strategy & tactics 1
Battle of Breitenfeld • German Paratroopers
The Cold War:
South Africa
vs. Cuba
Number 235
U.S. $22.
99 With Complete historiCal Game2 #235
War on Terror
This is the third game in the Lightning series. Fight the war on terror with America’s
cutting edge weapon systems! You have been charged with hunting down terrorists
aiding regions around the world and toppling their corrupt governments. To
accom-plish this, you have been given command of the latest weapons and best personnel
America has to offer. You get to command elements of the Air Force, Army, Navy,
Marines, Special Forces and Propaganda Warfare. War on Terror is an ultra-low
complexity card game for all ages. The focus is on fast card play, strategy, and fun
interactive game play for 2-4 players. Includes 110 full color playing cards and one
sheet of rules.
D-Day
June 6, 1944, the day that decided the fate of World War II in Europe. Now you command the
Allied and Axis armies as each struggles to control the five key beaches along the Normandy
coastline. If the Allied troops seize the beaches, Germany is doomed. But if the assault fails,
Germany will have the time it needs to build its ultimate weapons. You get to make vital
com-mand decisions that send troops into battle, assault enemy positions, and create heroic
sacri-fices so others can advance to victory!
SUB T
oTal$
TaX (Ca. RES.) S&H ToTal oRDERTiTle
QTY
Price
TOTAl
1st item Adt’l items Type of Service
$8 $2 UPS Ground/US Mail Domestic Priority 15(20) 4 UPS 2nd Day Air (Metro AK & HI) 14(10) 2(7) Canada, Mexico (Express) 17(25) 7(10) Europe (Express)
20(25) 9(10) Asia, Africa, Australia (Express)
Ziplocks count as 2 for 1 for shipping.
Shipping Charges
$
$
Lightning War on Terror $19.99
Lightning midway $19.99
Lightning D-Day $19.99
a F
ast
& e
asy
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layinG
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roup
oF
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ard
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ames
PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598
• (661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031
www.decisiongames.com
MiDWay
From June 4
thto June 6
thof 1942, a massive battle raged
around the tiny Pacific island of Midway that changed the
course of World War II. The victorious Imperial Japanese
Navy was poised to capture the airfield on the island of
Midway and thus threaten Hawaii and the United States.
The only obstacle in their path was an outnumbered US
fleet itching for payback for Pearl Harbor. You get to
com-mand the US and Japanese fleets and their squadrons of fighter planes, torpedo
bombers and dive bombers in this epic battle!
LighTning
SerieS
strategy & tactics 3
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20(25) 9(10) Asia, Africa, Australia (Express)
Shipping Charges
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Leningrad $14.00 Across Suez $30.00 Captivation $25.00PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598
• (661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031
www.decisiongames.com
Leningrad
This great introductory game covers Army Group North’s drive to
Len-ingrad during the summer of 1941. It features hidden values for the Soviet
units that only become known when they are involved in combat. Surprise
attacks are essential to the success of either side, and the arrival of
reinforce-ments can dramatically shift the course of battle. Leningrad features enough
surprises to ensure that each game will be different and exciting.
Components: 100 counters, 11” x 17” mapsheet, 8-page rule book.
$14.
00Across Suez
On 6 October 1973, troops of the Egyptian Third Army performed a
masterful surprise crossing of the Suez Canal, overwhelmed the emplaced
Israeli defenders along the Bar Lev line, and established themselves in force
in the Sinai. The Battle of Chinese Farm is an operational level game that
simulates the great battle between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies and the Israeli Defense Force as they
battle for Suez canal. Included are special rules for commandos, Egyptian Marines and paratroopers.
Components: 80 counters, 1 mapsheet, 8-page rule book.
$30.
00Captivation
Be the first player to move all your cones around the board and
into your home. Captivation plays like bacammon, only better.
Unlike bacammon, everyone moves in the same direction. Two
cones of the same color on one space are safe, however a single
cone can be captured. When you land on a space with only one
cone of another player on it, you stack your cone on top of it and
capture it. Until you move that cone again, his or her cone can’t
move! A captivating family game for two to four players that can
be played in 30-60 minutes.
Components:
mounted board, rules sheet, dice and 40 cones.
$25.
004 #235
F E A T U R E S
conTEnTS
Editor-in-Chief: Joseph Miranda
FYI Editor: Ty Bomba
Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie Cummins
Copy Editors: Ty Bomba, Jay Cookingham, and
David Lentini.
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping
Publisher: Christopher Cummins
Advertising: Rates and specifications available on request. Write P.O. Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390.
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16 South African
order of Battle
Organizing to fight a never-ending insurgency and turning
some of the tables.
by Joseph Miranda
6 cold War campaign: South Africa in Angola
In the depths of Africa, South African and Cuban forces fight one
of the largest mechanized campaigns
of the Cold War.
by Kelly Bell
strategy & tactics 5
F E A T U R E S
dEpARTmEnTS
RUlES
23 for your information
a first in Biological Warfare
by John Brown
Silver Dollar accuracy with a musket
by Robert Malcomson
first Black regiment of the Civil War
by Mark Lardas
aerial firsts over China
by Kelly Bell
the redstone rocket
by Bruce Costello
29 ThE long TRAdiTion
31 WoRkS in pRogRESS
R1 cold War Battles:
Budapest 56 & Angola 87
by Joseph Miranda
34 Tactical File—Breitenfeld:
Regiment vs. Tercio
Swedish regiments take on Imperial tercios in a battle
that opened Europe to modern warfare.
by Dave Higgins
conTEnTS
number 235
June 2006
44 A Brief history of the german
Airborne in WWii
The Germans pioneer airborne warfare in World War II,
with paratroopers, gliders and airlanding forces leading
the way.
6 #235
Cold War Campaign:
South Africa
in Angola
by Kelly Bell
strategy & tactics 7
A
s the mid-1970s broke in post-colonial Africa,
newly independent countries became embroiled
in conflicts as their new governments took power
over what had been European colonies. Armed
factions struck out at the remnants of European power—and
at each other. Some of the new forces embraced Marxism (at
least in their rhetoric), and so Africa became a “hot” Cold
War battleground. From the east, the Soviet Union
chan-neled military advisors, weapons and, through Fidel Castro’s
Cuba, manpower into the region, hoping to draw it into the
communist sphere of influence.
With the United States demoralized by the collapse of its
allies in Indochina in 1975, there seemed to be little hope
of intervention from the Western superpower. Faced with a
voting public that was 80% opposed to American
involve-ment in new foreign wars, there was little the administrations
of presidents Ford and Carter could do to openly check the
communists from expanding their influence, if not outright
control, throughout central and southern Africa. By the end
of 1975, Mozambique, Guinea, Madagascar, the Congo,
Somalia, Ethiopia and Tanzania had allied themselves with
the Warsaw Pact, and Angola was unstable, with insurgent
movements that controlled much of the countryside. And it
would be in Angola that one of the greatest conflicts of the
Cold War would be fought.
Scramble for Africa
The Portuguese had been involved in Africa since their
15
thcentury explorations of the coasts and establishment of
oceanic trade routes to the Indies. Portuguese influence for
several centuries was confined to the coastal regions of what
are today Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, but as part of
the 19
thcentury “scramble for Africa” had expanded inland.
By the 1960s, the European powers had largely withdrawn
from Africa. But Portugal still hung on grimly to its African
empire.
Three separate insurgent movements took up arms in
Angola. Roberto Holden commanded the National Front for
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA, from its Portuguese
acro-nym). The FNLA recruited mainly from the Bakongo tribes.
There was also the National Union for the Total
Indepen-dence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. That
fac-tion was mainly drawn from the Ovimbundu tribe, the
larg-est in Angola. There was also the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola, (Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de
Angola MPLA). The MPLA espoused a radical, left
intellec-tualism, and drew its membership mainly from city-dwellers
living in coastal areas.
8 #235
In the late 1960s Portuguese authorities had
severe-ly weakened the MPLA through mass arrests. Caught
up in the dragnet was the party’s leader, Dr. Agostino
Neto. Because Neto was (or claimed to be) a hard-core
communist, the Soviets threw their full support behind
him. The insurgency proved to be an endless if bloody
stalemate and, in April 1974, the economic and
politi-cal pressures of maintaining an overseas empire caused
the collapse of the Portuguese government. Lisbon
de-clared an end to its African empire. The Eastern Bloc
responded by shipping large amounts of arms and
am-munition to the MPLA.
In May 1975, as the Portuguese were
commenc-ing their final withdrawal, 250 Cuban technicians and
military advisors arrived to work with the MPLA. Just
before departing the Portuguese advised the insurgent
factions to form a coalition government, but none of
the movements were willing to share power. A new
scramble was on.
Big Picture
While the European powers themselves abandoned
their African colonies, there were two states that
main-tained white rule. One was in Rhodesia, where Ian
Smith’s government, fearing the civil strife that had
enveloped much of de-colonialized Africa, a
“Uni-lateral Declaration of Independence” from Britain in
1965. The other white-ruled state was, of course, the
Republic of South Africa. South Africa maintained
control of the territory of Southwest Africa, whose
northern border directly abutted southern Angola.
Concerned by the increasing instability of their
northern neighbor, the South Africans began posting
troops along the Angolan frontier. A Marxist victory in
Angola would mean further support for the Southwest
Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the guerrilla
movement challenging South African rule in
South-west Africa (also called Namibia). Eventually, units
of the South African 2
ndInfantry Division crossed the
border and occupied the large Ruacana Dam just
in-side Angola. And, despite the post-Vietnam malaise,
the United States was also getting involved.
By 1975 the West was relying heavily on oil
im-ported from the Middle East. With the Suez Canal
closed to shipping since the 1967 Six-Day War (and
with most modern oil tankers too big to fit through it
anyway), westward-bound petroleum shipping routes
went around the Cape of Good Hope. NATO
govern-ments feared that, with several African countries in the
Soviet camp, Warsaw Pact bombers could be shifted to
bases in range of those sea lanes in the event of World
War III. TU-95 “Bear” and TU-16 “Badger”
bomb-ers of the Red Air Force could then sever NATO’s oil
jugular. Western strategists also believed the Soviets
were moving to seize control of the glittering gold and
diamond reserves of southern Africa, possession of
which would strengthen Moscow’s financial clout to
the point of being irresistible.
Race for Luanda
With the withdrawal of the Portuguese, the FNLA,
UNITA and MPLA positioned themselves to take
con-trol of the country. The Angolan capital of Luanda was
the big prize. Despite MPLA strength there, it was not
wholly secure for Neto and his movement. The FNLA
threatened it from its bases in the north, and UNITA
was strong elsewhere. In 1975 the FAPLA (Patriotic
Front for the Liberation of Angola), the military wing
of the MPLA, worked with the Soviets to add Pact
mil-itary equipment to their arsenals and advisors to their
forces. Meanwhile, the FNLA made a desperate drive
on Luanda, but quickly collapsed in the face of the
bet-ter armed (and probably betbet-ter led) communists. [For
more on the Angolan civil war, see S&T 228. ed.]
Under the encouragement of US Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, the South Africans entered the
An-golan fighting and, on 2 October, launched Operation
SAVANNAH. A South African mechanized column
made a mad dash for Luanda, but lacked the strength
to fight its way through, so its drive stalled 150
kilo-meters short.
One dilemma that was endemic to South African
military operations in Angola was a reluctance to take
large numbers of casualties. Domestic political
senti-ment was against large wars abroad. And there was
also the political issue of maintaining the appearance
South Africa’s new UNITA allies were not simply
Pre-toria’s puppets.
Still, the South African Defense Forces (SADF)
proved effective in the field, owing to high levels
of training and military leaders with combat
experi-ence from World War II and elsewhere. Among other
things, the SADF used French-made Entac anti-tank
missiles to hurl back three separate MPLA armored
columns between Nova Lisboa and Lobito. While that
was a temporary setback for Luanda, UNITA-Cuban
forces still held a numerical edge; so the South
Af-Mech war Africa: column of South African Buffel armored
personnel carriers.
strategy & tactics 9
ricans pulled back across the frontier into Southwest
Africa.
In late 1975 the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) recognized the MPLA as the legitimate
govern-ment of Angola, which then became the 27th member
of the OAU. For Neto that was a major political
vic-tory; he could now openly embrace Soviet and Cuban
assistance. UNITA withdrew to southeastern Angola,
where South Africa provided them with support that
enabled them to slowly recover. UNITA took on a
pro-Western political line and made fighting communism
one of its major propaganda points.
In the Bush
By 1977 SWAPO was becoming militarily active,
prompting the SADF to launch Operation
REIN-DEER, in which more than 1,000 SWAPO insurgents
were killed for the loss of just 19 South Africans. In
retaliation, SWAPO and Zambian soldiers launched a
mortar and rocket attack on South African positions in
the Caprivi Strip, a narrow stretch of Southwest
Af-rican territory that ran along the southeastern
Ango-lan border. Ten South Africans died in the attack, but
retaliatory air and artillery strikes into Zambia killed
dozens of guerrillas and destroyed tons of military
equipment.
Border raiding became a way of life,
short-circuit-ing UN sponsored peace talks. SWAPO concentrated
on small-scale guerrilla and terrorist attacks, much of
which were directed against the black civilian
popu-lace. In response, the SADF became adept at
counter-insurgency operations, combining mechanized, light
infantry, special forces and airmobile units in the field.
One effective unit was the 32
nd“Buffalo” Battalion,
made up largely of refugees from MPLA rule. SADF
also controlled the Southwest Africa Territorial Force
(SWATF). SWATF included an array of units
com-posed of both white and black territorial troops, as well
as police counterinsurgency units. Both the SADF and
SWATF emphasized intelligence operations,
utiliz-ing special units of trackers to hunt guerrilla bands
and then fix them for elimination by larger units. The
South Africans also employed specialized vehicles that
could operate freely on the savannah. They included
purpose-built armored fighting vehicles, motorcycles,
and even horses.
Essentially, South African strategy was to combine
a forward offensive policy with a defense in depth.
SWATF units would provide security for frontier
re-gions, defending the civilian populace and tracking
SWAPO infiltrators who made it across the border.
Meanwhile, SADF and SWATF “external” operations
would target SWAPO bases within Angola to disrupt
their training, logistics and command control.
Exten-sive use was made of special operations forces to spot
SWAPO units heading towards the border. Guerillas
would be attacked by reaction forces before reaching
populated areas.
10 #235
In response SWAPO operated in smaller groups in
order to avoid detection, but that in turn reduced the
insurgency’s combat effectiveness. So SWAPO turned
to terrorism in order to demoralize pro-government
forces. That backfired, and made the South Africans
appear to many to be the lesser of the two evils. In any
event, the SWAPO insurgency never gained military
control of any significant part of Southwest Africa.
In 1979 South African forces carried out
Opera-tions SAFRAAN and REKSTOK, disrupting SWAPO
plans to secure control of the Angolan city of Caprivi
and, from there, all of southwest Angola. Subsequent
peace talks between South Africa and the warring
An-golan factions went nowhere.
In the spring of 1980 the SADF struck deep into
Angola in Operation SCEPTIC. The South Africans
killed 1,147 guerrillas at a cost of about 100 of their
own men. Another incursion the following year,
Opera-tion PROTEA, was more involved. Under an umbrella
of Mirage fighters, the South Africans routed Angolan
forces in a four-day battle, then advanced deeper into
the country. One SADF weapon that proved effective
was the 90mm recoilless rifle mounted on Eland
ar-mored cars. The Elands were mobile in the “bush;” so
they could outmaneuver the MPLA and Cuban
Soviet-made tanks, while the 90mm gun could pierce any
ar-mor, at least with a flank shot.
In July 1980, South Africa continued the
pres-sure with Operation KLIPKOP. Bolstered by UNITA
forces, the SADF reached the Marxist supply points of
Xagongo and Ongiva, where they blew up more than
2,000 tons of ammunition. A third attack, Operation
DAISY, further decimated SWAPO, which by the end
of 1981 had lost approximately 3,000 men. As a result,
SWAPO could not operate units of battalion or larger
size. Most of its actions were carried out by small
units that SADF/SWATF could track and neutralize.
SWAPO terrorism in Southwest Africa fell from 1,052
incidents in 1981 to 156 in 1982.
SWAPO launched two counterattacks into
South-west Africa early in 1982. One was through the
Ka-okaland Desert, and the other through the Tsumeb
mining region. But SWAPO simply lacked the strength
or logistics to carry through with a major offensive.
When the South Africans hurled back both thrusts,
secret peace negotiations commenced but again went
nowhere.
The International Front
Pressure was building against South Africa from
another direction. An international movement to end
white minority rule there utilized boycotts, UN
sanc-tions and support for the anti-apartheid resistance,
which was led by the African National Congress
(ANC). Pretoria offered to withdraw its forces from
Southwest Africa if the Cubans would pull out of
An-gola. Luanda rejected that proposal. Communist
na-tions supplied the MPLA with SAM-3 and SAM-6
anti-aircraft missiles, useful for neutralizing the South
African Air Force’s incursions. And the situation
with-in Angola was still uncertawith-in.
By August 1983, UNITA forces occupied more than
a quarter of the country, and the Reagan administration
was increasing its support for anti-Marxist insurgents.
It was a tricky situation, with Washington claiming to
be fighting against communism while Luanda claimed
to be fighting against apartheid. With its new and
pow-erful allies, UNITA fought on with increasing
confi-dence. Concerned about their Angolan ally the Soviets
stepped up shipments of military hardware, while the
Cubans provided even more troops.
Rushing to act before the MPLA and SWAPO could
rebuild, South Africa launched Operation ASKARI in
December, and raked SWAPO, FAPLA and Cuban
units in January 1984, killing 324 communists for five
dead South Africans. That prompted renewed peace
negoiations, but as the talks dragged on fruitlessly
the fighting in the bush continued. By year’s end 584
SWAPO insurgents had been killed; the South
Afri-cans had lost 39 troops. Nevertheless, by the end of
1984 SWAPO still had 8,500 trained guerillas under
arms.
SWAPO returned in force in 1985. Soviet Gen.
Konstantin Shagnovich was given overall command
of a massive assault that kicked off on 15 August
1985, in hopes of capturing UNITA’s capital of Jamba.
Attacking out of the towns of Luena and Moxico, the
two-pronged offensive ran into difficulties when
Sa-vimbi and his commanders prudently fell back into
thick brush, where the soft, sandy ground hampered
the movement of Soviet T-34, T-55 and T-62 tanks.
The pincer’s right prong was especially hindered,
and quickly came under attack by UNITA forces.
When the left element tried to come to the right’s
as-sistance, it fell under murderous UNITA artillery and
mortar fire and strafing by South African Air Force
12 #235
jets. Savimbi transferred his forces guarding Cazombo
to link up with the defenders of Mavinga—the
gate-way to Jamba. With that united force he launched a
counteroffensive on 26 September that hurled back the
communist attack.
That set the pattern for the next three years. MPLA
and SWAPO forces would assault UNITA and SADF
positions during the monsoons, and then be thrown
back. By 1986 there were 1,000 Soviet troops serving
in MPLA headquarters, 2,000 East Germans handling
signals and communications, and 15,000 Cuban
sol-diers supporting almost 25,000 FAPLA, SWAPO and
ANC troops.
On 27 May 1986, Shagnovich again set his forces
against UNITA in a three-pronged attack out of his
Cuito Cuanavale and Luena bases. In a lengthy
cam-paign the invaders slowly advanced to the town of
Cangombe, where UNITA and SADF units
counter-attacked and drove them back toward Cuito. Before
the counterthrust reached there, however, the fighting
stalemated. Little changed militarily for the rest of the
year.
HOOPER, MODULAR, PACKER
Early in 1987, Shagnovich, still hoping to take
Ma-vinga and Jamba, stepped up his southward probes.
He also hoped to re-open the Benguela railway to
in-crease commerce and improve Angola’s economy. In
July, Moscow initiated an airlift to support that crucial
offensive.
When they launched their attack in August, the
Marxists achieved some initial success, driving UNITA
forces back along the Lomba River. That two-pronged
attack, with four brigades moving south from Lucusse
and four brigades and two tactical groups driving
westward out of Cuito Cuanavale, worried Pretoria
because, if successful, it would have laid bare 650
ki-lometers of South Africa’s northern border to SWAPO
as well as inflicting a defeat on its UNITA ally.
With their armor slowed by sandy terrain, the
Marx-ists’ advance was leisurely, often just a few kilometers
a day, giving the SADF time to act. The Marxists
ex-pected any SADF/UNITA counterattack to come from
the east, out of UNITA-controlled territory around the
town of Cunjamba and the Lomba River. Instead, in
September the South Africans launched a series of
assaults on the Cuban-dominated FAPLA spearheads
from the unanticipated direction of the south,
destroy-ing tanks and killdestroy-ing more than 800 MPLA troops
along a 10 mile wide front.
The SADF’s 32
ndLight Infantry Battalion
spear-headed that counteroffensive, codenamed Operation
MODULAR. The 32
nd, backed up with the firepower
of 127mm mobile rocket launchers and 120mm
mor-tars, thwarted a FAPLA attempt to ford the Lomba
River on 9-10 September. As the fighting spread
throughout the Angola-South Africa border region, the
South Africans used their superlative 155mm G-5
ar-tillery to shell FAPLA positions throughout the theater
of operations. The G-5 artillery system outranged the
FAPLA/Cuban guns and proved an effective “force
multiplier.” FAPLA counter-battery radar could
deter-mine the bearings from which the South African shells
were coming, but the G-5 guns were always too far
away for the radar to determine their distance. MiG
pi-lots were mystified at their inability to locate the South
African artillery, never dreaming they were searching
thousands of meters short of the emplacements’ actual
positions.
During the operation’s heaviest fighting, 11-16
September, fire from South African Ratel-90 infantry
fighting vehicles and Valkyrie rocket launchers caused
numerous Marxist casualties. Though poorly armored,
the Ratel-90’s mobility made it a difficult targets for
FAPLA’s Soviet-made T-55 battle tanks to engage.
UNITA and SADF troops destroyed some 20 enemy
tanks, more than 150 other vehicles, and killed more
than 1,000 men. By month’s end the threat to Jamba
had passed.
On 3 October the South African 61
stMechanized
Battalion pulverized the Angolan 47
thBrigade as it
at-tempted to cross the Lomba and link up with the 59
thBrigade on the north bank. That effectively stopped
the invasion, and surviving FAPLA units began
with-drawing to what they hoped was a safe distance at the
headwaters of the Cuzizi and Cunzumbia rivers. The
South Africans kept up the pressure but did not
perma-nently occupy territory they overran. By mid-October
the SADF had advanced so far their G-5 artillery was
in range of FAPLA’s Cuito Cuanavale airbase, forcing
it to end aerial support operations.
Elsewhere, an SADF assault on SWAPO’s Central
Front forward headquarters, Operation FIREWOOD,
killed another 150 Marxist guerrillas on 31 October.
Carried out 35 kilometers north of Cassinga, that
at-tack reduced terrorist activity in the Ovambo region.
The South Africans launched a 9 November assault
on FAPLA forces in the Chambinga River area. By the
time this last phase of MODULAR wound down in
mid-December, the Marxists had lost 525 men killed,
33 tanks and three anti-aircraft systems destroyed. The
South Africans had 17 men killed while losing three
Ratels and a few support vehicles.
The combined South African/UNITA attacks on the
retreating Marxist forces were codenamed Operation
HOOPER. Harried by Savimbi’s guerrillas and South
African mechanized and artillery forces, the MPLA
were further decimated as it withdrew.
Fidel Castro, seeing his Angolan strategy
fac-ing ruin, hastily deployed reinforcements to Angola,
spearheaded by the Cuban 50
thDivision and its T-60
tanks. But those units were laid waste by South
Afri-can artillery when they reached the front. For a time
in early 1988 the front stalemated. A UNITA attack
strategy & tactics 13
on 2 January 1988 failed to dislodge FAPLA forces
from their positions adjacent to the Cuatir II River. A
joint UNITA/SADF attack on 13 January drove
FA-PLA from those positions, but the Marxists rallied and
retook them the next day.
On 14 February a joint South African/UNITA
at-tack mauled the FAPLA 21
stand 59
thBrigades, killing
230 troops and destroying nine tanks. That effectively
cleared FAPLA forces from the Chambinga highlands.
In late February FAPLA and its allies were again
forced back as UNITA and South African forces
con-tinued HOOPER.
Newly arrived Cuban Gen. Cintras Frias expertly
deployed his artillery behind high ground that shielded
the big guns from counter-fire. Despite having forced
the Marxists into a small perimeter around the Cuito
Cuanavale bridge, SADF/UNITA forces were too
be-deviled by accurate shellfire to finish off their foes.
At that moment SADF launched Operation
PACK-ER, with its objective being the driving of
FAPLA/Cu-ban forces across the Cuito River. Artillery did the job,
chasing all but one enemy battalion across the stream
and to its west bank. As usual, the political
ramifica-tions at home and abroad had their impact. Too many
South African casualties would have led to domestic
opposition to the war. That led to a pattern in major
South African offensives in which well trained and
14 #235
formations. Then South African refusal to take
casu-alties, combined with increasing Marxist resistance,
caused operations to grind to a halt. Stalemate would
follow. At least part of the problem was the SADF
lacked the manpower to occupy the territory it
cap-tured, often leaving units at the end of perilous lines
of communications. All that reflected back upon the
political situation, since the appearance of the SADF
gaining too much ground might have led to more UN
intervention.
With an eye toward scaling down the conflict,
Pretoria implemented containment tactics. The South
African Citizen Force 82
ndBrigade was brought in to
relieve other SADF units that were exhausted from the
fighting or whose tours of duty were up. A new assault
launched on 23 March, Operation PACKER
com-pressed FAPLA forces into an even smaller enclave
around Cuito Cuanavale bridge, and 82
ndBrigade
started planting an extensive minefield to pin down the
enemy during the following campaign season.
PACKER was South Africa’s last major sweep
through Angola. Both sides claimed victory. South
Af-rican veterans would later point out they had stopped
the Marxist offensive in its tracks and rolled back the
FAPLA/Cuban force to Cuito Cuanavale. Neatly
re-versing the history of the campaign, Marxist
propa-ganda had it that the FAPLA/Cuban army had stopped
a South African drive to bring down the Angolan
gov-ernment. The SADF lost 43 men in operations
MOD-ULAR and HOOPER, while they killed (or claimed to
have killed) 4,768 Cubans, and destroyed 94 tanks, 12
MiG jets, and dozens of armored personnel carriers.
Castro still had more than 40,000 well-armed
com-bat troops in Angola. On 20 July 1988, Marxist forces
pushed South African Maj. Mike Muller’s task force
to the town of Calueque. It was a modest battlefield
success, achieved at some cost, but Havana trumpeted
it as a major victory. Castro was then able to withdraw
his forces without losing face internationally. South
African forces, distracted by the new majority rule
government taking hold in their own country, were
glad to go home as United Nations Resolution 435
went into effect 1 August 1989. All remaining Cuban
forces were restricted to the area above the 13
thpar-allel, and the South African military contingent was
henceforth limited to 1,500 troops.
With the communist system on the brink of
col-lapse back home, Moscow no longer had time to
de-vote to faraway sub-Saharan Africa. A new era was
beginning for Africa.
strategy & tactics 15
Endgame
In MODULAR-HOOPER-PACKER about 3,000
South African soldiers and 8,000 UNITA irregulars
had decisively beaten a Soviet-commanded army of
50,000 Cuban and FAPLA troops. The South Africans’
high mobility, air and artillery support, and superior
combat training were too much for their enemies.
Also, the UNITA contingent fought with
determina-tion and skill, proving that not only communists were
capable of insurgent warfare.
The South African/UNITA partnership had not
only been effective, but essential to the successful
prosecution of the campaign. The military imbalance
would have otherwise made it impossible for UNITA
alone to withstand the FAPLA/Cuban onslaught. The
SADF provided the highly mobile, conventional
mili-tary force that ideally complemented UNITA’s
irregu-lar tactics. Even bolstered by an additional 3,000 or so
Soviet and East German combat advisors, the Marxists
could not overcome the lethal South African-UNITA
collaboration.
Airpower was another factor figuring significantly
in the conflict. The South African Air Force was loathe
to commit its expensive Mirage jets unless absolutely
necessary. Yet, when those warplanes were used, they
cut deeply into their targets. Though the South African
Air Force’s reluctance to appreciably deploy its
ma-chines enabled the Angolans to generally have more
warplanes in the air, they were ineffectual. On at least
six occasions Angolan jets bombed their own troops.
By the time the fighting ended, only four South
Afri-can soldiers had been confirmed as killed by Angolan
air attacks.
FAPLA claims of destroying 40 Mirages were
ex-aggerated. There was only one definite case of a South
African plane being shot down; that was by
anti-air-craft fire on 19 February 1988. Correctly assuming
FAPLA troops would swarm over the Mirage’s
wreck-age searching for documents, the South Africans
wait-ed until the crash site was thick with enemy soldiers
and then fired 96 rockets onto the coordinates. By
us-ing their lost aircraft as bait, the South Africans killed
more than 150 Cuban and Angolan troops.
Both sides bled in the brush. South Africa lost 715
men in the long years of warfare. Angola paid with
11,000 killed in action. The Angolans claimed many
more civilians killed, though givent he nature of
insur-gent warfare, it was often difficult to distinguish
com-batants from non-comcom-batants. An uncertain number
of Soviets and Cubans also died far from home. After
the outsiders left, UNITA and FAPLA continued their
internecine conflict, which only came to something of
an end when Savimbi was killed in action in February
2002. With the Cold War over, the fighting in Angola
lost any semblance of strategic importance it once had,
at least in the international arena. Luanda soon opened
negotiations with Washington, and it is the capitalist
West that now dominates Africa economically. Still,
Operations MODULAR, HOOPER and PACKER,
fought in the depths of “darkest Africa,” proved
to-gether to be one of the biggest mobile campaigns of
the Cold War—and perhaps one of the most decisive.
16 #235
South African Order of Battle
by Joseph Miranda
The South African Defense Force (SADF) units
that participated in Operations MODULAR, HOOPER
and PACKER can be reconstructed from a number of
sources. Interestingly, many veterans of the campaign
have created internet web sites detailing their
experi-ences. There is also some good material coming out of
modern miniature wargames.
In the summer of 1987, the SADF deployed the
32
ndLight Infantry and 61
stMechanized Battalions into
Angola. The 32
nd“Buffalo Battalion” was originally
recruited from FNLA veterans, to whom the SADF
added a solid cadre of leaders. Tactics revolved around
using tracker teams to find insurgents, and then calling
in reaction force units who would move in by
helicop-ter or cross-country vehicles for the kill. The Buffalo
Battalion must have had some impact on SWAPO and
the Angolans, since at least one Marxist source claims
the unit had 9,000 men.
The 61
stwas also stationed in northern Southwest
Africa during that period. It consisted of sub-units
ro-tated in from South Africa itself. Both battalions had
considerable experience in fighting SWAPO insurgents
and in “bush” warfare. For MODULAR, HOOPER
and PACKER, they used more conventional tactics.
As the campaign developed, the South Africans
added more units. They included the Armour School’s
Special Service Battalion (equipped with Olifant main
battle tanks), the 1
st, 4
thand 7
thInfantry Battalions (all
equipped with cross-country vehicles), and trackers
from the Southwest African Territorial Force (SWATF)
101
stInfantry Battalion. Also involved were elements
from the SADF Recon Commandos (special forces)
and 1
stParachute Battalion/44
thAirborne Brigade.
Those units were organized into brigade-sized
forma-tions referred to as Task Group A and Task Group B,
each with its own artillery group. The latter included
G-5 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers.
There’s also some indication the SWATF 301
stBattal-ion was present for MODULAR.
In early 1988, the SADF 82
ndMechanized Brigade
relieved units in Angola. The 82
ndincluded the
Presi-dent Stein Armor Battalion, the Root Caroo
Mecha-nized Battalion, and the De La Rey Infantry Battalion,
as well as the May River Reconaissance Company and
some artillery.
The SADF Air Force also contributed air support,
though it was loathe to risk much in the face of MiG
interceptors and Soviet-supplied surface-to-air
mis-siles. The air force also provided helicopters which
were very useful in airmobile operations.
SADF
The South African Defense Force (Army, Navy,
Air Force) consisted of the Permanent Force (39,000
men and women), the National Military Service (an
annual call-up of about 32,000 men for two years)
and the Citizen Force (reserves). There were also the
“Commandos,” home defense units. Supplementing
the armed forces was the South African Police. With a
strength of 55,000 officers, the police had experience
in both law enforcement and counterinsurgency.
In the 1980s, regular units included:
1
stBattalion/44
thAirborne Brigade
State Presidential Guard battalion
32
ndLight Infantry Battalion
61
stMechanized Infantry Battalion
Reconaissance Companies (special operations)
Training units (9 x infantry battalions, 2 x armored
regiments, 2 x artillery regiments, 1 x air defense
regiment, 1 x engineer regiment).
The Citizen Force included:
1 x corps headquarters
2 x divisions (3 x brigades, 1 x armored recon
regi-ment, 1 x artillery regiregi-ment, 1 x engineer regiregi-ment,
1 x air defense regiment).
44
thAirborne Brigade (2
nd, 3
rdParachute Battalions,
1
stParachute Artillery Battalion).
1 x independent motorized infantry brigade
16 x independent infantry battalions
2 x armored reconaissance regiments
5 x artillery regiments
2 x air defense regiments
3 x engineer regiments
1 x reconaissance (special operations) company
Deployment of forces for combat dispensed with
the paper organization. The SADF created five
modu-lar battalions (51 to 55) for service on the frontiers.
They were made up of sub-units assigned from both
the SADF and the SWATF. National Military Service
personnel were frequently rotated through those units.
A Marine company took over operations in Caprivi.
The modular battalions were each responsible for a
specific sector of the frontier. They operated from base
camps with all-weather airfields and supply depots,
but they were not tied down in static defense. Instead,
aggressive patrolling and offensive action were the
or-ders of the day. Meanwhile, other units would fight
forward within Angola itself with major operations
organized under ad hoc task groups.
strategy & tactics 17
SWATF
The South African government set up the
South-west Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) as a largely
counterinsurgency army. There were eight infantry
battalions (101, 102, 201, 202, 203, 301, 701, 901).
The battalions were territorially based, except the 901
stwhich could operate throughout the entire region. All
of those units were mobile within their own areas of
operations, and frequently provided tracking teams
to SADF units operating in Angola. The majority of
troops were recruited from the black population and
proved adept at bush warfare.
Also in the SWATF (and apparently composed
largely of white personnel) were three infantry
battal-ions (one regular, two Citizen Force), 91
stArmored
Re-conaissance Regiment, 91
stComposite Artillery
Regi-ment, some support units and an air force squadron,
as well as a brigade headquarters. Additionally there
were Area Force units, made up of citizen reservists
for local defense. Special forces included the 1
stand
2
ndSWA Specialist Units. There was also the Koevoet
(“Crowbar”) formation, recruited from the police and
SWAPO defectors. Koevoet teams used aggressive
tactics to hunt down infiltrators, emphasizing timely
intelligence and speed on the ground, the latter
pro-vided by cross-country vehicles.
Overall, SADF and SWATF forces had both the
tactical and operational ascendancy against their foes.
The real dilemma, of course, was on the strategic
lev-el. South Africa was increasingly isolated by UN
sanc-tions and international propaganda, as well as having
to face a restive black population at home. In the end,
politics would once more trump the military successes
in the field.
Sources:
Breytenbach, Jan, Forged in Battle, Capetown: Saagman and Weber, 1986.
Heitman, Helmoed-Romer, Modern African Wars: South-West Africa, London: Osprey, 1991.
Novak, Greg, “Externals,” in Command Post Quarterly, No. 2, Bloom-ington, IL, Game Designer’s Workshop, 1993.
Paul, Matthew, Parabat. Johannesburg: Covos Day.
_____Apartheid’s Army in Namibia, London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1982.
Websites
http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/modhoop.htm http://uk.geocities.com/sadf_history1/dfrench.html http://www.geocities.com/sadfbook/7sai.htm http://uk.geocities.com/sasolboy/abenstxt.html http://www.namibweb.com/chap20.htm18 #235
ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES
by Joseph Miranda
Manufactur-ing country Model Type Armament Armor (max mm) Crew Weight(kg) Horse-power
(bph)
Speed
(km/h) Range(km) Notes
USSR, 1944 T-34/85 Tank 1 x 85mm gun; 2 x 7.62mm MGs
90 5 32,000 500 55 300 World War II era tank, used by So-viet allies until the 1990s. USSR, 1948 T-54/55 Main battle tank 1 x 100mm gun; 2 x 7.62mm MG; 1 x 1.7mm MG 203 4 36,000 520 48 400 Manufactured in huge numbers and widely used by Soviet allies. USSR, 1952 PT-76 Light tank 1 x 76.2mm gun; 1 x 12.7mm and 1 x 7.62mm MG 17 3 14,000 240 45/10
in water 280 Amphibious and recon AFV. USSR, 1961 T-62 Main battle tank 1 x 115mm gun; 1 x 7.62mm MG 242 4 40,000 580 50 450 Standard Soviet MBT of 1960s and 1970s, continually upgraded. USSR, 1966 T-64 Main battle tank 1 x 125mm gun; 1 x 7.62mm MG 200 3 42,000 750 75 400 Advanced tank for the time, but plagued with automotive defi-ciencies. USSR, 1972 T-72 Main battle tank 1 x 125mm gun; 1 x 7.62mm MG; 1 x 12.7mm MG 250 3 45,500 780 65 400 Used auto-loader to reduce crew require-ment; late models use a laser-guided antitank round. USSR, 1961 BTR-60 Armored personnel carrier 1 x 14.5mm MG, 1 x 7.62mm MG 14 2; can carry 14 troops 10,300 90 80 500 Wheels instead of tracks for faster level terrain movement. USSR, 1967 BMP-1 Infantry combat vehicle 1 x 73mm gun; 1 x AT-3 Sagger antitank guided missile; 1 x 7.62mm MG 33 2; can carry 9 troops
13,500 300 80 500 The first true IFV, capable of trans-porting infantry to an objective and allowing them to fight from inside of it. Some versions equipped with infra-red driving sites. USSR, 1970 BMD-1 Airborne combat vehicle 1 x 73mm gun; 1 x AT-3 Sagger antitank guided missile; 3 x 7.62mm MG 23 3, can carry 4 troops
6700 240 70 320 Used with Soviet airborne units; can be air-dropped. USA,1953 M-48
“Patton” Main battle tank
1 x 90mm gun (later 105mm); 3 x 7.62mm MGs
180 4 49,000 750 48 500 Rushed into pro-duction during the 1950s, proved to be an effective MBT. USA, 1960 M-60 Main battle tank 1 x 105mm gun; 1 x 7.62mm MG, 1 x 12.7mm MG 143 4 52,600 750 48 500 Development of M-48, continually improved.
strategy & tactics 19
Manufactur-ing country Model Type Armament Armor (max mm) Crew Weight(kg) Horse-power
(bph) Speed (km/h) Range(km) Notes USA, 1960 M-551 “Sheri-dan” Airborne armored reconais-sance vehicle 1 x 152mm “Shillelagh” gun/missile system; 1 x 7.62mm MG ? 4 15,800 300 72 600 Intended as a light tank but frequently misused in other roles; main gun had numerous technical problems. USA, 1956 M-113 Armored personnel carrier 1 x 12.7mm MG 45 carry 11 2, can troops
11,350 212 61 480 Most widely used APC in the world; many variants and armament configu-rations.
United
King-dom, 1945 Centurion Main battle tank
1 x 76mm (later 105mm); 1 x 20mm or 1 7.62mm MG
127 4 43,200 650 35 190 World War II era design upgraded. United
King-dom, 1963 Chieftain Main battle tank 1 x 120mm; 1 x 12.7mm MG, 1 x 7.62mm MG ? 4 55,000 750 48 500 Export versions used successfully by Iran against Iraq in the 1980s. France, 1948 AMX-13 Light
tank 1 x 75mm, 90mm or 105mm gun; 2 x 7.62mm MGs
25 3 15,000 250 hp 60 400 Intended for rapid deployment and airborne inser-tion. Republic of South Africa, 1980 Olifant (“el-ephant”) Main battle tank 1 x 105mm gun; 2 x 7.62mm MGs ? 4 56,000 950 45 500 Upgraded version of the British Cen-turion MBT. Later versions had laser rangefinders and ad-ditional armor. Republic of South Africa, 1963 Eland Armored car 1 x 90mm gun; 1 x 76.2mm MG
? 4 6,000 103 85 450 90mm gun used suc-cessfully in antitank role; some versions armed with a 60mm mortar. Republic of South Africa, 1974 Ratel Infantry fighting vehicle 1 x 20mm gun; 3 x 7.62mm MG 20 3, can carry 7 troops 19,000 282 105 860 Many variants, including command post and forward observation vehi-cles; some version had 90mm gun. Republic of
South Africa, 1978
Buffel
(“buffalo”) Armored personnel carrier
2 x 7.62mm
MG ? carry 10 1, can troops
6140 125 96 1000 Unique “V” shaped hull to de-flect mine blasts. Republic of South Africa, 1979 Casspir Armored personnel carrier 1 x 7.62mm MG ? carry 10 2, can troops 12,580 170 90 850 Originally used by the South African Police, later adapted by the army.
20 #235
Bibliography
Bridgland, Fred. The War for Africa, Ashanti Press, 1990.
Debay, Yves. Angola and South West Africa: A Forgotten War (1975-89),
Raids magazine, July 1995 issue (#44.)
Els, Paul. We Fear Naught But God, BHB International, Inc., 2000. Norval, Morgan. Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy, Selous
Foundation Press, 1989.
Rotberg, Robert. War and Peace in Southern Africa, Brookings Institu-tion, 1998.
Rottman, Gordan L. South African Special Forces, Osprey Publishing, 1993.
Seegers, Annette. The Military and the Making of Modern South Africa, I.B. Taurus and Co., 1996.
strategy & tactics 21
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The Cold War Battles game system is a grand tactical simulation of battles that were fought—or could have been fought—during the Cold War. The playing pieces represent the actual units that participated or could have participated. Two games included in this issue are: BUDAPEST 1956, covering the ill-fated rebellion in the Hungarian capital in late 1956; and BLITZKRIEG ANGOLA, the clashes between Cuban and South African mechanized forces in Angola in 1987 and 1988.
There are two players in each game. In BUDAPEST 1956 one player controls the Hungarian Rebels and possible NATO “what-if” reinforcements, the other controls the forces of the Warsaw Pact. In BLITZKRIEG ANGOLA one player con-trols the South Africans and their UNITA allies, the other the Cuban and MPLA forces.
In the Budapest game each hexagon on the map represents half a kilometer across, and each game turn represents one day. Soviet maneuver units are mostly battalions, with regiments for their artillery and assault guns; Hungarian rebel units are ad
hoc groups; and NATO intervention, when playing that special
alternative history scenario, are represented by US “Pentomic” battlegroups.
In the Angola game each hexagon on the map represents eight kilometers across, while each turn represents anywhere from one week of intensive combat to four weeks of refitting. Units on both sides are mainly battalions or equivalent groups of irregulars.
The game system is low-complexity and compares to the one used in last year’s Middle East Battles: Suez ‘56 & El
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counters. Playing time between two experienced opponents of roughly equal skill levels will be about three hours per game. Designed by Joseph Miranda.
22 #235
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strategy & tactics 23
f
or
y
our
i
nformation
Did you Know
Despite their making good use of •
bow-armed soldiers in warfare, archery never became an event in the Olympics held by the clas-sical Greeks. Missile combat, compared to the preferred Greek heavy infantry fighting, was considered to lack the honor and courage necessary for true heroic achievement. Accordingly, not enough archers could be found who were willing to make a peaceful public contest out of bow and arrow shooting. In ancient Greek, the word “pha-•
lanx” means “roller.”
Historians specializing in mili-•
tary history generally agree the amount of tactical innovation that took place in warfare during the 40 years between 1910 and 1950 was more than that which occurred during the entire 10 centuries of the Classical Era (500 BC – AD 500).
Chainmail armor appears to •
have been invented by the Celts around 300 BC. From that time it remained in more or less constant use in warfare until the 16th century, when the increas-ing lethality of gunpowder weapons rendered such body armor useless.
Throughout history, three com-•
bat forces have so far arisen that have made recovery of their dead from the battlefield an activity of paramount importance, no matter which side actually won a just-fought battle. They are: the Homeric and classical Greeks, the warrior tribesmen of high-land Papua New Guinea, and the armed forces of the United States (starting around 1964).
The latest version of the Penta-•
gon’s overall strategic military doctrine for the US bears the title “1-4-2-1.” The first “1” refers to the idea the military must, above all, be prepared to maintain the defense of the US homeland. The “4” refers to the ability to deter hostilities, or at least coun-ter aggression, in four regions of the world at one time. The “2” means the US must maintain the capability of thwarting two adversaries in overlapping campaigns. The last “1” stands for being able to quickly and decisively win one of those two campaigns.
A recent military research •
project has identified “zom-bie computers” as one of the biggest threats to the ongoing cyberization of the US armed forces. Zombie computers are machines in which a program has clandestinely been hidden that, when put into operation, allows the host machine to be controlled by outsiders. The research project, carried out by Cipher Trust, Inc., claims an average of roughly 170,000 such programs have been identified so far. Further investigation has revealed roughly 20 percent of those programs originate in the US, while another 20 percent originate in China.
Across all of Europe today, some •
2.5 million military person-nel are serving their various countries on active duty. When all applicable legal and consti-tutional restrictions are taken into account, however, it turns out no more than a grand total of 125,000 of those soldiers, sailors and airmen could ever be committed to hostilities outside that continent, no matter what diplomatic or military conditions prevailed.
The US Navy currently deploys •
on active duty 363,315 person-nel (54,403 officers and 305,652 enlisted), along with 3,260 midshipmen, 142,094 reservists and 176,768 civilian employ-ees. At the same time, there are presently only 289 Navy vessels afloat, and that number is projected to decrease by about another 50 hulls during the next decade.
The US Marine Corps currently •
has one SOC MEU (Special Op-erations Capable Marine Expe-ditionary Unit, the 22nd) ready to deploy, with another two such formations soon to be organized. Each SOC MEU contains over 600 personnel, is intended for combat deployments of up to six months, and is trained to carry out the following types of missions: amphibious insertion, airborne raid, urban combat, peacekeeping, non-lethal riot control, hostage rescue, embassy evacuation and disaster relief. The 22nd is based out of Camp
Lejeune, NC, and is organized as the diagram below shows.