G.R. No. 95136 (October 3, 1991) G.R. No. 95136 (October 3, 1991)
RAFAEL BAYLOSIS and BENJAMIN DE VERA vs.
RAFAEL BAYLOSIS and BENJAMIN DE VERA vs. HON. APOLONIO R. CHAVEZ, JR. et al.HON. APOLONIO R. CHAVEZ, JR. et al.
FACTS: FACTS:
The case at bar originated from an information filed in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig The case at bar originated from an information filed in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig charging petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with one Marco Palo (all charging petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with one Marco Palo (all known high ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its military arm, the known high ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its military arm, the New
New People’sPeople’s Army), Army), with a violation with a violation of par. 3, Sec 1 of par. 3, Sec 1 of PD 1866.of PD 1866. That provision punishes with theThat provision punishes with the penalty of
penalty of reclusion perpetuareclusion perpetua, , any any person who person who unlawfully manufactures, deals unlawfully manufactures, deals in, in, acquires,acquires, disposes of, or possesses any firearm, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the disposes of, or possesses any firearm, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion.
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion. Baylosis, de Vera, and Palo, filed a motion to quashBaylosis, de Vera, and Palo, filed a motion to quash the information on the following grounds: (I) the facts charged do not constitute an offense the information on the following grounds: (I) the facts charged do not constitute an offense because they are founded on an unconstitutional/repealed statute, (2) for the same reason, this because they are founded on an unconstitutional/repealed statute, (2) for the same reason, this Honorable Court is devoid of jurisdiction to try this case. However, the Trial Court denied the Honorable Court is devoid of jurisdiction to try this case. However, the Trial Court denied the motion to quash and a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, Baylosis and de Vera motion to quash and a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, Baylosis and de Vera instituted this special action of
instituted this special action of certiorari certiorari , prohibition and mandamus., prohibition and mandamus. ISSUE:
ISSUE: WON PD No. 1866, or at least par. 3 of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for beingWON PD No. 1866, or at least par. 3 of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of due process and equal protection clauses of
violative of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.the Constitution.
HELD:
HELD:
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the
case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held
case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held
that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential
that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a
Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a
possibility of a double jeopardy.
possibility of a double jeopardy.
P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of
P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflictseek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an
punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an
imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and
imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and
provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would
provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would
aggravate the offense.
aggravate the offense. The petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as anThe petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as an argument against the constitutionality of PD 1866 is equally futile. The right against double argument against the constitutionality of PD 1866 is equally futile. The right against double jeopardy is
jeopardy is a matter a matter which the which the accused may accused may raise in raise in a motion a motion to quash to quash (Sec. 3[h], (Sec. 3[h], Rule 117). Rule 117). But,But, petitioner's motion to quash filed in the trial court did not raise the issue of double jeopardy petitioner's motion to quash filed in the trial court did not raise the issue of double jeopardy because it had not arisen. Moreover, even if
because it had not arisen. Moreover, even if such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D.such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D. No. 1866 will not be rendered unconstitutional because such is not a ground to nullify that law. No. 1866 will not be rendered unconstitutional because such is not a ground to nullify that law. Double jeopardy is merely a defense that an accused may raise to defeat a subsequent Double jeopardy is merely a defense that an accused may raise to defeat a subsequent prosecution or conviction for the same offense.
prosecution or conviction for the same offense.
Hence, the petition is DISMISSED in view of petitioner's failure to clearly and unequivocally Hence, the petition is DISMISSED in view of petitioner's failure to clearly and unequivocally establish that the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 violates the
G.R. No. 128096 (January 20, 1999)
PANFILO M. LACSON et al. vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al. FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, alleged eleven (11) members of Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies in Metro Manila were slain by elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group. On media expose however, it was alleged that what actually transpired was a summary execution or rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation and recommended the indictment for multiple murder charged as principals before the Sandiganbayan. This information was amended after re-investigation and petitioner herein was charged as accessory.
In 1997, R.A. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (R.A. 7975).
ISSUES:
1. WON the right to equal protection of the law by Lacson et al. has been violated with the passage of R.A. 8249.
2. WON the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng a case constitutes an ex post facto law.
3. WON R.A. 8249 violates the one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution. 4. WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case.
HELD:
1. The SC ruled that R.A. 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al. to equal protection of the law. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al. cannot claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
2. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249 because as defined, ex post facto law is limited in its score only to matters criminal in nature. R.A. 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
3. R.A. 8249 does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution. Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to “define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts”.
4. While Jurisdiction of the court is defined by the Constitution or Statute, the elementary rule is that jurisdiction of a court is determined by allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. . The mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officers in relation to their office is not sufficient. In determining jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, what is controlling is the specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the official duties and the commission of the offense charged. For failure to show in the amended information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharged of official functions of the accused (Sec.4, par. b of R.A. 8249), the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), not the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the petition is GRANTED and the case was transferred to the RTC.
G.R. No. L-52413, September 26, 1981
MELITON C. GERONIMO
vs.
COMELEC and JULIAN C. PENDREFACTS:
On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political turncoatism. After hearing the petition, the COMELEC on January 19. 1980 issued Resolution No. 8305 disqualifying Meliton C Geronimo. On January 22, 1980, Geronimo filed a motion to reconsider the said resolution, and on January 28, 1980 or two days before the elections, he filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to restrain the COMELEC from implementing its resolution to which the former has granted the same day. In the elections of January 30, 1980, Geronimo obtained a margin of 325 votes when he garnered 2,695 votes as against his opponent Bayani Ferrera's 2,370 votes. On March 11, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554, reinstating the proclamation made earlier by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal in favor of Geronimo as the winning candidate for mayor but the proclamation was declared temporary subject to the decision of this Court on the petition for certiorari filed by Geronimo. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC has acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner from running for the office of mayor of Baras, Rizal, and in refusing to give due course to his certificate of candidacy for the said position.
HELD:
SC find that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioner Geronimo since there was substantial evidence in support of the same . The matter of disqualification of petitioner is based on Section 10, Article XIIC of the 1973 Constitution, declaring that: “No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election.” and Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, adopting the aforesaid constitutional prohibition on political turncoatism as one of the special disqualification of local candidates running for elective positions. Petitioner contends that KBL is not a political party, hence, he is not guilty of violating the constitutional and statutory prohibitions on turncoatism when he affiliated to NP; consequently, he should not be disqualified from running for the office of mayor of Baras, Rizal. The contention is without merit. There being a clear showing of petitioner's affiliation with the KBL as a political party as fully established by his three aforequoted letters and his admissions by himself or through his counsel in his pleadings and at the hearing before the COMELEC, and having subsequently affiliated with the Nacionalista Party as shown by his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baras, subscribed and sworn to , his political turncoatism is undeniable, thus warranting his disqualification as a candidate for the office of mayor of Baras, Rizal.
