1. SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners, vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, respondents. G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Sto. Tomas and Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued. Resolution No. 94-3710 effects changes in the organization, specifically in the Central Offices (The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and
Audit] and OPR [Office of Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and Development Office (RDO)specifically)
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that public respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders. The Court granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office] HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place.
The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment
between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987
Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority hadexpressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a career service, adopt measures to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding
authority to thedepartments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.
2. Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111901, 21 August 1995 Facts:
Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute which is an agency of the DOST.
He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD building, while the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the construction. The structure is jointly funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments.
While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either directly requested and/or demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00, claimed as part of the expected profit of the contractor.
Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for committing said offense in relation to the performance of his official duties.
Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period. Hence the Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the case.
Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to “include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government…”
Issue:
WON a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government is a public officer. Held:
Yes. The word “includes” used in defining a public officer indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms “classified, unclassified or exemption service” were the old categories of position in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission by the Administrative Code of 1987.
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking falls under the non-career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019. Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, non-career service in particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and 2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include Contractual personnel or those employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
3. LAUREL vs. DESIERTO GR 145368 APRIL 12, 2002 FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration. The Committee was mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the National Centennial Commission (NCC). Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel was appointed to chair. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. It is also characterized as an ad-hoc body and shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. It is also
tasked to prepare, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Executive Order.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Laurel was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Laurel was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project and such was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation. President Joseph Estrada created an ad hoc committee to investigate the project.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended for the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.
Petitioner Laurel filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
Petitioner also assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because: (1) Expocorp, the corporation chaired by petitioner Laurel which undertook the freedom ring project in connection with which violations of the anti-graft and corrupt practices were allegedly committed, was a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation. (2) The national centennial commission (NCC) was not a public office. (3) Petitioner, both as chairman of the NCC and of Expocorp was not a public officer as defined under the anti-graft & corrupt practices act.
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
ISSUES:
(1) WON NCC is a Public Office (2) WON Laurel is a Public Officer HELD:
(1) YES. The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.
The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said commission less of a public office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer.
(2) YES. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless. A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define public officers. Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.