductionregardlessofwhatpovertymeasureisused.
However, giventhe potential for financial development tobe
endogenous,theseOLSestimatesmaybebiased.
Table5reportsthefixed-effects2SLSresultswhenusingrule
oflaw,ethnictensions,andthefirsttwolagsofbothbankcredit
andMFIcredittoinstrumentfor bankcredit andMFIcredit.
TheresultsinTable5indicatethatbankcreditreducespoverty
Table5
2SLSestimatesoftheeffectsoffinancialdevelopment(measuredbyprivatecredit/GDP)onpoverty.
Povertyheadcount Povertygap Squaredpovertygap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 PercapitaGDP −2.052*** −2.842*** −2.265*** −2.327*** −2.971*** −2.547*** −0.987 −1.410** −1.155* (−4.13) (−5.03) (−3.94) (−5.07) (−5.68) (−4.81) (−1.60) (−2.10) (−1.68) Giniindex 3.398*** 3.809*** 3.472*** 4.112*** 4.508*** 4.193*** 3.74*** 3.966*** 3.860*** (4.04) (4.41) (4.07) (5.19) (5.56) (5.22) (4.18) (4.30) (4.16) Creditbank(1) −0.648*** – −0.685*** −0.552*** – −0.585*** −0.256 – −0.312 (−3.30) (−3.31) (−2.88) (−2.91) (−1.08) (−1.13) CreditMFI(2) – −0.003 0.053 – 0.007 0.054 – 0.019 0.075 (−0.05) (0.73) (0.10) (0.80) (0.14) (0.51) Constant 8.775 12.038* 10.559* 7.014 9.360 8.806 −4.648 −2.558 −3.341 (1.51) (1.87) (1.67) (1.29) (1.56) (1.49) (−0.68) (−0.35) (−0.46) WithinR2 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.26 0.25 #ofcountries 58 58 58 58 58 58 57 57 57 #ofobs. 214 214 214 206 206 206 185 185 185 Sargan–Hansenp-value 0.178 0.703 0.271 0.061 0.721 0.177 0.386 0.623 0.503
Note:Allvariablesareexpressedinlogs.Theestimationisbasedonthefixed-effects2SLSmethodforwhichwereportthewithinR-squared.t-statisticsinparentheses arebasedonstandarderrorsthatarerobusttoheteroskedasticity.***,**,and*denotesignificanceat1%,5%,and10%,respectively.Thenumberofobservations isreducedinthetablebecauseofmissingvaluesforpovertyvariables(seesummarystatisticsfordetails).ThesampleisfurtherreducedbecauseICRGdoesnot reportdataforsomecountrieslikeBenin,Cambodia,Nepal,etc.(1)CreditbankisinstrumentedusingRuleoflaw,Ethnictensions,1stand2ndlagsofcreditbank, PercapitaGDP,andGiniindexasinstruments.(2)CreditMFIisinstrumentedusingRuleoflaw,Ethnictensions,1stand2ndlagsofcreditMFI,PercapitaGDP, andGiniindexasinstruments.
naturallogarithmsforbothpovertyandbankcreditimpliesthat
thecoefficientonbankcreditcanbeinterpretedasanelasticity.
Fortheheadcountindex,a10%increaseinbankcreditreduces
povertybyabout6.5–6.9%,whereasthesame10%increasein
bankcreditreducespoverty by5.5–5.9% asmeasured bythe
povertygap.Fortheformer,thismeansthata10%increasein
bankcreditreducesthefractionofthepopulationlivingonless
than$1.25adaybyabout6.7%.Forthelatter,thedifferencein
incomebetweenthe$1.25perpersonthresholdandtheactual
incomeofthepoordiminishesbyroughly5.7%.
ComparedtotheOLSestimates,theIVelasticitiesare
sta-tisticallystronger(1%significanceversus5%and10%forthe
OLSestimates)andlargerinmagnitude.JustliketheOLS
esti-mates,thecoefficientsfromtheIVestimationarenotsignificant
when considering the squared poverty gap although the sign
goesfrompositivetonegative.AsforMFIcredit,theIVresults
confirmthosefromTable4inthatMFIcreditdoesnothaveany
significanteffectonpovertyreduction.Percapitaincomeand
GinicoefficienthavetheexpectedsignsasinRavallion(1997)
andAdamsandPage(2005).Moreimportantly,themagnitudes
oftheirelasticitiesareconsistentwiththoseinRavallion(1997)
andAdamsandPage(2005).Onlyforthesquaredpovertygap
isincomepercapitanotstatisticallysignificantwhenthemodel
includesbankcreditonlyas itsmeasureoffinancial
develop-ment.
Onthevalidityoftheinstruments,theoveridentificationtests
generallyindicatethat theinstrumentsare valid.Weobserve,
however,arejectionatthe10%significancelevelwhen
regress-ingthepovertygaponthemeasureofbankcreditbyitself.As
thismaycastsomedoubtonhowvalidourinstrumentsare,we
takeastepfurtherandregressthethreepovertymeasuresonthe
proposedinstruments.TheresultsreportedinTable6indicate
thatonlythefirstlagofbankcreditissignificantlyassociated
withthesquaredpovertygap.Intheory,thisinstrumentshould
be dropped.However,we keep itin theinstrument listwhen
consideringthesquaredpoverty gapbecausetheresults– not
reportedherebutavailableuponrequest–donotqualitatively
change when excluding the first lag of bank credit from the
instrumentlist.
To sum up, our results indicate that bank credit reduces
poverty when poverty is measured by the headcount ratio
and poverty gap. These results support those from Honohan
(2004), Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005), Beck et al. (2007),
JeanneneyandKpodar(2011),andSehrawatandGiri(2015),
whoalsofindthatfinancialdevelopmentlowerspoverty.
How-ever,theseconclusionsaretemperedinthatwefindnosignificant
effectwhenusingthesquaredpovertygaptomeasurepoverty.
MFI credit, on the other hand, does not appear tohave any
impact on poverty regardless of the measure we consider,
suggesting that any effectupon poverty reduction is at most
small. We are not the first to be skeptical of the ability of
MFIs to lower poverty as Chowdhury (2009) raises similar
doubts.
From our results, one can thus wonder how banks show
poverty reductioneffects (atleastas shownbytheheadcount
and poverty gap measures)whereas MFIs do not, especially
sinceMFIsfocusuponhelpingthepoor.Onepossiblewayto
explaintheeffectofbankcreditonpovertyisthrough
invest-mentsininfrastructure.Infact,manydevelopingcountriesstill
havealotofroomforimprovementsininfrastructureandsuch
projects could create variousspillovers. Aconstruction
com-pany,forinstance,mayseekfundingfrombankstobuildroads.
Thisroadconstructionwillrequirethehiringofmanypeople,
including the poor, whichwill lead toadecrease in poverty.
Therecouldbealsoanindirecteffectonpovertyreductionas
Table6
OLSestimatesoftheeffectsofinstrumentsonpoverty.
Povertyheadcount Povertygap Squaredpovertygap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 PercapitaGDP −2.194*** −2.691*** −2.360*** −2.431*** −2.961*** −2.757*** −0.965 −1.526** −1.168 (−4.97) (−4.90) (−4.61) (−4.53) (−4.49) (−4.19) (−1.32) (−2.08) (−1.44) Giniindex 3.490*** 3.636*** 3.516*** 4.149*** 4.467*** 4.298*** 3.699*** 3.856*** 3.774*** (2.74) (2.98) (2.65) (3.31) (3.55) (3.23) (3.40) (3.44) (3.42) Ruleoflaw 0.323 0.289 0.328 0.264 0.187 0.253 0.429 0.442 0.402 (1.37) (1.12) (1.42) (0.82) (0.68) (0.87) (1.17) (1.23) (1.04) Ethnictensions 0.075 0.162 0.106 0.224 0.334 0.250 0.292 0.214 0.293 (0.38) (0.62) (0.52) (0.99) (1.16) (1.06) (0.90) (0.60) (0.90)
1stlagcreditbank −0.119 – −0.139 0.059 – 0.056 −0.887* – −0.923**
(−0.31) (−0.37) (0.16) (0.15) (−1.94) (−2.09)
2ndlagcreditbank −0.608 – −0.613 −0.739 – −0.791 0.758 – 0.735
(−1.21) (−1.18) (−1.35) (−1.42) (1.30) (1.27)
1stlagcreditMFI – 0.035 0.054 – 0.014 0.032 – −0.035 0.019
(0.62) (1.36) (0.21) (0.71) (−0.34) (0.17)
2ndlagcreditMFI – −0.059 −0.019 – −0.001 0.032 – 0.053 0.038
(−1.07) (−0.40) (−0.03) (0.74) (0.79) (0.55) Constant 9.420 10.807 10.862 7.561 8.821 10.099 −5.859 −1.849 −4.058 (1.37) (1.74) (1.55) (0.99) (0.248) (1.23) (−0.74) (−0.22) (−0.46) WithinR2 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.28 0.27 0.29 #ofcountries 58 58 58 58 58 58 57 57 57 #ofobs. 214 214 214 206 206 206 185 185 185
Note:Allvariablesareexpressedinlogs.Theestimationisbasedonthefixed-effectsmethodforwhichwereportthewithinR-squared.t-statisticsinparentheses arebasedonstandarderrorsthatarerobusttoheteroskedasticity.***,**,and*denotesignificanceat1%,5%,and10%,respectively.Thenumberofobservations isreducedinthetablebecauseofmissingvalues(seesummarystatisticsfordetails).
facilitatemarketaccessbyreducingtransportationcosts.
More-over,roadscanshortendistancestofeederroadsandincrease
laborproductivity inagricultureas shown inUganda byFan
andZhang(2008).Itisobviousthatlargecompanies,andtoa
lesserextent mediumcompanies,will notgo tomicrofinance
institutionstoseekfundinggiventhesizeofMFIs’portfolio.
Asecond possibleexplanationastowhytraditional banks
could bemoresuccessful ineliminatingpoverty isthat some
banksfacingcompetitionfromMFIshavealsoexpanded
lend-ingtothepoor.Infact,somebanksoffermicrocreditservices,
andsomesmallscalebusinessesmayfindbankloanscheaperas
MFIs are believedtochargeon averagehigher interest rates.
Thanvi (2010) finds that an MFI in India charges twice the
effectiveratechargedbybanks.Finally,fromthesupplyside,
Holden andProkopenko (2001) argue that the quality of the
loanportfolioofMFIsissometimespoorbecauseofinadequate
managementanddeficienciesincontroloftheiractivities.Asa
consequence,itisdifficultfor MFIstoreachefficiencylevels
tocovertheircosts.Asforthedemandside,Chowdhury(2009)
pointsout that borrowers maybe lacking business skillsand
marketinginformationforloanstoexpandbusinessesand
cre-atejobs.Borrowerspossessingtheseskillsmightthenbemore
successfulatobtainingfinancingfromtraditionalbanks.
Afinalreasonisthemuchgreatersizeofbanks.Asshown
inTable1,bank creditandassetsaremanytimes largerthan
thatofmicrofinanceinstitutions,providingmuchgreater
poten-tialfor their changesinlendingtoaffectthepoor. Moreover,
lendingfromMFIsisalmostalways“small”,implyingthatany
effectscouldbecontainedlocallyandsonotimpactpovertyat
thecountrylevel.
5. Robustnesscheck
Inthissection,wecheckhowrobustourresultsarebyusingan
alternativemeasureoffinancialdevelopment,namelyassetsasa
percentageofGDP.Thisvariableisalsopopularamongfinancial
developmentindicatorsintheliterature(seeforinstance,Beck
etal.,2013).Asmentionedearlier,theassetstoGDPvariable
has the advantage toincludecredit tothe public sector,
con-trarytocredittoGDP,whichonlyincludescredittotheprivate
sectorbybanksandotherfinancialintermediaries.For
conve-nience,weskiptheOLSestimatestofocusontheIVestimates.
Table7reportsthefixed-effects2SLSestimateswhenfinancial
developmentismeasuredbytheassetstoGDPratio.
The results are qualitatively similar to those of credit in
Table5.However,themagnitudesoftheelasticitiesarehigher.
An increaseinbankassetsby10% reducestheproportion of
peoplelivingonlessthan$1.25adaybyabout8%(7.8–8.4%).
Likewise,thesameincreaseof10%inbankassetsinducesabout
an8%(7.6–8.4%)declineintheamountofincomeseparating
thoseinpovertyfromthe$1.25threshold.Asbefore,estimates
arenotsignificantwhenusingthesquaredpovertygap.Turning
tomicrofinance,MFIassetsdonotappeartohaveanyimpact
onanyofthethreemeasuresofpoverty.Asbefore,incomeper
capitaandtheGinicoefficienthavetheexpectedsignsandare
statistically significant. Also, it is important tohighlight that
inallregressions,wefailtorejectthenullhypothesisof
over-identifying restrictions at conventional levels of significance.
Alltogether,theseresultsdonotsystematicallydifferfromthe
creditresultsintheprevioussection,althoughtheelasticitiesof
Table7
2SLSestimatesoftheeffectsoffinancialdevelopment(measuredbyassets/GDP)onpoverty.
Povertyheadcount Povertygap Squaredpovertygap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 PercapitaGDP −2.211*** −2.699*** −2.515*** −2.437*** −2.921*** −2.826*** −1.312** −1.515* −1.653* (−4.36) (−4.26) (−3.77) (−3.27) (−5.01) (−4.68) (−2.08) (−1.86) (−1.87) Giniindex 3.111*** 3.758*** 3.161*** 3.719*** 4.487*** 3.798*** 3.33*** 4.009*** 3.421*** (3.54) (4.33) (3.55) (4.53) (5.49) (4.56) (3.56) (4.28) (3.57) Assetsbank(1) −0.778*** – −0.839*** −0.762*** – −0.835*** −0.295 – −0.383 (−3.30) (−3.30) (−3.27) (−3.32) (−1.08) (−1.13) AssetsMFI(2) – −0.026 0.055 – −0.003 0.070 – 0.035 0.086 (−0.35) (0.71) (−0.05) (0.99) (0.27) (0.53) Constant 11.839* 10.968 14.568** 10.290* 8.989 13.695** −0.095 −1.799 2.908 (1.95) (1.62) (2.01) (1.82) (1.43) (2.05) (−0.01) (−0.23) (0.32) WithinR2 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.25 0.25 #ofcountries 57 58 57 57 58 57 56 57 56 #ofobs. 210 214 210 202 206 202 181 185 181 Sargan–Hansenp-value 0.478 0.438 0.651 0.296 0.712 0.315 0.147 0.691 0.221
Note:Allvariablesareexpressedinlogs.Theestimationisbasedonthefixed-effects2SLSmethodforwhichwereportthewithinR-squared.t-statisticsinparentheses arebasedonstandarderrorsthatarerobusttoheteroskedasticity.***,**,and*denotesignificanceat1%,5%,and10%,respectively.Thenumberofobservations isreducedinthetablebecauseofmissingvaluesforpovertyvariables(seesummarystatisticsfordetails).ThesampleisfurtherreducedbecauseICRGdoesnot reportdataforsomecountrieslikeBenin,Cambodia,Nepal,etc.(1)AssetsbankisinstrumentedusingRuleoflaw,Ethnictensions,1stand2ndlagsofassetsbank, PercapitaGDP,andGiniindexasinstruments.(2)AssetsMFIisinstrumentedusingRuleoflaw,Ethnictensions,1stand2ndlagsofassetsMFI,PercapitaGDP, andGiniindexasinstruments.
6. Conclusion
Thispaperexaminestherelationshipbetweenfinancial
devel-opment as measured by the size of either traditional banks
or MFIs andpovertyreduction. Specifically, we compare the
extent to which each one of thesefinancial institutions
con-tributestoalleviatepoverty.Tothateffect,weemployapoverty
modeldevelopedbyRavallion(1997)thatregressespovertyon
incomepercapitaandtheGiniindex,inwhichweinclude
finan-cialdevelopmentindicators.Applying the fixed-effects 2SLS
techniquetoapanelof 71developingcountriesfrom2002to
2011,ourresultsindicate thatbankloanshavepoverty
reduc-tioneffectswhenpovertyismeasuredbypovertyheadcountand
povertygap.Whenpovertyismeasuredbysquaredpovertygap,
bankloansdonothavesignificantimpacts.MFIloans,onthe
otherhand,donotappeartosignificantlyreducepovertyacross
allthethreemeasuresofpoverty.Theseresultsarerobustwhen
financialdevelopmentismeasuredbybankassetsorMFIassets
asapercentage ofGDP. Moreimportantly,banks’impacton
povertyishigher.Ourresultssuggestthatbankingdevelopment
canhelpcombatextremepoverty,butmayfailtoreachthe
poo-rest,whilemicrofinancedevelopmentisstillatinfantstageand
hascertainlyalongwaytogotoalleviatepoverty.Manystudies
havereportedpoverty reduction effects of MFIsat themicro
level,buttheseeffectsareyettoappearattheaggregatelevel.
A few studies have reported that financial development
reducespoverty(Honohan,2004;JalilianandKirkpatrick,2005;
Becketal.,2007;JeanneneyandKpodar,2011;Sehrawatand Giri,2015),andourbankresultsareconsistentwiththe
liter-ature,atleastwhenpovertyismeasuredbypovertyheadcount
andpoverty gap. In the model of Greenwoodand Jovanovic
(1990),thereisafeethepoorneedtopaytoparticipateinthe
formalfinancialmarket.Failingtopaythisfeeexcludesthepoor
fromtakingadvantageofopportunitiesinthefinancialsector.A
possiblepolicyrecommendationistolowersuchfeesinorderto
allowmorepeopletotakeadvantageoffinancialopportunities
thatbankscanprovide.Suchfeescouldbeacauseofamarket
failure,whichaccordingtoStiglitz (1993)isthefundamental
causeofpovertyindevelopingcountries.
The microfinance results seem to be consistent with
Chowdhury (2009), who casts doubt on the effectiveness of
microfinance as a means to alleviate poverty. Even if
theo-ries(Bueraetal.,2012)andevidence(Donou-Adonsou,2014; Donou-AdonsouandSylwester,2015)suggestthatMFIshave
macroeconomiceffectssuchasgrowtheffect,ourstudyclearly
implies that the so-called trickle-down effect inthe financial
developmentliterature maynot workfor MFIs as itdoes for
banks. We do not suggest that the international community
shouldnotsupportMFIs,butourresultsdosuggestthatevenif
theyarebeneficial,MFIsarenotpanaceasforreducingpoverty.
Weurgefurtherworkinthisareatobetterunderstand
find-ings.The dataonlyextendback to2002,preventinguseof a
longtimeseries.Perhapsoursampleperiodisnotlongenough
toadequatelymeasuretheeffectofMFIsonpoverty.Asstated
previously,duetodataavailabilityourmeasuresofthesizeof
MFIsrelyuponthecharacteristicsoftheborrower.Ideally,one
wouldlike toexamine towhatextentresultswouldchange if
MFIs weredefinedbased onthecharacteristics of the lender.
Finally,weconsiderthepotentialforbanksandMFIstohave
countrywideeffects, butmacroeffects couldarise atregional
(i.e.provinciallevels)eveniftheyarenotcountrywide.These
limitationswarrantcontinuedstudyofthisissue.
Appendix.
The countries in the sample include: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan,Bangladesh,Benin,Bolivia,Brazil,BurkinaFaso,
(Dem.), Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Domini-canRepublic,Ecuador,Egypt,ElSalvador,Ethiopia,Georgia,
Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Jor-dan,Kazakhstan,Kenya,Kyrgyzstan,Macedonia,Madagascar,
Malawi,Mali,Mexico,Moldova,Mongolia,Morocco,
Mozam-bique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania,
Thailand,Togo,Tunisia,Turkey,Uganda,Ukraine,Venezuela,
Vietnam,Yemen,Zambia.
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