and Radiation of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, Congress of the United
States, August 22, 1963.
6. Federal Radiation Council: Background Ma-terial for the Development of Radiation
Protection Standards, Protective Action Guides for Strontium, Strontium’ and Cesium”. Report No. 7, Max’ 1965.
7. Lade, J. H.: That 1953 fallout. Scietice, 141:
1109, 1963.
DISCUSSION
DR. Tiioipsox: I wish to comment on an
earlier portion of the program. In view of
the questions I have received it appears
that Dr. Chadwick’s and my answer to a
question misled some of you into thinking there are no epidemiological studies on the
St. George children. We have done
epide-miological studies and they are on paper.
We are waiting to see some of tile results of our analyses. At the moment we are dealing with a press release in connection with the clinical studies OIl these 13 children. That is
all. You can understand the tremendous
pressure on us, at least in the state of Utah, to find out what these 13 children have. The press and the public are not particularly in-terested at this point in all the rest of the analyses.
I would like to commend the state of
New York for their very broad,
comprehen-sive, radiological program, which has been
presented here. I wish all of the states,
in-eluding Utah, had it. We don’t. \Ve have
only part of what you have but I hope to
have the rest of it. I will confine my
re-marks to that portion with which we have
had some experience, namely, fallout. I will
not try to summarize the Utah experience; I
will refer you to publications-tile U. S.
Public Health Department releases, the
hearings before the Subcommittee of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of tile
Congress-and other areas.
I want to first clarify one or two points
made yesterday and today. It has been
stated that Utah did not use any numbers
in 1962. We did not use any numbers; but,
as we look back on our studies we find that
some numbers did come up. This wasn’t
planned; this was a judgment. In no
in-stance did we fail to take action when lev-els of 1,000 pc per liter of milk existed. In
every instance we did take decontrol
ac-tions when the level fell to 300 pCi per liter
of milk. This was on the individual dairies
and not on the Salt Lake Milk Pool. It was
truly a pinpointed situation. We had many
dairies in which we took no action
what-soever in the Salt Lake Milk Pool. I don’t
say we would use these same numbers again
if the same event occurred, or a
modifica-tion of the event, because at that time we
had the combination of fallout from
for-eign countries and from the United States.
This could change from time to time.
As you know, for a number of ‘ears we
have been developing a radiological system to give us early warning of potential
expo-sure of nuclear events, either domestic or
foreign. Beginning with a single monitoring
station in 1956, the system has evolved
through several stages to include, at the
present time, 21 stations, a milk monitoring
network of 15 grazing areas, and a
com-plete radiological laboratory.
In 1962, estimates made of gross beta ac-tivity in the air at Salt Lake City were re-lated to iodine’s’ in the Salt Lake Milk Pool in relationship to the series of Nevada tests
carried out in early July 1962. There was
little air effect until July 7, when tile level
peaked to 1,800 pCi. Dr. Mays mentioned
that there was also some monitoring being
done through Dr. Pendleton’s research
herds. Some were in operation, and for the
record I would like to make it clear we had
both sources of intelligence and not just the
herds. The milk curve on the Salt Lake
Milk Pool shows a peak which went above
2,000 pCi per liter of milk on August 25, and
then receded. We also had a second air
peak during the year, and, presumably, a
second peak on the milk. This was a
precip-itous rise in contrast to what happened in
the Midwest. Beginning in 1956, we had
seven other episodes. The air levels went as
high as 7,000 to 8,000 pCi. In those days
know what the milk was. We presume it was high also.
After tile event, ve studied 14 dairies in
the Salt Lake Milk Pool. From the 14
dair-ies we reduced it to tanker routes and
finally to individual herds. On July 25 a
peak of 6,000 pCi per liter of milk was seen. We now believe, from a study of this data,
we had some fallout much earlier in the
year, possibly as early as January. We also know that hay cut in this part of the state that was monitored in June was extremely
high, so obviously the event occurred
ear-her ill the year from some source.
The areas of production of the Salt Lake Milk Pool consitute two adjoining rectan-gular areas: one of which ranges generally south of the city to the Arizona line, with the other extending to tile east toward the
Colorado border. The monitoring stations
in Salt Lake City are for air. Tue high con-tamination areas were delineated by actual identification of herds; one herd was found
to go into Colorado and Wyoming.
In St. George and \Vashington counties, there have been instituted several air moni-toring stations. These stations extend up to the Idaho line. Had these stations been
op-erating in 1962, we would have been able
to have picked up tile highest point of fall-out and tile highest point of contamination.
Most of these air sampling stations are
sin-gle air sampling stations because we are
testing out different equipment, both high
and low volume samplers.
The location of our air sampling stations
now in use have been carefully selected to
give maximum information. The tanker
routes have been carefully picked out in
order to give us full coverage of grazing
areas for milk production in the state. In lay 1965, when the Chinese detonat-ed their second nuclear device, the system,
although not completed, had in operation
14 air monitoring stations and included
routine iodine analyses of milk from 13
grazing areas plus samples from the Salt
Lake Milk Shed. Thus, the Chinese event,
which has altered in minor disposition the
radioactive fallout in Utah, provided an
op-portunity to test the effectiveness of a near-ly completed network.
The bomb was detonated on May 14.
The beta and gamma field estimates
showed a peaking on May 20 and May 22.
A possible second peaking also occurred.
The I’s’ radioactive nuclide content of milk peaked at almost this same period. As
near-ly as we can compare them an apex
oc-curred in most instances on June 8, some 25
days after detonation. I only point this out that, while this was a low level incidence
from our standpoint, it did establish the
system for detection of these periods and
how the system would work.
Ordinarily, milk tanker routes are
moni-tored on a weekly or twice-weekly basis.
On indication the frequency can be
in-creased and we switched to daily readings
at the time the air samples jumped up. The
I’ll content of milk from individual dairies
varied from 15 to 150 pCi. The low values
came from dairies in which the cows were
fed on stored feed, and the high values
were OIl pasture grazing or chopped feed.
At no time did we have to worry about
tak-ing action, although this gave us the basis
to take action if we had to. Our review of
this by our Radiation Health Committee
felt that this is an effective method to give us constant surveillance of the air and milk.
I might add that we also have water
sam-pling.
DR. CHARLES: On behalf of some 300
pediatricians in New Jersey, I want to say
that it is with extreme satisfaction that we
can participate in this conference. As has
been observed in the last two days, there
are not very many practicing pediatricians
here, but they are concerned. Our group in
New Jersey has tried to transmit that
con-cern to some meaningful action. I think,
too, we should recognize how indebted we
are to the Committee on Environemntal
Hazards of the Academy, and especially to
tile leadership of Dr. Farr, whose
dedica-tion and imagination has brought this
con-ference to fruition.
In 1962 and 1963, before the Test Ban
New Jersey Committee on Radiation
Haz-ards began to wonder what would happen
if we should be faced with such an
mci-dent. In New Jersey the dairy industry is
one of the mainstays of our economy. As we
began to inquire what would happen in
New Jersey, it became obvious that the
problem extended into Delaware,
Pennsyl-vania, New York, and Connecticut because
all share common milk sheds. Fallout does
not respect state borders. At the suggestion of the state’s radiological health
commis-sioner at Trenton, a survey was made of 50
states. The state commissioner of health
was queried as to what he would do if he
faced such a situation and if his state had
prepared a countermeasure program. The
real question was, what would be done
should the threat materialize? It really does not make sense to monitor if there is no set pattern for action responses. All 50 states
answered the inquiry. In making
assess-ment of the replies, one is faced with the
question-what is a complete
countermea-sure program? This inquiry to the federal
government was unanswered. I doubt they
know we weren’t able to find out. We
de-cided that the responsibility of setting up a
complete countermeasure program could be
divided into certain phases. There is a phase initially requiring appointment and
activa-tion of a group and coordination to make a
fallout countermeasure plan. The second
phase is designation of responsible authority
to invoke the countermeasure plan. Someone
must have the responsibility. Now Dr.
In-graham indicated he would have the
re-sponsibility to exercise that authority and
he would then proceed. I can tell you from
inquiries to the various states that his asso-ciates in public health, the various commis-sioners of the states, do not all share his in-terpretation. On a third phase a statewide surveillance network is established to sup-plement the national surveillance networks. Phase four is establishment of fallout radia-tion protection criteria. Phase five is estab-lishment of a standard operation plan. This
has to be clearly written so that everyone
concerned-the dairy industry, the various
health officials, the people in the radiologi-cal health program, the medical profession,
and I submit the public-may understand
it. I think the crux of the problem is fear
and there would be no fear if people were
informed and if the people believed the au-thorities had a clear plan and knew express-ly what they would do in a given situation. Fear comes only with lack of information.
\Vith proper education and proper plans
the people will know the authorities have
clear intent and predetermined direction. In phase six research programs on
counter-measure problems are established. Dr.
In-graham has indicated we need more
re-search on these measures at both state and
federal levels.
Table I is a quick review of the states. I will summarize it briefly. Only seven states indicated the completion of an officially es-tablished countermeasure plan for complete
operation, 17 have working committees, 10
indicated they knew who had the authority
and how it would be used, 27 have state
surveillance in addition to the national
net-work, 17 know what radiation criteria they
will use, and only 1 had a satisfactory re-search plan.
The American Medical profession, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the
pub-lie, and this conference, have a right to
know that an orderly procedure will be set
up to be followed in the event of a
peace-time nuclear accident. The first practical
countermeasure to remove radioactivity
from our milk supply is a transfer of cattle
to stored feed. We need to know what the
preparation for supplies of this feed are.
Are there emergency supplies set up in the
50 states, or wherever indicated? An
alter-native to stored feed is the substitution of
unaffected milk or alteration and
pro-cessing of contaminated milk to make
con-sumption safe. What has been done to
es-tablish means for processing and alteration
of milk to make it safe? What population
samples are now involved in field trials?
The cost of decontamination is a fraction of
a cent per quart. There should be
TABLE I
CURRENT STATUS OF OPERATIONAL F.&uou’r COUNTERMEASURES
SURVEY OF THE STATES CONDUCTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL hAZARDS OF THE
NEW JERSEY CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS SEYMOUR CHARLES, M.D., CHAIRMAN (May 16, 1963)
State
Phase I
Working
Coin rn ittee
Phase II
Legal
Authoty
Phase III
State
Surveilnce
Phase IV
Radiation
Protection Criteria
Phase V
Standard
Ojerating
Procedures
Research
Phase VI
Progra in
Alaska no no no no no IO
Alabama no no no no no no
Arizona no no no yes no no
Arkansas no no no yes no no
California no no yes no no no
Colorado no no yes no no no
Connecticut yes no no no no no
Delaware no no no no no no
Florida yes yes no no yes no
Georgia no no yes no no no
Hawaii no no yes no no no
Idaho no no no no no no
Illinois yes no yes yes no no
Indiana no no no no no no
Iowa yes yes yes no yes no
Kansas no no no yes no no
Kentucky no no yes yes no no
Louisiana no no no yes no no
Maine no no yes no no no
I1aryIand yes yes yes yes no no
Massachusetts no no no no no no
Michigan no no yes yes no no
Minnesota yes no yes no no no
Mississippi no no no no no no
Missouri no no no no no no
Montana yes yes yes no yes no
Nebraska 110 no yes no n no
Nevada no no no no no no
New IIampshire no no no no no no
New Jersey no yes yes yes no no
New Mexico yes yes yes yes yes no
New York yes no yes no no no
N. Carolina no no yes no no no
N. Dakota no no no no no no
Ohio no no no no no no
Oklahoma no yes yes yes no no
Oregon yes yes yes yes yes no
Pennsylvania yes no yes no no no
Rhode Island yes yes no yes yes flO
S. Carolina no no yes no no no
S. Dakota no no no yes no
Tennessee yes no yes yes no no
Texas yes no yes yes no no
Utah yes yes yes yes yes yes
Vermont no no no no no 130
Virginia no no yes no no no
Washington yes no yes no no no
TABLE I-(Continued)
Phase 1
State Working
Committee
W Virginia no
Wisconsiii yes
Wyoming no
Total Yes 17
Total No Phase 11 Legal Authority 110 no 110 It) 39 Phase 111 Stale Surveillance 110 no yes .7’) Phase V Standard Operating Procedures 110 11(1 110 Phase IV Radiation Protection Criteria hO no 110 17 Research Phase VI Program 110 110 110 is
\\‘itliiii the fully operational fallout (ounterlneasure plan there must be established certain courses of action. One approach to the problem may he the following six phases: phase I, appointment and activation of a group or
committee to plati and co-ordinate a fallout countermeasure plan; phase II, specification of responsible authority
to invoke countermeasure plan; phase III, establishment of a statewide radiation surveillance network to
sup-plement tile national surveillance network; phase IV, establishment of fallout radiation protection criteria;
phase V, establishment of a written standard operational plan; phase VI, organization of research program on
countermeasure problems.
In this chart tile following definitions are used: yes, this phase was reported to be established and in operation;
no, this phase was not reporte(l to be fully establisised.
The data within the chart were obtained from replies received in response to a survey letter sent to tile various state governments on May 16, 1963. The data should not be considered conclusive as it is often difficult to record
1111(1 report plans whichi are in a formative stage.
so that it may sometime be economically
feasible to get a milk which has been
de-contaminated from strontium and
radioac-tive iodine. For this milk tile 1)ublid may be
willing to pay more. Now we know some
milk, such as SMA and Similac, in being
manufactured has electrolytes removed and
that these have less strontium than fresh
milk. We hear very little about whether
such milk is safer than other processed and
fresh milk. \Ve hear very little if these
would be satisfactory to have applied in a
nuclear incident. What cooperation has
al-ready been effected in the dairy industry,
the transportation industry, the public
health authorities, and the individual
farm-er so that mass dumping of contaminated
supplies can be avoided? What interstate
cooperation has already been arranged so
that one state will not refuse milk from
an-other state? New York, Delaware, and
Con-necticut, according to our information, have
not yet entered into a common contract as
has been done in the Midwest. This is the
kind of cooperation that needs to be done
now. It was mentioned before that now,
since no crisis exists, we can sit and talk
about tiliS with some degree of calm and
calculated direction. Now is the time when
we should establish these plans so that a
crisis will be avoided. In an acute contami-nation event a particular area of the coun-try may bear such heavy radio contamina-tion as to make milk obtained there unsafe
for public consumption for several weeks.
If reprocessing may not be sufficient, what
provisions have been made now for such
emergency supplies of dried and processed
milk? Will it come from Civil Defense
sources? Would there be enough available
on a commercial basis? What channels of
distribution would be immediately involved
so that the people would have steady
sup-ply? Dr. Saenger’s optimism about the pres-ent international situation is not shared by all. I feel that we cannot assume there will
not be an accident, local or international,
which might not suddenly cause serious
ra-dioactive contamination of our
environ-ment. We mentioned the other day the
inci-dent of the nuclear bomb lost in Spain. It
another 18 nations could develop nuclear
arms capacity. Fortunately, today we have
in this conference a good many of our
na-tion’s scientists who are most aware, though
they may differ about the degree, but they
are certainly most aware of what the
prob-lems are. From this group should come the
leadership. From this group should come a
clear responsibility to speak for the public
health, to transmit to the national and
world political leaders our concern. We
must continue to clear the confusion and
the inadequacy of our country’s radiologi-cal health program. So that it need not stop with this consideration of radiological
fall-out, we need complete radiological health
protection. We need radiation statutes
which clearly set up laws within the state, just as Dr. Ingraham has indicated, with tile licensing and registration of machines aIld with surveillance and inspection so we know
how our patients are exposed, and at tile
very least we need a raising of the level of
education of the technicians. The most
im-mediate accomplishment of this conference
is the unmistakable emphasis that the
health of future generations of American
children may depend appreciably upon the
