638 Mendiola St.
San Miguel, Manila
SY 2016-2017
CASE DIGESTS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS,
ELECTION LAW, AND LAW
ON PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS
Submitted to: Atty. Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura
Submitted by:
2C
2K
ABDULHALIM, Abduljalil
ABONG, Mario
DOLOR, Xylene
ACOSTA, Noel
ESPINOSA, Ma. Ana
ALIH, James
LAGUMBAY, Maeryl
BERNALES, Maybelle
MACASINAG, Hoven
CHING, Anj
MALAPITAN, Chelo
CULAJARA, Jes
MONES, Mikkaela
FONTANILLA, Miguel
QUE, Anna Carmela
MANDA, Loren
REYES, Marie Sherrydane
PELAUSA, Steph
REYNO, Rosette
SALONGA, Jay
ROQUE, Christian
SAMANIEGO, Emil
SAGMON, Kristine
SARMIENTO, Mica
TOLENTINO, Ruiza
TOLENTINO, Fatima
VARDELEON, Crizedhen
VELASCO, EG
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
2C and 2K would like to thank Atty. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura for
tirelessly imparting his knowledge on Administrative Law, Law on
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
OVERVIEW
1. Aratuc v COMELEC G.R NO. 49705-09 8 February 1979
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.”
“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
The Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to warrant its being given due course. Petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando, Antonio and Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for such dismissal.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had initially agreed to dispose of the cases in a minute resolution, without prejudice to an extended or reasoned out opinion later, so that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering, however, that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice has expressed misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the conclusions of respondent Commission because in his view there are strong considerations warranting farther meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be earmarks of seemingly traditional faults in the manner elections are held in the municipalities and provinces herein involved, and he is joined in this pose by two other distinguished colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more time to put down at least some of the important considerations that impelled Us to see the matters in dispute the other way, just as the minority bidded for the opportunity to record their points of view. In this manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their respective reactions in proper perspective.
2. Maceda et.al vs Energy Regulatory Board G.R. Nos. 95203-05 December 18, 1990 FACTS:
On September 10, 1990, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. and Petron Corporation proferred separate applications with the respondent Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for permission to increase the wholesale posted price of petroleum products and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase
temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending further proceedings. ERB granted the provisional relief pursuant to Sec. 8 of EO No. 172. Petitioners contended that the Order had been issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. They submitted that the Order was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Sec. 3 par. (E) of EO No. 172.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the Order by ERB is a grave abuse of discretion resulting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
HELD: No.
The Court held that petitioners overlooked the provisions of Sec. 8 of EO No. 172 which provides for the authority to grant provisional relief. Their contention that what should be applicable is Sec. 3(e) has no merit. What must be stressed is that while under EO No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the ERB from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did in this case, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Sections 3 and 8 of the said executive order do not negate each other, or otherwise, they operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Sec. 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order under Sec. 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however, it can be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
3. Malaga vs. Penachos. Jr. G.R. No. 86695 3 September 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project
4. Beja. Sr. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97149 31 March 1992
FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA. With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”. On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.” With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation
5. EUGENIO vs. CSC et al G.R. No. 115863
FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commissionpassed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.
Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed,
therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
6. THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC.G.R. No. 8357, March 16, 1989, SARMIENTO, J. FACTS:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation,
Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985.
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.
On April 16, 1985, the lower court declared Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration. On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court.
The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to hold as null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 and May 20, 1988, reversing its Decision, dated October 24, 1986. The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial Court, as well as its Order, dated August 21, 1985. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and
2. Whether or not said presidential body may be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution.
HELD:
1. No. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. Its undertaking is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court. In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.
2. No. We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be
"responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
7. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982, FERNANDO, C.J.
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes" is being assailed in this case. The assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his
authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed.
Whether or not BP Blg. 129 is unconstitutional. HELD:
The Court held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed.
8. LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. vs. JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967, SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual
occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines. On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion."
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President cannot undo the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and
2. Whether or not the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect. HELD:
1. No. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary. 2. No. It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed. No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
9. EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, Judge of the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXIII and HONORATO G. MACKAY, acting Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital and the CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN G.R. No. L-54554, March 30, 1981, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General Hospital, Caloocan City. Private respondent,, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr., protested Dr. Mackay's designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others that, as Chief of Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles, who succeeded former Mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated September 20, 1978, sustained Mackay's appointment.
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission on appeal. On December 29, 1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49 sustaining Medalla's appeal and revoking Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator.
Upon automatic review by the Office of the President, pursuant to section 19(6), PD No. 807, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave revoked the appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as Assistant Hospital Administrator and awarded the position in favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla. The Acting City Mayor, on behalf of Mackay, moved for reconsideration.
On May 7, 1979, totally disregarding the Decision of the Office of the President, the same Acting City Mayor appointed Mackay, this time as Hospital Administrator, and designated Dr. Tantoco as his Assistant, thereby again completely bypassing Medalla. Mackay took his oath of office on May 7, 1979.
On June 27, 1979, however, the Civil Service Commission, acting on Medalla's protest, and besides calling attention to the penal provision of P.D. No. 807, disapproved Mackay's appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment extended to private respondent, Dr. Honorato C. Mackay, as Hospital Administrator is null and void.
HELD:
Yes. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan RA No. 5502, it is clear that the power of appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations. The Caloocan City General Hospital is one of the city departments provided for in the said law. The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla. The special reason given by the Acting City Mayor for Mackay's appointment, which is, that lie had completed all academic requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not tenable, since Medalla himself was found to be in possession of the same
qualification. But while the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is clear that the position of Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to I hospital Administrator under the organizational line-up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackay’s appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator and subsequently hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked Mackay who was only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in rank, Medalla is entitled to appointment as Hospital Administrator. It is true that, as the respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possesses of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment. However, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board, upheld by the Office of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications of
both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a careful study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be ignored.
10. Lianga Bay Logging Co. vs. Enage GR. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987 FACTS:
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered asurvey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. The decision fixed the common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached to the decision. In an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated August 9, 1965 set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that indicated by the green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of the appealed decision." Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President, where in a decision dated June 16,1966, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the ruling of the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. On motion for reconsideration, the Office of the President issued another decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit reversing and overturning the decision of the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the decision, dated March 20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry. Thereafter, Ago brought the action in the CFI.
ISSUE: WON the CFI has authority to hear and decide the case.
HELD: No. The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to review anew the decision in administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of forestry, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
11. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD GR No. L-75697, June 18, 1987 DOCTRINE:
VRB was conferred the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law and not being tasked to legislate.
FACTS: In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the ground that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s argument is correct.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”
12. Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission GR No. 11612 Facts:
Sometime in May 1991, Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this" Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date"2/28/91." In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City. Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows: "Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted: 'Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
’
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non- extendible." Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991. Issue:
Whether or not the service of the petitioner is already not extendible. Held:
Yes. We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law."Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2)delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension." Applying now the results of our reexamination of the instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed." It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not incontradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. "The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450). The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.
13. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.
G.R. No. 11952, March 26, 1997 FACTS:
This Special Civil Action seeks to prohibit respondent Civil Aeronautics Board from exercising jurisdiction over private respondent's Application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and to annul and set aside a temporary operating permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board in favor of Grand International Airways, allowing the same to engage in scheduled domestic air transportation services, particularly the Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, and converse routes. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) alleges that Grand Air does not possess a legislative franchise authorizing it to engage in air transportation service within the Philippines or elsewhere. Such franchise is, as argued, a requisite for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity by the respondent Board, as mandated under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Respondent Grand Air, on the other hand, posits that a legislative franchise is no longer a requirement for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary Operating Permit, following the Court's pronouncements in various jurisprudential cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional mandate for the approval of such authority is no longer necessary.
HELD:
Yes. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. The trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the power to regulate and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and as a general rule, courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right. The Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the other requirements prescribed by the law. Such requirements were enumerated in Section 21 of R.A. 776. There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.
14. US v Ang Tang Ho GR No. L-17122 February 27, 1922 Facts:
Act 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose” was passed by the Philippine Legislature in 1919. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the Governor General issued Executive Order No. 53 which fixed the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos, which was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO.
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General Ruling:
Yes, there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Governor General in this case. By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
15. Ynot v IAC GR L-74457 March 20, 1987 Facts:
Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabao and carabeef from one province to another and provides for confiscation and forfeiture of those transported by the government to be distributed to charitable institutions and similar institutions and to deserving farmers as the Chairman of the National meat Inspection Commission and the Director of Animal Industry may see fit. Restituto Ynot had transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984 when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of EO 626-A. Ynot sued for recovery but the RTC sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. The Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the ruling of the trial court, which led petitioner to file a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. He alleged that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it is an improper exercise of legislative power.
Issue: Whether or not there is an invalid delegation of legislative power Ruling:
Yes, the Court held that there is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken and declared EO 626-A unconstitutional. The Court marked the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
16. Pelaez v Auditor General GR No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 Facts:
During the period from September 4 to October 29. 1964, the President issued Executive Orders 93 to 121, 124, and 126 to 129, all based on section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, creating 33 municipalities. On November 10, 1964 Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez instituted an action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities, alleging that said Eos are null and void as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Pelaez cites the 3rd paragraph of Sec. 3 RA2370 which prohibited the creation of barrios except under provisions of the Act or by Act of Congress and argues that "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Issue: Whether or not the Executive Orders are valid Ruling:
No, the Court declared the Executive Orders in question as null and void ab initio.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, what must not be overlooked is the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President “... may change the seat of the government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require”. It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is purely a legislative question or a political question. The power of control of the President only covers the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. It does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau or to create a new one. Therefore, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code entails an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President insofar as confers more power to the President over municipal corporations and the questioned Executive Orders, which are issued pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, are all null and void ab initio.
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE
17. Republic v Drugmaker’s Laboratories. Inc GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014
Doctrine: Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power.
Kinds of Administrative Rules or Regulations:
1. Legislative Rule - in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.
2. Interpretative Rule - try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said rules.
3. Contingent Rule - those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
Facts:
The Food and Drug Administration was created pursuant to RA3720 to establish safety standards and quality measures for foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetic products . In 1989, the DOH issued Administrative Order 67 s. 1989 which required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before release to the market. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a Certificate of Product Registration. The BA/BE testing requirement was implemented through Circular no. 1 s. 1991 and Circular no. 8 s. 1997 issued by the FDA.
Respondents Drugmakers Laboratories Inc and Terramedic Inc are manufacturers of rifampticin/Refam which were issued CPRs until 2008 despite lack of BA/BE test results. The results turned out that Refam is not bioequivalent with reference drug. Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results, respondents filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of Circular nos. 1 and 8 alleging that it is the DOH which was granted authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA3720. The RTC ruled for respondents.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Circular nos. 1 and 8 partake the nature of administrative rules and regulations 2. Whether or not the FDA may validly issue the assailed Circulars
Ruling:
1. No, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.
2. Yes. As they are not administrative regulations, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity. In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 are valid issuances and binding to all concerned parties, including the respondents in this case.