International Journal of Research in Information Technology (IJRIT)
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www.ijrit.com ISSN 2001-5569
MAPV: Message authentication protocol for vehicular adhoc networks
Sushma N S 1, Shivamurthy R.C 2
1 Department of Computer Science & Engg., AIT, Tumkur, Karnataka Email: [email protected]
2 Prof & Head, Department of Computer Science & Engg, AIT, Tumkur, Karnataka Email: [email protected]
Abstract: VANET is a nothing but vehicular adhoc networks, here each vehicle is considered as a node. Here we adopt public key infrastructure and certificate revocation list for the security purpose.in PKI system we use to check whether vehicles certificate is already in CRL or not.
which reduces time for checking the certificate whether it is revoked or not .Here we are using HMAC-hash message authentication protocol for VANETS where key used in calculating HMAC is known only to the only the vehicles which are not revoked on board units.
1 .Introduction
Vehicular adhoc networks (VANETS) recently evolved as a revolutionising technology which is providing communication sevices to the vehicles. In olden days there was a wireless networks and there was a more chance to inject a false information,So to ensure a secure communication VANETS technology was proposed. It consists ofcertificate revocation list(CRL), on board units(OBU),trusted authority(TA),road side units(RSU) and hardware security module(HSM). Cryptographic schemes are used to protect the network from external attacks.Road side units are like towers as soon as vehicle entered a region it will provide information to trusted authority to check whether certificates are revoked or not.RSU’s will be provided a range.For example 300-400 ks.On board units will be embedded in the vehicles where the certificates will be there with digital signature.
In earlier system it was taking a long time to search the certificate whether it is revoked or not in CRL and also information can be easily hacked But we can overcome those problems by implementing this paper using PKI system and efficient cryptographic
HMAC is a cryptographic scheme involving a function in combination with secret cryptographic key.HSM will be located in OBU where keys will be uploaded.
Here we employ PKI i.e public key infrastructure and it holds authenticated certificas and every message is digitally signed.Trusted authority will issue a CRL a list containing all the revoked certificates.In PKI system as soon as the vehicle entere a region first it will check whether the certificate is revoked or not and then finally it verifies the sender’s signature on the received message.
It can be used in the applications like providing the vehicles other routes if any traffic jams or accident and also it provides the information about the road type and also provide the route to the vehicles if fog occurs.
In this paper message loss ratio, authentication delay can be reduced compared to other authentication methods.
2. System Architecture
In this architecture three important concepts are there i.e.TA-TrusteD authority:Here database will be maintained where all the certificates which are digitally signed..OBU-On board units:It will be present in the vehicles where anonymous certificates will be maintained to mislead the attackers..RSU-Road side units:It will be present on road side where the range will be provided for example:200-300 kms.If the vehicles entered a particular range it will send the certificates to the trusted authority.
Fig 1.1: Overview of VANETS
3. Related Work
In [12], Hubaux identify the specific issues of security and privacy challenges in VANETs, and indicate that a PKI should be well deployed to protect the transited messages and to mutually authenticate network entities. In [4], Raya and Hubaux use a classical PKI to provide secure and privacy preserving communications to VANETs. In this approach, each vehicle needs to preload a huge pool of anonymous certificates. The number of the loaded certificates in each vehicle should be large enough to provide security and privacy preservation for a long time, e.g., one year. Each vehicle can update its certificates from a central authority during the annual inspection of the vehicle.
In [13], Studer et al. propose an efficient authentication and revocation scheme called TACK. TACK adopts a hierarchy system architecture consisting of a central trusted authority and regional authorities (RAs) distributed all over the network. The authors adopted group signature where the trusted authority acts as the group manager and the vehicles act as the group members. Upon entering a new region, each vehicle must update its certificate
In [13], Studer et al. propose an efficient authentication and revocation scheme called TACK. TACK adopts a hierarchy system architecture consisting of a central trusted authority and regional authorities (RAs) distributed all over the network. The authors adopted group signature where the trusted authority acts as the group manager and the vehicles act as the group members. Upon entering a new region, each vehicle must update its certificate from the RA dedicated for that region
4. Methodology and protocol
Algorithm:
1: Check the validity of Tstamp 2: if invalid then
3: Drop the message 4: else
5: Check REVcheck ¼ ? HMACðKg; PIDukTstampÞ 6: if invalid then
7: Drop the message 8: else
9: Verify the TA signature on certOBUu 10: if invalid then
11: Drop the message 12: else
13: Verify the signature siguðMkTstampÞ using OBUu public key ðPKuÞ
14: if invalid then 15: Drop the message 16: else
17: Process the message 18: end if
19: end if 20: end if
21: end if
ny OBUyA ny receiving the message ðMkTstamp kcertuðPIDu;and veriy by executing.
5. Result and analysis
1.Authentication DelayWe compare the message authentication delayand verifying the sender’s signature. For the first authentication phase which checks the revocation status of the sender, we employ either the CRL or EMAP. For EMAP, we adopt the Cipher Block Chaining Advanced Encryption Standard (CBC-HMAC AES) [28] and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 SHA-1 [29] as theHMAC functions. We consider the PID of OBU and the time stamp ðTstampÞ having equal lengths of 8 bytesemploying the CRL with that employing EMAP to check the revocation status of an OBU. As stated earlier, the authentication of any message is performed by consecutive phases: checking the sender’s revocation status, verifying the sender’s certificate.
2.End-to-End Delay
The adopted simulation parameters are given in Table 1. We select the dissemination of the road condition information by an OBU every 300 msec to conform with the DSRC standards. The mobility traces adopted in this simulation are generated using TraNS [34]. We are interested in the
end-to-end delay, which is defined as the time to transmit a message from the sender to the receiver. Fig. 5 shows the end-to-end delay in msec versus the OBUs density, by employing authentication using the proposed EMAP (SHA-1), the linear CRL checking, and binary CRL checking, respectively. In the simulation, we consider CRLs containing 20,000 and 30,000 revoked certificates, respectively, and the OBUs density as the number of OBUs per km2. It can be seen that the end-to-end delay increases with the OBUs density because the number of the received packets increases with the OBUs density resulting in longer waiting time for the packets to be processed by the application layer in each OBU.
6. References
[1] P. Papadimitratos, A. Kung, J.P. Hubaux, and F. Kargl, “Privacy and Identity Management for Vehicular Communication Systems: A Position Paper,” Proc. Workshop Standards for Privacy in User-Centric Identity Management, July 2006.
[2] K. Sampigethaya, L. Huang, M. Li, R. Poovendran, K. Matsuura,
and K. Sezaki, “CARAVAN: Providing Location Privacy forVANET,” Proc. Embedded Security in Cars (ESCAR) Conf., Nov.2005.
[3] A. Wasef, Y. Jiang, and X. Shen, “DCS: An Efficient Distributed Certificate Service Scheme for Vehicular Networks,” IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technology, vol. 59, no. 2 pp. 533-549, Feb. 2010.
[4] M. Raya and J.-P. Hubaux, “Securing Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks,” J. Computer Security, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 39-68, 2007.
[5] Y. Sun, R. Lu, X. Lin, X. Shen, and J. Su, “An Efficient Pseudonymous Authentication Scheme with Strong Privacy Preservation for Vehicular Communications,” IEEE Trans. Vehicular
Technology, vol. 59, no. 7, pp. 3589-3603, Sept. 2010.
[6] R. Lu, X. Lin, H. Luan, X. Liang, and X. Shen, “Pseudonym Changing at Social Spots: An Effective Strategy for Location Privacy in Vanets,” IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technology, vol. 61, no. 1,
pp. 86-96, Jan. 2012.
[7] US Bureau of Transit Statistics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Passenger_vehicles_in_the_United_States, 2012.
[8] J.J. Haas, Y. Hu, and K.P. Laberteaux, “Design and Analysis of a Lightweight Certificate Revocation Mechanism for VANET,” Proc.
Sixth ACM Int’l Workshop VehiculAr InterNETworking, pp. 89-98, 2009.
[9] IEEE Std 1609.2-2006, IEEE Trial-Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments - Security Services for Applications and Management Messages, IEEE, 2006.
[10] “5.9 GHz DSRC,” http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/scc32/dsrc/
index.html, 2012.
[11] A. Wasef and X. Shen, “MAAC: Message Authentication Acceleration Protocol for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks,” Proc. IEEE
GlobeCom, 2009.
[12] J.P. Hubaux, “The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 2, no. 3, pp.
49-55, May/June 2004.
[13] A. Studer, E. Shi, F. Bai, and A. Perrig, “TACKing Together Efficient Authentication, Revocation, and Privacy in VANETs,”
Proc. IEEE CS Sixth Ann. Conf. Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Comm. andNetworks (SECON ’09), pp. 1- 9, 2009.
[14] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, I. Aad, D. Jungels, and J.-P. Hubaux,
“Eviction of Misbehaving and Faulty Nodes in Vehicular Networks,” IEEE J. Selected Areas in Comm., vol. 25, no. 8, pp. 1557- 1568, Oct. 2007.
7. Authors Bibilography
Prof. Shivamurthy R C received the BE degree from PDA college of Engineering, Gulbarga University and received the M.Tech degree in Computer Science & Engineering from Malnad College ofEngineering,Visvesvaraya Technological University, Belgaum. He served as a Bio Medical Engineer in AIMS Hospital & Cancer Research Center. He served as Assistant Professor in B.G.S.Institute of Technology, B.G.Nagar and currently working as professor in the department of Computer Science at A.I.T, Tumkur, Karnataka, and is also a Ph.D scholar in CMJ University, India.
