Property Cases 3

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BACHRACH MOTORS V. TALISAY-SILAY MILLINGkn BACHRACH MOTORS V. TALISAY-SILAY MILLINGkn [G.R. NO. 35223. SEPTEMBER 17, 1931.]

[G.R. NO. 35223. SEPTEMBER 17, 1931.]

En Banc, Romualdez (J): 7 concurring En Banc, Romualdez (J): 7 concurring

Facts:

On 22 December 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the PNB. To secure the payment ofOn 22 December 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the PNB. To secure the payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property under to the bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property under that mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on the same date, and amended on 23 March 1928, that mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on the same date, and amended on 23 March 1928, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to 2% of the debt undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to 2% of the debt secured according to the yearly balance, the payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from time to secured according to the yearly balance, the payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from time to time, as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the time, as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such payment.

to make such payment.

<It seems Mariano Lacson Ledesma is indebted

case facts.>

Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount of P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on 30 June 1930, as bonus in of P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on 30 June 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise, and to pay accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise, and to pay Bachrach Motors a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by Bachrach Motors a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void. The PNB filed a third

said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void. The PNB filed a third

party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay-Silay answered the complaint that Mariano Lac

from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay-Silay answered the complaint that Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s creditson Ledesma’s credit (P7,500) belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it. Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an owner by (P7,500) belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it. Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an owner by purchase in good faith. At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar purchase in good faith. At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the P7,500 part of the credit in question, for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and Ledesma of the P7,500 part of the credit in question, for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7,500. And upon cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7,500. And upon conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the amount of P11,076.02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s bonus, and it ordered the central to deliver said sum amount of P11,076.02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s bonus, and it ordered the central to deliver said sum to Bachrach Motors. PNB appealed.

to Bachrach Motors. PNB appealed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, as it found no merit in the appeal;, without express The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, as it found no merit in the appeal;, without express finding as to costs.

finding as to costs.

1. Civil Fruits under Article 355 of the Civil Code

Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings;

second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue. According to the context of the law, the phrase “u otras analogas” refers only to rents or sources of revenue. According to the context of the law, the phrase “u otras analogas” refers only to rents or income, for the adjectives “otras” and “analogas” agree with the noun “rentas,” as do also the other adjectives income, for the adjectives “otras” and “analogas” agree with the noun “rentas,” as do also the other adjectives “perpetuas” and “vitalicias.” The “civil fruits” the Civil

“perpetuas” and “vitalicias.” The “civil fruits” the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things, to Code understands one of three and only three things, to wit:wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.

the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.

2. Bonus not a civil fruit; not an income of the land

The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the value, The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and independent of the property secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and independent of the property referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from the land, it is not civil fruits of that land. It is neither rent of referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from the land, it is not civil fruits of that land. It is neither rent of buildings, proceeds from lease of lands, or income under Article 355 of the Civil Code.

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Pacific Farms v. Esguerra [G.R. No. L-21783. November 29, 1969.] Pacific Farms v. Esguerra [G.R. No. L-21783. November 29, 1969.]

En Banc, Castro (J): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: On several occasions from 1 October 1956 to 2 March 1957 En Banc, Castro (J): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: On several occasions from 1 October 1956 to 2 March 1957 the Carried Lumber Company sold and delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. the Carried Lumber Company sold and delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. which the latter used in the construction of 6 buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan, of the total which the latter used in the construction of 6 buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan, of the total procurement price of P15,000, the sum of P4,710.18 has not been paid by Insular Farms, Inc. Consequently, on 17 procurement price of P15,000, the sum of P4,710.18 has not been paid by Insular Farms, Inc. Consequently, on 17 October 1958 the Company instituted Civil Case D-775 with the CFI Pangasinan to recover the said unpaid balance October 1958 the Company instituted Civil Case D-775 with the CFI Pangasinan to recover the said unpaid balance from the Insular Farms. On August 23, 1

from the Insular Farms. On August 23, 1 961 the trial court rendered ju961 the trial court rendered judgment sustaining the Company’s claim. Thedgment sustaining the Company’s claim. The judgment-debtor did not appeal;

judgment-debtor did not appeal; so on 19 so on 19 December 1961 December 1961 the corresponding writ of the corresponding writ of execution was issued. On execution was issued. On 1616 January 1962 the sheriff levied upon the 6 buildings. On 30 January 1962, the Pacific Farms filed a third-party claim January 1962 the sheriff levied upon the 6 buildings. On 30 January 1962, the Pacific Farms filed a third-party claim asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms by virtue of a deed of asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed on 21 March 1958, about 7 months before the Company filed the present action (Civil case absolute sale executed on 21 March 1958, about 7 months before the Company filed the present action (Civil case D-775). Shielded by an indemnity bond of P7,120 put up by the Company and the Cosmopolitan Insurance D-775). Shielded by an indemnity bond of P7,120 put up by the Company and the Cosmopolitan Insurance Company, the sheriff proceeded with the announced public auction on 12 February 1962 and sold the levied Company, the sheriff proceeded with the announced public auction on 12 February 1962 and sold the levied buildings to the Company for P6,110.78.

buildings to the Company for P6,110.78.

Asserting absolute and exclusive ownership of the buildings in question, the Pacific Farms filed a complaint on 14 Asserting absolute and exclusive ownership of the buildings in question, the Pacific Farms filed a complaint on 14 May 1962 against the Company and the sheriff with the CFI Pangasinan, praying that judgment be rendered, (a) May 1962 against the Company and the sheriff with the CFI Pangasinan, praying that judgment be rendered, (a) declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of the 6 buildings, and (b) adjudging the defendants jointly and declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of the 6 buildings, and (b) adjudging the defendants jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,000 by way of actual damages and for such amount as the court severally liable to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,000 by way of actual damages and for such amount as the court may deem proper and just to impose by way of exemplary damages and for costs of the suit. After due trial and on may deem proper and just to impose by way of exemplary damages and for costs of the suit. After due trial and on 30 May 1963, the court rendered judgment annulling the levy of 16 January 1962 and the certificate of sale of 12 30 May 1963, the court rendered judgment annulling the levy of 16 January 1962 and the certificate of sale of 12 February 1962. The court, however, denied the plaintiff’s claim for actual and exemplary damages on the ground February 1962. The court, however, denied the plaintiff’s claim for actual and exemplary damages on the ground tha

that it was not “prepared to find that there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any of thet it was not “prepared to find that there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any of the defendants.” Hence, the appeal.

defendants.” Hence, the appeal.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, and dismissed the complaint. The Court granted, however in view of The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, and dismissed the complaint. The Court granted, however in view of the equities attendant in the case, Pacific Farms a period of 30 days from the date of the finality of the judgment, the equities attendant in the case, Pacific Farms a period of 30 days from the date of the finality of the judgment, within which it may exercise the option of redeeming the 6 buildings, by paying Carried Lumber Company the sum within which it may exercise the option of redeeming the 6 buildings, by paying Carried Lumber Company the sum of P4,710.18 with legal interest from 23 September 1961 until the said amount shall have been fully paid; without of P4,710.18 with legal interest from 23 September 1961 until the said amount shall have been fully paid; without pronouncement as to costs.

pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-21783, Inc. v. Company, 32 SCRA 36 G.R. No. L-21783, Inc. v. Company, 32 SCRA 36 Republic of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila Manila EN BANC EN BANC DECISION DECISION March 25, 1970 March 25, 1970 G.R. No. L-21783 G.R. No. L-21783

PACIFIC FARMS, INC.

, plaintiff-appellee,, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

vs.

SIMPLICIO G. ESGUERRA, ET AL., defendants, CARRIED LUMBER COMPANY

, defendant-appellant., defendant-appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N R E S O L U T I O N

Castro,

J. J.

::

Subject of this resolution is a motion filed by the plaintiff-appellee Pacific Farms, Inc. for reconsideration of our Subject of this resolution is a motion filed by the plaintiff-appellee Pacific Farms, Inc. for reconsideration of our decision of November 29, 1969.

decision of November 29, 1969.

Briefly stated, the plaintiff-appellee's first a

Briefly stated, the plaintiff-appellee's first a rgument is that it should not have been found rgument is that it should not have been found liable for the payment ofliable for the payment of the unpaid portion of the procurement price of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant the unpaid portion of the procurement price of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant to its predecessor-in-interest, the Insular Farms, Inc., because it was a purchaser for value and in good faith of the to its predecessor-in-interest, the Insular Farms, Inc., because it was a purchaser for value and in good faith of the

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six buildings in question. The flaw in this argument lies in its assumption that the reason we held the appellee six buildings in question. The flaw in this argument lies in its assumption that the reason we held the appellee liable is that it was not a buyer in good faith and for value, which is incorrect. When we applied article 447 of the liable is that it was not a buyer in good faith and for value, which is incorrect. When we applied article 447 of the Civil Code by analogy to this case, we did so on the assumption that the plaintiff-appellee was in good faith. Thus, Civil Code by analogy to this case, we did so on the assumption that the plaintiff-appellee was in good faith. Thus, after quoting said article, we stated:

after quoting said article, we stated:

Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the six buildings were built is Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the six buildings were built is owned by the appellee, nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns the six buildings constructed out of the owned by the appellee, nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns the six buildings constructed out of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article 447 by lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went analogy, we perforce consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the values of the said materials; the appellant - which apparently has no desire to remove the obligation to pay for the values of the said materials; the appellant - which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings -has the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid

has the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. (Decision, pp. 4lumber and construction materials. (Decision, pp. 4 --5; emphasis supplied)

5; emphasis supplied)

Indeed, because we assumed that the appellee was in good faith, we did not pronounce it liable for the reparation Indeed, because we assumed that the appellee was in good faith, we did not pronounce it liable for the reparation of damages but only for the payment of the unpaid price of the lumber and construction materials due to the of damages but only for the payment of the unpaid price of the lumber and construction materials due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher thereof. Based on this same assumption, we likewise held that the appellant has no appellant as unpaid furnisher thereof. Based on this same assumption, we likewise held that the appellant has no right to remove the materials but only to recovery the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. right to remove the materials but only to recovery the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. Thus, since the appellee benefited from the accession, i.e., from the lumber and materials that went into the Thus, since the appellee benefited from the accession, i.e., from the lumber and materials that went into the construction of the six buildings, it should shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of construction of the six buildings, it should shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials, pursuant to the rule we cited in

materials, pursuant to the rule we cited in our decision that compensation should be borne by our decision that compensation should be borne by the person who hasthe person who has been benefited by the accession.

been benefited by the accession.

Under the overall environmental circumstances of the case, considering that although the appellee was in a better Under the overall environmental circumstances of the case, considering that although the appellee was in a better position to protect its own interest it took no action to intervene in the suit filed by the appellant against the position to protect its own interest it took no action to intervene in the suit filed by the appellant against the Insular Farms, Inc. or to hold the latter to account therefor, notwithstanding that it concededly acquired Insular Farms, Inc. or to hold the latter to account therefor, notwithstanding that it concededly acquired knowledge, after its purchase from the Insular Farms, Inc., on March 21, 1958 of the six buildings in question; of knowledge, after its purchase from the Insular Farms, Inc., on March 21, 1958 of the six buildings in question; of the filing and pendency of the appellant's suit for payment of the unpaid balance of the price of the lumber and the filing and pendency of the appellant's suit for payment of the unpaid balance of the price of the lumber and construction materials delivered to the Insular Farms, Inc. and used in the construction of the said buildings, the construction materials delivered to the Insular Farms, Inc. and used in the construction of the said buildings, the Court believes that its decision upholding the sheriff's sale of the six buildings but granting the appellee the option Court believes that its decision upholding the sheriff's sale of the six buildings but granting the appellee the option of redeeming the same by paying to the appellant the unpaid balance with interest owing to it as supplier of the of redeeming the same by paying to the appellant the unpaid balance with interest owing to it as supplier of the construction materials, is completely in consonance with justice and equity.

construction materials, is completely in consonance with justice and equity.

ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff-appellee's motion for reconsideration dated December 12, 1969 is hereby denied. ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff-appellee's motion for reconsideration dated December 12, 1969 is hereby denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R.

G.R. No. No. L-44606 L-44606 November November 28, 28, 19381938 VICENTE STO. DOMINGO

VICENTE STO. DOMINGO BERNARDO,BERNARDO, plaintiff-appellant,plaintiff-appellant, vs.

vs.

CATALINO BATACLAN,

CATALINO BATACLAN, defendant-appellant.defendant-appellant. TORIBIO TEODORO,

TORIBIO TEODORO, purchaser-appellee.purchaser-appellee. Pedro de Leon for plaintiff-appellant. Pedro de Leon for plaintiff-appellant. Ange

Angel H. l H. MojiMojica aca and Fnd Francrancisco isco LaviLavides des for for defdefendendant ant appeappellanllant.t. Jose

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LAUREL,

J.: J.:

This is an appeal taken by

This is an appeal taken by both the plaintiff and the defendant from the order of September 26, 193both the plaintiff and the defendant from the order of September 26, 193 5, hereinabove5, hereinabove referred to, of the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Civil Case No. 2428.

referred to, of the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Civil Case No. 2428.

There is no controversy as to the facts. By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership There is no controversy as to the facts. By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of a parcel of land of about 90 hectares situated in sitio Balayunan, Silang, Cavite. To secure possession of the land of a parcel of land of about 90 hectares situated in sitio Balayunan, Silang, Cavite. To secure possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20, 1929, instituted Civil Case No. 1935 in the Court of First Instance of from the vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20, 1929, instituted Civil Case No. 1935 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. The trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court on appeal Cavite. The trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court on appeal (G.R. No. 33017).

(G.R. No. 33017). 1 1 When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Catalino When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in C

improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in C ase No. 1935, plaintiff, on ase No. 1935, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted againstJune 11, 1931, instituted against him, in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Civil Case No. 2428. In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but the him, in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Civil Case No. 2428. In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good fa

defendant was held to be a possessor in good fa ith, entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, ith, entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for workfor work done and improvements made. The dispositive part of the

done and improvements made. The dispositive part of the decision reads:decision reads: Both parties appealed to this court (G. R. No. 37319).

Both parties appealed to this court (G. R. No. 37319). 2 2 The decision appealed from was modified by allowing the The decision appealed from was modified by allowing the defendant to recover compensation amounting to P2,212 and by reducing the price at which the plaintiff could defendant to recover compensation amounting to P2,212 and by reducing the price at which the plaintiff could require the defendant to purchase the land in question from P300 to P200 per hectare. Plaintiff was given by this require the defendant to purchase the land in question from P300 to P200 per hectare. Plaintiff was given by this court 30 days from the date when the decision became final within which to exercise his option, either to sell the court 30 days from the date when the decision became final within which to exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from him. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff manifested to the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from him. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff manifested to the lower court his desire "to require the defendant to pay him

lower court his desire "to require the defendant to pay him the value of the land at the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare orthe rate of P200 per hectare or a total price of P18,000 for

a total price of P18,000 for the whole tract of land." The defendant informed the lower court that he was unable tothe whole tract of land." The defendant informed the lower court that he was unable to pay the land and, on January 24, 1934, an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the pay the land and, on January 24, 1934, an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant the sum of P2,212 stating that, in the event of failure to make

defendant the sum of P2,212 stating that, in the event of failure to make such payment, the land would be orderedsuch payment, the land would be ordered sold at public auction "

sold at public auction "Para hacer pago al demandante de la suma de P2,212 y el remanente despues de deducidosPara hacer pago al demandante de la suma de P2,212 y el remanente despues de deducidos los gastos legales de la venta en publica subasta sera entregado al demandante

los gastos legales de la venta en publica subasta sera entregado al demandante ." On February 21, 1934, plaintiff." On February 21, 1934, plaintiff moved to reconsider the foregoing order so that he would have preference over the defendant in the order of moved to reconsider the foregoing order so that he would have preference over the defendant in the order of payment. The motion was denied on March 1, 1934 but on March 16 following the court below,

payment. The motion was denied on March 1, 1934 but on March 16 following the court below, motumotu proprio

propriomodified its order of January 24, "modified its order of January 24, "en el sentido de que el demandante tiene derecho preferente al importeen el sentido de que el demandante tiene derecho preferente al importe del terreno no se vendiere en publica subasta, a razon de P200 por hectares y el remanente, si acaso lo hubiere se del terreno no se vendiere en publica subasta, a razon de P200 por hectares y el remanente, si acaso lo hubiere se entregara al demandado en pago de la cantidad de P2,212 por la limpieza del terreno y las mejoras introducidas en entregara al demandado en pago de la cantidad de P2,212 por la limpieza del terreno y las mejoras introducidas en el mismo por el citado demandado

el mismo por el citado demandado." On April 24, 1934, ." On April 24, 1934, the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and withoutwithout objection on the part of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The land was objection on the part of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The land was sold on April 5, 1935 to Toribio Teodoro, the highest bidder, for P8,000. In the certificate of sale issued to said sold on April 5, 1935 to Toribio Teodoro, the highest bidder, for P8,000. In the certificate of sale issued to said purchaser on the very day of sale, it was stated that the period of redemption of the land sold was to expire on purchaser on the very day of sale, it was stated that the period of redemption of the land sold was to expire on April 5, 1936. Upon petition of Toribio Teodoro the court below ordered the provincial sheriff to issue another April 5, 1936. Upon petition of Toribio Teodoro the court below ordered the provincial sheriff to issue another certificate not qualified by any equity of redemption. This was complied with by the sheriff on July 30, 1935. On certificate not qualified by any equity of redemption. This was complied with by the sheriff on July 30, 1935. On September 18, 1935, Teodoro moved that he be placed in possession of the land purchased by him. The motion September 18, 1935, Teodoro moved that he be placed in possession of the land purchased by him. The motion was granted by order of September 26, 1935, the dispositive part of which is as follows:

was granted by order of September 26, 1935, the dispositive part of which is as follows:

The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of these is the principle of The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of these is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that which is united to it accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that which is united to it either naturally or artificially. (Art. 353.) Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the either naturally or artificially. (Art. 353.) Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land (art. 358). Where, however, the planter, improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land (art. 358). Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced coownership" (vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced coownership" (vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent (art. 361). It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is the proper rent (art. 361). It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of acc

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4th ed., p. 213). In the case before us, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner 4th ed., p. 213). In the case before us, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to pay for the land.

of the improvements, to pay for the land.

The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. We do not doubt the validity of the premises stated. "

article 453 of the Civil Code. We do not doubt the validity of the premises stated. " Considera la ley tan saarada yConsidera la ley tan saarada y legitima la deuda, que, hasta que sea pagada, no consiente que la cosa se restituya all vencedor

legitima la deuda, que, hasta que sea pagada, no consiente que la cosa se restituya all vencedor ." (4 Manresa, 4th." (4 Manresa, 4th ed, p., 304.) We find, however, that the defendant has lost his right of retention. In obedience to the decision of ed, p., 304.) We find, however, that the defendant has lost his right of retention. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the this court in G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. The said defendant could have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession land. The said defendant could have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we have already said, requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the have already said, requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the owner of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of retention.

defendant herein lost his right of retention.

The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself (p. 22, bill of exceptions) and the purchase The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself (p. 22, bill of exceptions) and the purchase price of P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture of the situation thus price of P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture of the situation thus created between them, the defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to recover from the plaintiff the sum created between them, the defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212.

of P2,212.lawphi1.net lawphi1.net

The judgment of the lower court is accordingly

The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made in favor modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made in favor ofof the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. In all the respects, the same is affirmed, the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. In all the respects, the same is affirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered. Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur. Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

G.R.

G.R. No. No. L-12486 L-12486 August August 31, 31, 19601960 LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA

LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA,TORRALBA, petitioners,petitioners, vs.

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and

THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ,JARDENIO SANCHEZ, respondents.respondents.

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioners. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioners.

E.D. Mercado, J.V. Ong and J.T. Gonzales for respondents. E.D. Mercado, J.V. Ong and J.T. Gonzales for respondents.

GUTIERREZ DAVID,

J J

.:

This is a petition to review on

This is a petition to review on certioraricertioraria decision of the Court of Appeals.a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Leonor Grana and Julieta Torralba, defendants below and herein petitioners, were on April 13, 1951 sued by Leonor Grana and Julieta Torralba, defendants below and herein petitioners, were on April 13, 1951 sued by Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, respondents herein, before the Court of First Instance of Agusan, for the Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, respondents herein, before the Court of First Instance of Agusan, for the recovery of 87 square meters of residential land. After trial, the court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs, recovery of 87 square meters of residential land. After trial, the court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs, herein respondents, owners of the land in controversy and ordering petitioners to vacate and deliver it to said herein respondents, owners of the land in controversy and ordering petitioners to vacate and deliver it to said respondents and to pay a monthly rental of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the respondents and to pay a monthly rental of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same, plus attorney's fees and costs. The decision, on appeal, having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals with same, plus attorney's fees and costs. The decision, on appeal, having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the only modification of disallowing the award for attorney's fees, petitioners brought the case to this Court the only modification of disallowing the award for attorney's fees, petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present petition for review.

through the present petition for review.

The record discloses that sometime in 1909 a cadastral survey of Butuan, Agusan, was made by the Bureau of The record discloses that sometime in 1909 a cadastral survey of Butuan, Agusan, was made by the Bureau of Lands. In that survey, the parcel of land here in question was included as part of the lot belonging to Gregorio Lands. In that survey, the parcel of land here in question was included as part of the lot belonging to Gregorio Bongato and Clara Botcon for which Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) was issued in their favor on Bongato and Clara Botcon for which Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) was issued in their favor on February 12, 1923. On November 25, 1933, this lot was purchased by the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia February 12, 1923. On November 25, 1933, this lot was purchased by the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia

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More, and upon their death, the land was inherited by the respondents Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, the More, and upon their death, the land was inherited by the respondents Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, the former being the daughter of Marcos Bongato by his first marriage while the latter is the son of Eusebia More also former being the daughter of Marcos Bongato by his first marriage while the latter is the son of Eusebia More also by her first marriage.

by her first marriage.

Petitioners claim that the lands in Butuan were subsequently resurveyed due to conflicts and overlapping of Petitioners claim that the lands in Butuan were subsequently resurveyed due to conflicts and overlapping of boundaries. In that resurvey (TS-65 Butuan Cadastre), Gregorio Bongato's lot, according to petitioners, was boundaries. In that resurvey (TS-65 Butuan Cadastre), Gregorio Bongato's lot, according to petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and that of Isidaria Trillo, their predecessor in interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that identified as Lot No. 311 and that of Isidaria Trillo, their predecessor in interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) covers 295 square meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) covers 295 square meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of Butuan shows that Lot No. 311 has only 230 square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the cadastral survey of Butuan shows that Lot No. 311 has only 230 square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the latter area properly belongs to respondents and that the land

latter area properly belongs to respondents and that the land in question is part of the ain question is part of the a djoining land, Lot No. 310,djoining land, Lot No. 310, which belonged to their predecessor in interest.

which belonged to their predecessor in interest.

Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was erroneous or that it Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was erroneous or that it included part of the contigous land of

included part of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest as part of the lot now petitioners' predecessor in interest as part of the lot now covered by covered by OriginalOriginal Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138). Note that the difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138). Note that the difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the resurvey plan is 65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And No. 311 of the resurvey plan is 65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And what is more, the alleged sketch

what is more, the alleged sketch plan of the resurvey was not plan of the resurvey was not presented in evidence.presented in evidence.

Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the Torrens title Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. Said title has not been contested up issued way back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. Said title has not been contested up to the present, and, therefore, has become inconvertible evidence of the ownership of

to the present, and, therefore, has become inconvertible evidence of the ownership of the land covered by it. Wellthe land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the settled is the rule that a Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which it may be impugned (Reyes, et al.

period within which it may be impugned (Reyes, et al. vs.vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs.vs. Rivera, et al., 64 Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13).

Phil., 13).

Petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in not granting their motion for new trial on the ground of Petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in not granting their motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, likewise, cannot be sustained. The new evidence sought to be introduced was the newly discovered evidence, likewise, cannot be sustained. The new evidence sought to be introduced was the sketch plan of the second survey, which, with the employment of reasonable diligence would have easily been sketch plan of the second survey, which, with the employment of reasonable diligence would have easily been discovered and produced at the trial. Anyway, even if presented at the result of the case. If a subsequent discovered and produced at the trial. Anyway, even if presented at the result of the case. If a subsequent certificate of title cannot be permitted to prevail over a previous Torrens title (Reyes,

certificate of title cannot be permitted to prevail over a previous Torrens title (Reyes, et al,et al, vs.vs. Borbon, et al., Borbon, et al.,suprasupra)) with more reason should a resurvey plan not to be allowed to alter or modify such title so as to make the area of with more reason should a resurvey plan not to be allowed to alter or modify such title so as to make the area of the land therein described agree with that given in the plan. (See Government of the Philippines

the land therein described agree with that given in the plan. (See Government of the Philippines vs.vs. Arias, 36 Phil., Arias, 36 Phil., 195).

195).

Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by the Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment the right to appropriate as his own faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere to the builder of necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which stands the improvement. proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which stands the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige petitioners to must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article 448 of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article 448 of the new).

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In this connection, the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to pay monthly rentals of P10

In this connection, the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to pay monthly rentals of P10 .00 from the date.00 from the date of filing of the complaint until they actually vacate said land. A builder in good faith may not be required to pay of filing of the complaint until they actually vacate said land. A builder in good faith may not be required to pay rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. (Miranda

incurred by him. (Mirandavs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801; 51 Off. Gaz., 6226, see also Martinezvs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801; 51 Off. Gaz., 6226, see also Martinez vs.vs. Baganus, 28 Baganus, 28 Phil., 500; De Guzman

Phil., 500; De Guzmanvs.vs. De la Fuente, 55 Phil., 501; Kasilag De la Fuente, 55 Phil., 501; Kasilagvs.vs. Rodriguez, Off. Gaz., Supp., August 16, 1941, p. Rodriguez, Off. Gaz., Supp., August 16, 1941, p. 247).

247).

Petitioners further contend that he complaint should have been dismissed for nonjoinder of an indispensable Petitioners further contend that he complaint should have been dismissed for nonjoinder of an indispensable party, it being alleged that their mother Maria Cupin, who owns the land in question as part of her Lot No. 310, has party, it being alleged that their mother Maria Cupin, who owns the land in question as part of her Lot No. 310, has not been made a party defendant in the case. This contention, which was not raised in the trial court, deserves not been made a party defendant in the case. This contention, which was not raised in the trial court, deserves scant consideration. Petitioners clearly asserted ownership over the land in dispute as well as over Lot No. 310 in scant consideration. Petitioners clearly asserted ownership over the land in dispute as well as over Lot No. 310 in their answer to the complaint. They are consequently estopped from alleging

their answer to the complaint. They are consequently estopped from alleging otherwise.otherwise. As to petitioners' assertion that they should have been awa

As to petitioners' assertion that they should have been awa rded damages alleged to have been suffered by rded damages alleged to have been suffered by them inthem in their counterclaim, suffice it to say that petitioners failed to prove that they suffered any damage at all by reason their counterclaim, suffice it to say that petitioners failed to prove that they suffered any damage at all by reason of the filing of the complaint. Indeed, in the light of the view we have taken of the case, they could not have of the filing of the complaint. Indeed, in the light of the view we have taken of the case, they could not have substantiated their claim for damages.

substantiated their claim for damages.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is modified in the sense that respondents are hereby directed to In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is modified in the sense that respondents are hereby directed to exercise within 30 days from this decision their option to either buy the portion of the petitioners' house on their exercise within 30 days from this decision their option to either buy the portion of the petitioners' house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion of their land and petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they land or sell to said petitioners the portion of their land and petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the same and must pay reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time respondents made their must vacate the same and must pay reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time respondents made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the eland is considerably more than the choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the eland is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then petitioners may elect to rent the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon value of the improvement, then petitioners may elect to rent the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court of origin is hereby instructed to intervene and fix the terms the terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court of origin is hereby instructed to intervene and fix the terms thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the curt fixes

the lease or until the curt fixes such terms.such terms. So ordered without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered without pronouncement as to costs. G.R.

G.R. No. No. L-175 L-175 April April 30, 30, 19461946

DAMIAN IGNACIO, FRANCISCO IGNACIO and LUIS I

DAMIAN IGNACIO, FRANCISCO IGNACIO and LUIS IGNACIO,GNACIO, petitioners,petitioners, vs.

vs.

ELIAS HILARIO and his wife DIONISIA DRES, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of ELIAS HILARIO and his wife DIONISIA DRES, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan,

Pangasinan,respondents.respondents. Leoncio R. Esliza for petitioners. Leoncio R. Esliza for petitioners. Mauricio M. Monta for respondents. Mauricio M. Monta for respondents.

MORAN,

C.J.C.J.

::

This is a petition for

This is a petition for certiorari certiorari arising from a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan between the herein arising from a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan between the herein respondents Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the herein petitioners Damian, Francisco and respondents Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the herein petitioners Damian, Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court, presided over by Hon. Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court, presided over by Hon. Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. The dispositive part of the decision, hub of this controversy, follows: accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. The dispositive part of the decision, hub of this controversy, follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:

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(1) That the plaintiffs are the owners of the whole property described in transfer certificate of title No. (1) That the plaintiffs are the owners of the whole property described in transfer certificate of title No. 12872 (Exhibit A) issued in their name, and entitled to the possession of the same;

12872 (Exhibit A) issued in their name, and entitled to the possession of the same;

(2) That the defendants are entitled to hold the position of the residential lot until after they are paid the (2) That the defendants are entitled to hold the position of the residential lot until after they are paid the actual market value of their houses and granaries erected thereon, unless the plaintiffs prefer to sell them actual market value of their houses and granaries erected thereon, unless the plaintiffs prefer to sell them said residential lot, in which case defendants shall pay the plaintiffs the proportionate value of said said residential lot, in which case defendants shall pay the plaintiffs the proportionate value of said residential lot taking as a basis the price paid for the whole land according to Exhibit B; and

residential lot taking as a basis the price paid for the whole land according to Exhibit B; and (3) That upon defendant's failure to

(3) That upon defendant's failure to purchase the residential lot in question, said defendants shall removepurchase the residential lot in question, said defendants shall remove their houses and granaries after this decision becomes final and within the period of sixty (60) days from their houses and granaries after this decision becomes final and within the period of sixty (60) days from the date that the court is informed in writing o

the date that the court is informed in writing o f the attitude of the parties f the attitude of the parties in this respect.in this respect. No pronouncement is made as to damages and

No pronouncement is made as to damages and costs.costs.

Once this decision becomes final, the plaintiffs and defendants may appear again before this court for the Once this decision becomes final, the plaintiffs and defendants may appear again before this court for the purpose of determining their respective rights under article 361 of the Civil Code, if they cannot come to purpose of determining their respective rights under article 361 of the Civil Code, if they cannot come to an extra-judicial settlement with regard to said rights.

an extra-judicial settlement with regard to said rights. Subsequently, in a motion filed in

Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same Court of First Inthe same Court of First In stance but now presided over by the stance but now presided over by the herein respondentherein respondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad, the plaintiffs prayed for

Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither toexecution alleging that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendants should be ordered to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this motion which, after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by defendants objected to this motion which, after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by defendants praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b) an order to praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b) an order to compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or (c), compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or (c), a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement. a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement. The judgment rendered by Judge Felix is founded on articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code which are as follows: The judgment rendered by Judge Felix is founded on articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code which are as follows:

ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.

the one who sowed, the proper rent.

ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good

may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.to him.

Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the

expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in thing may have acquired in consequence thereof.consequence thereof. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case before us.

having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case before us.

We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings

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not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.

furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.

There is, however, in the decision of Judge Felix a question of procedure which calls for the clarification, to avoid There is, however, in the decision of Judge Felix a question of procedure which calls for the clarification, to avoid uncertainty and delay in the disposition of cases. In that decision, the rights of both parties are well defined under uncertainty and delay in the disposition of cases. In that decision, the rights of both parties are well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, but it fails to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, but it fails to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods

are erected as well as the periods of time within which the option may of time within which the option may be exercised and payment should be made,be exercised and payment should be made, these particulars having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final. This these particulars having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final. This procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution. And execution cannot be had,

can be done therewith except its execution. And execution cannot be had, the sheriff being ignorant as to how, forthe sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, and within what time may the option be exercised, and certainly no authority is vested in him to settle how much, and within what time may the option be exercised, and certainly no authority is vested in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never these matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never become final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters which become final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in

remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the instant case.the instant case.

For all the foregoing, the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad is hereby set aside and the lower court For all the foregoing, the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad is hereby set aside and the lower court ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings and of the ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected, as well as the period of time within which the plaintiffs-respondents may residential lot where they are erected, as well as the period of time within which the plaintiffs-respondents may exercise their option either to pay for

exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the last instance, the period of timethe last instance, the period of time within which the defendants-petitioners may pay for the land, all these periods to be counted from the date the within which the defendants-petitioners may pay for the land, all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment

judgment becomes becomes executory executory or or unappealable. unappealable. After After such such hearing, hearing, the the court court shall shall render render a a final final judgmentjudgment according to the evidence presented by the parties.

according to the evidence presented by the parties. The costs shall be paid by

The costs shall be paid by plaintiffs-respondents.plaintiffs-respondents. DEPRA v. DUMLAO,

DEPRA v. DUMLAO,

G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985 G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985

Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his. Dumlao built his house on Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his. Dumlao built his house on his own land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depra’s property. Upon finding this, Depra’s mom his own land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depra’s property. Upon finding this, Depra’s mom ordered Dumlao to move back from his encroachment, then subsequently filed an action for unlawful detainer ordered Dumlao to move back from his encroachment, then subsequently filed an action for unlawful detainer against Dumlao.

against Dumlao.

The lower court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay rent (PhP5.00/month) The lower court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay rent (PhP5.00/month) – – forced lease between the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals so Dumlao deposited this with the MTC. forced lease between the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals so Dumlao deposited this with the MTC. Neither party appealed judgment so this became final and

Neither party appealed judgment so this became final and executory.executory.

1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this, stating that the suit is 1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this, stating that the suit is barred by res judicata. But Depra averred that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of barred by res judicata. But Depra averred that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of real property

real property – – only the CFI has jurisdiction. only the CFI has jurisdiction. ISSUE:

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to the case at bar?

2. Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent payments by the court (with both LO and BPS 2. Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent payments by the court (with both LO and BPS being in good faith)?