University of San Carlos
College of Law
LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
(FINALS)
Submitted to:
Atty. Jefferson M. Marquez
Submitted by:
Dana Flynch R. de Lira
EH 406
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC 12: RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION...6
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS, G.R. NO. 152356, AUGUST 16, 2005...6
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, G.R. NO. 170132, DECEMBER 6, 2006...8
DIOKNO VS. CACDAC, G.R. NO. 168475, JULY 4, 2007...9
SAN MIGUEL CORP. EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO VS. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 171153, SEPT. 12, 2007... 11
DONG SEUNG INC., VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, G.R. NO. 162356, APRIL 14, 2008...16
DEL PILAR ACADEMY ET AL., VS. DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 170112, APRIL 30, 2008... 18
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL INC., VS. SS VENTURES LABOR UNION, G.R. NO. 161690, JULY 23, 2008 ... 20
INGUILLO ET AL, VS. FIRST PHIL SCALES INC., ET AL., GR NO. 165407, JUNE 5, 2009...22
STA LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORP., VS. SOLE ET AL., GR NO. 162355, AUGUST 14, 2009...26
MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS INC. VS. SECRETARY OF DOLE, ET AL., G.R. NO. 183317, DECEMBER 21, 2009 ... 28
GENERAL MILLING CORP VS. CASIO ET AL., GR NO. 149552, MARCH 10, 2010...30
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS. NATL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL ETC., GR NO. 178296, JANUARY 12, 2011... 33
LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LTD., VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA, G.R. NO. 169754, FEB. 23, 2011... 35
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER) ET AL., VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORP., G.R. NO. 169717, MARCH 16, 2011... 36
SAN MIGUEL FOODS VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION G.R. NO. 146206 AUGUST 1, 2011... 38
BPI VS. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER, GR NO. 164301, OCTOBER 19, 2011 RESOLUTION ON THE MAIN DECISION OF AUG. 18, 2010... 40
OCTAVIO vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY...42
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES vs. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION...44
TOPIC 13: RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION...46
RIVERA VS. ESPIRITU, G.R. NO. 135547, JANUARY 23, 2002...46
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 119293, JUNE 10, 2003...49
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA SULPICIO LINES VS. SULPICIO LINES, G.R. NO. 140992, MARCH 25, 2004 ... 51
NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA VS. LAGUESMA, G.R.NO. 149833, JUNE 29, 2004...53
MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 140518, DECEMBER 16, 2004... 55
UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION VS. SEC. OF LABOR, G.R. NO. 151379, JANUARY 14, 200556 CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 147080, APRIL 26, 2005...58
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 169632, MARCH 28, 2006... 63 SUKHOTAI CUISINE & RESTAURANT VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 150437, JULY 17, 2006...64 PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION VS. PHIL. GLOBAL COMMUNICATION, G.R. NO. 144315, JULY 17, 2006..67 FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION VS. FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSO., G.R. NO. 168362, OCTOBER 12, 2006... 68 GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, G.R. NO. 170132, DECEMBER 6, 2006...71 BIFLEX PHILS., INC., LABOR UNION VS. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL & MFG., CORP., G.R. NO. 155679, DECEMBER 19, 2006... 72 MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. MANILA HOTEL CORP., G.R. NO. 154591, MARCH 5, 2007, CITING GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL VS. DACANAY, G.R. NO. 153665, JULY 18, 2003...74 FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 164060, JUNE 15, 2007... 76 PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORP., VS. PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSO. G.R. NO.160058, JUNE 22, 2007 ... 77 LANDTEX INDUSTRIES VS. CA, G.R. NO. 150278, AUGUST 9, 2007...79 SAN MIGUEL FOODS INC., VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO , G.R. NO. 168569, OCTOBER 5, 2007... 80 TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS WORKERS ASSO.VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 158786, OCTOBER 19, 2007...82 YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILS VS. YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 159553, DECEMBER 10, 2007. 86 PHIL. AIRLINES INC. VS. PHIL AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, G.R. NO. 142399, MARCH 12, 200887 STEEL CORP. VS. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL G.R. NO. 169829-30, APRIL 16, 2008...88 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK ET AL., G.R. NO. 161933, APRIL 22, 2008... 91 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA) VS. SAMMA CORP., G.R. NO. 167141, MAR. 13, 2009...93 HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILS., (HYATT REGENCY) VS. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-(NUWHRAIN) G.R. NO. 165756, JUNE 5, 2009... 94 TEODORICO S. MIRANDA, JR. VS. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. (ATI) AND COURT OF APPEALS GR NO. 174316 JUNE 23, 2009... 96 NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER VS. SOLE, ET AL. G.R. NO. 181531, JULY 31, 2009...97 A. SORIANO AVIATION VS. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANO AVIATION ET AL. G.R. NO. 166879, AUG. 14, 2009... 100 YSS EMPLOYEES UNION-PHIL TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. YSS LABORATORIES INC. G.R. NO. 155125, DECEMBER 4, 2009...103 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, AND ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, G.R. NO. 180291, JULY 27, 2010...105 PICOP RESOURCES INC. VS. TANECA ET. AL., G.R. NO. 160828, 09 AUGUST 2010...107 INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL VS. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL-DAVAO, G.R. NO. 174040-41, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010... 109 CITREK EMPLOYEES LABOY UNION-FFW VS. CITREK ELECTRONICS INC. G.R. NO. 190515, 15 NOVEMBER 2010... 111
SOLIDBANK CORP. VS. GRAMIER, ET. AL, , G.R. NO. 159460-61, NOVEMBER 15, 2010...113
FADRIQUELAN ET AL VS MONTEREY FOOD CORP., G.R. 178409, JUNE 08, 2011...115
MIGUEL DELA BARAIRO, PENA PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MST MARINE SERVICES (PHILS,), INC. RESPONDENT, G.R. NO. 189314, JUNE 15, 2011...115
MAGDALA MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD COOPERATIVE VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LGS ET AL, G.R. NOS. 191138-39, OCTOBER 19, 2011... 116
ABERIA ET AL., VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATION COMMISSION ET., [G.R. NOS. 154113, 187778, 187861, AND 196156 DECEMBER 7, 2011]... 119
PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED VS DEQUILLA, ET. AL. ; GR NO 172666; DECEMBER 7, 2011....120
C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 155109, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010, NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), AND ITS MEMBERS WHOSE NAMES ARE LISTED BELOW, PETITIONERS, VS. C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 179220122 DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS INC. vs. DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION ET AL...124
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS vs. PROGRESIBONG UNYON NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AER...125
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL vs. HON. STO TOMAS ET AL...128
VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER vs. YBALLE, ET AL...130
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC. vs. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS... 131
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS. vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS., FACULTY & STAFF ASSOCIATION. 132 TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP...134
TOPIC 14: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE...136
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. CONFESOR...138
PHILIPPINE CARPET EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. STO. TOMAS...142
ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. vs. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY EMPLOYEES UNION...145
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO...148
PUREFOODS CORP. vs. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS RANK AND FILE150 GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. CCBPI(GEN. SANTOS CITY) ET ... 152
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY ET AL. vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION...154
TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA BREWERY vs. ASIA BREWERY, INC...156
MANILA MINING CORP. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FFW vs. MANILA MINING CORP...158
PRINCE TRANSPORT ET AL. vs. GARCIA ET AL... 160
PARK HOTEL ET AL. vs. SORIANO ET AL... 162
GOYA, INC. vs. GOYA, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW...162
BAPTISTA ET AL. vs. VILLANUEVA ET AL... 164
TH SHOPFITTERS CORP. ET AL. vs. T&H SHOPFITTERS CORP. UNION...166
TOPIC 15: REVISED GUIDELINES OF THE NCMB FOR THE CONDUCT OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS...168
SANYO PHILIPPINE WORKERS UNION-PPSLU vs. CANIZARES...168
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC. VS. NLRC... 175
SILVA ET AL vs. NLRC... 177
UNION OF NESTLE WORKERS CAGAYAN DE ORO FACTORY vs. NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC...182
TABIGUE ET AL. vs. INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION...183
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY vs. COBARRUBIAS... 185
TENG vs. PAHAGAC ET AL... 187
CAONG, JR. vs. BEGUALOS... 188
ESTATE OF DULAY vs. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME INC. ET AL...189
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY vs. THE LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION...192
TOPIC 12: RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS, G.R. NO. 152356, AUGUST 16, 2005 Facts:
On 15 June 1998, Respondent union, identifying itself as an affiliate of Federation of Free Workers (FFW), filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE Regional Office. In the petition, respondent stated that it sought to be certified and to represent the permanent rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the petitioner. The following documents were attached to the petition:
(1) a Charter Certificate issued by FFW on 5 June 1998 certifying that respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter of FFW;
(2) a copy of the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary, Noel T. Bathan and attested by its President, Wilfred V. Sagun;
(3) a list of respondent’s officers and their respective addresses, again prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun;
(4) a certification signifying that respondent had just been organized and no amount had yet been collected from its members, signed by respondent’s treasurer Chita D. Rodriguez and attested by Sagun; and
(5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun.
Petitioner company filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election on the sole ground that the respondent union is not listed or included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Respondent then submitted to the BLR the same documents earlier attached to its petition for certification. The accompanying letter stated that such documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter pursuant to the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules; and it was hoped that the submissions would facilitate the listing of respondent under the roster of legitimate labor organizations. After which, the Chief of LRD-DOLE Regional Office issued a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter certifying that from 30 July 1998, respondent has acquired legal personality as a labor organization or worker’s association, it having submitted all the required documents. Opting not to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss, respondent instead filed a Position Paper wherein it asserted that it had complied with all the necessary requirements for the conduct of a certification election, and that the ground relied upon in the Motion to Dismiss was a mere technicality.
In turn, petitioner filed a comment, wherein it reiterated that respondent was not a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the petition. Petitioner also propounded that contrary to respondent’s objectives of establishing an organization representing rank-and-file employees, two of respondent’s officers, namely Vice-President Emannuel L. Rosell and Secretary Bathan, were actually supervisory employees. In support of this allegation, petitioner attached various documents evidencing the designation of these two officers in supervisory roles, as well as their exercise of various supervisory functions.[9] Petitioner cited Article 245 of the Labor Code, which provides that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees.
Agreeing with the petitioner company, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order dismissing respondent’s petition for certification election. The sole ground relied upon for the dismissal was the Med-Arbiter’s Opinion that as of the date of filing of the petition on 15 June 1998, respondent did not have the legal personality to file the said petition for certification election.
Respondent union appealed the Med-Arbiter’s order to the DOLE which reversed the same. The DOLE concluded that respondent acquired legal personality as early as 15 June 1998, the date it submitted the
that a local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documentary requirements as mandated in the Implementing Rules. DOLE’s ruling was also affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the union has already acquired legal personality at the time of its filing for certification election.
2. Whether or not the union’s president and secretary are supervisory employees and thus barred from membership in that union.
Ruling
1. The SC held that the union has already acquired legal personality at the time of its filing for certification election. Section 3, Rule VI of Department Order No. 9 provides when the local/chapter acquires legal personality.
Section 3.Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. – A local/chapter constituted in accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
It is evident based on this rule that the local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of the filing of the complete documentary requirements, and not from the issuance of a certification to such effect by the Regional Office or Bureau. On the other hand, a labor organization is deemed to have acquired legal personality only on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration, which takes place only after the Bureau of Labor Relations or its Regional Offices has undertaken an evaluation process lasting up until thirty (30) days, within which period it approves or denies the application. In contrast, no such period of evaluation is provided in Department Order No. 9 for the application of a local/chapter, and more importantly, under it such local/chapter is deemed to acquire legal personality “from the date of filing” of the documents enumerated under Section 1, Rule VI, Book V.
Apart from promoting a policy of affiliation of local unions with national unions, there is a practical reason for sanctioning a less onerous procedure for the registration of a local/chapter, as compared to the national union. The local/chapter relies in part on the legal personality of the federation or national union, which in turn, had already undergone evaluation and approval from the Bureau of Legal Relations or Regional Office. In fact, a federation or national union is required, upon registration, to establish proof of affiliation of at least ten (10) locals or chapters which are duly recognized as the collective bargaining agent in the establishment or industry in which they operate; and the names and addresses of the companies where the locals or chapters operate and the list of all the members in each of the companies. Once the national union or federation acquires legal personality upon the issuance of its certificate or registration, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack.
The fact that the local/chapter acquires legal personality from the moment the complete documentary requirements are submitted seems to imply that the duty of the Bureau or Regional Office to register the local/chapter is merely ministerial.
It is thus very clear that the issuance of the certificate of registration by the Bureau or Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal personality upon a local/chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the complete documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI. Admittedly, the manner by which respondent was deemed to have acquired legal personality by the DOLE and the Court of Appeals was not in strict conformity with the provisions of Department Order No. 9.
In the ordinary course, it should have been FFW, and not respondent, which should have submitted the subject documents to the Regional Office. Nonetheless, there is no good reason to deny legal personality or defer its conferral to the local/chapter if it is evident at the onset that the federation or national union itself has already through its own means established the local/chapter. In this case, such is evidenced by the
Charter Certificate dated 9 June 1998, issued by FFW, and attached to the petition for certification election. The Charter Certificate expressly states that respondent has been issued the said certificate “to operate as a local or chapter of the [FFW]”. The Charter Certificate expressly acknowledges FFW’s intent to establish respondent as of 9 June 1998. This being the case, the SC consider it permissible for respondent to have submitted the required documents itself to the Regional Office, and proper that respondent’s legal personality be deemed existent as of 15 June 1998, the date the complete documents were submitted. 2. The SC held that they are not supervisory employees and are thus qualified to join the rank-and-file union.
Under the law, a managerial employee is “one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.” A supervisory employee is “one who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommends managerial actions if the exercise of such recommendatory authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.’” Finally, “all employees not falling within the definition of managerial or supervisory employee are considered rank-and-file employees”. It is also well-settled that the actual functions of an employee, not merely his job title, are determinative in classifying such employee as managerial, supervisory or rank and file.
In the case of Emmanuel Rossell, appellant’s evidence shows that he undertakes the filling out of evaluation reports on the performance of mechanics, which in turn are used as basis for reclassification. Given a ready and standard form to accomplish, coupled with the nature of the evaluation, it would appear that his functions are more routinary than recommendatory and hardly leave room for independent judgment. In the case of Noel Bathan, appellant’s evidence does not show his job title although it shows that his recommendations on disciplinary actions appear to have carried some weight on higher management. On this limited point, he may qualify as a supervisory employee within the meaning of the law. This may, however, be outweighed by his other functions which are not specified in the evidence.
Assuming that Bathan is a supervisory employee, this does not prove the existence of fraud, false statement or misrepresentation. Because good faith is presumed in all representations, an essential element of fraud, false statement and misrepresentation in order for these to be actionable is intent to mislead by the party making the representation. In this case, there is no proof to show that Bathan, or appellee union for that matter, intended to mislead anyone. If this was appellee union’s intention, it would have refrained from using a more precise description of the organization instead of declaring that the organization is composed of ‘rank and file monthlies’. Hence, the charge of fraud, false statement or misrepresentation cannot be sustained.
Petition is denied.
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, G.R. NO. 170132, DECEMBER 6, 2006 Facts:
This case has its genesis when the manager of GSIS issued a memorandum directing a number of its employees who are union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action. The union’s counsel sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, of administrative charges against some 110 union members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The union then filed with the CA a petition for prohibition against the GSIS on the ground that its members should not be made to explain why they supported their union’s cause since the Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to “harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention to employees’ grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules.” It argued that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the exercise of their “broader rights of free expression” and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions. On the other hand, petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action.
The CA ruled in favor of the union and held that the filing of administrative charges against the union members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action.
Ruling:
The SC held that the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. It may be that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however, about these rights as including the right on the part of government personnel to strike ought to be, as it has been, trashed.
The Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any
collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees
staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
DIOKNO VS. CACDAC, G.R. NO. 168475, JULY 4, 2007 Facts:
The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco.Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES. On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May 2003.The COMELEC was composed of petitioner Dante M. Tong as its chairman, and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as members. Subsequently, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano filed their respective certificates of candidacy.On 12 April 2003, the COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ongs candidacy on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES.Meanwhile, the certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion of their department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The employees assigned to the aforesaid department are allegedly deemed disqualified from membership in the union for being confidential employees.
On 24 April 2003, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, Jaime T. Valeriano (Ong, et al.), and a certain Leandro M. Tabilog filed a Petition before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On 30 April 2003, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan issued an Order directing DOLE personnel to observe the conduct of the FLAMES election on 7 May 2003.
On 2 May 2003, petitioners filed a Petition with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondents Edgardo Daya, Pablo Lucas, Leandro Tabilog, Reynaldo Espiritu, Jose Vito, Antonio de Luna, Armando Yalung, Edwin Layug, Nards Pabilona, Reynaldo Reyes, Evangeline Escall, Alberto Alcantara, Rogelio Cervitillo, Marcelino Morelos, and Faustino Ermino (Daya, et al.).
On 6 May 2003, the COMELEC issued a Decision, declaring Daya, et al., officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections.
According to the COMELEC, Daya, et al., violated Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) by allowing non-members to aid them in their campaign.Their acts of solicitation for support from non-union members were deemed inimical to the interest of FLAMES.
On 7 May 2003, the COMELEC proclaimed the following candidates, including some of herein petitioners as winners of the elections.
On 8 May 2003, private respondents Daya, et al., along with Ong, et al., filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, a Petition to: a) Nullify Order of Disqualification; b) Nullify Election Proceedings and Counting of Votes; c) Declare Failure of Election; and d) Declare Holding of New Election to be Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE.
On 14 May 2003, another group led by private respondent Gaudencio Jimenez, Jr., along with private respondents Johnson S. Reyes, Gavino R. Vidanes, Arnaldo G. Tayao, Bonifacio F. Cirujano, Edgardo G. Cadavona, Maximo A. Caoc, Jose O. Maclit, Jr., Luzmindo D. Acorda, Jr., Lemuel R. Ragasa and Gil G. de Vera (Jimenez, et al.) filed a Petition with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR against petitioners to nullify the 7 May 2003 election on the ground that the same was not free, orderly, and peaceful.It was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-0305-004-LRD, which was subsequently consolidated with the Petition of Daya, et al. and the earlier Petition of Ong, et al.
Meanwhile, the records show that a subsequent election was held on 30 June 2004, which was participated in and won by herein private respondents Daya, et al.
The Court of Appeals, in the aforesaid case, rendered a Decision dated 12 January 2007, upholding the validity of the 30 June 2004 elections, and the declaration of herein private respondents Daya, et al., as the duly elected winners therein.
On 7 July 2003, Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, Jr. issued a Decision in favor of private respondents, Daya,
et al.However, the petition of Jimenez, et al.,was dismissed because it was premature, it appearing that the
COMELEC had not yet resolved their protest prior to their resort to the Med-Arbiter.Finally, the Petition of Ong, et al., seeking to declare themselves as bona fide members of FLAMES was ordered dismissed.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the Director of the BLR.On 3 December 2003, the Director of the BLR issued a Resolution, affirming in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter.Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari.The Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal to be bereft of merit. The appellate court held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC concerns the dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is vested in the FLAMES Executive Board, and not the COMELEC.It affirmed the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., committed a procedural shortcut.
Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the 17 June 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied
Hence, the instant Petition. Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the jurisdiction of the BLR to take cognizance of the case and then upheld the ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the COMELECs order of disqualification of private respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections.
Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit.We affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals upholding the jurisdiction of the BLR.Article 226 of the Labor Code is hereunder reproduced, to wit:
ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, interpreting Article 226 of the Labor Code, was explicit in declaring that the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts.We said that since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction.As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions. More specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz:
(z) Intra-Union Dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, and includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.
The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute.There is no question that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union.At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May 2003 elections.It must also be
stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that private respondents Daya, et al., sought the help of non-members of the union in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not detract from the real character of the controversy.It remains as one which involves the grievance over the constitution and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the union.Moreover, the non-members of the union who were alleged to have aided private respondents Daya, et al., are not parties in the case.We are, therefore, unable to understand petitioners persistence in placing the controversy outside of the jurisdiction of the BLR.The law is very clear. It requires no further interpretation.The Petition which was initiated by private respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly within its cognizance, it being an intra-union dispute. Indubitably, when private respondents Daya, et al.,brought the case to the BLR, it was an invocation of the power and authority of the BLR to act on an intra-union conflict.
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 June 2004, and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA are AFFIRMED.
SAN MIGUEL CORP. EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO VS. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 171153, SEPT. 12, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the San Miguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant in Laguna. It had been the certified bargaining agent for 20 years – from 1987 to 1997.
Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP issued Charter Certificate No. 112 to respondent on 15 June 1999.5 In compliance with registration requirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for the purpose of acquiring legal personality. Upon submission of its charter certificate and other documents, respondent was issued Certificate of Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July 1999. Thereafter, respondent filed with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional Officer in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three separate petitions for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP.8 All three petitions were dismissed, on the ground that the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.9
On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent's registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. In its petition, petitioner accused respondent of committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. It raised allegations that respondent violated Articles 239(a), (b) and (c) and 234(c) of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot directly create a local or chapter. On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and irregularity in the submission of documents by respondent. Regional Director Lim further ruled that respondent is allowed to directly create a local or chapter. However, he found that respondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the cancellation of its certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. Respondent appealed to the BLR.
While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional Director dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and in upholding that PDMP can directly create a local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional Director's ruling that the 20% membership is a requirement for respondent to attain legal personality as a labor organization.
Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the BLR
Issues:
1. Whether or not the private respondent is required to submit the number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate 2. Whether or not PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization and has the power to create a local or chapter
Ruling:
There is merit in petitioner's contentions.
A legitimate labor organization is defined as "any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof."The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure strict compliance with the requirements on registration because a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, and are involved in activities directly affecting matters of public interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends.Legitimate labor organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.
The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization is provided in Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21 June 1997, and again by Department Order No. 40 dated 17 February 2003. The Implementing Rules as amended by D.O. No. 9 should govern the resolution of the petition at bar since respondent's petition for certification election was filed with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August 1999.
The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first involves the affiliation of an independent union with a federation or national union or industry union. The second, finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct creation of a local or a chapter through the process of chartering.
A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local or chapter by submitting to the DOLE Regional Office or to the BLR two copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided, That where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly. All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President.
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be directly created by a federation or national
union. A duly constituted local or chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shall acquire legal
personality from the date of filing of the complete documents with the BLR. The issuance of the certificate of registration by the BLR or the DOLE Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal personality
upon a local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the complete documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.
Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of the Labor Code when it provided for less stringent requirements for the creation of a chapter or local. This Court disagrees.
Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR:
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it. (Italics supplied.)
It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of an independent labor organization, association or group of unions or workers.
However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated differently. This Court, in the landmark case of
Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, declared that
when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for registration of an independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article 234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter. The intent of the law in imposing less requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.
Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano where the validity of Department Order No. 9 was directly put in issue, this Court was unequivocal in finding that there is no inconsistency between the Labor Code and Department Order No. 9.As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certificate of Registration through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court finds that the imputations are not impressed with merit. In the instant case, proof to declare that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation remains wanting. This Court had, indeed, on several occasions, pronounced that registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights.
This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of a labor organization based on fraud and misrepresentation in securing its certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence. The records of the case are devoid of such evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and this
judicial bodies, such as the BLR, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.
Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and legitimately created, for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter as it is not a legitimate labor organization, it being a trade union center.
Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of PDMP as a labor organization. Firstly, this line of reasoning attempts to predicate that a trade union center is not a legitimate labor organization. In the process, the legitimacy of PDMP is being impugned, albeit indirectly. Secondly, the same contention premises that a trade union center cannot directly create a local or chapter through the process of chartering.
Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of cases, the legal personality of a legitimate labor organization, such as PDMP, cannot be subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter. Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or local thereof." On the other hand, a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules.
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules. The aforementioned provision is enunciated in the following:
Sec. 5.Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers' association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14 February 1991. Until the certificate of registration of PDMP is cancelled, its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization subsists. Once a union acquires legitimate status as a labor organization, it continues to be recognized as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation. It bears to emphasize that what is being directly challenged is the personality of respondent as a legitimate labor organization and not that of PDMP. This being a collateral attack, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly impugning the legitimacy of PDMP. Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenant to a legitimate labor organizationand continues to be recognized as such until its certificate of registration is successfully impugned and thereafter cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly create a local or a chapter, it being a trade union center.This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on this ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter.
After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions, both statutory and regulatory, we find no legal justification to support the conclusion that a trade union center is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering. Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the first and fundamental duty of this Court, which is to apply the law. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code, was enacted in 1972. Being a legislation on social justice, the provisions of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules have been subject to several amendments, and they continue to evolve, considering that labor plays a major role as a socio-economic force. The Labor Code was first amended by Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic Act No. 9481.
Incidentally, the term trade union center was never mentioned under Presidential Decree No. 442, even as it was amended by Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade union center was first adopted in the
Implementing Rules, under Department Order No. 9.
Culling from its definition as provided by Department Order No. 9, a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. The same rule provides that the application for registration of an industry or trade union center shall be supported by the following:
(a) The list of its member organizations and their respective presidents and, in the case of an industry union, the industry where the union seeks to operate;
(b) The resolution of membership of each member organization, approved by the Board of Directors of such union;
(c) The name and principal address of the applicant, the names of its officers and their addresses, the minutes of its organizational meeting/s, and the list of member organizations and their representatives who attended such meeting/s; and
(d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws and minutes of its ratification by a majority of the presidents of the member organizations, provided that where the ratification was done simultaneously with the organizational meeting, it shall be sufficient that the fact of ratification be included in the minutes of the organizational meeting.
Evidently, while a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at least ten locals or chapters or affiliates, each of which must be a duly certified or recognized collective bargaining agent; a trade union center, on the other hand, is composed of a group of registered national unions or federations.
The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, provide that "a duly registered
federation or national union" may directly create a local or chapter. The provision reads:
Section 1.Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. – A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly. All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President.
Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering – a duly registered federation or a national union. Department Order No. 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registered federation or
national union and reported to the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of these Rules.
Republic Act No. 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines" lapsed into law on 25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June 2007. This law further amends the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations.
Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendment of the implementing rules, there was no mention of a trade union center as being among the labor organizations allowed to charter.
This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Expressium
facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally.
Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is without authority to charter directly.
The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the policy of the law to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement, and thus assure the rights of workers to self-organization. The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring strict compliance with the procedural requirements for registration is not without reason. It has been observed that the formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted voluntariness, which is basic to free unionism. As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affecting public interest, it is necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties affected. However, as this Court has enunciated in Progressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment, it is not this Court's
function to augment the requirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as previously discussed, is to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.
In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization, it has no power to directly create a local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient requirements for chartering, but must have complied with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificate of Registration of San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union–Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED, and SMPPEU-PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. Costs against petitioner.
DONG SEUNG INC., VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, G.R. NO. 162356, APRIL 14, 2008 Facts:
Petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV a Petition for cancellation of the union registration of respondent union on the grounds that the List of Officers and Constitution and By-laws which the respondent union attached to its application for union registration contain the union secretary's certification but the same is not under oath, contrary to Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997; and that, as shown in a Sinumpaang Petisyon, 148 out of approximately 200 employees-members have since
denounced respondent union for employing deceit in obtaining signatures to support its registration application.
DOLE (Region IV) Regional Director Ricardo Martinez, Sr. delisted from the roster of legitimate labor organization the Charter Certificate [of] NAMAWU-Local 188. Respondent union appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations BLR gave due course to the appeal and granted the same, it ordered that NAMAWU-Local 188, shall remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the BLR, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, insisting that the BLR acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to respondent union’s appeal despite its having been filed out of time. The CA dismissed the petition and the motion for reconsideration which was subsequently filed by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the BLR when it declared respondent’s union registration valid. Ruling:
The BLR found respondent union’s appeal tardy yet gave due course to it on account of its inherent merit. The CA found respondent union’s appeal to have “substantially complied with the requirements provided by law.
The requirement that the union secretary certify under oath all documents and papers filed in support of an application for union registration is imposed by Article 235 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 235. Action on application. The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president.
In reversing DOLE Region IV, the BLR cited its Advisory, dated October 14, 1998, which interprets the requirement under Article 235, to wit:
Pursuant to Rule XVII, Section 1 of Department Order No. 09, Series of 1997 x x x. [T]he Bureau of Labor Relations is empowered, consistent with the State policy to promote unionism, to “devise or prescribe such forms as are necessary to facilitate the process of registration of labor organizations x x x,” including the chartering of locals or chapters. Accordingly, the Bureau has devised and transmitted to the Regional Offices the appropriate official registration forms, particularly the following:
x x x x
5. BLR Reg. Form No. 5-LOC-LO. S. 1998 For Chartering Locals/ Chapters x x x x
Part I of each of the first seven forms is a space provided for the notarization of the application x x x. However, considering that applicants are not yet fully familiar with the forms in spite of orientation and seminar conducted, some applications have been submitted without using the forms prescribed by the Bureau. In lieu of submitting a notarized application using the official forms, some applicants comply with the requirements by having their supporting documents separately notarized.
To prevent inconvenience to the public, particularly to the applicants, the Regional Offices are hereby advised that applications submitted with supporting documents which are separately notarized need not comply with the notarization requirement under Part I or Part II, as the case may be, of the prescribed forms. x x x
Accordingly, the absence of notarization under Part I or Part II of the appropriate forms shall not be a basis for denying applications where it appears that all the required supporting documents have already been notarized or attested. (Emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the registration records of the [respondent] revealed that respondent’s registration application was sufficient in form and substance, having been notarized as provided in the BLR official forms. (Atty. Manuel E. Robles notarized such application on 8 February 1999 at Cavite City.) All the other supporting documents to the charter certificate issued by the National Mines and Allied Workers Union were certified true and correct by the secretary and attested to by the president.
Thus, from the standpoint of compliance, [respondent] x x x submitted all the documentary requirements for the creation of a local/chapter in accordance with Section 1, Rule VI, D.O. 9 series of 1997. [28] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, all that Article 235 requires is that the secretary’s certification be under oath. It does not prescribe a specific manner of its notarization. Based on its interpretation of Article 235, the BLR, in its October 14, 1998 Advisory, allows for the wholesale notarization of a union’s application for registration and recognizes the effects thereof even on the attachments, including the secretary’s certification. This is a reasonable interpretation considering that the form of notarization contemplated in said Advisory adequately serves the purpose of Article 235, which is to forestall fraud and misrepresentation. More importantly, such interpretation of the BLR is accorded great weight by the Court for it is said agency which is vested with authority and endowed with expertise to implement the law in question.
The other ground cited by DOLE Region IV in canceling the registration of respondent union is that the latter allegedly committed misrepresentation in securing the signatures of its members. The CA and BLR, on the other hand, assign no credence to the Sinumpaang Petisyon for it is a mere photocopy, the genuineness and due execution of which cannot be reasonably ascertained. Another factor which militates against the veracity of the allegations in the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of particularities on how, when and where respondent union perpetrated the alleged fraud on each member. Such details are crucial for in the proceedings for cancellation of union registration on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, what needs to be established is that the specific act or omission of the union deprived the complaining employees-members of their right to choose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
DEL PILAR ACADEMY ET AL., VS. DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 170112, APRIL 30, 2008
Facts:
Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR), an educational institution operating in Imus, Cavite.
On September 15, 1994, the UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) granting salary increase and other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff.
The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union employees, and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said assessment from the employees’ salaries and wages. DEL PILAR, however, refused to effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not amenable to it.
Traversing the complaint, DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION. It justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual check off authorization from the non-union employees. As regards the proposal to amend the provision on summer vacation leave with pay, DEL PILAR alleged that the proposal cannot be considered unfair for it was done to make the provision of the CBA conformable to the DECS’ Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the union that DEL PILAR should have deducted the union fees from the non-union employees citing article 248 of the Labor Code. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Arbiter’s ruling. In gist, it upheld the UNION’s right to agency fee, but did
not consider DEL PILAR’s failure to deduct the same an unfair labor practice. The UNION’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, it then went to the CA via certiorari. On July 19, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with modification the resolutions of the NLRC.
Like the Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA upheld the UNION’s right to collect agency fees from non-union employees, but did not adjudge DEL PILAR liable for unfair labor practice. However, it ordered DEL PILAR to deduct agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees.
Issue:
Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so, whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.
Ruling:
The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees, from employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees' wages for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check off. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from the CBA.
DEL PILAR urges this Court to reverse the CA ruling insofar as it ordered the deduction of agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees, arguing that such conclusion proceeds from a misplaced premise that the salary increase arose from the CBA.
The argument cannot be sustained.
Contrary to what DEL PILAR wants to portray, the grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that benefited the non-union employees. The UNION negotiated for other benefits, namely, limitations on teaching assignments to 23 hours per week, additional compensation for overload units or teaching assignments in excess of the 23 hour per week limit, and payment of longevity pay. It also negotiated for entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay for two (2) months for teaching staff who have rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of service. For the non-teaching personnel, the UNION worked for their entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with pay. These provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-union employees, justifying the collection of, and the UNION’s entitlement to, agency fees.
Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o), [requiring written authorization is inapplicable to non-union members, especially in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.
As explained by this Court in Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. v. Hon. Joaquin viz.:
The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
