Personality and Social Sciences

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Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 2006, 47, 513–522 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9450.2006.00523.x

Personality and Social Sciences

Category and stereotype activation revisited

NAZAR AKRAMI, BO EKEHAMMAR and TADESSE ARAYA Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Akrami, N., Ekehammar, B. & Araya, T. (2006). Category and stereotype activation revisited. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 47, 513–522. In Study 1 (N = 230), we found that the participants’ explicit prejudice was not related to their knowledge of cultural stereotypes of immigrants in Sweden, and that they associated the social category immigrants with the same national/ethnic categories. In Study 2 (N = 88), employing the category and stereotype words obtained in Study 1 as primes, we examined whether participants with varying degrees of explicit prejudice differed in their automatic stereotyping and implicit prejudice when primed with category or stereotypical words. In accord with our hypothesis, and contrary to previous findings, the results showed that people’s explicit prejudice did not affect their automatic stereotyping and implicit prejudice, neither in the category nor stereotype priming condition. Study 3 (N = 62), employing category priming using facial photographs of Swedes and immigrants as primes, showed that participants’ implicit prejudice was not moderated by their explicit prejudice. The outcome is discussed in relation to the distinction between category and stereotype priming and in terms of the associative strength between a social category and its related stereotypes.

Key words: Stereotype activation, category activation, implicit prejudice, explicit prejudice.

Nazar Akrami, Department of Psychology, Uppsala University, Box 1225, SE-751 42 Uppsala, Sweden. E-mail: [email protected]

INTRODUCTION

Stereotypical judgment and prejudice can be the outcome of two processes – automatic/implicit and controlled/explicit (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Devine, 1989). Automatic (implicit) processes are fast, effortless, autonomous and do not require conscious attention. They involve a well-practiced set of associations that can be activated spontaneously in the presence of a triggering stimulus in the environment. In contrast, controlled (explicit) processes are slow, flexible, and under the conscious control of the individual (for a review, see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Based on this distinction, Devine (1989) has suggested that people high and low on explicit prejudice may not differ in their automatic stereotype activation because common socialization processes and frequent activation of stereotypes in the past make both groups more likely to have the same stereotype activation level. However, Devine argued that high- and low-prejudice groups could differ in their personal beliefs which, unlike cultural stereotypes, are relatively new and have a shorter history of activation. Consequently, for people low in explicit prejudice, intentional control of the activated stereotypes requires the employment of controlled processes. People high on explicit prejudice, however, can simply activate their accessible stereotypes on the mere presence of a stereotyped group member because their personal beliefs overlap with the prevailing cultural stereotypes.

Devine (1989, Study 2) asked her participants to form an impression of an ambiguous person description after being primed with words that were stereotypical (e.g., lazy, poor) with respect to African Americans. As predicted, she found

that participants rated the target in accord with the activated stereotypes regardless of their scores on explicit racial prejudice. Consistent with Devine’s hypothesis, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996, Experiment 3), and Lepore and Brown (1997, Study 3), found no differences in implicit prejudice between people high and low in explicit racial prejudice. Similarly, Banaji and Greenwald (1995, see also Dunning & Sherman, 1997; Brauer, Wasel & Niedenthal, 2000) found no differences in implicit prejudice and gender stereotyping between individuals high and low in explicit gender stereo-typing. However, some other research suggests that people high and low in explicit prejudice might differ in their auto-matic stereotype activation and implicit prejudice (Augoustinos, Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997; Kawakami, Dion & Dovidio, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997, Study 2; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel & Schaal, 1999; Neumann & Seibt, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997). Still other research has found the relation to be moderated by factors, like internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice (Akrami & Ekehammar, 2005; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones & Vance, 2002), and internalized egalitarian goals (Moskowitz et al., 1999). Over-all, when a relationship between implicit and explicit prejudice has been found it has tended to be low (Fazio & Olson, 2003; but see Cunningham, Nezlek & Banaji, 2004; McConnell & Liebold, 2001).

Of relevance to the present study, Lepore and Brown (1997) distinguished between stereotype and category activation and found that when primed with category words (e.g., Black), people high in explicit prejudice showed automatic stereo-type activation to a greater extent than people low in explicit

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514 N. Akrami et al. Scand J Psychol 47 (2006) prejudice. However, when primed with stereotypical (e.g., lazy)

rather than category words, both groups showed the same levels of stereotype activation, thus replicating Devine’s (1989) findings. Central to Lepore and Brown’s theorizing is the contention that for low-prejudice people the linkage between the category and negative attributes might be weaker as compared to that of high-prejudice people. Also, some research (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh & van Knippenberg, 2000; Fazio, 1993, 2001; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Gawronski, Ehrenberg, Banse, Zukova & Klauer, 2003) give empirical support for the importance of associative strength in the stereotype activation domain. Some other research suggests that associative strength or chronic accessibility may not moderate priming effects or stereotype activation (e.g., Bargh, Bond, Lombardi & Tota, 1986; Bargh et al., 1996; Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992; Moskowitz et al., 1999; Rudman & Borgida, 1995), that is, category activation is more likely to enhance the accessibility of relevant stereotypes independent of associative strength. Yet, some recent research (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia & Chaiken, 2002) have found evidence for implicit automatic evaluation of novel prime stimuli with no specific associative strength involved. Additionally, Smith and DeCoster (1998) have shown that few new encounters with the knowledge structure may dramatically increase the accessibility of a “decayed” construct (i.e., with low or zero accessibility) that is equivalent or higher as compared to the level it had before its decay.

As shown above there are contradictory findings in Devine’s and Lepore and Brown’s studies. Specifically, the results of Devine suggest that there is no relation between implicit and explicit prejudice, whereas Lepore and Brown show that the outcome is dependent on the type of primes used (category or stereotype). There are, however, some methodological shortcomings in their studies (see Method-ological Issues, below). As to the theoretical aspect the research reviewed above implies that the question of the role of associative strength on stereotype activation remains with no definite answer and one could hypothesize that stereo-type activation is not moderated by associative strength as well as that it is. In fact, social categorization and category activation are general processes that, after all, are supposed to facilitate social information processing and ease interac-tions in the social world – regardless of people’s prejudice level. We suggest that social categories are tightly connected with their stereotypes for both high- and low-prejudice people. This is a highly reasonable assumption from a social information processing view and theories of social auto-maticity. Further, much of the information processed with respect to social groups, especially outgroups, is of stereo-typic nature and mostly negative (e.g., Devine, 1989, Study 1; Lepore & Brown, 1997, Study 1). Thus, in accord with Devine (1989) but in contrast to Lepore and Brown (1997), we hypothesized that category and stereotype words would activate implicit stereotypes and induce implicit prejudice to

roughly the same extent. This would also be valid for people regardless of their degree of explicit prejudice. Hence, we examine, with the appropriate methodology, whether people with different degrees of explicit prejudice differ in their implicit prejudice and automatic stereotyping as a function of the character of the prime (category words, stereotype words, or facial photographs). Moreover, we suggest that automatic activation of negative stereotypes must almost necessarily be linked to implicit prejudice. It is difficult to imagine that an automatic activation of negative stereotypical traits concerning an outgroup, for example, can lead to any-thing else than an automatic (implicit) negative evaluation (i.e., prejudice) of that group. Especially in an automatic, fast, and unconscious process, stereotype activation and implicit prejudice should consequently be considered equivalent.

The practical relevance of the research reviewed above is highly important for dealing with prejudice as a social phe-nomenon. For example, if low-prejudice people activate stereotypes to a lesser extent than high-prejudice people (as suggested by Lepore and Brown), changing people’s explicit beliefs could be one way to change their spontaneous reac-tions toward members of a stereotyped group. However, if both high- and low-prejudice people automatically activate and apply the stereotype when exposed to a member of a stereotyped group (as suggested by Devine), then any inter-vention designed to change people’s explicit beliefs might result in failure. Such a finding would imply that a person can hold non-prejudiced beliefs but nevertheless act discrim-inatory in his or her spontaneous reactions (automatic behaviors like body posture, eye contact, and interpretation of people’s ambiguous behaviors). As such, it is of importance to know whether high- and low-prejudice people automati-cally activate and apply stereotypes to the same extent.

Methodological issues

A closer look at the priming stimuli in the studies of Devine (1989) and Lepore and Brown (1997) disclose no clear differentiation between category and stereotype words (see Appendix). Thus, several of the stereotype primes used by Devine could be classified as category words (e.g., Afro,

Blacks, Negroes, Nigger) and a majority (7 out of 13) of the

stereotype words used by Lepore and Brown were actually category words (e.g., Afro-Caribbean, Blacks, West Indians,

Dreadlocks). However, in line with Fiske (1998), we argue

that for category priming the “critical test pre-consciously activates merely the ethnic category; that is, the label (e.g., ‘blacks,’ ‘West Indians’) is primed alone – without the addi-tional stereotypic primes present in the original Devine study” (p. 365). Therefore, unlike previous studies, we attempt to clearly distinguish the character of the primes in the cat-egory and stereotype conditions. We suggest that stereotype priming occurs when stereotypical words (e.g., lazy, criminal) are directly primed without their associated category label (e.g., immigrants, Blacks).

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Scand J Psychol 47 (2006) Category and stereotype activation 515 Another methodological aspect is that Devine (1989) and

Lepore and Brown (1997) dichotomized the explicit prejudice scores – a continuous variable – which is a rarely defensible method that often yields misleading outcomes (e.g., Cohen, 1983; MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher & Rucker, 2002). Accord-ingly, and to enhance the statistical power of the present study, we treat prejudice level as a continuous variable and base our data analysis on multiple regression methods. However, to ease comparison with the studies of Devine, and Lepore and Brown, we employ ANOVA as well.

Finally, we employ category and stereotype priming (as well as random assignment) within the same experimental design to allow a firm conclusion to be drawn about the hypothesized interaction effect. Lepore and Brown (1997), on the other hand, examined this issue in two different experi-ments, one employing category words (Study 2) and the other stereotype words (Study 3), making an appropriate statistical test of the interaction effect difficult.

The present studies

To sum up, in Study 1, in line with Devine (1989) and Lepore and Brown (1997), we investigate in a European context whether people’s explicit prejudice is associated with their knowledge about the cultural stereotypes concerning immi-grants. Further, we examine which groups or national categories that people with different degrees of prejudice associate with the word immigrant, and whether they differ in their associations. In Study 2, we examine the association between people’s explicit prejudice and their automatic stereo-type activation and implicit prejudice when primed with category and stereotype words. These words were chosen on the basis of the results in Study 1. Thus, following Fiske’s (1998) advice, we use only words referring to nationality or ethnicity as category primes. For reasons outlined above, the use of “pure” category words could eliminate the confound-ing effects that could occur due to the mixture of category and stereotype words (see also Wittenbrink et al., 1997). In Study 3, employing a more ecologically valid prime stimulus, we use facial photographs of Swedes and immigrants as category primes to examine whether explicit prejudice moderates implicit prejudice.

STUDY 1: IMMIGRANT STEREOTYPES AND TARGET GROUPS

Some researchers have emphasized the necessity of exploring the contents of ethnic stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989) so as to ensure that people high and low on explicit prejudice do not differ in their knowledge of the prevailing cultural stereo-types about the target group. Devine (1989), for example, asked participants to list the cultural stereotypes they knew about African Americans and found that high- and low-prejudice people did not differ in their knowledge. This result has been replicated in other cultural contexts (e.g.,

Augoustinos et al., 1994; Lepore & Brown, 1997; but see Gordijn, Koomen & Stapel, 2001). However, whereas previous research has focused on specific outgroups (e.g., African Americans, West Indians, or Aborigines), we examine the stereotypical knowledge about immigrants as a heterogeneous group, which seems highly relevant in the cultural context in which the present study took place (Sweden). Consequently, we investigate whether people with different degrees of explicit prejudice possess the same knowledge about stereotypes associated with immigrants, and which particular ethnic or national categories they associate with the word “immigrant”.

Method

Participants.There were 230 participants, 138 women and 92 men,

students from various academic disciplines at Uppsala University and at the local authority-administered adult education, in the age range of 18 to 59 years (M = 23.1 years). Six of the participants had immigrant origin. Participants received cinema vouchers (approxim-ately equivalent to &7) for their participation.

Procedure. Participants were given envelopes containing a

question-naire of several parts. The experimenter gave oral instructions and told the participants not to write their names or make personal marks on the questionnaires in order to ensure anonymity. The parts relevant to the present study consisted of answering the Modern Racial Prejudice Scale (MRP; α = 0.82 in this study), which is a Swedish adaptation of the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986), that has been found to have satisfactory psychometric (reliability and validity) properties (cf. Akrami, Ekehammar & Araya, 2000). Finally, there were two open-ended tasks. The first task, which followed the methodology of Devine (1989, Study 1), contained the following instruction: “In the space below, list at least five common conceptions (stereotypes) of immigrants in Sweden. Note that we are not interested in your own personal beliefs, but the conceptions (stereotypes) common in the society.” The second task contained the following instruction: “List the group(s) you think of when men-tioning immigrants.” Several blank lines followed each task. When the participants had finished this task, they were told to put the envelope in a box placed in the room and then received their cinema vouchers.

Results and comments

Stereotypes of immigrants. Participants’ responses to this

part of the task were content analyzed in order to form categories. If participants repeated one theme, it was coded only once in that category. Two coders, blind to the participant’s explicit prejudice level, coded the responses independently. The inter-judge reliability coefficient Kappa (κ) which cor-rects for chance agreement, was found to be high (κ = 0.97). This analysis resulted in 17 different categories mentioned in the following rank order (the proportion of the total sample mentioning each stereotype is given within parentheses):

Living at public expense (0.69), Criminal (0.63), Conflicting

interests between Swedes and immigrants (0.40), Sexist (0.38),

Aggressive/Violent (0.37), Miscellaneous negative (0.32), Dirty

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Non-516 N. Akrami et al. Scand J Psychol 47 (2006)

integrated (0.23), Low intelligence (0.19), Miscellaneous

neutral (0.14), Uneducated (0.10), Miscellaneous positive

(0.07), Inferior (0.03), and Physical description (0.02). Following the methodology employed by Devine (1989) and Lepore and Brown (1997), we formed a low-prejudice (n = 115, M = 1.45, SD = 0.21) and a high prejudice (n = 115, M = 2.39, SD = 0.59) group based on a median split of the participants’ explicit prejudice (MRP) scores. The proportion of high- and low-prejudice participants mentioning each stereotype category was computed. The differences between the proportions of high- and low-prejudice participants mentioning each stereotype category were then examined using chi-square tests. The results disclosed no significant differences between these two groups on any stereotype category. Thus, the results showed that participants high and low on explicit prejudice displayed the same knowledge of cultural stereotypes of immigrants. These results are in line with those of Devine (1989) and Lepore and Brown (1997), despite the higher power in our statistical tests (N = 230) as compared to the Devine (N = 40) and Lepore and Brown (N = 39) studies. Further, in order to avoid dichotomization, we also examined whether participants’ mean explicit prejudice (MRP) scores differed between those who mentioned and those who did not mention each stereotype category. These differences were then examined using between-groups t-tests. Of the 17 categories, only one (Criminal) displayed a signi-ficant [t(228) = 2.36, p = 0.02] difference in MRP scores between participants who mentioned and who did not mention this category. Participants mentioning the category

Criminal had lower MRP scores than those who did not

mention the category.

Notwithstanding the cultural differences between Sweden, England, United States, and Australia, the stereotypes are very similar as to content and negativity. Interestingly, people in these countries tend to mention corresponding cultural stereotypes – lazy, criminal, inferior, dirty, and uneducated – when probed for their knowledge of the cultural stereotypes of prejudiced ethnic groups (Augoustinos et al., 1994, Study 1; Devine, 1989, Study 1; Lepore & Brown, 1997, Study 1).

Ethnic and national groups associated with immigrants.

Parti-cipants’ responses to this part of the task were content ana-lyzed and major categories were formed. The first author carried out coding of responses blind to the participant’s prejudice level. The analysis resulted in 20 different national/ ethnic groups mentioned in the following rank order (the proportion of the total sample mentioning each category is given within parentheses): Iranians (0.72), Turks (0.60),

Yugoslavs (0.47), Iraqis (0.44), Finns (0.44), Africans (0.43),

Arabs (0.38), Greeks (0.26), Chileans (0.25), Eastern Europeans

(0.24), Asians (0.23), Kurds (0.22), Bosnians (0.17), Somali (0.16), South Americans (0.15), Scandinavians (0.13),

Medi-terranean (0.11), Western Europeans (0.10), All non-Swedes

(0.07), and North Americans (0.07).

Using the median split of explicit prejudice, we examined through chi-square tests the proportion of high and low MRP participants mentioning each national category. Of the 20 categories, only South Americans [χ2(1) = 4.14, p = 0.04] and Mediterranean [χ2(1) = 5.60, p = 0.02] yielded significant differences between high and low MRP participants, where low-prejudice participants mentioned these categories more frequently. Further, for reasons explained above, we also examined whether participants’ mean MRP scores differed between those who mentioned and those who did not mention each national category. These differences were then examined using between-groups t-tests. There were no significant differences in MRP scores between the two groups. Thus, as for cultural stereotypes, these results showed no major differences between participants varying in explicit prejudice.

STUDY 2: CATEGORY AND STEREOTYPE PRIMING Study 1 showed that people with various degrees of explicit prejudice did not only display the same knowledge of cultural stereotypes of immigrants but they also associated these stereotypes with the same ethnic and national groups. The question is whether automatic activation of the immigrant stereotypes or categories influence the social judg-ments of people high and low on explicit prejudice to the same degree.

Following the basic paradigm used by Lepore and Brown (1997), we hypothesized that participants, irrespective of their explicit prejudice, would not differ in their automatic stereotype activation and implicit prejudice when primed with category or stereotype words. Further, we predicted that participants in the category and stereotype activation conditions would express higher implicit prejudice as com-pared with those in the no-prime condition. We employed category and stereotype words obtained on empirical basis in Study 1. This procedure would permit a clear distinction between category and stereotype priming and a more ecologically valid choice of prime words. Furthermore, based on pretesting,1_{we shortened the exposure duration}

employed by Lepore and Brown from 100 ms to 80 ms.

Method

Participants and design. The participants were 88 students, 44

women and 44 men, from various academic disciplines at Uppsala University and at the local authority-administered adult education, in the age range of 18 to 36 years (M = 23.2 years). None of the participants had immigrant origin. They received cinema vouchers for their participation. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: stereotype priming (n = 35), category prim-ing (n = 31), and no-prime (n = 22). A 3 (Prime: category, stereotype, or no-prime) _× 2 (Explicit prejudice level: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design was employed.

Apparatus. The experiment was conducted using an Everex Step II

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Scand J Psychol 47 (2006) Category and stereotype activation 517 at a resolution of 1152 _× 864 and an 85 Hz screen refresh rate. An

Authorware program controlled the monitor display.

Stimulus materials. The priming stimuli for the category priming

condition consisted of the ethnic and national categories obtained from Study 1 (see Appendix). The stereotype priming condition employed stereotype words associated with the ethnic and national categories found in Study 1 (see Appendix).

Procedure. The experimenter, blind to the priming condition, told

the participants that they were to take part in three unrelated experi-ments, a “localization speed experiment” (the priming part), an “impression formation experiment” (the impression formation part), and a social opinion questionnaire (the assessment of explicit prejudice). Participants were made to believe that they were parti-cipating in three unrelated experiments. The experimenter instructed the participant to focus on the center of the screen, at a distance of 60 to 70 cm, and left the experimental room. All further instructions were presented on the screen.

In the priming part, each participant was exposed to 80 presenta-tions, four presentations of each prime word. Every presentation started with a dot appearing in the center of the screen for 1 second. Then, the prime word was presented in one of four different posi-tions on the screen, at a distance of approximately 3.5 cm from the dot (approximately 2–6° of the visual field). The order and the loca-tion of the prime words were randomized, with the only restricloca-tions that the same prime word could not appear twice in a row or twice in the same area. Each prime was exposed for 80 ms and was imme-diately replaced by a letter string (xqfbzrpmqwhgbx), also exposed for 80 ms. Participants in the no-prime condition were exposed only to the letter string. The randomized inter-trial interval varied between 1 and 6 seconds. The participant was then instructed to locate the position of the flash, which consisted of the prime word and the letter string in the stereotype and category words condi-tions, and the letter string only in the no-prime condition. Except for the exposure duration, the priming procedure was much the same as Lepore and Brown’s.

In the impression formation part, participants were given a Swedish translation of the passage about Donald (Srull & Wyer, 1979; see also Devine, 1989). In the present study, the main character was renamed to PP. As we agreed with previous critique that its tone is too negative (e.g., Carver, Ganellen, Froming & Chambers, 1983), the passage was slightly modified by inserting a few positive elements to neutralize the tone. Participants were instructed to read the passage and then rate the target person on twelve adjectives representing positive and negative qualities. The ratings were made on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 10 (agree

completely). We constructed an overall negativity or implicit prejudice

index of the rated adjectives (interesting, thoughtful, kind, pleasant,

unfriendly, boring, narrow-minded, hostile, dishonest, intelligent,

dependable, and deceitful) by reversing the coding of the positive items and taking the mean of all items. The internal consistency reliability of the implicit prejudice index was found to be satisfactory (α = 0.78).

In the assessment of explicit prejudice part, participants were guided to another room and asked to complete a computerized booklet containing the Modern Racial Prejudice Scale (α = 0.76 in this study). In order not to arouse participants’ suspicion about the main purpose of the study the scale items were embedded in 30 items concerning general subjects (e.g., The social insurance system should be improved). After having completed the experiment, participants were asked about what they thought of the experiment, if they had any idea of what it was about, and if they had seen anything unusual in the first part (word priming). None of the participants reported any suspicion about any part of the experiment, or noted any relation between the different parts. Participants were then debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Based on their MRP scores, participants were divided by a median split into a high and a low group. We conducted a 3 (Prime: category, stereotype or no-prime) × 2 (Explicit prejudice level: high vs. low) between-subjects ANOVA with the implicit prejudice index as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Prime, F(2, 82) = 5.08, p = 0.01, showing that the no-prime condition had a lower implicit prejudice score than the category and stereo-type priming conditions (see Table 1). A Newman-Keuls post-hoc test showed no significant difference in implicit prejudice between the category and stereotype priming con-ditions (p = 0.62) whereas each of these concon-ditions differed significantly from the no-prime condition (p = 0.01 for the stereotype, and p = 0.02 for the category condition). More important, the Prime × Explicit prejudice interaction was non-significant, F(2, 82) = 0.34, p = 0.71. Also the main effect of Explicit prejudice was non-significant F(1, 82) = 2.71, p = 0.10. For reasons explained in the Introduction section, we conducted a multiple regression analysis (see, e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 1983) using the implicit prejudice index as dependent variable and the contrast-coded prime condition (step 1), the continuous (non-dichotomized) scores of the MRP (step 2), and the Prime × MRP interac-tion (step 3; the product of the prime condiinterac-tion and MRP) entered stepwise as independent variables. The analysis revealed a significant effect of prime condition, R = 0.31, F(2, 85) = 4.35, p = 0.02. However, the effect of explicit prejudice (MRP), R = 0.00, F(1, 86) = 0.004, p = 0.95, and the Prime × Explicit prejudice interaction, R = 0.04, F(2, 85) = 1.11, p = 0.33, were not significant. The contrast-coded variables revealed that the stereotype and category condi-tions were not significantly different as to implicit prejudice, t(85) = 0.54, p = 0.59, whereas the mean implicit prejudice for these conditions was significantly different from that of the no-prime condition, t(85) = 2.86, p = .005.

As predicted, the results revealed that participants with different degrees of explicit prejudice displayed a similar pattern of implicit prejudice and regardless of whether they were primed with category or stereotype words. Further, the main effect of prime condition was significant and showed that category and stereotype priming yielded the same Table 1.Mean implicit prejudice scores for the total group, the high-prejudice, and the low-prejudice groups in the three prime conditions in Study 2

Group

Prime condition

No-prime Stereotype Category

All 4.92 (1.33) 5.88 (1.19) 5.72 (1.23)

Low explicit prejudice 5.24 (1.49) 6.07 (0.96) 5.83 (1.43) High explicit prejudice 4.45 (0.97) 5.76 (1.33) 5.58 (0.96) Note: SDs within parentheses.

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518 N. Akrami et al. Scand J Psychol 47 (2006) degree of implicit prejudice and they both differed from the

no-prime condition.

However, in order to draw a firm conclusion the findings should be further examined. Therefore, in Study 3, we employ facial photographs as primes to increase the ecological validity of the prime stimuli and to test the generalizability of the results in Study 2.

STUDY 3: CATEGORY PRIMING USING FACIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

Using the category and stereotype words obtained in Study 1 as primes, we found in Study 2 that category and stereo-type priming elicit the same degree of implicit prejudice. We argued that social categories are highly contaminated by their associated stereotypes, which – for the social category immigrants – are mostly negative (see Study 1). The national categories are, however, supposed to be semantically neutral without any negative connotations.2

To avoid misunderstandings, the idea that social cate-gories are highly contaminated by their stereotypes does not mean that associative strength is not important or does not play a moderating role in the activation of a primed con-struct. What we suggest is that a low level of associative strength seems to be sufficient to produce priming effects, resulting in similar stereotype activation and implicit pre-judice for people high and low on explicit prepre-judice. Although associative strength was not manipulated, the results of Study 2 point in this direction and support the contention that social categories are strongly linked with their associ-ated stereotypes, regardless of people’s explicit prejudice.

Daily social interaction is, however, not based on primed stereotypes or social categories, and people, in their social interaction with members of other ethnic groups, tend to base their categorization (and stereotype activation) on the target person’s external markers. Therefore, in Study 3, to arrive at a more daily-life-like situation we prime our participants with facial photographs of members of the social category immigrant. We suggest that priming with facial photographs makes a distinctive and clear-cut category priming possible and differential activation in participants with varying degrees of explicit prejudice as well. If participants with different explicit prejudice levels show similar levels of activation, resulting in equivalent implicit prejudice, then the idea of differences in the category-stereotype linkage between high-and low-prejudice people is to be questioned.

Method

Participants and design. The participants were 62 students (31

women and 31 men) at the local authority administered adult edu-cation in Uppsala, aged between 19 and 51 years (M = 23.5 years). They received cinema vouchers for their participation. None of the participants had immigrant origin. The participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Immigrants primes (n = 29), Swedish primes (n = 33). A 2 (Prime: Immigrants, Swedes) × 2

(Explicit prejudice level: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design was employed.

Apparatus. The equipment was identical to that in Study 2.

Stimulus materials. Forty facial photographs (face-shots), 20

immi-grant and 20 Swedish males, were selected in a pilot study (see Ekehammar, Akrami & Araya, 2003). Two types of masks were used. The first, a pattern mask, was composed of dark beige back-ground with short, brown lines. The second, a “dot mask”, was composed of dark beige with colored (blue, brown, or red) circles (“dots”). The number of dots varied between 6 and 12. To ensure that the “right” social category was activated the word immigrant was added to the photographs representing immigrant and Swede to the photographs representing Swedish faces. The words were added onto the lower part of the prime photographs. The modifications of the photographs and the arrangement of the masks were designed following Ekehammar et al. (2003, Experiment 3).

Procedure. The participant was told by the experimenter, blind to

the priming condition, that he/she was to take part in two unrelated experiments, a “perceptual counting speed experiment” (the priming part) and an “impression formation experiment” (the impression formation part).

In the priming part, each participant was exposed to 40 presentations, where each prime appeared twice. The interval between the presen-tations was 1 to 6 s (randomized). In each presentation, the prime was exposed for 13 ms, in one of four parafoveal positions (2 to 6° of the visual field, the prime was positioned between 3.5 and 6.5 cm from the center of the screen). Both the order and the location of the primes were randomized, with the only restrictions that the same picture could not appear twice in a row or twice in the same area. The prime was replaced by the pattern mask, also presented for 13 ms. The pattern mask in turn was replaced by the dot mask which remained on the screen for 2 s. After each presentation, the participant was asked to indicate whether an odd or an even number of dots was presented. To introduce variation into the task, dot masks with different numbers of dots were used in each presentation.

The impression formation part of the experiment was similar to that in Study 2.

After the impression-formation task, participants were guided to another room and asked to complete a computerized questionnaire containing the Modern Racial Prejudice Scale (Akrami et al., 2000). The reliability of the Modern Racial Prejudice Scale was found to be satisfactory (Cronbach α = 0.76 in this study).

None of the participants reported any suspicion about any part of the experiment, or noted any relation between the different parts of the experiment. Participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Based on their MRP scores, participants were divided by a median split into a high and a low group. A 2 (Prime: Immi-grant vs. Swedish) × 2 (Explicit prejudice level: high vs. low) between-subjects ANOVA with the implicit prejudice index as the dependent variable was conducted. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Prime, F(1, 58) = 8.34, p = 0.001, showing that those in the Swedish prime condi-tion had a lower implicit prejudice score than those in the Immigrant prime condition (for means see Table 2). More important, the Prime × Explicit prejudice interaction was non-significant, F(1, 58) = 0.79, p = 0.38. The main effect of

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Scand J Psychol 47 (2006) Category and stereotype activation 519

Explicit prejudice was marginally significant F(1, 58) = 3.97, p = 0.051. For reasons explained in the Introduction section, we also conducted a multiple regression analysis (see, e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 1983) using the implicit prejudice index as dependent variable and the dummy-coded prime condition (step 1), the continuous (non-dichotomized) scores of the MRP (step 2), and the Prime × MRP interaction (step 3; the product of the prime condition and MRP) entered stepwise as independent variables. The analysis revealed a significant effect of prime condition, R = 0.32, F(1, 60) = 7.00, p = 0.01. However, the effect of explicit prejudice (MRP), R = 0.05,

F(1, 60) = 2.39, p = 0.13, and the Prime × Explicit prejudice

interaction, R = 0.03, F(1, 60) = 1.27, p = 0.26, were not significant.

The results of Study 3 are in line with those of Study 2 and point in the predicted direction. Thus, participants’ explicit prejudice did not moderate their scores on implicit prejudice. The negative stereotypes seem to be activated also when using primes with no semantically negative connota-tion. These results extend the findings in Study 2, and give support to the idea of tightly linked social categories and stereotypes. It should be noted that the results of the present study have been replicated in three independent experiments (Ekehammar et al., 2003). One of these experiments (Experi-ment 3) used the words immigrant and Swede added onto the lower part of the photographs, like the present study, whereas the other two (Experiment 1 and 2) used photo-graphs without these labels. However, despite this difference the outcome was the same in all experiments.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Lepore and Brown (1997) have suggested that one should distinguish between stereotype and category priming, and they argued that the cognitive representation of categories and their associated stereotypes might be different for par-ticipants high and low on explicit prejudice. Further, Lepore and Brown argued that participants high, but not low, in explicit prejudice are more likely to automatically activate their stereotypes when primed with category words. As pre-dicted, they found that these groups exhibited different

activation levels when primed with category words but not when primed with both category and stereotypical words. Also, in line with Devine’s (1989) study, they found no differences in the knowledge of cultural stereotypes between people high and low in explicit prejudice.

Investigating the stereotype knowledge concerning immi-grants in Sweden, in Study 1 we replicated previous findings (e.g., Augoustinos et al., 1994; Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997; but see Gordijn et al., 2001), and found no relation between explicit prejudice level and stereotype knowledge. Further, we found no relation between explicit prejudice level and the national categories that are associated with the social category immigrants.

In Study 2, our research question was based on the con-tention that categories are strongly linked with their associated stereotypes. This contention was empirically supported and category and stereotype primes were shown to elicit the same degree of implicit prejudice. Increasing the ecological validity of the priming stimuli by employing facial photo-graphs as primes, Study 3 extends the support for the category-stereotype association and the generalizability of the findings. Whereas Lepore and Brown based their hypothesis on a selected sample of empirical findings (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986), we base our predictions on another body of research (e.g., Bargh et al., 1986, 1992, 1996; Moskowitz et al., 1999; Rudman & Borgida, 1995).

The lack of association between implicit and explicit prejudice for both stereotype and category primes could be seen as a null finding. As to this issue, Frick (1995) has outlined criteria for accepting the null hypothesis. The first criterion is that the null hypothesis should be possible. Agreeing with the logical possibility of a null hypothesis, we present appropriate theoretical (e.g., the stereotype-category contamination) and methodological (e.g., the prime words and design issues discussed in the Introduction) positions that indeed allow the statement of the no-differences hypothesis. Further, and of importance for the statistical conclusion validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979), first, to improve the statistical power in our studies, we exceeded the number of participants as compared to the studies of Lepore and Brown, and Devine. Thus, in Study 1 we employed 230 participants as compared to 40 (Devine’s Study 1) and 39 (Lepore & Brown’s Study 1), and in Study 2, 88 participants as compared to 78 (Devine’s Study 2) and 51 and 45 in Lepore & Brown’s Study 1 and Study 2, respectively. Second, employing more powerful statistical techniques than those used in the previous studies (multiple regression and t-test instead of median-split-based ANOVA and chi-square test) would increase the possibility of rejecting the null hypo-thesis. It should be noted that, in Study 1, we even exchanged our dependent and independent variables to increase the possibility of finding an effect. Third, we find no reason to believe that the present results suffer from a higher Type I error than the compared studies because multiple compari-sons were based on explicit, directed hypotheses. Fourth, the Table 2. Mean implicit prejudice scores for the total group, the

high-prejudice, and the low-prejudice groups in the three prime conditions in Study 3

Group

Prime condition

Swedish prime Immigrant prime

All 4.74 (1.23) 5.52 (1.04)

Low explicit prejudice 4.89 (1.29) 5.97 (0.73) High explicit prejudice 4.57 (1.17) 5.15 (1.12) Note: SDs within parentheses.

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520 N. Akrami et al. Scand J Psychol 47 (2006) Cronbach alpha reliability of the explicit prejudice measure

showed to be of the same magnitude (0.76 – 0.82) as in the Devine (0.81– 0.83), and Lepore and Brown (0.84 –0.88) studies. Further, the reliability of the implicit measure (0.78) showed to be comparable to that of Lepore and Brown (0.70 – 0.82), whereas Devine (1989) did not provide any information on this point. According to Frick (1995) the “[u]se of statistics provides a method of demonstrating that the null hypothesis is not correct, but does not provide any technique for demonstrating that the null hypothesis is cor-rect. Therefore, the only way to provide evidence supporting the null hypothesis is to try, but fail, to demonstrate a statistically significant effect” (p. 135). This emphasizes the researcher’s efforts to reject the null hypothesis – the good effort criterion. Against the background of the exami-nation presented above, we believe that we have met this criterion.

However, the different hypotheses and the research they are based on cannot explain the differences between the present outcome and that of Lepore and Brown. It is impor-tant to note that Study 1 and Study 2 are not duplications or strict replications of Devine’s or Lepore and Brown’s studies. Rather, they are attempts at examining the general-izability of the previous empirical results and the presented models of stereotyping and prejudice. Evidently, as the present studies were conducted in Sweden we could not focus on African Americans (like Devine’s study) or West Indians (like Lepore & Brown’s study), and for the same reason, we could of course not employ the same stereotypes (e.g., slavery,

plantation, jazz) and categories (e.g., Brixton, Notting Hill,

Harlem) as used by the referred authors. Also, immigrant as a social category has a clear connotation in Sweden, and probably in Northern and Central Europe as well, which perhaps is not the case in the USA or UK. Further, we do not believe that the differences can be explained by the minor deviations in methodological details, for example, different instructions for generating stereotypes (Lepore and Brown explicitly asked their participants to generate positive and negative stereotypes but we did not mention “positive” or “negative” in our instruction), the shorter exposure duration in the priming task, the use of a modified Donald paragraph in the impression formation task, and (in accord with classical psychometric reasoning) one composite depend-ent measure instead of a positivity and a negativity scale. There are, however, some more crucial differences between our study and Lepore and Brown’s that might explain the different outcomes. These, we argue, have to do with the methodological modifications we introduced, and which are already presented in the Introduction section (“Methodological issues”). In addition, in Study 3, we employed facial photo-graphs as primes to make the priming stimuli more ecologically valid.

Categorization and category activation are fundamentals of social (and non-social) perception. Stereotypes, in addition, are not only social expectations, but also necessary information

about social categories. Imagine categories without related stereotypes and attached information – Japanese, Arabs, Africans, and carpenters – these categories are meaningless without the additional information, which almost entirely is stereotypical in nature. To put it shortly, stereotypical infor-mation is part of the social inforinfor-mation necessary for our understanding of the complicated social world. Thus, the findings in this study question the elasticity of the associa-tive strength between social categories and their associated stereotypes, as suggested by Lepore and Brown (1997). Stereotypic information is needed and indeed activated rather easily and seemingly with a low degree of associative strength. At the same time, our results also provide evidence against the distinction between category and stereotype priming.

As to the relation between implicit and explicit prejudice, our results provide support for the dissociation hypothesis where no relation between implicit and explicit prejudice is expected. As associative strength has been a candidate in the search for a moderator between implicit and explicit pre-judice, the present results suggest that the answer might not be found in the associative strength between social categories and their associated stereotypes. The results can also be seen as supportive for the idea of prejudice as a multidimensional construct, as suggested by Brauer et al. (2000). Thus, the dissociation indicates that implicit and explicit prejudice are not necessarily the two sides of the same coin. Implicit prejudice might tap the affective component and explicit prejudice the cognitive component of the construct.

Finally, the present research demonstrates the inevitability of stereotype activation and implicit prejudice and adds support to Bargh’s (1999) statement that “evidence of con-trollability is weaker and more problematic than we would like to believe” (p. 361).

This research was supported by Grant no. 421-2002-2849 from the Swedish Research Council (Study 1 & 2), and Grant 2000-0282 from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (Study 3) to Bo Ekehammar. A previous version of this manuscript was presented at the 6th European Social Cognition Network Meeting (8–11 Sep-tember 2004), Lisbon, Portugal.

NOTES

1_{At first we conducted the priming using the exposure duration}

(100 ms) proposed by Lepore and Brown (1997) but found that all the pre-tested participants (N = 7) reported seeing the primes (see also Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Calvini, 1999, p. 600). There-fore, we shortened the exposure duration to 80 ms which was shown to be satisfactory to produce perception without awareness.

2_{Interestingly, a reviewer of a previous version of this manuscript,}

gave us an excellent everyday-life example of this stereotype-category contamination stating: “The majority of the items (both stereotypes and categories) in the priming task have negative connotations . . . ”. The national categories are, of course, supposed to be strictly neutral (see Appendix), but obviously people (including prominent journal reviewers) tend to see negative connotations in them.

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Received 29 November 2004, accepted 26 July 2005

APPENDIX

Table A1. Stereotype and category words used as primes in the present, Lepore and Brown’s (1997), and Devine’s study (1989)

The present study Lepore & Brown (1997) Devine (1989)

Stereotypes Categories Stereotypes Categories Stereotypes Stereotypes

Aggressive African Afro-Caribbean Afro-Caribbean Afro Africa

Allowance Algerian Blacks Blacks Athletic Basketball

Loud-voiced Arab Brixton Brixton Bussing Blacks

Drug Bosnian Dreadlocks Dreadlocks Harlem Blues

Criminal Chilean Ethnic Ethnic Jazz Ghetto

Sexist Finn Reggae Reggae Minority Lazy

Lazy Greek West Indians West Indians Musical Negroes

Dishonest Indian Nigger Notting Hill Nigger Plantation

Stupid Immigrant Rude Rap Oppressed Rhythm

Unreliable Iraqi Unemployed Rastafarian Poor Stereotype

Uneducated Iranian Dirty Afro Prejudice Unemployed

Productive Chinese Crime Coloured Slavery Welfare

Romantic Kurd Drugs Culture

Careless Palestinian Family-loving Pole Dirty Russian Temperamental Somali Thievish Turk Violent German Gypsy