The Role of Intelligence in Countering the Islamic State Threat- Dissertation paper

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National School of Political and Administrative Studies

International Relations and European Integration Department

Security and Diplomacy M.A.

Dissertation

The role of intelligence in countering the Islamic State threat

Coordinated by

Prof.univ.dr. George Cristian MAIOR

Graduate

Ioana Iulia BLAGA

Bucharest, 2015

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ACRONYM LIST

AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQI Al-Qaeda in Iraq

CIA Central Intelligence Agency COMINT Communications intelligence

DAESH ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyahfīl-ʿIrāq wash-Shām ELINT Electronic intelligence

HUMINT Human Intelligence

ICT International Institute for Counter-Terrorism IED Improvised explosive device

IMINT Imagery intelligence ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham ISR Islamic State Report

ITIC The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

MO Modus operandi

R&D Research and Development SIGINT

SMO

Signal intelligence

Social movement organization US United States of America USA United States of America

TRAC The Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium TSG The Soufan Group

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ABSTRACT

Upon entering the old entrance of the CIA headquarters, on the marble wall there is the following inscription: ―And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free‖ (John VIII- XXXII). It is a very nice feeling, but it overdraws and distorts what is going on in that building or any other intelligence agency. It is also ironically, because intelligence is not about the truth.

The present paper presents the important role of intelligence in countering the Islamic State as a terrorist group by analyzing the threat and the intelligence efforts, from a counter-terrorism point of view. Analyzing the relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism, I aimed to ―give to Caesar what is Caesar's‖, showing ad-litteram what has been done and should be done, without making a case just that my assumption (that intelligence has one of the most significant roles in countering this particular threat) to be proven right. Therefore, the entire paper is centered on and built around the intelligence concepts and practices, in relation to counter-terrorism.

The first chapter of the paper called ―Theoretical approach‖ sets off the difficulties in having theories about terrorism and intelligence. The first part ―Terrorism and religion‖ focuses on the controversial relationship between religious radicalization and terrorism, by looking at what counter-terrorism specialists, authors scholars and analysts have to say about this relationship. The second part of the chapter, ―Intelligence and counter-terrorism‖ evinces on the link between the two practices and what kind of intelligence is used in counter-terrorism and mostly why the first one is an indispensable tool for the second one.

The second chapter called ―The Islamic State‖ is the first part of the study case. It is an intelligence analysis of the terrorist group, from historical background – the most important stages until it became what we call today The Islamic State, moving to ideology and objectives (both religious and political), to organizational dimension of the group (leadership system, leader and authority), to capabilities (military and manpower, weapons possession, territorial control and safe heavens, recruiting and training, means- finances and propaganda), modus operandi and tactics points of view. I tried to show in this chapter why this group poses such a threat, not on a local level, but on an international one and why acting against it is mandatory for the sake of humanity.

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The third chapter, ―The role of intelligence in countering ISIS‖ is the second part of the study case and is focused on a very realistic approach on what exactly was done (on the set period of the analysis) and what should be done in terms of countering the Islamic State, both by military and intelligence methods, stressing out the role of the second one. I also assessed the difficulties that intelligence is having in countering the organization.

In conclusions, I riveted on how the mistakes of not properly understanding the Islamic State`s ideology and confusing it with Al- Qaeda, presuming that the experience and knowledge about one terrorist group is enough to counter another has cost us. Underestimating the power of the Islamic State both in the region and abroad has led to terrible decisions and we are facing now a new type of enemy who has, for now, a big advantage. We have to make a lesson of it, to look deeper and with more critical eyes the geopolitical context of the Middle East in the past years and stop thinking that is too far to affect us. The battle is not lost yet, we still have time and the means to counter this threat and to stop its spreading. And in this stage, intelligence is crucial. Military, we have the capability to counter it, but without good and smart intelligence, it will be costly and inefficient.

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Introduction

Humanity stands of a dangerous edge. Very frequently we are reminded that terrorism keeps on incurring agony and enduring on individuals everywhere throughout the world. Barely a week passes by without a demonstration of terrorism acts in some place on the planet, unpredictably influencing innocent individuals, who simply happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.―Countering this scourge is in the interest of all nations and the issue has been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades.‖1

The topic of my thesis is ―The role of Intelligence in countering the Islamic State threat― and I propose to find out what the Islamic State is and how intelligence agencies worked to counter a global threat; what has the intelligence community has done so far to fight with this terrorist organization and why is so strenuous in this fight, so that more will be known about terrorism, a ―disease that no country is immune for‖2

and maybe how to achieve in the future a stage of security in the Middle East.

As primary sources for the case study I will rely on the main data from the public reports of intelligence agencies and communities, also from counter-terrorism research groups. As a secondary source I will use additional data that comes from international media.

The research will be conducted through mixed methods that combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative method will be used to answer research questions, drawing on the descriptive broad quantitative research design and heavily on statistical analysis techniques to examine the data collected, whether descriptive or inferential in nature, using quantitative data (data sets and structured observation) combined with the qualitative approach by using manly the intelligence and terrorism ―theories‖ to help the research process, interpreting the qualitative data, using the inductive process of going back-and-forth through the data, in order to identify particular aspects of the Islamic State. I justify the choosing of this method by stating that is most appropriate because it combines various methods and approaches, in order to answer the initial questions.

The limitations of the case study come from the period of time analyzed and from the intelligence perspective. I settled the period from the begging of the Islamic State as a Caliphate (29th June) to 1st January 2015. There are some matters that this methodology may not help me to explain. In order to find out exactly how reality was shaped as a consequence of intelligence efforts in the area that the Islamic State operates, a useful method would have been to participate and interview the persons that were involved right there, on the huge battlefields, but given the specific conditions of this case, this kind of approach could not be considered nor applied.

1_{http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/}

2_{HRH Crown Prince Hussein of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan speaking before UN Security Council}

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Chapter 1 Theoretical approach

Terrorism and intelligence, counter-terrorism and counterintelligence as any other concept in International relations are hard to be defined and frame into a theoretical dimension. All of them come from practice and afterwards attempts were made to frame them into theories and concepts, there isn`t yet a single complex and complete definition to describe none of them.

In this first chapter, I will try to tackle the theoretical dimension of terrorism and intelligence, by dividing them according to the connections terrorism and religion, respectively, intelligence and counter-terrorism. I chose this partition in conformity with the subject of my paper and with the study case.

i. Terrorism and religion

There are more than 200 definitions of terrorism, none of them world-wide accepted and treated as such universal truth. Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, because the term has evolved and because it is associated with an activity that is designed to be subjective. Terrorism refers on ―the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties‖3.

While some critical theorists blame Terrorism Studies for the ―problem-solving approach‖4, mainstream researchers have no problem with that, arguing that this is entirely legitimate, just as the medical profession studies diseases in order to be able to cure them.

Boaz Ganor, one of the most famous counter-terrorism experts in the world, the director of the ICT in Herzlyia, Israel has given a long list of all the reasons why terrorism is difficult to define.: because terrorism is a ‗contested concept‘ and political, legal, social science and popular notions of it often diverge; because the definition questions is linked to (de-) legitimization and criminalization; because there are many ‗terrorisms‘ with different forms and manifestations; because the term has undergone changes of meaning in the more than 200 years of its existence; because terrorist organizations are (semi-)clandestine and the secrecy surrounding them makes objective analysis difficult; because the definition questions is linked to whether or not terrorists work for or against one‘s own national) interests, and, consequently, double standards tend to be

3_{Richard Jackson, ‗Research for Counterterrorism: Terrorism Studies and the Reproduction of State Hegemony‘ 2008, p.4} 4

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applied; because the boundaries with other forms of political violence (e.g. assassination, guerilla warfare) are hazy or unclear; because the state, with its (claimed) monopoly of the use of force and its legal definition of power, can exclude any of its own activities (e.g. indiscriminate repression) from the definition; because it is linked to a discussion of primary responsibility for initiating a downward spiral of action-reaction violence and a discussion of root causes; because some authors use two different vocabularies (force vs. violence, terror vs. terrorism) for state vs. non-state actors; because the conceptual and normative frameworks of the users of the term differ (e.g. criminal justice model, war model); because the discussion on terrorism has been linked to issues regarding self-determination, and armed resistance against foreign occupation and racist regimes; because those who engage in acts of terrorism often also engage in other, more legitimate forms of armed conflict and/or engage in party politics; because the violence perpetrated by the terrorists‘ opponent might be as indiscriminate as, or worse than, that perpetrated by those who are deemed to be ‗terrorists‘; because the assessment of the terrorist act is intertwined with the discussion concerning the actor‘s goals and the status of the actor him-or herself. 5

He also defined terrorism concisely and unequivocally as ―a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious, etc.)‖6

. While Ganor has a very valid point, and his thinking on issues of definition and typology is among the most sophisticated, the focus on ‗civilians‘ rather than ‗non-combatants‘ takes away some ambiguity but creates new problems. It also overlooks the fact that there is widespread use of terrorism in war.

The essential points of terrorism are: premeditation- terrorism is not an accident or a crime of passion, it takes time, resources and planning; political motivation - this being what makes murder ‗terrorism‘ instead a general crime; non-combatants (which includes military that are not on duty at the time of the attack), like political motivation, this element separates terrorism from an act of war or general crime; sub-national groups or clandestine agents – terrorism allows for independent actors and state-sponsored groups; influence – the act of violence is a message, this element returns to the political motivation behind terrorism.7

Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: illegal state repression; propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state and non-state actors.8

The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involve single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual-phase life-threatening incidents

5_{Boaz Ganor, ‗Defining Terrorism: Is One Man‘s Terrorist Another Man‘s Freedom Fighter? ICT Papers, 4, August 1998, pp.22-23, 29;} 6_{Boaz Ganor, ‗ The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers‘, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 2005, p.17}

7_{Schmid, Alex, Jongman, Albert, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, Amsterdam:}

North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988, p. 16

8 Idem

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(like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage taking for coercive bargaining), as well as multi-phase sequences of actions such as in ‗disappearances‘ involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder).9

Public (-ized) terrorist victimizations initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, one the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies, or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators.10

At the origin of terrorism stands terror - instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety - spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment.

The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenseless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to the acts of terrorism.11

The direct victims are not the ultimate target, (as in a classical assassination, where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims‘ plight or the terrorists‘ professed cause.

Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams).

While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime, as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but almost always in its societal repercussions. 12

The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favorable power outcome, for example obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, obtaining submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public. 13

9_Idem

10_{Hoffman, Bruce (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press, p. 43} 11_{Ibidemp. 60}

12_{Ibidemp. 72} 13

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The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives.

The following ten elements cover core features of terrorism: the demonstrative use of violence against human beings; the conditional threat of more violence; the deliberate production of terror or fear in a target group; the targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents; the purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda; the act that it is a method, tactic or strategy of waging conflict; the importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences; the illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence; the predominantly political character of the act; its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public. 14

The phenomenon of terrorism in religious movements is not a new one. ―Historically, all three Abrahamic traditions have experienced the rise of radical offshoots that promote extreme interpretations of religion and engage in ‗holy‘ violence to promote worldly political objectives. The same can be said for nearly all non-Abrahamical traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on. Those who want to promote a peaceful agenda that includes compromise with former enemies and accommodation with extant political elites will find in their religious tradition the requisite verses and symbols for peace. Those who want to promote a militant agenda, that includes anti-civilian violence and rebellion against incumbent governments will find in their religion the required verses and symbols for war.‖15

Thus, the best way to proceed analytically is by looking at the political agendas of religious groups, the conditions that may encourage them to turn to violence, and the dynamics of contention that facilitate their growth or decline. There is hardly any evidence to suggest that the content of religion is sufficient to give rise to political extremism and terrorism. All world religions have periods of peace and periods of extreme violence.

The review of typological work in terrorism has shown that there is great variety in both the approaches and the conceptual lenses utilized. Arguably, this is because of the range of contexts in which terrorism can occur. From those whose state support affords them impunity, to those who have too few reservations about victimizing the innocent, and those ‗true fanatics‘ who believe their apparently noble ends justify the use of generally ignoble means - the range of motivations and circumstances in which terrorism is used is considerable Further complexities arise, as terrorism is sometimes used as the sole instrument to further a group‘s aims, while other groups use it as one instrument among several tactics that can vary in their legality, justification and impact. Since there is no typical psychological terrorist profile and since most terrorist are normal in a clinical sense

14_{Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p.70} 15

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(albeit not it a moral one), typologies of terrorism that take the terrorist actor as their main criterion for classification are bound to be of limited value. 16

The various typologies considering the motivation and purpose of terrorist groups incorporate, inter alia, structural causes, and political and ideological motivation. They respond to the question of why groups resort to terrorism, either with respect to their own internal justifications, or through the wider influences present in the environment. The debate on ‗root causes‘ and terrorist groups justifications is one, and it necessitates multiple levels of analysis, implicating historical, social, political, ideology, group and individual psychology. What would be most helpful is a layered approach allowing the exploration of different levels of analysis within a unified framework of hypothesized causes and justifications for terrorism.

The typologies outlining the conflict zone from and in which terrorists operate broadly identify similar features: that terrorist can operate both within and outside their home territory, and that they can potentially do so at a number of levels ranging from domestic, through regional, to international and transnational terrorism and, finally, global terrorism. There is no doubt that locations matter, especially when it comes to issues of jurisdiction and for determining who should take the lead in dealing with terrorist and other militant activists who transgress both geographical and moral boundaries. The increasingly high profile of cross-border terrorism makes this particular aspect or terrorist investigation one of considerable pertinence, with these typologies providing a platform on which to position debate. 17

The various attempts to devise new typologies looking at how terrorist operate may be of some use to counter-terrorists, as they enable them to identify potential organizational weaknesses. They might also sensitize to the evolving nature of terrorist groups. However, given the level of specificity required to verify empirically these typological conceptualizations, sufficient information may be hard to gather, reducing their practical and theoretical utility.

A number of developments have been seen in the review of more contemporary typological attempts, with an increased focus on root causes, temporal dimensions and organizational make-up. Some conceptualizations considered structural causes of terrorism, including historical and cultural factors as well as other actors‘ influence, and those of supporters and opponents. Distinguishing between different periods of terrorism has also emerged as a useful approach, with Rapoport‘s four waves of terrorism18 gaining considerable credence. A similar debate is emerging over the genesis of a new type of terrorism. Finally, a new development has been seen in the analysis of the organizational make-up of the terrorist group, with a number of conceptualizations presented

16_{Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 246} 17_{Ibidemp. 341}

18

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including networks, dune organizations, and analogies to company structures aiming to inform analysis.

Religion has an ambiguous relationship with violence in general. Although religion is often associated with positive values such as compassion and peace, the mythology of most world religions is filled with violent images and bloody histories.

The main problem is studying the role played by religious radicalism (extremism) in motivating, supporting, justifying, and guiding a certain group‘s terrorist activity can be most evidently demonstrated by the case of Islamist terrorism. The problem is that while religious extremism may serve as a powerful driving force and/or be effectively instrumentalized to guide/justify terrorist activity, it does not necessarily or automatically lead to terrorism or indeed, to violence. It should also be stressed that groups using terrorist means in the name of religion do not necessarily represent some ‗deviant sects‘, but are often guided by a radical interpretation of religion‘s basic tenets, concepts and notions, such as the radical militant interpretation of a traditional and essential Islamic concept of jihad19. Still, while Islamist jihadi terrorism has become the main form of transnational (in fact, supra-national) terrorism over the recent decade, it does not mean that all Islamist (radical Islamic) movements include jihad in a set of their first priorities and are ready to use violence, particularly against civilians (e.g. the strongly extremist Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement in Central Asia has consciously opted not just for abstaining from the use of terrorist means, but for non-violence in general.20

Religion provides an additional operating and motivational space for violence that other secular ideologies cannot provide. On the margin, the benefits of religion-sanctioned violence can be argued to prove that divine benefits that will always exceed secular costs for those committed to religious violence. For example, the perpetrator‘s personal utility derived from ‗eternal salvation‘ will always trump the risk of imprisonment or even actual imprisonment to an adherent of an organization that uses religiously motivated violence. By dancing around the subject of religion and violence, analysts deprive themselves of this insight that in a fundamental way, religious (ideologies) can motivate different kinds of violence as compared with secular ideologies.21

There is no direct relationship between terrorism and religion. But religious extremists are commonly using incitement and brainwashing messages in order to provoke their followers to use terrorism in order to fulfill the so-called divine command. Religion is also used to challenge the internationally widely accepted laws of war, and permit in the name of God deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian targets. Religious extremists are sometimes trying to justify their

19_{David C. Rapoport, Terrorism: The fourth or religious wave, Taylor & Francis, 2006, p. 345} 20_{Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 250}

21_{KürşadTuran, Menderes Çinar, Religious versus Secular Politics: Competing Ideologies in a Changing System, OrtadoğuEtütleri, Volume 4, No 2,}

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wrongdoing as a defensive war that is designed to protect their religion from malicious intent of other religions with the cooperation of the ―infidels‖ from their own religion. In many cases the religious extremist provocateurs have concrete political goals which they are trying to achieve – revolting against regimes, demolishing ―infidel‖ states, or creating a new religious political entity.22

There is something in all religious forms of terrorism, and that is radicalization. There are some complex mental processes at work in the radicalization process, for empirical observations, the more grounded theory of Silbner and Bhatt is useful. In their study, conducted for the New York Police Department, they envisage four steps23.

Pre-radicalization is the first step: the life situation before vulnerable individuals were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology, The majority of individuals involved in almost a dozen plots began as ‗unremarkable‘, had ‗ordinary‘ jobs, had lived ‗ordinary‘ lives and had little, if any criminal history.24

Self-identification is the second step: the phase were individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for the ‗religious seeking ‗ is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one‘s certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews. There can be many types of triggers: economic (losing a job, blocked mobility); social (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived); political (international conflicts involving Muslims); and personal (a death in the close family).25

Indoctrination is the third step: the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology, and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause. That action is militant jihad. This phase is typically facilitated and driven by a ‗spiritual sanctioner‘. While the initial self-identification process may be an individual act, as noted above, association with like-minded people is an important factor as the process deepens. By the indoctrination phase, this self-selecting group becomes increasingly important as radical views are encouraged and reinforced.26

Jihadization is the fourth step: the phase in which members of the cluster accepts their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack. These ‗acts in furtherance‘ will include planning, preparation and execution. 27

22_{Boaz Ganor, ‗ The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers‘ New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 2005, p.35} 23_{Mitchell D. Silber, Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, Police Department, 2007}

24_{Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 246} 25_{Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism,Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 246} 26_Idem

27 Idem

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Therefore, religion isn`t the main cause of terrorism, but there are some potential religious causes of terrorism: political and economic grievances are the primary causes or catalysts, and religion becomes a means to legitimate and mobilize; even though religion may not be the sole cause of terrorism, it can exacerbate the situation. Religion brings to a situation of conflict images of grand struggle and an abiding absolutism. Religion is often centered on themes that can be inherently polarizing – concepts of truth, notions of good, of absolutes and ultimate realities; religion can contribute to a culture of violence where violence becomes a ‗defining issue‘ in the identity of activist groups; examples of religious terrorism can be found in all religious traditions, not one religious tradition holds a monopoly in violence, and all religious traditions can be used to justify acts of destruction and aggression; regarding its role in conflict, religion is seldom the problem, but the role of religion can be problematic.28

ii. Intelligence and Counter-terrorism

Intelligence is as hard to define as terrorism and has the same theoretical dilemmas and as many definitions as terrorism. To many people, intelligence seems little different from information, except that it is probably secret. However, it is important to distinguish between the two. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it may be discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policymakers and has been collected, refined, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information; intelligence and the entire process by which it is identified, obtained and analyzed respond to the needs of policymakers. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.

Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First, much of what goes on is secret. Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some information from other governments, which, in turn, seek to discover hidden information be means that they wish to keep secret. All of this secrecy leads some authors to believe that there are issues about which they cannot write or may not have sufficient knowledge. Thus, they feel the need to describe the limits of their work. Although numerous aspects of intelligence are – and deserve to be- kept secret, this is not an impediment to describing basic roles, processes, functions and issues.29

Secrecy does make intelligence unique. That others would keep important information from us, that we need certain types of information and wish to keep our needs secret, and that we have

28_{Ibidemp. 249}

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the means to obtain information that we also wish to keep secret are major reasons for having intelligence agencies.

When we use the word intelligence, we are largely referring to issues related to national security – that is, defense and foreign policy and certain aspects of internal security. The actions, policies and capabilities of other nations are primary areas of concern.

Most people tend to think of intelligence in terms of military information – troop movements, weapon capabilities, and plans for surprise attack. This is an important component of intelligence (in line with avoiding surprise attack, the first reason for having intelligence agencies), but it is not the only one. Many different kinds of intelligence – political, economic, social, environmental health, and cultural – provide important inputs to analysts. Policymakers and intelligence officials also must think beyond foreign intelligence. They must consider intelligence activities focused on threats to internal security, such as subversion, espionage and terrorism.

Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintellingence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.30

Intelligence can be thought of as a process, the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted. Intelligence can be thought of as a product of these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves. Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various functions, therefore an organization.

The following are the most frequently mentioned countermeasures for terrorism, in declining order of perceived effectiveness: intelligence, inter-agency and international information sharing and cooperative action; cutting off many of the sources of funding of terrorists; a prudent foreign policy; international consensus over the definition and scope of terrorism; limiting the spread of terrorist ideology through propaganda and the internet; educating the public about what to do if an attack is suspected, and after an attack; providing counter-terrorism assistance to countries lacking expertise; military cooperation; improved borders, airport and maritime security; deterrence; public support and involvement; remedying root causes; international peace building and state building in failed or weak states; arrests of key members or groups; solid alliances-no seams between states which terrorists can exploit; sorting out politics and ethics: support for

30_{Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence" Understanding Our Craft Michael Warner}

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democracy or for anti-fundamentalist non-democratic regimes; scientific community R&D, e.g. on early warning/detection; decoupling from religion; isolation of radicals.31

Counter-terrorism incorporates the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt to attack terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed. While intelligence is the key to selective counter-terrorism not targeting broad segments of the public, intelligence gathering on underground conspiracies in open societies faces human rights and privacy concerns. Intelligence efforts are also hampered by the increasing use of encryption by terrorists, their use of unfamiliar foreign languages, and the sheer volume of intelligence gathered automatically from intercepted phone calls, emails and other electromagnetically transmitted communications which have to be read and interpreted in actionable time to be of operational use.32

Counterterrorism intelligence is of three categories33: strategic, tactical and psychological. Strategic: Intelligence about the organization of the terrorist organizations,leadership, intentions, aims, modus operandi, sources of funds, weapons and means attheir disposal, contacts with external elements, including foreign intelligence agencies,etc.

Tactical: Intelligence which relates to the specific plans of terrorist action, alsocalled preventive and indications-and-warning intelligence, which would enable the stateto preempt terrorist action, prevent attacks, and frustrate terrorist plans.

Psychological: Intelligence which covers details of psychological warfare propaganda of the terrorists against the state that need to be countered, and data relatingto the terrorists, which enable the state to mount its own psychological warfare againstthem. Indicators of discontent against the leadership in terrorist organizations, coercivemethods in the recruitment of volunteers, and misuse of children and women for terroristoperations are examples of such data.

While the coverage of strategic and psychological intelligence by the intelligenceservices in general seems to be satisfactory, the collection of tactical, preventive, andindications and warning intelligence has left much to be desired. This is due largely to thedifficulties in penetrating terrorist organizations for collection of human intelligence andtheir communications for the collection of signals intelligence.While strategic and psychological intelligence can be collected from open sources, peripheral secret sources, interrogation of captured or surrendered terrorists, analysis andexploitation of captured documents, IT hardware and software, precise preventive andindications and warning intelligence can generally be obtained only from moles in key positions in the terrorist organizations and through interception of communications.

31_{Richard Jackson, ‗Research for Counterterrorism: Terrorism Studies and the Reproduction of State Hegemony‘ 2008, p.49} 32_{Ibidemp. 51}

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The significance of intelligence in counter-terrorism stems from three main drivers34: its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity, its role in post-incident investigations, its contribution to preventive/protective security measures. Effective counter terrorism intelligence should focus on four areas35: prevention, pursuit, protection, preparedness. Prevention – addressing underlying causes of terrorism. That means, among other things, ensuring that every citizen enjoy the full protection of the law and are able to participate to the full in society. Pursuit – using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists. It should include joint working and intelligence-sharing between governments and law enforcement agencies. It aims to make borders more secure, to make identity theft harder and to curb terrorist access to financial sources. Protection – ensuring that reasonable security precautions are in place. Preparedness – making sure that one has the people and resources in place to respond effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack.

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Chapter 2 Case study: The Islamic State

―Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.‖36

To counter, by any means – military or through intelligence, an enemy that enormous and powerful as this terrorist group, we have to know what with are fighting with.

In order do to that, in this chapter and in the next one I will analyze the terrorist group (using most of the times ‗the Islamic State‘, ISIS or IS denomination). Looking it at from the intelligence perspective, as a counter terrorism specialist does, from the following points of view: historical background, ideology and objectives (both religious and political), system and structure (leadership, leader and authority), capabilities (military and manpower, weapons possession, territorial control, recruiting and training, means- finances and propaganda), modus operandi and tactics.

i. Historical background

The Islamic State is the most renowned Islamic extremist terrorist organization in the world. It has many names, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) or DAESH, from its Arabic name, ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyahfīl-ʿIrāq wash-Shām, leading to the acronym Da ish or Da eesh.

Even if it began to be ―famous‖ in June 2014, it is a group with history. The Islamic State takes pride in claiming the Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadeel al Nazal al Khalayleh) as its founder and inspiration, and it has been assiduously polishing his reputation through its online propaganda.37 In truth, Zarqawi was a local Jordanian hoodlum who discovered that he had an ability to inspire a following through the violent pursuit of an anti-State and anti-Shia agenda based loosely on the teachings of a fellow Jordanian, Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi (Isam Mohammad Tahir al Barqawi), one of the most famous contemporary salafist/takfiri preachers. Maqdisi‘s theories draw from the 14th Century scholar IbnTaymiyya 1263- 1328), who argued inter alia that Muslim rulers were not necessarily true Muslims and so could be overthrown, as well as from the ultra-conservative 18th century Saudi scholar, MohammedIbn ‗Abd al Wahhab. While a strong supporter of Al Qaeda, Maqdisi has condemned the actions of The Islamic State.38 They first met in Afghanistan in the 1990s and also spent time together in prison in Jordan in the same period.

36_{Sun Tzu, The art of war}

37_{July 2014 issue of Dabiq, The Islamic State‘s on-line English language magazine} 38

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The historical background of ISIS begun in the new era created in Iraq after the Americans took control of the country in 2003. The Second Gulf War led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the dismantling of the Iraqi army and the destruction of the existing governmental structure. As a result, a security and governmental vacuum was created and the country's fragile social fabric (in the middle of which was the volatile Sunni-Shi'ite schism) was severely damaged. Although in contact with al Qaeda at this time, Zarqawi regarded the Levant as a more important battleground than the West and generally kept his distance from Usama bin Laden and Aiman al Zawahiri.39 He set up a training camp in Western Afghanistan and established Jund al Sham (the Army of the Levant). It is believed that many of the Afghan characteristics of The Islamic State in organization and appearance may originate from Zarqawi‘s time in the country.40

The US invasion of Iraq provided Zarqawi an opportunity to build his organization, which he renamed al Tawhidwa al Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), and by August 2003 he was well enough established to launch three major attacks: against the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, the United Nations headquarters there, and the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, an important Shia shrine.

During the almost nine years (2003 – 2011) the United States army was stationed in Iraq, the Americans failed to establish effective Iraqi army and security forces to fill the newly-created security vacuum. While in Iraq, the Americans encouraged the establishment of what was supposed to be a democratic national Shi'ite regime headed by Nouri al-Maliki. However, the regime alienated the Sunni population, which had traditionally controlled the country; even though they were a minority (about 22% of the Iraqi population is Sunni Arabs – alongside the Kurds, who are also Sunnis – while about 60% of Iraqis are Shi'ites)41. The branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, established in 2004, entered the security vacuum and took advantage of the increasing political-societal Sunni alienation: it became an important actor in the insurgent organizations fighting the American army, became stronger after the withdrawal of the American troops at the end of 2001, and spread to Syria after the civil war began in March 201142. The establishment of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq and Syria occurred in four stages:

Stage One (2004-2006) – The establishment of the branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and called ―Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia‖ It waged a terrorist-guerilla war against the American and coalition forces and against the Shi'ite population. In 2004, after much discussion, Zarqawi joined al Qaeda and changed the name of his group to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), also known as ‗Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers‘ and ‗Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia‘. Zarqawi believed an

39_{Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, Robert A. Guffey, The Iraq Effect The Middle East After the Iraq War by,}

RAND Corp, 2010, pp. 115-120

40_Idem

41_{Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis, Center for Strategic and International Studies January 6, 2014}

http://csis.org/files/publication/130106_Iraq_Book_AHC-sm.pdf

42 Idem

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association with al Qaeda would attract recruits and funds, while bin Laden needed a presence in Iraq as the most active front for ‗jihad‘ at that time. Bin Laden may also have hoped to limit Zarqawi‘s ability to challenge al Qaeda‘s leading role by accepting him as a subordinate. Zarqawi then brought together several other groups to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council in early 2005. Zarqawi died in an American airstrike in mid-2006 and soon afterwards, under its new leader, Abu Hamza al Muhajir, an Egyptian close to Zawahiri, the group again joined with others to become The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), headed by Abu Omar al Baghdadi. ISI was thus the local al Qaeda affiliate. The first stage ended when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in an American targeted attack in June 2006.43

Stage Two (2006-2011) – Establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI): ISI served as an umbrella network for several jihadi organizations that continued waging a terrorist-guerilla campaign against the United States, its coalition allies and the Shi'ite population. ISI was weakened towards the end of the American presence in Iraq following successful American military moves and a wise foreign policy that supported the Sunni population and knew how to win their hearts and minds. Abu Hamza and Abu Omar were killed together in 2010, by which time the movement had been severely degraded even though it had allied with many secularist opponents of the Iraqi regime who found themselves excluded from power as ex Ba‘athists. It was at this point that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (originally named Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al Badri al Samarrai) became leader of the movement and set about rebuilding it, largely through a relentless campaign of car bombs and suicide bombing attacks, but subsequently much helped by the Syrian civil war, which began in earnest around May 2011.

Stage Three (2012-June 2014) – The strengthening of ISI and the founding of ISIS: After the American army withdrew from Iraq ISI became stronger. Following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war ISI established a branch in Syria called the Al-Nusra Front ("support front"). Dissension broke out between ISI and its Syrian branch, leading to a rift between ISI and Al-Qaeda and the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).44

Stage Four (as of June 2014) – Dramatic ISIS military achievements: The most prominent was the takeover of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. At the same time ISIS established its control in eastern Syria where it set up a governmental center (its "capital city") in Al-Raqqah. In the wake of its success, ISIS declared the establishment of an "Islamic State" (IS) (or "Islamic Caliphate") headed by an ISIS leader named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In September 2014 the United States

43_{ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014}

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20733

44 Idem

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declared a comprehensive campaign against ISIS, which is currently waging a fierce struggle against its many enemies both at home and abroad.45

Before declaring the Caliphate, ISIS had conducted some market research through social media to judge the likely reaction. It had also approached several other ‗jihadist‘ groups; for example, Abu Bakr is said to have approached Nasser al Wuhaishi, the military commander of al Qaeda and the head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)46, who - unsurprisingly – rebuffed him.47 He met a similar response from other leaders though he did receive some support from within Libya, Tunisia, and the Sinai.48

Although the consensus opinion was that the declaration of a Caliphate would be premature because the group‘s control of territory was not yet firm enough, Abu Bakr decided that he had more to gain than to lose, and may also have been deceived by his own appreciation of his historic role. Jabhat al Nusra has since shown that it faces similar disagreements over raising its status, in this case to become an Islamic Emirate or State.49 A supposedly leaked tape of Golani announcing an Islamic State in four areas of Syria under al Nusra control on 12 July 2014 was followed by a partial retraction and some confusion.50

Although Abu Bakr has failed to achieve a significant number of pledges of allegiance to the Caliphate, even from salafist/takfiri groups,51 that does not mean that they all oppose him. Even AQAP has said that it respects the achievements of The Islamic State, even though it does not endorse its claim to leadership. At first the lack of endorsement may have made Abu Bakr appear something of a clown elsewhere in the Muslim world, but his dramatic appearance in Mosul on 4 July, heavy with symbolism that will have impressed some Muslims who watched his performance, and the sheer determination of his fighters in the field, despite the growing alliance against them, have at the very least attracted worldwide interest and admiration among extremists.

On the first day of Ramadan 28 June 201452, following rapid territorial gains, which included the capture of Mosul on 10 June, ISIS declared the revival of the Caliphate53, naming it The Islamic State and Abu Bakr as Caliph Ibrahim.54 The declaration was intended as a rallying call to all observant Muslims, but in particular those who shared the salafist/takfiri views expressed by

45_{ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 2014}

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20733

46_{However, AQAP, like other AQ affiliates, supports the objectives of The Islamic State even though it does not support the declaration of the}

Caliphate.

47

http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18219 which reports the Twitter leaks of a former member of The Islamic State who defected to Jabhat al Nusra.

48_{From Ansar al-Sharia branches and AnsarBayt al-Maqdis. JM Berger analysis}

http://jihadology.net/category/other-groups/jamaat-an%E1%B9%A3ar-bayt-al-maqdis/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/islamic_state_vs_al_qaeda_next_jihadi_super_power

49_{http://eaworldview.com/2014/07/syria-daily-jabhat-al-nusra-denies-declared-islamic-emirate/}

50_{http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jul-14/263738-nusra-plans-own-islamic-emirate-insyria}

51_{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10943404/Most-Muslims-dont-care-about-the-Isis-Caliphate.html}_. 52_{Sunni rebels declare new ‗Islamic caliphate‘}_{http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new}

islamiccaliphate-201462917326669749.html

53_{The last Caliphate, run by the Ottoman Turks, was dissolved by the Turkish Government in 1924.}

54_{In his first address as Caliph on 4 July, Abu Bakr argued that as soon as Muslims controlled territory that was administered according to Islamic}

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The Islamic State, and so draw away support from like-minded groups in Syria, including al Nusra, that might compete for recruits and resources. As Caliph, he demands the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, according to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). When the Caliphate was proclaimed, ISIL stated: ―The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's (caliphate's) authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.‖ This was a rejection of the political divisions in the Middle East that were established by Western powers during World War I in the Sykes–Picot Agreement.

The declaration was also a direct challenge to the authority of Zawahiri and the role of Mullah Omar, who until then had been the undisputed Amir al Mu‘minin Leader of the Faithful).55

At Friday prayers at the Grand Mosque of al Nuri in Mosul on 4 July, in his first address as Caliph, Abu Bakr claimed that he had reluctantly accepted the title at the behest of the community of Islamic scholars, albeit that they remained unidentified and silent. The rapid conquest of Mosul and the declaration of the Caliphate caused a brief surge in new recruits56, but did not achieve the impact that supporters of The Islamic State had expected or hoped for.57

ii. Ideology and objectives

The Islamic State has a complex ideology and set of beliefs. Coming from Islam, or a particular interpretation of it, their ideology is a combination of political, societal and religious concepts, which not only favor their plans and objectives, but give them a good cover-up for all the atrocities.

Aside from a lust for power, the driving ideological force behind The Islamic State comes from two very different directions, though both have a common theme. The first and now dominant strand is the fundamentalist canon of Islamic opinion that stretches from the 14th Century scholar Ibn Taymiyya through Muhammad ibnʿAbd al Wahhab, who died in 1792, to modern day salafist ideologues. Essentially their interpretation of Islam demands the harsh and absolute rejection of any innovation since the times of the Prophet. They argue that any diversion from puritanical precepts that they draw from a literal reading of the Quran and the Hadith is blasphemy, and must be eradicated. It follows therefore that Shi‘ism, Sufism or essentially anything - and anyone - that does not conform to their interpretation of Islam, should be destroyed. This is the essence of takfirism58. The Islamic State therefore claims legitimacy for its violence by arguing that all its actions are in

55_{A title adopted by Caliphs since the 7}th_{Century, but less presumptuous than the title itself.}

56_{6,300 in July alone according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights}_._{http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/19/us}

syriacrisis-islamicstate-idUSKBN0GJ0W420140819.

57_{http://news.intelwire.com/2014/07/the-caliphate-so-far-flatlining.html}_{, and}

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/islamic_state_vs_al_qaeda_next_jihadi_super_power.

58

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the interest of reviving Islam, returning it to its pure form, uniting the Muslim world under truly Islamic rule, and so restoring the dignity and greatness of its people while fulfilling the orders of God.

This ideology comes from this extreme interpretation of the Quran and has all its roots in the Caliphate concept. The political manner, in which they understand the state, is also a religious concept. Basically, their entire ideology is built on various ways of performing anything it takes, especially promoting religious violence and punishing those who do not agree with this interpretation, perceived as infidels or apostates to purify Islam of its flaws and return to what was perceived as the Golden Age of Islam.

The three most important concepts that lay at the base of the ideology of ISIS are the Caliphate, jihad and takfiri. On a very minimalist way of explaining their beliefs, these three concepts mean that: they want to restore an age when all of the Muslims lived in peace and they were pure, through a holy war and without mercy towards those who are infidels or apostates.

Religious ideology

The religion aspect is the core of the Islamic State`s ideology and not only. Their entire existence can be seen as a violent religious group.

ISIS is an Islamic Salafist-jihadi organization. Salafism is an extremist Sunni political-religious movement within Islam that seeks to restore the golden era of the dawn of Islam, the time of the prophet Muhammad and the early Caliphs who followed him (the Arabic word Salaf means ancestor or first generation). That is to be done, according to Salafist jihadist ideology, by jihad (a holy war) against both internal and external enemies. Jihad, according to Salafist jihadism, is the personal duty of every Muslim. ). The modern Salafist movement began in Egypt, a result of the desire to purify Islam of its flaws and return to what was perceived as the Golden Age of Islam. Al-Qaeda and the global jihad organizations (of which ISIS is the most powerful one) sprang from Salafist jihadism. It follows an extreme interpretation of Islam, promotes religious violence, and regards those who do not agree with its interpretations as infidels or apostates. ―Initially, the Salafist movement focused on religious studies and the winning of hearts and minds (da‗wah) as a way of creating an Islamic society and a state ruled by Islamic law. However, within the Salafi movement an extremist faction called Salafiyya Jihadiyya (i.e., jihadi Salafism) developed, from which Al-Qaeda and the global jihad organizations, including ISIS, have emerged.‖59 An ideologically important contribution to the development of the movement was made by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian ideologue whose ideas inspired the establishment of Islamic

59

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organizations that supported violent struggle (including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden‘s successor as leader of Al-Qaeda).

According to Hayder al Khoei, a repected Islamic scholar, a researcher at the Centre for Academic Shi'a Studies,―ISIL`s philosophy is represented by the symbolism in the Black Standard variant of the legendary battle flag of Muhammad that it has adopted: the flag shows the Seal of Muhammad within a white circle, with the phrase above it, ‗There is no God but Allah‘‖60. In Arabic this is called Shahadah - declaring there is no god except God, and Muhammad is God's Messenger and it represents the first pillar of the Islamic religion. ―Such symbolism has been said to point to ISIL's belief that it represents the restoration of the caliphate of early Islam, with all the political, religious and eschatological ramifications that this would imply.‖61

Even though most of the educated Muslim world doesn`t admit it, and is fair to understand why, probably many Christians didn`t identify themselves with those who were fighting in the Crusades, also most of them nor believe today it was representative for their religion, the reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Because the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.

Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, ―the Prophetic methodology‖, which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn‘t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it. The intelligence community has to get acquainted with the Islamic State‘s intellectual genealogy if their efforts will be more than efforts, but actual solutions.

The focus on religion is also evident in the education system, so far as it exists. Schools teach little more than the main Islamic subjects of aqida (belief), fiqh (jurisprudence), and sira (life of the Prophet). There appears to be no provision for general education or vocational training. Artistic expression is considered of no importance and music is banned. The Islamic State therefore appears keener to ensure that the next generation is fully indoctrinated into its propaganda and accepts its salafist/takfiri interpretation of Islam, than it is capable of performing any useful function in society.

Political doctrine

Before stating what their political doctrine is formed of, it`s important for any kind of ruling to look at how they see peace. We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of

60_{Hayder al-Khoei discusses Iraq crisis on BBC News}_{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_FPo1kaymo}

61 Idem

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principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of - and headline player in - the imminent end of the world.

The Caliphate

―The political dimension of Islam is embedded in the concept of khilafah that finds its literal meaning in niyabah (representation) and amanah (trusteeship). According to the Qur‘an and Sunnah, khilafah is the basic nature of rule or the character of Islamic rule, not a specific form of government.‖62

According to the ISIS concept, Islam's golden era will be restored through the establishment of a supranational Islamic Caliphate modeled after the regimes of the first Caliphs after the death of Muhammad. They view the caliphate as the only righteous government on Earth and it has to be ruled by Islamic religious law, the Sharia, but not in the same manner as some countries in the Middle East that are ruled by this law, instead, they will rule the Caliphate according to its most extreme interpretation (ISIS does not recognize nation-state legitimacy or the national borders of the Middle East as outlined in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and formulated by the superpowers during and after the First World War). Because, according to the Salafist-jihadi perception, the enemies of Islam are not only external (mainly the US and the West), but also Arab regimes that cooperate with the West or secular Arab regimes that are considered ―infidel‖ Therefore, according to Salafist jihadists, Islamic religious law justifies overthrowing them.

Their leader, Baghdadi spoke at length of the importance of the Caliphate in his Mosul sermon. He said that to revive the institution of the caliphate—which had not functioned except in name for about 1,000 years—was a communal obligation. He and his loyalists had ―hastened to declare the caliphate and place an imam‖63

at its head, he said. ―This is a duty upon the Muslims— a duty that has been lost for centuries. The Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it.‖64

Like bin Laden before him, Baghdadi spoke floridly, with frequent scriptural allusion and command of classical rhetoric. Unlike bin Laden, and unlike those false caliphs of the Ottoman Empire, he is Qurayshi. The Islamic prophet, Muhammad was born into the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe and he considers himself coming from the same tribe, therefore, being the only one who has the right to become a caliph and rule the Muslim world to salvation.

62_{Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State: True Concept and Eradicating Misconceptions (Khilafah), Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, 2009 ,}

p. 8

63_{ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi first Friday sermon as so-called 'Caliph'}

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/07/ISIS-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdidi-first-Friday-sermon-as-so-called-Caliph-.html

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Before the caliphate, ―maybe 85 percent of the Sharia was absent from our lives‖,65―These laws are in abeyance until we have khilafa‖66 -a caliphate- ―and now we have one.‖67 Without a caliphate, for example, individual vigilantes are not obliged to amputate the hands of thieves they catch in the act. But create a caliphate, and this law, along with a huge body of other jurisprudence, suddenly awakens. In theory, all Muslims are obliged to immigrate to the territory where the caliph is applying these laws.

The caliph is required to implement Sharia. Any deviation will compel those who have pledged allegiance to inform the caliph in private of his error and, in extreme cases, to excommunicate and replace him if he persists. (―I have been plagued with this great matter, plagued with this responsibility, and it is a heavy responsibility,‖68

Baghdadi said in his sermon.) In return, the caliph commands obedience—and those who persist in supporting non-Muslim governments, after being duly warned and educated about their sin, are considered apostates.

In their opinion, Sharia has been misunderstood because of its incomplete application by regimes such as Saudi Arabia, which does behead murderers and cut off thieves‘ hands. ―The problem‖, as they perceive it, ―is that when places like Saudi Arabia just implement the penal code, and don‘t provide the social and economic justice of the Sharia—the whole package—they simply engender hatred toward the Sharia.‖69

That whole package would include free housing, food, and clothing for all, though of course anyone who wished to enrich himself with work could do so. Health care is free. This provision of social welfare was not a policy choice of the Islamic State, but a policy obligation inherent in God‘s law. As a caliphate, the Islamic State must conduct its foreign policy through a jihad. It has already taken up what Islamic law refers to as ―offensive jihad,‖ the forcible expansion into countries that are ruled by non-Muslims. ―Hitherto, we were just defending ourselves‖70

, because without a caliphate, offensive jihad is an inapplicable concept. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph.

―Khilafah does not vest absolute authority in the ruler, whether it takes the form of a presidential government or a parliamentary government, rather his obedience is primarily to the Qur‘an and Sunnah which override any form which government might take. Therefore, if true Islamic rule is enforced and all governmental policies, injunctions, judicial and executive functions are subservient to the laws legislated by the Qur‘an and Sunnah, it can be considered to be khilafah regardless of the form of government being used.‖71

65_Idem 66_Idem 67_Idem 68_Idem

69_{What ISIS really wants by Graeme Wood}_{http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/} 70_Idem

71_{Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State: True Concept and Eradicating Misconceptions (Khilafah), Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications,}