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Middle Eastern Studies
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Crisis in Turkish–Israeli Relations
(December 2008–June 2011): From
Partnership to Enmity
Banu Eligür
Published online: 26 Apr 2012.
To cite this article: Banu Eligür (2012) Crisis in Turkish–Israeli Relations (December
2008–June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity, Middle Eastern Studies, 48:3, 429-459, DOI:
10.1080/00263206.2012.662893
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.662893
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Crisis in Turkish–Israeli Relations
(December 2008–June 2011):
From Partnership to Enmity
BANU ELIGU¨R
Turkey and Israel had been strategic partners since the 1990s. Yet there has been an unprecedented crisis between the two countries particularly since the winter of 2009. Currently, the former allies regard each other as opponents. What accounts for this radical shift in Turkish–Israeli relations? This article analyses the stalemate in the bilateral relations, and argues that the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) Islamist foreign policy toward the Middle East and the 2003 Iraqi war ended the sources of strategic partnership between Turkey and Israel.
The AKP, which has roots in political Islam, has successfully mobilized against the secular-democratic state, and has reformulated Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East according to its Islamist perception. Within this framework, the AKP government formed close political and economic relations with political Islamist regimes like Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Hamas, and Hezbollah. The AKP also formed close relations with Syria – an ally of Iran and Hamas. The new Turkish foreign policy led to a crucial divergence of strategic interests between Turkey and Israel. Turkey, while distancing itself from Israel, has become a partner of the region’s radical forces. The new Turkish foreign policy has adversely changed the regional balance of power for Israel by reducing the power of semi-secular and pro-US Arab states, such as Egypt and Jordan, while empowering that of the radical forces. The Turkish foreign policy also created a security challenge for the pro-US Sunni Saudi Arabia by strengthening the Shi’a Iran’s power in the region.
The 2003 Iraqi war, which resulted in the resurgence of PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, also known asKongra-Gel) terrorism in Turkey and the formation of a semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, was an additional divergence of strategic interests between Turkey and Israel. The AKP government formed close political and economic relations with Syria and Iran and, eventually, with Iraq and the KRG in order to counter the threat of PKK terrorism. During the Cold War, Turkey relied on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance in order to protect its national security. Yet in the 1990s Turkey faced growing security challenges from its neighbours in the Middle East: Syria, Iraq, and Iran. And the Cold War’s end diminished the relevance of the NATO alliance for Turkey in countering the security challenges from its neighbours. Vol. 48, No. 3, 429–459, May 2012
ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/12/030429-31ª2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.662893
This led Turkey to search for new allies in the region. The Turkish state establishment (mainly the military) defined Kurdish separatist PKK terrorism and Islamist reactionism (fundamentalism) as two existential threats to the Turkish state. Turkey, by forming a strategic partnership with Israel, counterbalanced Syria, Iraq, and Iran, which were PKK supporters. Moreover, Turkey had disagreements with Syria and Iraq on the use of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and with Syria on the status of the Turkish province of Hatay, and had an additional threat perception from Iran on account of the latter’s endeavours to export its Islamist regime to secular Turkey. The West, which regarded Turkey’s war against PKK terrorism as controversial due to allegations of human rights violations, was reluctant to sell the country advanced military technology. Turkey, by signing a number of military agreements with Israel, purchased advanced military equipment. The countries also collaborated on intelligence and counterterrorism. For Israel, forming close relations with pro-Western, secular-democratic, and Muslim-majority Turkey was an opportunity to end its regional isolation, to reduce the religious element of the Arab–Israeli conflict, and to use Turkish airspace for training purposes. Israel and Turkey had also shared a common threat perception: radical Islam.1Yet, the Islamist AKP’s becoming the party of government in Turkey since 2002 and the 2003 Iraqi war ended the sources of the Turkish–Israeli strategic partnership.
The AKP became the party of government by securing 34.3 per cent of the popular vote in the 2002 general elections. The party further increased its vote share to 46.6 per cent in the 2007 general elections, and also had the presidency under its control after the AKP-dominated parliament elected Abdullah Gu¨l, who was the former AKP foreign minister, as president in August 2007. Given its Islamist roots the AKP had a legitimacy problem. For this reason, during its first term (2002–7) the party emphasized that despite its roots in political Islam it was a pro-Western political party, appearing pro-European Union and pro-US – the latter resulted in maintaining Turkish–Israeli relations. Yet even during this period the AKP government started to show signs of its Islamist sensitivity with respect to the Palestinian problem by pursuing a pro-Hamas stance. For example, in April 2004 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called Israel’s assassination of Hamas leaders ‘state terrorism’.2 Despite Erdogan’s remarks, however, an American Jewish organization, the Anti-Defamation League, awarded the prime minister the ‘Courage to Care Award’ in June 2005. During the award ceremony, Erdogan strongly condemned anti-Semitism and emphasized maintaining close Turkish– Israeli relations.3 However, Erdogan also retained his pro-Hamas stance. In February 2006, the AKP government accepted a Hamas delegation headed by its leader in exile, Khaled Mashaal,4despite the fact that Hamas is listed as a terrorist group by the US, the EU, and Israel.
Current foreign minister and former chief adviser to Prime Minister Erdogan, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu,5played a crucial role in the reformulation of Turkish foreign policy since the AKP’s ascendance to power in 2002. According to his vision, given its ‘geographical position and historical assets’,6‘Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified category.’7 And he summarizes the new Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East as
follows: Turkey will play a pivotal role in the region by pursuing a ‘zero problem policy’ toward its neighbours, by establishing a common security for the entire region through creating economic interdependence, and by playing the mediator role to solve regional problems, while adhering to multilateralism and cultural coexistence and plurality.8Davutoglu defines Turkey as ‘a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time’.9 And he envisions that Turkey, by pursuing this new foreign policy, will be ‘a global actor’ by the year 2023, which is the centenary of the Turkish Republic’s foundation.10
At first glance, Turkey’s new foreign policy toward the Middle East seems that it is based on a calculation of the country’s strategic interests given its endeavours to promote regional stability and peace. Indeed, Turkey, by improving its relations with Syria and Iran, countered the threat of PKK terrorism to some extent. Yet the new Turkish foreign policy toward the region has been dominated by the AKP government’s Islamist vision of a brotherhood of Islamic countries. Islamism in Turkish foreign policy clearly manifested itself in the current strained Turkish–Israeli relations as well as Turkey’s pro-Hamas stance and its pro-Iranian policy on Iran’s nuclear programme. Under the Islamist AKP government, Turkey abandoned its former balanced Middle East policy of not involving itself as a party of conflict in regional problems and pursuing a clear stance against terrorist groups. Instead, the country started to follow an Islamist foreign policy, which culminated in Turkey actively pursuing a common foreign policy with the region’s radical forces. The AKP government, by being the defending voice of the region’s radical forces against Israel and the West, aims at making Turkey a regional leader, while galvanizing electoral support for the party by evoking Islamist sentiments among the conservative/Islamic Turkish electorate. The Islamist Turkish foreign policy ended the sources of the Turkish–Israeli strategic partnership.
Another source of contention between Turkey and Israel was the resurgence of PKK terrorism in Turkey in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraqi war. On the one hand, Turkey, along with its former enemies Syria and Iran, focused on preventing the creation of an autonomous or independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The three countries have Kurdish-populated areas in their territories, which might result in irredentist claims of Kurdish separatism. On the other hand, Israel regarded the creation of such a Kurdish state in northern Iraq as an opportunity to strengthen its defence capability against the rising threat from weapons of mass destruction by Islamic states like Iran and Pakistan. News of Israel training Kurdish peshmergas (fighters) in northern Iraq11made Turkey uneasy regarding Israel. For example, in December 2005, the Turkish Islamist newspaper Milli Gazete, citing the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronotand the Italian newspaper La Stampa, reported that retired Israeli military officers were training Kurdish peshmergas in northern Iraq.12 Israel’s denial of the allegations did not ease Turkish concerns that Israel was encouraging and organizing Kurdish ambitions to establish an independent state in northern Iraq.13 The Turkish military high command along with political parties of various ideological orientations (from centre-right to centre-left and from Turkish nationalist to Islamist) supported the AKP government’s formation of close relations with Syria and Iran in order to counter the threat of PKK terrorism.14
Particularly since 2009, Turkey, having realized that maintaining Iraq as a unitary state was not an achievable goal, focused on establishing strong political and economic relations with Iraq and the KRG in northern Iraq in order to resolve the problem of PKK terrorism.15 The AKP government also pursued a pro-Kurdish policy in Turkey, known as ‘Kurdish opening’, which culminated in the return of some PKK terrorists from PKK camps in northern Iraq to Turkey, and Turkish authorities’ granting them a general amnesty even though the PKK members declared that they did not regret their terrorist activities against the Turkish security forces and civilians.16
While it remains to be seen whether the AKP government’s formation of close ties with Iraq and the KRG in northern Iraq and its pro-Kurdish policy will resolve the PKK issue, terrorist attacks against the Turkish security forces and civilians continue.17 Thus, Turkey maintains its policy of improving political, strategic, and economic ties with Syria and Iran. It is important to note that Turkish concerns still continue about the alleged Israeli support for Kurdish separatist ambitions in the region. And the Islamist AKP government has been successfully utilizing this issue in order to legitimize its anti-Israeli stance among Turkish society.18For example, on the day of the freedom flotilla incident between Turkey and Israel on 31 May 2010, the PKK attacked a naval base in Iskenderun province (a province in the Mediterranean) during which seven soldiers died.19 The AKP Vice-Chair Hu¨seyin C¸elik implied that Israel was behind the PKK attack by stating, ‘We don’t think the incident [_Iskenderun attack] was coincidental.’20 Moreover, during the National Security Council (Milli Gu¨venlik Kurulu, MGK) meeting on 24 February 2011, the National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Tes¸kilaˆtı, M_ IT) presented an_ intelligence report suggesting that the PKK was forging new ties with Israel. The report also asserted that Israel was behind the Iskenderun attack and MOSSAD (Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) officials were training PKK terrorists in northern Iraq.21
Following its landslide electoral victory in the 2007 general elections, the Islamist AKP government successfully mobilized against the secular-democratic state, and changed the country’s balanced foreign policy direction toward the Middle East by pursuing a visible Islamist foreign policy. Drastic changes in Turkish domestic politics favouring the Islamist movement, while weakening the military’s power, had a crucial impact on the country’s foreign policy making. The AKP government successfully utilized EU reform packages intended to democratize the country to further strengthen the Islamist movement, while weakening the military’s power in Turkish politics. Furthermore, particularly since 2008, prominent secular AKP critics have been continuously arrested as suspects of the Ergenekon terror organization. The Ergenekon lawsuit is based on an allegation that a number of nationalist-oriented organized crime bosses, along with intelligence officers, retired generals, military officers, journalists, university presidents, professors, politicians, businessmen, civil society association members, and artists tried to initiate a coup against the AKP government by resorting to violence. Ergenekon suspects were arrested (and some of them were detained) without an indictment and were mainly interrogated based on their private phone conversations, which the police wiretapped. Arrests and detentions of prominent pro-secular AKP critics within
the framework of the Ergenekon investigation raised suspicions regarding the AKP government trying to suppress its secular-oriented critics by arresting (and in some cases detaining) them together with possible real criminals. Similar to the Ergenekon case, there is also the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) lawsuit, which is based on an allegation that current and retired generals and military officers tried to initiate a violent coup against the AKP government. The Sledgehammer case was later combined with a branch of the Ergenekon lawsuit.22The Islamist AKP government successfully utilized the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases in order to mobilize against the secular military. And the AKP particularly since its second term (2007–) has dominated Turkish foreign policy making.
It is important to note that the military high command played a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of close Turkish–Israeli relations in the 1990s. In fact, the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) Chair and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, despite his strong reservations, signed a military agreement with Israel in September 1996 under pressure from the Turkish military leadership. Yet the AKP, the RP’s successor as the party of government since 2002, drastically changed the checks and balances in Turkish politics by weakening the military’s power.
The AKP government, while pursuing its Islamist foreign policy toward the Middle East, has created profitable trade opportunities mainly for Turkish Islamist businessmen. The AKP’s merging of business interests with its foreign policy23 resulted in further strengthening of the power of the Islamist business class in the country – alas, that of the Islamist movement. Moreover, as will be shown in the following text, the AKP government also utilized various Islamist civil society associations, while pursuing its anti-Israeli foreign policy. Indeed, current Foreign Minister Davutoglu already suggested in 2008 that ‘Turkey’s success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil society, business associations, and numerous other organizations, all operating under the guidance of the new vision.’24 Despite the AKP government’s formation of close relations with Israel’s competitors (Iran, Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah), Turkey and Israel maintained their strategic, political, and economic relations for some time. For example, Turkey, Israel, the US, and Italy continued to conduct an annual NATO military air force exercise called ‘Anatolian Eagle’ until 2008.25 Turkey played a facilitator role in Israeli–Syrian indirect peace talks in 2008, which Israel welcomed.26 The two countries also maintained their close trade relations, particularly in the area of defence.27 Yet Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s first visit to Turkey in mid-August 200828after he came to power in 2005 was a crucial indication regarding the shift in Turkish foreign policy. Israel officially protested to Turkey for granting legitimacy to Ahmadinejad, who calls for the destruction Israel and denies the Holocaust.29Despite the tension between Turkey and Israel, just a few days following the Iranian president’s visit Turkey, Israel, and the US held a military exercise in the Mediterranean Sea called ‘Reliant Mermaid’ for the ninth time.30 This created an impression that Turkey, despite its pro-Iranian stance, was still eager to maintain its relations with Israel.
But it became clear in late November 2008 that a crisis between Turkey and Israel was to come, when Turkey and Syria announced that they would send humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, and put pressure on Israel to lift the blockade of Gaza.31Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on Gaza in 2007 after Hamas violently
seized control. Both states, by restricting the flow of goods into and out of Gaza, aim at preventing the smuggling of weapons and fighters to Hamas and other anti-Israel militants. The AKP government, while forming close political and economic relations with Israel’s competitors, made the Gaza issue, the Arab–Israeli peace process, and the Iranian nuclear programme a top priority of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. The AKP cadre calculated that in case Turkey brought a solution to the Middle East peace process and the Iranian nuclear issue favouring Israel’s competitors, this would increase Turkey’s power and prestige in the Muslim Middle East. For this reason, the AKP has been pursuing a strategy of isolating Israel in the region as a means of putting pressure on it. In January 2010, Suat Kınıklıoglu, AKP parliamentarian and deputy chair of external affairs for the party, partly summarized the new Turkish foreign policy toward Israel as follows:
Our regional policy seeks to reintegrate Turkey into its immediate neighbor-hood, including the Middle East. . . . Unless there is visible change addressing the humanitarian situation in Gaza and a more constructive position is adopted in relation to making peace with Syria, it is highly unlikely that the quality of the bilateral relationship with Israel will improve.32
Turkey under the AKP government has been criticizing Israel for violating human rights in Gaza. Yet to what extend the AKP is concerned about the protection of human rights remains highly questionable. When there is a violation of human rights under an Islamist regime, the AKP government not only remains silent, but also defends the violation. For example, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur for the massacre of 200,000 non-Arab Africans and causing 3 million people to flee their homes, visited Turkey twice in January and August 2008 at President Gu¨l’s invitation. Turkey ignored the Western reactions to al-Bashir’s visits.33 During his second visit, while praising closeness of Sudanese–Turkish relations under the AKP government, al-Bashir denied the ICC’s charges against him by asserting that Sudan was a state based on Sharia law; thus the ICC’s indictment, which was not based on the Sharia, was inapplicable on him.34 Al-Bashir’s use of Turkey as a political platform to defend himself by referring toSharia law and the silence of the Turkish state establishment (mainly the military) and Turkish society shows how the Islamist AKP government adversely changed the nature of secularism and democracy in Turkey. In November 2009, al-Bashir attempted to visit Turkey for a third time despite the ICC issuing a warrant of arrest for him on 4 March 2009. Indeed, given intense international reactions and al-Bashir’s fear of a possible arrest while abroad, he cancelled the visit at the last minute.35However, this time Prime Minister Erdogan defended al-Bashir by stating that he went to Darfur and ‘did not see any genocide around’.36Yet on 12 July 2010 the ICC issued a second warrant of arrest for al-Bashir for the crime of genocide.
The AKP’s ignorance of the violation of human rights in Iran is another example of the government’s double standard on this issue. Both President Gu¨l and Prime Minister Erdogan were among the first foreign leaders to congratulate Iranian President Ahmadinejad for his highly controversial election victory in June 2009. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Davutoglu remarked that ‘we truly hope that
dynamic and well-attended political election will not be shadowed by the recent developments’,37 thus expressing his disapproval of the Iranian opposition move-ment against Ahmadinejad’s rule.
The AKP also pursues a double standard policy toward human rights violations in Gaza. In May and June 2010, Islamists in Gaza attacked two United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) summer camps for children, which Hamas and the Islamic Jihad regard as a rival to their Islamist summer camps where they breed a new generation of Islamist extremists by indoctrinating children with Islamist ideology and providing them military training to wage war against Israel.38Yet the AKP government did not condemn the Islamists in Gaza regarding the attack. In fact, Turkey under the AKP government has become quite popular among the Islamists in Gaza. For example, the Islamic Jihad named one of its summer camps in honour of ‘the martyrs of the freedom flotilla’ in reference to the death of nine Turkish Islamist activists during the clashes with Israeli soldiers while trying to break the blockade of Gaza in late May 2010.39 The AKP government does not criticize Hamas for resorting to violence against Israeli civilians, for using its militants to suppress people in Gaza, or for curtailing the freedom of women in Gaza.40 Thus, the AKP government’s criticism of Israel for violations of human rights is unconvincing.
The 22-day Israeli military strike against Gaza called ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in the winter of 2009 became a turning point in Turkish–Israeli relations. During the Israeli attacks over 1,300 Palestinians, more than half of them civilians, and 13 Israelis died.41 Islamism in Turkish foreign policy became visible during the Gaza war. The major source of contention between Turkey and Israel with respect to the Palestinian problem is that Prime Minister Erdogan does not regard Hamas as a terrorist organization; instead he calls it ‘a political party’, which came to power democratically through elections.42 Indeed, the prime minister establishes an analogy between his party and Hamas as both came to power by electoral means. And he criticizes Israel and the West for not accepting Hamas as a party along with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. For example, in February 2009 Erdogan stated, ‘The world has not respected the political will of the Palestinian people. On the one hand, we defend democracy . . . but on the other hand we do not respect . . . [what] comes out of the ballot box.’43 Given the AKP government’s pro-Hamas stance, the crisis between Turkey and Israel was unavoidable.
The Israeli military operation in Gaza began on 27 December 2008, after Hamas’ declaration of the expiration of an Egyptian-brokered six-month truce between Israel and Hamas, and in the aftermath of Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel. The Israeli military reported that more than 200 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel from Gaza since the ceasefire’s end on 19 December. On 25 December, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert warned Palestinians in Gaza that they should reject their Hamas rulers and stop rocket fire at Israel. Otherwise, ‘I will not hesitate to use Israel’s might to strike Hamas and (Islamic) Jihad’, stated Olmert.44 In response, Hamas speaker Fawzi Barhoum threatened that Israel would ‘pay the price’ for any attack.45 Turkey under the AKP government, which defines itself as a crucial actor for providing stability in the Middle East, did not warn Hamas against harming the regional peace by ending the truce with Israel and by resorting to violence against
Israeli civilians. Instead, during Israeli Prime Minister Olmert’s visit to Ankara on 22 December to discuss the Israeli–Syrian indirect peace talks,46 Prime Minister Erdogan, who promised Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh to put pressure on Israel, expressed Hamas’ demand for Israel to lift its blockade of Gaza,47 and suggested that ‘it would not be correct not to include Hamas in the negotiations’ on the grounds that it came to power by electoral means. Olmert rejected Erdogan’s demands on behalf of Hamas.48
When the Israeli military strike on Gaza began,49contrary to the US, the EU, and pro-US Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia), Turkey promptly condemned Israel without mentioning Hamas’ rocket attacks into Israel.50President Gu¨l condemned Israel and described the Israeli strike ‘a great irresponsibility’ on the part of Israel,51while Prime Minister Erdogan first called the Israeli attack ‘a blow against peace’52 and later, ‘a crime against humanity’.53 It should be noted that Erdogan was particularly disappointed by the fact that Olmert did not inform him in advance regarding the Gaza attack, did not make enough concessions to Syria during the indirect peace talks,54and did not accept the demands of Hamas.55On 30 December, the MGK convened and urged Israel to cease the military strike immediately without mentioning Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel.56The next day, Prime Minister Erdogan started his Middle East tour to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in order to garner the Arab states’ support for Hamas.57However, he did not visit Israel, arguing that the Israeli strike was ‘a show of disrespect for Turkey’s peace efforts’ and thus it would be pointless for him to speak with the Israeli prime minister.58But during Erdogan’s Middle East tour Davutoglu, then chief adviser to the prime minister, met with Hamas’ exiled leader Mashaal in Damascus.59By this action, Turkey abandoned its impartial mediator role in the region, and instead became an outspoken advocate of Hamas.60
Turkey, by lending support for Hamas, differed both from the West61and the pro-US Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia). In fact, Prime Minister Erdogan at the end of his Middle East tour only received Syrian support for his pro-Hamas policy.62 Even PA President Mahmoud Abbas criticized Hamas for ending the truce with Israel, alas, not avoiding the Israeli attacks on Gaza.63It was mainly Turkey, Iran, and Syria that pursued a pro-Hamas policy during the Gaza war. Indeed, Hamas’ exiled leader Mashaal argued in February 2009 that only these three countries supported Gaza during the Israeli offensive.64
It was not only Israel that Prime Minister Erdogan harshly criticized, but also the West, stating:
I am calling on the entire world again. Why do you not show the sensitivity you showed in Georgia? Russia at the time started an incident in Georgia. The UN, the US, the EU countries and others mobilized rapidly. Everybody remains unmoved while Gaza is shot with disproportionate power.65
Likewise, then Turkish justice minister and current parliament chair Mehmet Ali S¸ahin criticized both Israel and the US, stating:
The US, which is the biggest supporter of Israel, is allegedly fighting against global terrorism. Supposedly, it came to Afghanistan and Iraq to do this.
The biggest provocateur of global terrorism in the world is Israel. Success in the fight against terrorism will not be possible as long as Israel’s provocations continue.66
It is important to note the Turkish and Iranian cooperation during the Gaza war. Even though Prime Minister Erdogan did not visit Iran during his Middle East tour, when the Israeli offensive began Iranian President Ahmadinejad called his Turkish counterpart in order to discuss the Gaza issue. And Turkish–Iranian cooperation on Gaza became more visible on 7 January when Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Saaed Jalili visited Ankara as the Iranian president’s special representative, and met with Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gu¨l in order to determine a strategy on Gaza. Jalili, while praising Turkey’s pro-Hamas stance, suggested that Iran and Turkey by acting together and by receiving Arab support should put pressure on Israel and the US.67
The AKP government also involved Turkish Islamist civil society associations and the Islamist media as actors in its foreign policy making by cultivating anti-Jewish public opinion in Turkey. The Islamist AKP and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) separately organized a series of mass demonstrations with the participation of Islamist civil society associations to protest against Israel and the US throughout Turkey, from Istanbul to Diyarbakır. For example, one demonstration in Istanbul drew 200,000 people, while another in Kurdish-populated Diyarbakır province drew 50,000 people.68 The protesters, while carrying Palestinian flags and pro-Hamas banners, condemned Israel, the US, and pro-US Arab leaders. Rhetoric of mass demonstrations was designed to evoke Islamist sentiments; slogans of hundreds of thousands were the same: ‘Damn Israel’’, ‘Jews are cursed’, ‘Salute to Hamas; continuation to resistance’, ‘Zionist dogs will give [an] account’, ‘Israel is a cancer in Muslim’s body’, ‘A free Jerusalem, a world without Israel’, ‘Zionism will be defeated; Islamist resistance will win’, and ‘Zionist Israel and imperialist USA will drown in massacred babies’ blood’.69
It is important to note that Prime Minister Erdogan successfully utilized the Gaza issue prior to the March 2009 local elections in order to increase his party’s popularity among the conservative/Islamic Turkish electorate by evoking their Islamist sentiments. For example, on 5 January, during a public speech in Antalya (a province in the Mediterranean), Erdogan argued that sooner or later Israel would be punished for transgressing the rights of innocents in Gaza by using excessive force.70 He stated, ‘Israel will be cursed for the children and the defenceless women who died under bombs. Israel will be cursed for tears shed by mothers.’71The next day, during the AKP parliamentary group meeting, the prime minister asserted that ‘history will accuse them [Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni] of putting a stain on humanity’.72
The AKP government also mobilized the Prime Ministry and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the latter controls mosques in Turkey), in order to gather financial assistance for Gaza.73The AKP even targeted school children in order to cultivate anti-Jewish sentiments in the Turkish public. On 13 January, Minister of Education Hu¨seyin C¸elik issued an order that all schoolchildren would observe a minute’s silence in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. The minister also announced that there would be a drawing and essay contest for schoolchildren entitled
‘Humanitarian tragedy in Palestine’.74The ministry cancelled the contest following Israeli initiatives.75 The ministry’s attitude created concerns among the secular segment of the Turkish society that such policies could lead to anti-Semitism in the country. However, the minister of education not only denied such concerns, but also defended his order by arguing that it was done for ‘humanitarian reasons’. ‘If one day Israeli children face such a treatment stated C¸elik, ‘I can observe a minute’s silence for the Israeli children as well.’76
Statements by Erdogan, his government’s policies, and anti-Semitic slogans during the Islamist mass demonstrations were successful in creating anti-Jewish sentiments among the Turkish public. Signs were put on Jewish-owned stores stating ‘Do not purchase from here; the store owner is a Jew.’ Moreover, in Izmir, an Aegean province known for its staunch secularism, ‘We will kill you’ was written on the door of one of the biggest synagogues; the incident resulted in the synagogue’s closure.77 Members of Osmangazi Cultural Associations Federation in Eskis¸ehir (a province in Central Anatolia), placed the following banner on their building: ‘From this door Jews and Armenians cannot enter, but dogs can.’78 Another anti-Semitic incident occurred in Antalya province, where the Turkish–Israeli volleyball match could only be played without an audience. Protesters, who were not allowed to enter the sports hall, shouted such slogans as: ‘Surrender the Jews to us’ and ‘Muslim police do not protect the Jew’.79The AKP put up billboards in Istanbul with anti-Semitic slogans and accusing Jews of civilian deaths in Gaza. Such anti-Semitic incidents resulted in the Turkish-Jewish community issuing a public statement for the first time expressing their concern regarding their physical safety.80 In response, Prime Minister Erdogan, while arguing that he was against anti-Semitism, calling it a ‘crime against humanity’,81continued to promote anti-Jewish sentiments among the Turkish public by quoting from the Old Testament in his speeches: ‘You shall not kill.’ Erdogan suggested that Israel’s UN membership should be put in question on the grounds that it was ‘committing a crime against humanity’.82 He also asked, ‘How can such a country, which totally ignores and does not implement the UN Security Council’s resolutions be let through the gates of the UN?’83
It is important to note that a 2008 Pew survey already revealed an increase in Turkish society’s intolerance toward Jews and Christians under the AKP rule. The survey showed that since 2004 unfavourable views of Jews and Christians had surged in Turkey: an overwhelming majority of the respondents (76 per cent) in 2008 expressed an unfavourable view of Jews (49 per cent in 2004). And 74 per cent of the respondents in 2008 expressed an unfavourable view of Christians (52 per cent in 2004). It is interesting to note that 86 per cent of the respondents expressed favourable views of Muslims.84 The survey suggests that under AKP rule Turkish society has become conservative based on a Muslim identity. It should be noted that the US-based Bna’i Brith International Chair Moishe Smith already expressed his concern to President Gu¨l in January 2008 regarding targeting of the Jews by Turkish Islamist press publications. In response, President Gu¨l assured Smith that the Turkish government would take the necessary action against such publications.85 However, it was mainly the AKP government’s policies which resulted in the rise of anti-Semitic sentiments and incidents in Turkey.
Tensions in Turkish–Israeli relations continued in the aftermath of the Gaza war.86 On 20 January 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan, during his speech at the
European Policy Centre in Brussels, once again harshly criticized Israel for its Gaza offensive. ‘They [Israelis] are saying, ‘‘We hit police stations.’’ But unfortunately children and women were hit instead of police stations’, said Erdogan. He also criticized the West for failing to stop the violence in Gaza, calling their attitude ‘a double standard’. And, more importantly, the prime minister criticized the West for leaving Hamas out of the peace process. Erdogan reiterated that Hamas came into power democratically by winning elections, and argued that it should be taken as a party in the peace process.87 Iran welcomed Erdogan’s Brussels speech. On 21 January, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chair for the Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security of the Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly, during his visit to Ankara, praised Erdogan’s full support for Hamas. ‘I am thankful for the statements by Turkish people and authorities, particularly those by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and lastly for Erdogan’s statements in Brussels’, he stated.88
In the meantime, five American Jewish organizations (the American Jewish Committee, the B’nai B’rith, the Anti-Defamation League, the Conference of Major American Jewish Organizations, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) wrote a letter to Prime Minister Erdogan for the first time expressing their concern about the rise of anti-Semitism in Turkey and safety of Turkish Jews. The letter, while enumerating some of the anti-Semitic incidents in Turkey cited in the preceding text, argued that there was a link between the rise of anti-Semitism in Turkey and Turkish officials’ statements.89However, the letter did not result in the AKP government taking the necessary actions regarding the problem. On the contrary, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan,90when asked about his opinion regarding the letter, remarked that ‘Turkish–Israeli relations are strategic. Without Turkey’s support Israel’s existence in the region will not be too easy.’ Moreover, he argued that Turkey’s prestige increased as a result of its Gaza policy, while declaring that ‘If the same events occur, we will state the same [give the same reaction] to Israel.’91In response to the American and Turkish Jewish communities’ concerns about the rise of anti-Semitism, President Gu¨l assured them that ‘Each and every citizen of the Turkish Republic has equal rights. And discrimination against them [Turkish Jews] is out of question. Israel is one thing and our Jewish citizens in Turkey are another.’92However, just two days after Gu¨l’s statement it was revealed that on the AKP’s Ankara Province Chairmanship’s official website there was an article with anti-Semitic rhetoric entitled, ‘Promised Lands – Palestine’; it was withdrawn after a report by the Turkish liberal daily newspaperRadikal.93
On 29 January, Prime Minister Erdogan further escalated the tension between Turkey and Israel at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Erdogan harshly criticized Israeli President Shimon Peres, a Nobel laureate, by stating, ‘When it comes to killing you know very well how to kill. I know very well how you killed children on the beaches’, and left the panel saying that he would never return to Davos.94 Upon his arrival in Istanbul from Davos, masses waving Turkish and Palestinian flags met Erdogan by shouting such slogans as: ‘Davos hero Erdogan’, ‘Conqueror of Davos’, and ‘World leader Erdogan’.95Erdogan successfully utilized his anti-Israeli policy and the Davos incident for electoral gains in the March 2009 local elections. According to the Ankara-based Metropoll polling firm, immediately following the Davos incident the AKP’s votes increased by 10 per cent, rising to 49.3 per cent.96
Indeed, the Davos incident also increased the popularity of Prime Minister Erdogan and his government in the Middle East – in Gaza, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Hamas praised Erdogan for boldly defending the rights of the Gazans.97 Palestinians in Gaza even organized a gathering to celebrate Erdogan’s anti-Israeli stance.98Tehran municipality declared Erdogan an ‘honorary fellow’ of the city,99 while Iranian parliament chair Ali Laricani congratulated the prime minister for his stance in Davos. Likewise, Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi argued that Erdogan was pursuing a policy of isolating Israel in the region, while empowering the Palestinian resistance movement. Shirazi suggested that Erdogan should be awarded the Nobel peace prize.100Iran’s praise of the AKP’s Islamist foreign policy toward the Middle East shows that Iran does not regard Sunni Turkey as a competitor, but as an ally to increase its sphere of influence in the region.101
Under the AKP government, NATO ally Turkey also became a country where radical Islamist figures held their meetings. In mid-February 2009, around 200 radical figures from various Muslim countries organized a meeting in Istanbul under the title ‘Victory in Gaza’. The participants praised Prime Minister Erdogan’s stance in Davos, and argued that after Afghanistan and Iraq, a third jihadfront against Israel should be opened up in Gaza. During the meeting, one of Hamas’ exiled leaders in Damascus, Mohammed Nazzal, declared that ‘There will not be a peace with Israel. . . . Only weapons create respect.’102
Turkish–Israeli tensions once again rose in mid-February 2009, when Israeli Land Forces Commander General Avi Mizrahi criticized Prime Minister Erdogan by stating, ‘He should first look at the mirror’ before criticizing the Israeli actions in Gaza. Mizrahi accused ‘Turkey of committing Armenian genocide and pursuing the same policy toward Kurds, and invading northern Cyprus’.103The general’s statements not only targeted the Islamist AKP government, but also the entire Turkish society. Thus, Mizrahi’s remarks only served the interests of the Turkish Islamists, who sought Turkish society’s complete alienation from Israel. Even though Israeli Chief of the General Staff General Gabi Ashkenazi contacted his Turkish counterpart General _
Ilker Bas¸bug to ameliorate the situation by arguing that Mizrahi’s statements did not reflect the Israeli military’s official view,104 to what extent the Israeli effort was successful is questionable: General Bas¸bug commented that the Israeli explanation was insufficient.105 Furthermore, in April 2009 Turkey and Syria for the first time held a joint military exercise on their border aimed at improving cooperation and confidence and increasing the capability of border troops to train and work together.106 When asked what he thought about Israeli criticisms regarding the drill, General Bas¸bug replied, ‘We are not concerned about Israel’s reaction.’107 The general’s statement showed the Turkish military high command’s alienation from Israel.
In the spring and summer of 2009 there were certain developments which created an impression that the Turkish–Israeli crisis was finally coming to an end. For example, despite the political crisis, the bilateral defence relations continued.108 Moreover, there were some contacts between Turkish and Israeli officials, including a secret meeting between foreign ministers of the two countries, in order to mend the bilateral relations.109Furthermore, in mid-August 2009 Turkey, Israel, and the US launched a joint military exercise called ‘Reliant Mermaid’ for the tenth time in order to practise coordinated energy search and rescue procedures and measures for saving lives at sea.110Iranian President Ahmadinejad harshly criticized Turkey for serving
the Israeli interests by participating in the drill. He stated, ‘We are sorry for those countries around us and those neighbours that are at the service of the Zionists in the name of Islam, and are providing the means to their hegemony over the world.’111 Following the Iranian reaction, Turkish officials, instead of condemning Iran for interfering in Turkish foreign affairs, tried to appease it by assuring that the drill did not target any countries in the region.112Indeed, the ‘Reliant Mermaid’ was the last drill in which Turkey would allow Israel’s participation.
On 21 September, during his US visit to attend the UN General Assembly meeting, Prime Minister Erdogan met with around 50 representatives of American Jewish organizations. Following the meeting, Abraham Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, commented that ‘It was a very positive meeting. Indeed, we have buried the Davos incident in history.’113But it soon became clear that the crisis between Turkey and Israel was not over yet. On 24 September, during his UN General Assembly speech, Erdogan criticized the situation in Gaza, stating: ‘It has been eight months since the declaration of the ceasefire that ended the conflict in Gaza. However, I regret that the human tragedy in Gaza is still going on.’ He added:
I wonder what the UN is able to do, what the [UN] Security Council is able to do. We have to focus on this with sensitivity. Promises given to Gaza have not been kept. As with events during the offensive, Gaza has been left to its own fate following the offensive and the destruction.114
It was not only the AKP government’s pro-Hamas stance that created a divergence of strategic interests between Turkey and Israel, but also its pro-Iranian policy toward the nuclear weapons problem. Indeed, this was a sharp division of strategic interests not only between Turkey and Israel, but also between Turkey and the West. On 26 September, Prime Minister Erdogan defended Iran’s nuclear weapons programme by arguing, ‘Statements by Ahmadinejad are not about a nuclear weapon, but are about a peaceful intended enrichment.’115He also maintained, ‘We are completely against nuclear weapons in the Middle East’, while noting that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. Thus Erdogan accused the international community of treating Iran unfairly by focusing only on its nuclear programme. The prime minister also remarked that Israel was the real threat to the region because of its use of phosphorous bombs during the Gaza war, asking, ‘What is this? A weapon of mass destruction’, and he called for the international community ‘to act honestly’.116 Likewise, Foreign Minister Davutoglu117 pointed out Israel’s nuclear weapons capability, and argued that ‘we do not want any nuclear weapons in our region’.118 Davutoglu also maintained that he was both against imposing sanctions on Iran and a military solution to the nuclear problem, while demanding a solution to the issue by diplomatic means. Yet it is unclear how Iran can be persuaded to have negotiations without the imposition of sanctions. Turkey under the Islamist AKP government does not perceive a threat from Iran, and this presents a unique opportunity for Iran to gain time to develop its nuclear weapons programme. The International Atomic Energy Agency Chair Mohammed El Baradey already declared in September 2008 that Iran was heading toward having a nuclear weapons capability.119
Tensions between Turkey and Israel further escalated on 11 October 2009, when Turkey excluded Israel from the Anatolian Eagle military exercise. Following the
Turkish decision, the US and Italy withdrew from the drill.120 Prime Minister Erdogan defended the Turkish decision on Israel by stating that his government acted as ‘the speaker for the conscience of the people’ and that ‘the Turkish people did not want Israel to participate in the exercise’.121
Yet on 13 October, during the first High-level Strategic Cooperation Council122 meeting in Aleppo, Turkey and Syria announced that they would expand the scope of their bilateral military exercise, which was first conducted in April 2009.123Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem welcomed Turkey’s exclusion of Israel from the Anatolian Eagle drill by arguing, ‘We extremely welcome that decision. This decision is based on Turkey’s approach towards Israel and reflects the way Turkey regards the Israeli attack in Gaza.’124 In response, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated, ‘Our sensitivity on Gaza, East Jerusalem, and al-Aqsa mosque are there. If these sensitivities are taken into consideration the peace process would resume in the region.’125 During the meeting, Turkey and Syria also signed a protocol allowing visa-free travel for their citizens.126While signing the protocol, Davutoglu declared: ‘Our slogan is about a common destiny, common history, and common future. And we will build the future together. . . . From now on, we want neither mines, walls, wires, nor border gates. We want complete integration.’127 During the meeting, al-Moualem assured Turkey that Syria was against the PKK, stating: ‘Syria considers the PKK a terrorist organization. Turkey’s security is part of Syria’s security.’128
Like Syria, Iran embraced Turkey’s anti-Israeli stance. On 20 October, Iranian Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi praised Turkey’s decision to exclude Israel from the drill, arguing: ‘It would not be acceptable for planes that bombarded the Gaza Strip to participate in a military exercise in a Muslim country.’129Moreover, during his visit to Ankara on 21 October Mohsen Rezaee, of the Expediency Discernment Council of Iran, maintained that ‘The Middle East needs a new order based on justice and fairness. I am happy to see that our Turkish friends are thinking in the same way.’ Rezaee suggested that Turkey and Iran could be key actors in this new Middle East.130
It is important to note that the AKP government, while pursuing an anti-Israeli foreign policy, utilized the media in order to further cultivate anti-Jewish sentiments in Turkish society. In October 2009 the state-owned television channel TRT-1 (Turkish Radio and Television) began airing a TV series entitled, ‘Separation: Palestine in Love and in War’, which portrayed Israeli soldiers intentionally murdering unarmed civilians in Gaza, including babies and children. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman commented that the TV series ‘constituted incitement against Israel at the most grave level’.131Likewise, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu132 called the series ‘a provocation’.133 Israeli officials expressed their objections and concerns to their Turkish counterparts regarding the series, which incited hatred against Israel and Jews.134Likewise, the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League expressed their concerns regarding the TV series and the growing tensions between Turkey and Israel.135
Yet, despite the endeavours of Israel and the American Jewish organizations, the series continued to be aired.136Furthermore, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu argued that ‘the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza’ was the main source of the dete-rioration in Turkish–Israeli relations. ‘Turkey cannot remain silent on what is hap-pening in Gaza now,’ stated Davutoglu.137Moreover, he remarked that his agenda
was full with regional and international meetings, thus he had no time to deal with a TV series; he also called the state-owned TRT channel ‘an autonomous institution’138 and criticized Israel for ending peace in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead.139The foreign minister made another unconvincing argument by asserting that ‘Turkey is not based on censorship and the state has no right to comment on the quality or opinions expressed in broadcasts.’140 Contrary to Davuoglu’s assertion, however, under AKP rule media freedom has been visibly curtailed in Turkey.141Indeed, in April 2011, the International Press Institute announced that ‘Turkey has more journalists in prison than any other country in the world, including China and Iran.’142
Similar to Davutoglu, Bu¨lent Arınc¸, Turkish deputy prime minister and state minister responsible for the state-run broadcaster TRT, argued that the state-owned TRT was not a state TV channel, but autonomous; thus, Arınc¸ maintained, the AKP government could not tell the channel what to do and what not to do. Expressing his content at the TV series getting high ratings, Arınc¸ defended the programme, arguing: ‘The show absolutely does not contain anti-Semitic materials. Anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity, which we reject.’143However, he also stated, ‘of course, we feel sorrow about what is going on in Palestine. People in Gaza and Ramallah, whose children die in their arms, concern us. When people in Lebanon were bombed, we felt sorrow as if those bombs were exploding above our head.’144 While making such statements, Arınc¸ asserted that the AKP government had no intention of severing Turkish–Israeli relations.145 President Gu¨l also pursued a relaxed attitude toward the Israeli concerns, stating: ‘I am sure that the government is carefully dealing with these issues [referring to the TV series].’146
It should be noted that the AKP cadre has been aware of how stereotypes in media productions can be disturbing. For example, in February 2005 the AKP government reacted promptly when US Fox TV channel aired a series called ‘24’, which presented a Turkish family in the US as members of a terrorist organization. Then Turkish Foreign Minister Gu¨l contacted his US counterpart Condoleezza Rice to take the necessary measures against the private TV channel and its series.147Yet this time President Gu¨l completely ignored Israel’s concerns about the AKP govern-ment’s use of the state-run TV channel to propagate anti-Jewish sentiments in Turkey.
Under AKP rule, Turkish society has become intolerant toward non-Muslims. A 2009 poll conducted by the Istanbul-based Frekans Research Company revealed that 57 per cent of the respondents stated that they did not want an atheist neighbour, while 42 per cent said that they did not want a Jewish neighbour, and 35 per cent claimed that they did not want a Christian neighbour. The poll also showed that an overwhelming majority of the respondents had no knowledge about cultures and lifestyles of non-Muslims: 76 per cent stated that they were not knowledgeable about the Jews, 74 per cent said that they were not knowledgeable about the Greeks and Armenians, and 73 per cent said that they were not knowledgeable about the atheists.148 The poll suggests that there is a potential support base in the Turkish public which the AKP can shape and mobilize for its Islamist policies.
The AKP government had also maintained its policy of putting pressure on Israel to accept Hamas as a party in the peace talks, even if the latter does not renounce violence and continues not to recognize Israel’s existence. For example, on 15 October Hamas announced that it rejected an Egyptian-mediated proposal to
reconcile with Fatah on the grounds that the plan did not make any ‘reference to the struggle [with Israel]’.149 Yet the next day Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, instead of criticizing Hamas, once again accused Israel of being unwilling to end ‘humanitarian tragedy in Gaza’ and ‘to revive the Middle East peace efforts’. He defended Turkey’s decision to exclude Israel from the Anatolian Eagle drill by stating, ‘Turkey cannot be seen as having military relations with Israel at such a sensitive time, when there are no peace efforts, when peace has not gained momentum.’150Davutoglu also asserted that ‘the notion of moral depth should not be ignored, while pursuing foreign policy goals’,151 and that, ‘Israel will start its peace efforts again. This is what we want.’152 Prime Minister Erdogan, during a public speech in Kırs¸ehir (a province in central Anatolia) on 17 October, called Israel ‘unjust’ and a ‘persecutor’.153
However, only two days after Erdogan harshly criticized Israel for violating human rights in Gaza, Sudanese President al-Bashir and Turkish Agriculture Minister Mehdi Eker announced during the Turkey–Sudan Trade and Investment Forum in Khartoum that Sudan would lift visa requirement for Turkish citizens in order to further improve bilateral trade relations.154 Turkey’s formation of close relations with Sudan despite the ICC’s conviction of al-Bashir of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of genocide makes the AKP government’s calls for morality and protection of human rights unconvincing.
The AKP government’s policy of increasing Turkey’s power and prestige by playing a mediating role in the Middle East peace process also failed mainly because of its pro-Hamas, pro-Iranian, and pro-Syrian stance. In mid-October 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that he did not want Turkey’s mediation in the peace talks with Syria.155Despite Turkey’s clear anti-Israeli stance, Israel tried to maintain the bilateral relations. For example, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon stated on 21 October that in spite of the tensions, Turkish–Israeli relations would continue to be strong.156Yet Prime Minister Erdogan’s statements during his second visit to Tehran once again revealed the sharp differences between Turkey and Israel. Erdogan called Iranian President Ahmadinejad ‘our friend’,157 and harshly criticized Israel for waging the Gaza war and for imposing the blockade there.158 Moreover, the prime minister criticized the West for treating Iran ‘unfairly’159over its nuclear programme, which he called ‘peaceful and humanitarian’,160 while down-playing the Western fears that Iran wants to build an atomic bomb as ‘gossip’ and stating that a military strike against Iranian nuclear installations would be ‘crazy’.161 Iranian President Ahmadinejad praised Erdogan, stating:
When an illicit regime possesses nuclear arms, one cannot talk about depriving other nations of a peaceful nuclear programme. Your clear stance toward the Zionist regime had a positive effect in the world, especially the Islamic world, and I am sure that everyone was satisfied.162
During Erdogan’s visit, Turkish and Iranian energy ministers signed a series of agreements such as a joint exploration and production of natural gas in the South Pars region in Iran, building two power plants, setting up a free industrial zone on both sides of the border, and opening Turkish and Iranian banks in both countries.163 Moreover, Turkey’s biggest petrochemicals company Petkim and
Iran’s state-owned NPC International Ltd agreed to establish a joint venture to build a petrochemicals plant in Iran.164Turkey formed close economic relations with Iran despite the US reservations.165
As a result of Turkey’s clear pro-Iranian, pro-Hamas, and anti-Israeli policies, Western scepticism regarding the country’s foreign policy direction rose. In response to such questions, Prime Minister Erdogan argued on 4 November that ‘Turkey’s foreign policy is not changing its direction, but it is becoming normal’, while defending close Turkish–Iranian relations and criticizing Israel for not wanting peace in Palestine. Erdogan also accused people who were questioning Turkey’s new foreign policy of intentionally trying to harm the country’s national interests.166The next day, President Gu¨l asserted that, ‘Turkey knows what it has been doing. . . . Of course, Turkey has been simultaneously going toward the east, west, north, and south; it has been going toward every direction.’167 Yet, contrary to what Gu¨l argued, Turkey had been going in only one direction: towards the bloc of radical forces in the Middle East.
While the AKP cadre had been vehemently denying the shift in the country’s foreign policy direction from the West toward the East, the region’s radical forces stated the contrary. For example, on 7 November Syrian President al-Assad said: ‘Turkey is changing its direction and this is a healthy change. Turkey’s view of the region is changing, the West used to separate us from each other. Now we have entered a period in which we need to solve internal issues in the region.’168Likewise, the Lebanese Hezbollah leader Seyid Hassan Nasrallah, while praising Turkey for forming close strategic ties with Syria and Iran, urged the establishment of further cooperation among regional countries against Israel.169 ‘We welcome and support Turkey’s peaceful role in regard to the Gaza Strip and Lebanon’, stated Nasrallah.170 It is interesting to note that the Obama administration, similar to the AKP cadre, denied that there was a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy direction. For example, assistant secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon asserted on 13 November that ‘I do not see a change in Turkey’s axis. Our confidence on Turkey remaining as our key partner is full.’171On 10 December, Prime Minister Erdogan declared, ‘in case Israel uses the Turkish airspace for intelligence gathering on Iran, then Turkey’s response will be like an earthquake’, while reminding that his government’s expulsion of Israel from the Anatolian Eagle drill was supported by the Turkish electorate.172 Even after this declaration Gordon maintained on 16 December that ‘Turkey is playing a more active role in its region and seeking a very important role. . . . I believe that thinking Turkey has turned its back to its decades-long cooperation with NATO, the US, and Europe is an incorrect perception.’173 Reasons for the continued US support (the Bush administration supported the AKP government within the framework of the US Greater Middle East Initiative174and the Obama administration maintains US support for the AKP) for the Islamist AKP government remain to be seen. But Prime Minister Erdogan, after his re-election as the AKP’s chair during the party’s Third Congress on 3 October, declared that his government changed the diplomatic focus of the country after becoming the party of government in 2002, while praising his government’s anti-Israeli policy during the Gaza war as one of his successes.175
The AKP government, while utilizing the state-owned TRT-1 TV channel and the Islamist media in order to cultivate anti-Jewish sentiments in Turkish society,
continued to mobilize Islamist civil society associations as actors of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel. For example, on the annual anniversary of the Gaza war, Turkish Islamist civil society associations protested against Israel in Istanbul by burning Israeli flags.176 Turkey also participated in a British-based international assistance convoy called ‘Viva Palestine’ to deliver assistance to Gaza. Five AKP parliamentarians (Turkish Parliament Foreign Affairs Commission Chair Murat Mercan, Mehmet Hıdır Nil, Seracettin Karayagız, Cemal Yılmazdemir, and Hu¨snu Tuna), Islamist SP Secretary General Temel Karamollaoglu, and over 200 Turkish Islamists, including the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (Insan Hak ve Hu¨rriyetleri ve_ Insani Yardım Vakfı,_ _IHH) Chair Bu¨lent Yıldırım, participated in the convoy. Egypt was concerned about the strengthening of its own Islamist movement by a Hamas-ruled enclave on its border; therefore, it did not allow the convoy to enter Gaza through the Rafah crossing. Indeed, a riot broke out along the border to protest against Egypt’s blockade of Gaza during which one Egyptian border guard died. It was only after pressure from Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu that Egypt allowed the convoy to enter Gaza for only 24 hours to deliver its cargo. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and his ministers and parliamentarians held a meeting with the AKP parliamentarians and theIHH_ chair.177During the meeting, Haniyeh called the convoy participants ‘true heroes’, and praised Prime Minister Erdogan’s stance on Gaza, remembering the Davos incident and stating that ‘We still have not forgotten Prime Minister Erdogan’s courageous act in the face of Israel’s attacks and blockade.’ Haniyeh maintained, ‘With the new policy Turkey has been pursuing, the Middle East is also being reshaped.’178 While the PA President Abbas criticized the convoy participants for being ‘a propaganda tool for Hamas’,179Erdogan asserted that ‘Our stance on Gaza is not the reflection of a change of axis in our foreign policy, but the reflection of our sincerity and humanity.’180Egypt, which became uneasy about Turkey’s pro-Hamas stance, declared that it would not allow any future assistance convoys to Gaza.181
Tension between Turkey and Israel rose once again in mid-January 2010, when Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon summoned Turkish Ambassador to Israel Oguz C¸elikkol to protest at a controversial, but popular Turkish TV series Kurtlar Vadisi (Valley of Wolves) which portrayed Israeli intelligence agents as masterminds of a child abduction ring. Ayalon’s treatment of the Turkish ambassador led to further alienation of the Turkish public from Israel. Ayalon invited the media at the beginning of the meeting and stated that there was no Turkish flag on the table and he deliberately avoided a handshake with the ambassador, who was seated on a low couch. Israeli Foreign Ministry speaker Yigal Palmor explained the initial cause of the incident by stating, ‘The core issue is Erdogan’s repeated anti-Israeli rants.’182Yet, Ayalon’s undiplomatic attitude toward the ambassador only benefited the AKP government, which sought to maintain the tension with Israel. In fact, the incident was not only criticized in Turkey, but also in Israel. Even though Israel tried to mend the situation by Ayalon’s official apology to Turkey183and Israeli Defence Minister Barak called Ayalon’s behaviour ‘a mistake’,184 the incident adversely affected bilateral relations.185
The most intense crisis between Turkey and Israel, however, occurred on 31 May when the controversial Turkish Islamist civil society associationIHH_ 186organized a six-ship flotilla187campaign called ‘Our route is Palestine; our cargo is humanitarian
aid’ in order to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza. The flotilla carried hundreds of pro-Palestinian activists from various countries and humanitarian assistance, such as construction materials and medical equipment. It should be noted that the AKP government utilized the IHH and Turkish Islamists as actors of its ambitious_ Islamist foreign policy goal of ending the Gaza blockade.188 Israel, in advance, declared that it would not allow the flotilla to reach a port in Gaza. Instead, Israeli officials proposed that if the ships docked at an Israeli port, they would allow the full shipment of humanitarian cargo to reach Gaza, after undergoing security checks. When the Israeli navy intercepted the flotilla in international waters, it warned the activists of the flotilla’s leading Turkish shipMavi Marmara(Blue Marmora) that they should change the flotilla’s route to Israeli Ashdod port where the cargo would be unloaded and delivered to Gaza.189Yet the activists not only rejected the Israeli proposal, but also attacked the Israeli commandos with metal rods, clubs, and knives while the soldiers were being lowered onto the deck from helicopters. Israeli commandos, who only expected the activists’ peaceful resistance, were surprised by the level of violence they encountered; one Israeli soldier commented, ‘We were in shock we were not prepared for that.’190The commandos boarded the remaining five ships without incident. It was only after the activists’ resorting to violence that the Israeli commandos used antiriot measures against them.191During the Israeli raid, nine Turkish citizens died, including one Turkish-American citizen, while dozens were injured as well as several Israeli soldiers.
The AKP government successfully utilized the_IHH and Turkish Islamists in order to escalate the crisis with Israel and end the strategic partnership with Israel by making Turkey a party of conflict with Israel. Prior to this incident there had never been a violent clash between the two countries. And the flotilla incident marked the lowest point in the history of Turkish–Israeli relations. Prime Minister Erdogan called the incident ‘state terrorism’,192while Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated that it was ‘piracy, banditry, and barbarism’ on Israel’s part.193The Turkish Parliament issued a resolution calling for the AKP government to ‘reconsider all political, military, and economic relations with Israel’.194
In the meantime, a series of Islamist demonstrations occurred in Istanbul during which protesters carrying Turkish, Palestinian, and Hezbollah flags chanted anti-Semitic and anti-US slogans.195 The flotilla’s organizer, the IHH Chair Yıldırım,_ threatened to form larger flotillas in cooperation with NGOs from Europe and all over the world, and send them to Gaza both by sea and through Egypt.196
In the aftermath of the flotilla incident, Turkey recalled its ambassador from Israel; demanded the end of the Gaza blockade as a condition for restoring full diplomatic relations with Israel,197a public apology and payment of reparations by Israel, and an international investigation into the Israeli flotilla operation;198 declared that it cancelled military exercises with Israel, which were already not in operation since 2009; and closed down its airspace and military airports to the use of Israeli military aircrafts. However, the AKP government did not inform the Turkish military high command regarding the closures of the country’s airspace and military airports to Israel.199 This shows that the military has been weakened by the AKP government’s actions against it, utilizing the EU reform packages and the Ergenekon case, so that it can no longer balance the Islamist AKP government’s foreign policy actions.
Prime Minister Erdogan’s pro-Hamas stance once again emerged when he stated on 3 June that ‘I do not regard Hamas as a terrorist organization’, while declaring fates of Jerusalem and Istanbul as well as Gaza and Ankara were the same.200Even though the US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip Crowley promptly responded to Erdogan by arguing that Hamas was a terrorist organization, it is questionable to what extent the Obama administration has been able to check and balance the Islamist AKP government’s actions.201In fact, it was not only the AKP government’s pro-Hamas stance that created uneasiness both in Israel and the US, but also its pro-Iranian policy regarding the nuclear weapons problem. The AKP government, despite the US reservations, increased Turkey’s commercial relations with Iran.202Moreover, on 9 June Turkey vetoed a fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran,203which disappointed the US.204
However, the most drastic change in Turkish politics was the revision of the National Security Policy Paper (Milli Gu¨venlik Siyaset Belgesi, MGSB) mainly by the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the General Staff, and the National Intelligence Organization in mid-August 2010, and its approval during the MGK meeting on 27 October. According to the new MGSB, Iran, which was listed as a primary external threat to Turkey, and Islamist reactionism (fundamentalism), which was listed as a crucial domestic threat to the secular-democratic Turkish state, are no longer defined as threats. Deputy Prime Minister Cemil C¸ic¸ek called Islamist reactionism ‘a political concept’,205and not a threat to the Turkish state. The MGSB defined the PKK as the foremost domestic threat to the Turkish state. The document also redefined the role of the military, which is only defending the boundaries against external threats. This means that the military will no longer be able to protect the secular-democratic Turkish state against the Islamist movement.206It is important to note that the military high command207has become a supporter of the AKP government’s Gaza policy.208
In October 2010, the shift in Turkish foreign policy once again became visible when Turkish and Chinese air forces secretly participated in Anatolian Eagle war games in Konya (a province in central Anatolia), and Iran indirectly supported the drill by allowing its airbases to be used for refuelling of Chinese SU-27 warplanes. The US contacted Turkey prior to the drill, and expressed its concerns over the planned use of F-16 warplanes in a military drill involving China. It was only after the US memorandum to Turkey stating ‘We expect you to honor the agreement article that requires the existence of caution regarding the transfer of technology to third countries’ that Turkey used older F-4 warplanes instead of F-16 fighters in the drill.209 This incident shows that Turkey under AKP rule has been seeking new strategic partnerships with countries that are rivals of the West.
As a result of Turkey’s partnership with the Middle East’s radical forces,210 Turkish–Israeli relations have been in stalemate. Mutual trust in the bilateral relations came to an end. While Israel no longer wants to provide Turkey with high technology in the defence sector,211a March 2011 BBC country survey revealed that Israel is the most negatively viewed state in Turkey: 77 per cent of the Turkish respondents stated that they had a negative view of Israel, while only 9 per cent expressed a positive view.212
This article argued that the AKP government’s Islamist foreign policy toward the Middle East and the 2003 Iraqi war ended the sources of the strategic partnership
