Deciding for Oneself: Considering Wolff’s and Raz's Conceptions of Autonomy

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Considering Wolff’s and Raz's Conceptions of Autonomy

Master’s Thesis

Philosophical Perspectives on Philosophy and the Economy

Leiden University

Xanthe Sluijs

s2328240

17 February 2020

Supervisor: Bruno Verbeek

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Abstract

In In Defense of Anarchism,Robert Paul Wolff claims that a legitimate authority cannot exist, as

any authority will necessarily prevent its subject’s autonomy. Jospeh Raz, in contrast, argues that a

legitimate authority can exist and should support its subjects’ autonomy. In the argumentation to

defend their conclusions, both focus on formulating their conceptions of (legitimate) authority. In

this paper, I argue that the difference in their conceptions of autonomy is the basis of the

disagreement in Wolff’s and Raz’s conclusions. After a comparison of the two conceptions and the

role autonomy plays in the authors’ argumentations, I conclude that Raz’s conclusion is the more

plausible of the two.

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§1 Introduction

In In Defense of Anarchism, Robert Paul Wolff argues that legitimate state authority does not

appear to be possible due to the incompatibility of individual moral autonomy and authority. Wolff

bases this argument on the Kantian conviction that individuals can only be responsible for their

actions if they are free to determine their own life policies. In other words, moral autonomy follows

from being able to determine your own policies and actions (Wolff, 1970: 8). He argues that if

individuals have the possibility to be morally autonomous, they have the obligation to be so. In

contrast to autonomy, Wolff defines legitimate authority as the right to command and right to be

obeyed (Wolff, 1970: 6). Such a right, he argues, implies a subject’s surrender of judgement to

others. However, this is incompatible with those subjects being autonomous. Wolff concludes that a

αὐτός [au̯.tós]

self

νόμος [nó.mos]

usage, custom, law

statute, ordinance made by authority

αὐτονομία [u̯.to.no.mí.aː]

freedom to use its own laws, independence

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon

autonomy (noun)

[ɔːˈtɒn.ə.mi]

the right of an organization, country, or region to be independent and govern itself,

the ability to make your own decisions without being controlled by anyone else

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legitimate authority, a moral right to rule, does therefore not appear to be possible (Wolff, 1970:

10).

This challenge to the possibility of the existence of a legitimate authority has garnered a

variety of responses. Among them, Joseph Raz has tried to formulate political authority in such a 1

way that it does not necessarily negate the personal autonomy of its subjects. To do so, he has

proposed what he calls ‘the service conception of authority’. According to this conception, authority

is legitimate if it serves its subjects to better conform their actions to the reasons that apply to them

(Raz, 1986: 67; 2006: 1014). Raz considers personal autonomy as people having, to some degree,

control over their own life; fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives (Raz,

1986: 369). He argues that a legitimate authority facilitates, rather than negates, the conditions for

personal autonomy of its subjects (Raz, 2006: 1015; 1986: 407-10, 415-8). Raz's conclusion is

radically different from Wolff’s, in both envisioning the co-existence of personal autonomy and

political authority, and in allowing the possibility of a legitimate authority.

Despite the differences in their conceptions of authority, both Wolff and Raz commit to a

conception of authority in which subjects submit to authority independent of the content of its

directives and in a pre-emptive fashion. However, they differ in their conclusions as to whether

political (legitimate) authority is compatible with personal autonomy. Whilst Wolff rejects the

possibility of an autonomous individual being commanded, Raz does not consider being

autonomous and at the same time following commands as mutually exclusive. In this thesis, I argue

that the difference in their conceptions of autonomy is the basis of Wolff’s and Raz's disagreement

on the possibility of a legitimate authority. The central question of this thesis is therefore: How do

the conceptions of autonomy, that Wolff and Raz have, affect their disagreement on the possibility

of its existence under political authority?

See for example Ani, 2014; Perkins, 1972; Raz, 1989; 2009.

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To answer this question, I summarize Wolff’s challenge to the possibility of legitimate

authority and Raz's answer to this conception of authority in the second section. This leads me to

reject Wolff’s and Raz’s conceptions of authority as the (sole) basis for their disagreeing

conclusions. It follows then, that autonomy needs to be the main focus when comparing the two

theories. Therefore, I consider the two authors’ conceptions of autonomy in section three (Wolff)

and four (Raz). This is followed by a comparison of the two conceptions of autonomy in section

five. In section six, I trace how the authors’ conception of autonomy informs their different

conclusions.

Finally, I conclude that Wolff’s and Raz's difference in the way they conceive autonomy

indeed affects their disagreement on the possibility of its existence under political authority. 2

Wolff’s conception does not allow for any outside coercion of an individual, dismissing the

possibility of a legitimate authority. For Raz, an autonomous person requires the conditions of

autonomy, which a legitimate authority has a duty to facilitate for its subjects. The disagreement

between Wolff and Raz is based mainly on the different requirements of —, and purposes ascribed

to, autonomy. The more nuanced nature of Raz’s conception of autonomy enables him to put forth a

more coherent account of the legitimacy of authority. 

From this point onwards, I shall use authority when I consider political authority.

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§ 2 Wolff’s Challenge and Raz's Reply

§ 2.1 Wolff’s Challenge to Justified Political Authority

As stated in the introduction, Robert Paul Wolff challenges the existence of legitimate

political authority in his In Defense of Anarchism. Political authority is incompatible with “the

moral autonomy of the individual” (Wolff, 1970: 3). Wolff starts his challenge by first describing

the properties of a hypothetical legitimate authority of a state. He continues by arguing that any

individual has the obligation to be morally autonomous. Finally, he asserts the incompatibility of

both having autonomy and giving up final judgement of one’s actions, which would be required

under a legitimate authority (Wolff, 1970: 10).

Wolff describes a state as “a group of persons who have supreme authority within a given

territory or over a certain population” (Wolff, 1970: 4). A state can have de facto authority, but only

a legitimate state has de jure authority. A legitimate authority’s right to be obeyed must be

understood as a normative claim, i.e. de jure in the sense of “the moral right to rule” (Wolff, 1970:

6), rather than a statement of a de facto situation. De facto authority exists when authority is

acknowledged, whilst de jure authority is to have the right to authority (Wolff, 1970: 5). That

people accept a de facto authority and obey its commands due to their acceptance, is not enough to

prove that a de jure authority can exist. Wolff claims that, as it is a non-empirical concept, the

existence of a legitimate authority must be proven a priori, rather than shown through pointing out

its instances. Wolff questions if there is any possibility of (an a priori) existence of a “moral right to

rule” (Wolff, 1970: 6).

Wolff, considering a state with supreme authority, claims that since de jure authorities would

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argues that a de jure, moral right to rule should be perceived as an authority having the right to issue

commands that correlate with its subjects’ duty to obey (Wolff, 1970: 4). Subjects’ obedience to 3

commands is based on the authority possessed by a person or persons, rather than on their

agreement with the content of a demand (Wolff, 1970: 5). In other words, authority is

content-independent. Wolff does not list possible limitations to a legitimate state’s power, he merely notes

that the limitations of affairs over which a state may claim authority, is one of the questions political

philosophy must answer (Wolff, 1970: 5). Instead, he seems to imply that a legitimate state would

have a nearly unlimited authority to make decisions for its subjects in a wide range of topics. On the

basis of this assumption, he argues that an authority negates its subjects’ autonomy.

Wolff argues for this by offering an interpretation of the Kantian argument for the necessity

of the moral autonomy of individuals. Wolff claims that people can only be held accountable for

their actions when they are responsible for them. This requires that they are autonomous or, in other

words, self-legislating (Wolff, 1970: 8). This is the only way in which they can be held morally

responsible for their actions. Wolff extends this argument by claiming that whilst individuals can

temporarily surrender their autonomy, they cannot give up the responsibility for their actions or the

consequences that follow from those actions. For him, “responsibility for one’s actions means

making the final decisions about what one should do. For the autonomous man, there is no such

thing, strictly speaking, as a command” (Wolff, 1970: 9). Wolff asserts that whilst autonomous

individuals can take others’ arguments into account in their deliberation, they cannot obey another’s

command (Wolff, 1970: 9). He concludes that there is no possibility of a legitimate authority, as no

moral right to rule over autonomous people can exist.

However, it can be questioned whether Wolff’s conclusion can be sustained. He argues that

the negation of autonomy automatically follows from a state’s supreme authority. It can be

Not everybody assumes the automatic connection between a right to command and a subject’s obligation to obey.

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questioned if this also necessarily follows for any form of authority whatsoever. Wolff’s legitimate

state seems to be authoritative in nature, as it has supreme power to dictate its subjects’ behaviour,

which results in an absence of autonomy (Wolff, 1970: 5, 10). The authority Wolff grants to a state,

covers such a wide range of matters it may determine for its subjects within the borders of its

territory, that if it were real, very few people would consider it legitimate. It results in a state with a

potential for such invasive power, that its subjects would experience no sense of freedom. Wolff’s

conflation of any form of political authority with supreme state authority leads to questions about

the usefulness of Wolff’s conception of authority. I will further discuss this problem in section four

of this essay.

For now—returning to Wolff’s argument—the autonomous agent’s rejection of the duty to

obey authoritative commands, is the crux of the dilemma he presents. At the end of In Defense of

Anarchism, he concludes that “the concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous”

(Wolff, 1970: 34). The impossibility of a legitimate state is neither due to an imperfect rationality,

nor due to a subject’s limited knowledge. Even in a democratic Utopia of “a society of rational men

of good will,” Wolff cannot imagine a possibility for a de jure authority to exist (Wolff, 1970: 34).

He therefore sees no other alternative than a doctrine of philosophical anarchism for any reasonable

person. Philosophical anarchism, Wolff explains, is the categorical denial of “any claim to

legitimate authority by one man over another” (Wolff, 1970: 35). Consequently, Wolff cannot 4

discern an a priori possibility for the existence of a legitimate authority, as his view of the

incompatibility of political authority with individual moral autonomy precludes this.

The challenge Wolff sketches is a serious one. If there is no such thing as an a priori justified

political authority, it seems only right we should question our commitments to the de facto

Philosophical anarchism can be contrasted with political anarchism. Advocates of the former argue that there is no

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authorities that do exist. However, whilst Wolff’s entire argument is based on authority’s

incompatibility with individual moral autonomy, he does not provide a specific definition of that

autonomy. In In Defense of Anarchism, Wolff refers to Immanuel Kant’s self-legislating man and

asserts that a moral autonomous agent is both free and responsible. However, these requirements

remain vague, as he does not explicate their scope or precise relationships.

§ 2.2 Raz's Defence of Legitimate Authority

Joseph Raz’ work could be seen as answering Wolff’s challenge. He argues in favour of a

certain conception of authority, the service conception of authority, and asserts that a legitimate

authority does not negate, but is instead compatible with autonomy. Raz makes an even stronger

claim: legitimate authority is required to provide an maintain conditions for personal autonomy for

its subjects.

In agreement with Wolff, Raz endorses that “authority is a right to rule” (Raz, 2006: 1012).

In opposition to Wolff, however, Raz argues that political authority can be legitimate. For it to be

so, it must adhere to what he calls the ‘service conception of authority’ (Raz, 2006: 1014).

According to this conception of authority, a political authority is legitimate when it facilitates its

subjects’ well-being better than they could do themselves. A legitimate authority helps its subjects

align their actions better to the reasons that apply to them than if they were to do this on their own

(Moore, 1989: 842; Raz, 1986: 425). Raz's conception of a legitimate authority is instrumental, as

an authority’s legitimacy is dependent on the outcome of its actions (Green, 2012: 15-6). Raz claims

that legitimate authority is legitimate due to it serving its subjects.

Raz's theory of authority is a part of his general moral theory which concerns “the

advance-ment of well-being of individuals” (Raz, 1986: 267). Rather than an assumption of pure

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Comprehensive goals are those goals that are imbedded deeply in one’s life and that affect a longer

period and multiple aspects of it (Raz, 1986: 293). These goals are based on social conventions

(Raz, 1986: 289, 309). An example of such a goal is marriage. A person might want to get married,

or not, or non-traditionally, but all these goals exist in reference to the convention of marriage.

Raz’s service conception of authority claims that a legitimate authority helps align its subjects’

ac-tions to reasons applicable to them, which are mainly determined by the subjects’ comprehensive

goals.

Raz's argumentation for the service conception of legitimate authority is built on three

theses. He claims that combined, these theses explain that individuals have “a duty to subject one’s

will and judgment to those of another” (Raz, 2006: 2012). These theses are the normal justification

thesis, the (in)dependence thesis and the pre-emption thesis. The relationship of the theses could be 5

envisioned as a triangle: they all suppose and depend on each other. Raz assumes that if an authority

is proven to adhere to these theses, its authority is legitimate.

The normal justification thesis states that subjects “would better conform to reasons” that

already apply to them when guided by an authority’s directives than when they would not (Raz,

2006: 1014). Raz assumes that people normally justify the existence of authority in this way, hence

the name ‘normal justification’ thesis (Raz, 1986: 53). When proven, Raz argues that it

demonstrates that there are instances in which there are compelling reasons to accept authority.

However, the normal justification thesis does not shed light on the relation between an authority’s

directive as a reason for an individual to act and other possible reasons for (different) actions (Raz,

Throughout his work, Raz has employed different structures of his argument. In The Problem of Authority the first two

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1986: 56-7). This is what the (in)dependence thesis contributes to Raz’s service conception of

authority.

Raz refers to the second thesis as the dependence thesis in earlier work and as the

independence thesis in more recent articles. They differ slightly. The focus of the independence

thesis is on the matters for which an authority may issue directives. It claims that a legitimate

authority should be concerned with only those matters in which its subjects require help in aligning

their actions to reason (Raz, 2006: 1014). The dependence thesis on the other hand claims that:

all authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive (Raz, 1986: 47; emphasis added).

The focus of the dependence thesis is on the reasons an authority should take into

consideration for its directives. It claims that an authority’s reasoning must be dependent on the

reasons for action which subjects would consider when deciding how to act. 6

Despite the difference in focus, the dependence and independence theses share the same

function. They both direct the scope of matters an authority can decide upon and the suitability of

its directives. For Raz such directives can only concern those matters that subjects are aided by in

aligning their actions to reasons that already apply to them. Both theses therefore claim the need for

some alignment in an authority’s considerations to the reasons applicable to its subjects. Due to

their shared function and slight difference in focus, in this article, I refer to the thesis as the

‘(in)dependence thesis’. 7

Later, Raz adds a caveat to this thesis. Rather than only based on reasons already applicable to its subjects, an authori

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-ty’s directives should at least have taken some of these reasons into account. In this formulation, it is not necessary that only or all the reasons applicable to its subjects are considered. Rather, an authority’s reason to act might and may differ from its subjects’. But directives can still only be given for matters that its subjects need assistance with.

It is open for question how feasible Raz’ (in)dependence thesis is. Could an authority have the possibility to both de

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Where the normal justification thesis considers the reasons applicable to subjects for

conformity to authority, the (in)dependence thesis concerns the matters about which directives can

be given by a legitimate authority. The normal justification thesis and (in)dependence thesis ground

Raz's justification of an authority’s claim to be obeyed, but they do not explain how subjects should

regard its directives.

Raz's explication of subjects’ attitudes to an authority’s directives is based on the

pre-emptive thesis. This thesis states that a directive of a legitimate authority must replace other reasons

subjects might have for acting in a certain way (Raz, 1986: 46). More precisely, reasons that apply

to subjects, which could normally challenge the reason for acting in accordance with the authority’s

directive, must no longer be considered as possibilities to pursue, on the basis of the directive

coming from the legitimate authority (Raz, 2006: 1019).

According to Raz, only when its subjects consider an authority’s directives as pre-emptive,

can one speak of the existence of authority. First of all, any non-pre-emptive command or directive

would only be considered advice or as one of many reasons considered for acting. On top of this,

Raz claims that regarding directives as non-pre-emptive, would lead to double-counting a reason to

act. Raz argues that an authority’s directive provides a new reason for a subject to act in a certain

way, based on other reasons. However, if both the directive and the reasons that are the basis for the

directive are a part of a subject’s reasoning for a certain course of action, the latter is

double-counted (Raz, 1986: 58). For Raz, directives of a legitimate authority pre-empt other reasons for

action.

Having elaborated his three foundational theses, Raz continues his argument by stating that

a legitimate authority will make mistakes. Still, he claims that even when it does, its directives

should be followed and it should still be considered legitimate (Raz, 2006: 1022-3). He does so

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is higher than if subjects should everything decide for themselves. Thus, whilst Raz's conception of

authority is instrumental, as asserted above, it is also content-independent. It is content-independent

in the sense that subjects should not consider the reasoning or merit of every directive of a

legitimate authority. Instead, they should accept its directives, as they originate from the authority.

Raz argues that if subjects would reflect on each directive they have doubts about, they would not

approach the authority’s directives as pre-emptive (Raz, 1986: 61). There would no longer be an

actual authority to speak of.

However, this claim results in an inconsistency in Raz’s theory. Raz’s instrumental service

conception in effect does not allow subjects to question directives and act against their authority as

soon as they perceive it as legitimate. This exposes a problematic aspect of Raz’ conception of

authority. It leaves little space for subjects to contest directives without immediately contesting an

authority’s legitimacy. Even further, if the subjects of an authority should not reflect on that

authority’s legitimacy (by questioning and not acting on its directives), then how can they ever

determine if a de facto authority is also a de jure authority?

Asserting the need of unreflective acceptance for the functioning of a legitimate authority,

Raz effectively claims that a subject must follow directives of an authority as soon as she considers

it legitimate. After all, he claims that when a subject has at one point considered as authority as

legitimate, this prevents her from acting against that authority’s directives. Consequently, if subjects

themselves should not determine legitimacy of an authority based on the service it gives provides

them, how can legitimacy be questioned once it has been given to an authority. Should such a task

be given to outsiders to determine whether an authority serves its subjects’ adherence to reasons

applicable to them? This seems disputable. Why would one assume that outsiders, rather than

subjects themselves should not question an authority’s directives, which are the basis for that

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Leaving little space for subjects to question and act against the directives of the authority

they consider legitimate, Raz’s service conception seemingly grants legitimacy to any de facto

authority due to the strength of his pre-emptive thesis. As soon as a subject assumes that that a

authority has the right to rule, she therefore assumes its legitimacy since she follows the normal

justification thesis. Due to the preemptive thesis, however, that subject is unable to question or act

on any further doubts about the authority actually meeting both the (in)dependence and the normal

justification thesis, going forward. Raz proposes a service conception of a legitimate authority

which is instrumental due to its focus on outcome (service to subjects), founded upon the normal

justification thesis, the (in)dependence thesis and the pre-emptive thesis, and is

content-independent. Though Raz prescribes a weak or limited conception of authority, he does not offer

subjects much room to decide when an authority is not legitimate, leaving his theory of legitimate

authority with a serious (authority) problem. I return to this problem in paragraph 6.2.

Having described his conception of authority, Raz continues his answer to Wolff by

claim-ing that personal autonomy is not excluded by a legitimate authority. This step is based on both his

service conception as well as his assumption that, contra Wolff, autonomy should not be seen as just

the absence of outside coercion (Raz, 1986: 207). Rather, autonomy is the actualization of three

conditions: the mental ability to choose and plan, having an adequate range of options, and

inde-pendence as freedom from other’s coercion and manipulation. Only if an agent actualizes the

condi-tions for autonomy by choosing the kind of life she wants, does personal autonomy come about

(Raz, 1986: 373). As we shall see, for Raz, a legitimate political authority must promote personal

freedom, which presupposes both value-pluralism and autonomy (Raz, 1986: 367). He claims that a

legitimate authority does not exclude personal autonomy, rather, it must actively try to bring about

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§ 2.3 Two Different Conceptions of Autonomies

Wolff and Raz thus have different conclusions to the question if autonomous subjects can

exist under authority. However, there is considerable overlap in their conceptions of authority; both

assume authority as right to rule and as tied to subjects’ duty to obey. Both also assume that

directives of authority are accepted on the basis of them coming from the authority, rather than from

the reasoning on which the directives are based. Of course, Wolff’s description of authority is more

expansive, whilst Raz's authority conception seems quite limited. At the same time, both Wolff and

Raz propose, effectively, a content-independent conception of authority. The disagreement in their

judgement of the possibility of autonomy under authority must therefore be based on more than just

the differences in their authority conceptions. Their disagreement might be based on their

conceptions of autonomy.

Before continuing, however, it must be noted that Wolff and Raz use different adjectives to

describe their autonomy conceptions. Wolff uses ‘moral’ and Raz ‘personal’. Raz's acknowledges

that there is a difference in concepts of autonomy between Wolff (moral autonomy) and himself

(personal autonomy). Raz argues that instead of a “doctrine about the nature of morality,” like

moral autonomy, personal autonomy is concerned with individuals’ capacity to be (partially) in

control of their own life (Raz, 1986: 370n2). Regardless, he does seem to claim that his theory can 8

be seen as overcoming Wolff’s challenge to the existence of a legitimate authority (Raz, 1986: 97;

2009: 27). Raz does not focus on the different concepts of autonomy and instead continues with the

formulation of authority. However, this difference in the conception of autonomy explains for a

large part the difference in their assessment of the possibility of a legitimate (state) authority.

Due to the partial overlap in Wolff’s and Raz's conceptions of authority and due to Raz's

acknowledgement of difference in their conceptions of autonomy, a closer look at the two

At the beginning of section four, I explain the difference between moral and personal autonomy.

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conceptions of autonomy is required. Therefore, the main focus of the rest of this paper will be on

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§3 Wolff’s Moral Autonomy

In this section, I start with a consideration of Wolff’s conception of moral autonomy in In

Defense of Anarchism. Wolff’s conception of autonomy is moral, as he introduces it as the

requirement for individuals to be held accountable for their actions. I continue by exploring

Autonomy of Reason, a work in which Wolff explains Kant’s Groundwork. From this book, I

characterize Wolff’s conception of autonomy more extensively, through Wolff’s opposition to Kant.

Moral autonomy for Wolff is having the possibility to rationally decide on one’s own policies.

Furthermore, I review some criticisms on Wolff’s conception of autonomy, to both consider others’

portrayal of Wolff’s conception of autonomy and to see if there are possible problematic aspects in

his conception.

§3.1 Moral Autonomy in In Defense of Anarchism

Wolff argues that an agent must act autonomously in order to be morally accountable, he

claims that therefore, autonomy is a duty. Being morally accountable implies responsibility for

one’s actions. An agent’s actions must be her own to be accountable for them. Wolff continues his

argumentation by stating that such responsibility can only exist if agents are free to choose their

actions and able to reason about their choices (Wolff, 1970: 8). For Kant, since rational beings are

morally accountable, they have the duty to be autonomous. Wolff claims to follow Kant in assuming

that a person who is free to choose and able to reflect on her choices has the obligation to do so. A

moral person must be the sole judge on any constraints on her actions; put differently, she must be

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Wolff characterizes moral autonomy as follows:

Since the responsible man arrives at moral decisions which he expresses to himself in the form of imperatives, we may say that he gives laws to himself, or is self-legislating. In short, he is autonomous. As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to laws which one has made for oneself. The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense of the word, free (Wolff, 1970: 8; emphasis in original).

In other words, in order to be autonomous an agent has to be the final judge and author of

her actions. To be able to do so, she must be free to decide. This freedom comes from the absence of

outside coercion. For Wolff, autonomy is not a matter of degrees; either an agent makes the final

decisions in her life, or she does not. An agent is either autonomous or not. Only when an agent has

the freedom to decide for herself, without another infringing upon that freedom, can she reflect on 9

her options and is she responsible for her actions (Wolff, 1970: 8). Since we assume that people are

responsible for their actions, Wolff concludes that agents have the duty to be autonomous.

Wolff argues that this duty remains throughout an agent’s life, although one can suspend

one’s autonomy in a certain context. For example, if you are in a burning house and a you obey a

firefighter who tells you to jump out of a specific window without further reflection, you temporary

give up your autonomy. Since there is no reflection on which course of action to take, you do not

act autonomously. Your final decision is based on being told to do something by another individual

with authority, not through your own reasoning. You could have jumped out of another window, but

to act on the basis of the firefighter’s authority without reflection, you follow her command.

However, for Wolff, such a temporary surrender of decision-making is both bound by time

and place, and does not absolve an agent from the responsibilities for her actions. So, even when

you act because another says so, it is still your responsibility. Autonomy as a duty is an absolute

factor in one’s life, according to Wolff (Wolff, 1970: 9). Only an agent taking final responsibility for

Wolff’s account of freedom as the absence of outside interference in decisions, can be seen as an example of negative

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her actions through formulating her own decisions, adheres to the duty of autonomy and is truly

autonomous.

Wolff expands his argument by claiming that an agent remains autonomous when she is

following another’s command in the case of a life-threatening situation, as long as she reflects on

her decision to obey that other. The example he gives here is of an agent following the orders of the

captain of a sinking ship. All the other passengers follow the captain’s orders, it is therefore prudent

to follow them also. According to Wolff, if the agent decides for herself to follow the captain’s

orders, even without further reflection on those orders, the agent remains autonomous. He defends

this position by pointing out that the agent decides for herself to follow the commands (she is not

forced) and that her adherence to the commands is not based on the captain giving them. It is simply

the most reasonable course of action; she would have followed another’s command, whether or not

that person is the captain (Wolff, 1970: 9). In short, for Wolff an agent is autonomous if she, based 10

on reflection, decides her own policies in life. At the same time, autonomy can remain even in

situations where another makes the final decisions for her actions.

§3.2 Moral Autonomy in The Autonomy of Reason

In The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of

Morals, Wolff attempts to provide further insights into Kant’s Groundwork, whilst also rectifying it

where he thinks it is flawed (Wolff, 1973: 4-5, 84-5). As the title of his work suggests, Wolff

considers autonomy the pivotal element of Kant’s moral theory (Wolff, 1973: 178-9).

Exploring this book is of interest due to Wolff’s juxtaposition between Kant and himself. It

uncovers an analogy between Wolff’s conception of an autonomous state and of an autonomous

in-dividual. The juxtaposition also facilitates further description of Wolff's conception of autonomy as

Both Harry Frankfurt and I notice that Wolff’s expansion seems to lead to an inconsistency in his conception of auto

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a certain discretion to rationally determine one’s own policies and actions. To be able to extract

Wolff’s conception of autonomy, I consider his explanation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and,

based on Wolff’s commentaries, I lay bare some of the features of his own conception of autonomy.

Wolff identifies Kant’s principle of autonomy as: “Never choose except in such a way that

in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also present as universal law” (Wolff, 1973: 177;

citing Kant, Ak. 440). Wolff criticizes this formulation as too vague. However, the main source of

his critique stems from his dissatisfaction with Kant's explanation of the formulation: “Kant turns

out not to be saying what I want him to say” (Wolff, 1973: 178). Kant begins his explanation of

au-tonomy by saying that an agent must always be considered as the maker of the law for herself. This

is in line with Wolff’s conception of autonomy (Wolff, 1973: 178; based on Kant, Ak. 431).

How-ever, Wolff disagrees with Kant’s emphasis on the need for disinterest in making laws for oneself as

an essential part of autonomy. For Kant, an agent should not legislate from her particular interests,

but independently from them (Wolff, 1973: 179).

Wolff points out that that Kant’s explanation of autonomy as making disinterested laws for

oneself is based on Kant’s presentation of autonomy as a formulation of the categorical imperative.

An imperative is a law for oneself, a policy for one’s life. An imperative is hypothetical if it is based

on a rational agent’s interest; adherence to such an imperative is based on reasons that are not

inher-ent in that law. This means that abiding by the law is conditional on the right circumstances,

mind-set, etc. of the agent (Wolff, 1973: 179). A categorical imperative is the opposite of that. Adherence

to a categorical imperative is based on reasons inherent in the law. No personal interest is the reason

to adhere to that imperative. A categorical imperative must therefore be universal; every rational

being has the same reason for adherence, which is found in the law (Wolff, 1973: 126-33). Kant

in-sists that moral autonomy revolves around choosing an imperative that is not dependent on

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submit to an imperative without adhering to her interests, this is only possible if the imperative

would be self-legislated. Following another’s laws will necessarily remain conditional, as the

fol-lowing would be based on the agent’s interests (for example, an agent wanting to prevent that she

comes to harm by not following the law or wanting to please the one who established the law).

Therefore, a categorical imperative must be self-legislated. (Wolff, 1973: 180). According to Kant,

moral autonomy, presented as a formulation of the categorical imperative, must be both

self-legis-lated and universally applicable.

Wolff further explains why Kant depicts moral autonomy as universally applicable, through

Kant’s distinction between heteronomy and autonomy. Wolff explains that for Kant, a

het-eronomous agent’s will is bound to objects of volition rather than wills external to the self (Wolff,

1973: 187). An agent bound by objects of volition acts from a hypothetical imperative. Bondage to

external objects of volition arises due to an agent’s own interests in bringing about certain objects,

which are outcomes that occur outside herself. For Kant, heteronomy occurs due to desire, for

ex-ample a desire for happiness. It can also occur due to an agent’s rational conception, for exex-ample

the principle of perfection (Wolff, 1973: 187). If an agent makes policies for herself from the desire

to be happy or to ensure something is perfect as measured by predetermined, external factors, her

will is heteronomous.

By formulating Kant’s explanation of heteronomy as such (as bound by objects of volition

instead of external wills), Wolff implies an alternative interpretation of heteronomy. Instead of

ing bound by objects of volition, he seems to claim, a heteronomous agent could also be seen as

be-ing bound by external wills. He does so in reference to Kant’s assumption that a person must

legis-late an imperative herself, if it is to be categorical. Kant’s conception of will comes from ‘willed,’

which is similar to choosing from a certain principle (Korsgaard, 1998: xi). According to Kant, a

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(Mc-Cormick, n.d.: §8b). Wolff concludes that for Kant, autonomy being the opposite of heteronomy, an

agent’s will is autonomous only when it is not influenced by outside objects of volition, it must

therefore be universal (Wolff, 1973: 187).

That Wolff’s interpretation of autonomy is distinct from Kant’s, becomes more apparent by

his dissatisfaction with Kant’s argumentation for autonomy’s universal applicability. He claims that

Kant’s explanation does not explain why self-legislation by an agent creates an unconditional

necessity to follow one, universal law for that agent (Wolff, 1973: 181). Wolff argues that Kant

engages in two incompatible doctrines. The first is Kant’s assumption that all rational agents

recognize and adhere to “objective, substantive, categorical moral principles” (Wolff, 1973: 181).

For Wolff, this leaves the notion of agents’ self-legislation vacuous, since they cannot decide for

themselves what law to legislate. There is, in effect, nothing to choose from, as there is only one

universal law according to Kant. Wolff argues that such a formulation predetermines an agent’s

policy choice. The other doctrine Wolff discerns, is Kant’s belief that only to the extent that a

rational agent’s free choice is the reason for her adoption of a policy, should she considered herself

bound by it. Wolff argues that a belief in the latter necessarily dismantles a belief in the former

doctrine. Either there is free choice in policy, or there is the same moral law for all rational agents.

Wolff argues that the content of moral principles must be determined on the basis of commitment to

freely self-formulated goals (Wolff, 1973: 181). In contrast to Kant, Wolff champions the need for

free choice of policy for rational agents.

Wolff concludes his explanation of Kant’s formula of autonomy by stating that Kant

assumes objective laws that bind the content of autonomy for every rational agent. In opposition to

Kant, Wolff claims that such objective laws are merely formal criteria that ensure that policies are

not inconsistent. They are negative laws, excluding the incorporation of non-rational policies, never

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are bound by life-policies only when these are legislated by agents themselves. However, Wolff

argues that agents should not do away with the influence of their interests. Rather, according to him,

agents must have an actual choice when formulating their own rational policies (Wolff, 1973: 181).

They should reject the influence of others’ wills upon one’s own. Wolff, contra Kant, considers an

autonomous agent as free from bondage to external wills (Wolff, 1973: 187). Rather than freedom

from objects of volition, Wolff assumes that autonomy requires freedom from “wills external to the

self” (Wolff, 1973: 187). Freedom from others’ wills, is freedom from influence of others’ choices

on one’s own. Wolff argues that autonomous agents will be influenced by their own interests, 11

since to be truly free to decide, agents must be able to choose different (rational) policies.

It is noteworthy that Wolff’s conception of autonomy shows an analogy with his conception

of (state) authority. For Wolff, an autonomous agent has a nearly limitless power to determine

policies for herself. The only restriction the autonomous agent encounters is rationality. Wolff

conceives authority, or rather a state authority, as having a nearly limitless power to determine

policies for its subjects (Wolff, 1970: 4). However, this is not a perfect analogy, as Wolff does not

seem to place restrictions on the power of authority, as he does for agents. Rather, Wolff seems to be

convinced that the only restrictions such an authority has, are its territorial borders. Within those

borders, it seems, anything goes for an authority’s directives. All the same, it can be claimed that for

Wolff an autonomous agent has nearly limitless authority to determine her own rational policies and

actions.

Combining insights from Autonomy of Reason and In Defense of Anarchism, Wolff

considers an autonomous agent as deciding for herself what life-policies to act from. According to

him, there are objective principles that exclude an autonomous agent from selecting inconsistent,

As in In Defense of Anarchism, Wolff’s understanding of freedom here can be labeled as negative (negative freedom

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non-rational policies. Wolff argues that this consequently results in a freedom to choose her own

actions, as long as she reflects on their rationality in relation to her goals. In opposition to Kant, for

Wolff there is a variety of valid reasons for an autonomous agent to reason from when determining

one’s own policies and actions. Wolff does not adhere to Kant’s view of autonomy as freedom from

external objects. Instead, he considers autonomy as freedom from other’s wills. The freedom to

choose from a variety of policies and actions, is presented by Wolff as a duty of all those who can

be autonomous. Due to that duty to freely choose, Wolff excludes the possibility of legitimate

authority, because obeying an authority is obeying another’s will. Any (state) authority, due to

having the power to make policies for its subjects, necessarily infringes upon the authority of an

autonomous agent over herself. Under an authority, an agent’s policies cannot be determined by

herself. Therefore, Wolff concludes, authority negates any agent’s moral autonomy.

Wolff lays bare some of the features of his conception of autonomy by taking distance from

Kant and by contrasting autonomy to authority. However, the above interpretation of Wolff’s

conception of autonomy is not based on Wolff clearly explaining what it is or on his explicit

argumentation, but on my deduction from his opposition to Kant and from his minimal description

in In Defense of Anarchism. This leaves his conception of autonomy unclear still.

§3.3 Critiques of Wolff’s Moral Autonomy

Since Wolff does not give a complete conception of autonomy, though one can deduce its

central aspects by combining his arguments of In Defense of Anarchism and The Autonomy of

Reason. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to consider another avenue to shed light on it. I do so by

considering some critiques of Wolff’s works on autonomy and authority. These critiques show how

others interpret Wolff’s conception of autonomy. On top of this, if their arguments hold, this might

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authority. The critiques presented here fall into two categories. The first and most important shows

an inconsistency in Wolff's autonomy conception, already shortly discussed above. The second

category questions if Wolff's conception of autonomy is ‘Kantian’.

§3.3.1 Critique of Wolff’s Moral Autonomy: Inconsistency

As mentioned in a footnote above, both Harry Frankfurt and I notice an inconsistency in

Wolff’s explanation of autonomy. In In Defense of Anarchism, Wolff argues that autonomy is

something that exists in absolute only: “moral autonomy is simply the condition of taking full

responsibility for one’s actions. […] Taking responsibility for one’s actions means making the final

decisions about what one should do.” (Wolff, 1970: 9). This requires that an agent reflects on the

consequences of her possible actions and makes her decisions based on such reflections. Wolff’s

conception points to him perceiving autonomy as an absolute: an agent is either autonomous and

makes the final decisions for her actions, or she is not.

The inconsistency that both Frankfurt and I observe, presents itself in Wolff’s example of an

agent retaining autonomy when following a captain’s commands on a sinking ship. This example

expands the scope of his conception of autonomy considerably. Wolff claims that an agent can

remain autonomous if she follows the captain’s commands out of prudence, as her life is in danger

and others already act accordingly. Wolff claims that the agent does not have to reflect on every

forthcoming command. Instead, autonomy’s required reflection is present in her earlier

consideration whether to follow the commands or not. On top of this, Wolff asserts, her following

the commands is based on prudence, not the perceived authority of the commanding person (Wolff,

1970: 9). In such a life-threatening situation, according to Wolff, an agent can still be autonomous

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Frankfurt notes, however, that whilst it might be prudent to follow the orders, the actions in

the given example cannot be said to be in line with an agent always taking the final decision for her

actions (Frankfurt, 1973: 409-10). Wolff claims that having autonomy requires making all decisions

about ones actions oneself on the basis of one’s reflection (Wolff, 1970: 9). However, if it is

sufficient to make a single autonomous decision to hand over one’s final decisions to another, it is

not clear how Wolff can maintain that authority negates autonomy.

Wolff might argue that only if an agent consents to obedience, she may act unreflectively on

command. An agent would still be autonomous and therefore accountable for her actions. However,

repeating Frankfurt’s argument, if this would be the case, autonomy would no longer require an

agent to make her final decisions (Frankfurt, 1973: 409-10). Furthermore, if consent to obedience

would not negate autonomy, it is unclear why authority negates autonomy. Taking the above

argument to its logical conclusion, one could argue that as long as agents, after reflection, decide for

themselves to follow an authority’s commands, they preserve their autonomy. Therefore, Wolff’s

conclusion —authority necessarily negates autonomy— would not follow from autonomy

conception, as long as he maintains that an agent can remain autonomous when following an

authority’s command in a life-threatening situation.

Either autonomy means making the final decisions about one’s actions and is therefore

incompatible with authority, or autonomy allows surrendering some of the final decisions on one’s

actions, as was shown in the example. The latter conception might allow the possibility of

autonomy’s compatibility with authority. However, this conception flies in the face of Wolff’s

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§3.3.2 Critique of Wolff’s Moral Autonomy: Kantian

On top of the possibility of inconsistency, doubts can also be cast on Wolff’s claim to have a

Kantian conception of autonomy. Wolff uses his explanation of autonomy to reject the possibility of

autonomous agents existing within a political authority. Since such an authority will claim the right

to rule, not all the actions an agent would perform under such an authority are expressions of her

own policies. He argues that, on the basis of Kant, autonomy must be seen as a duty to all rational

beings (Wolff, 1970: 10). Therefore, Wolff concludes, a legitimate political authority is an

impossibility (Wolff, 1970: 11).

Those somewhat familiar with the Kantian notion of autonomy might be surprised by

Wolff’s explanation and the consequences he supposes the duty of autonomy has on the possibility

of legitimate authority. This surprise is shared by some of Wolff’s commentators (for example

Oberdiek, 1977; Riley, 1978). Hans Oberdiek, for example, states in a review on Wolff’s The

Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that

Wolff’s work, though inspired by Kant, “does not adequately reflect Kantianism” (Oberdiek, 1977:

482). Rather than a mere commentary, what Wolff presents is a reconstruction of Kant’s moral

theory (Oberdiek, 1977: 483). Oberdiek notices the difference between Kant and Wolff in their

consideration of autonomy.

Oberdiek contrasts Kant and Wolff, stating that the former assumes autonomy to be freedom

due to reason, whilst the latter assumes autonomy as be “the freedom from reason” (Oberdiek,

1977: 484; emphasis in original). Whilst in Kant’s autonomy reason is the way to rise above

influence from one’s outside world interests, Oberdiek claims that Wolff’s autonomy is the freedom

to follow one’s self-formulated principles, be they reasonable or unreasonable. However, I do not

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there are objective laws that autonomous agents must follow in determining their policies (Wolff,

1973: 181).

Oberdiek is correct, however, in contrasting the two conceptions of autonomy. Wolff

introduces his conception of autonomy in In Defense of Anarchism as Kantian, whilst at that time

already having worked for almost two decades on The Autonomy of Reason in which he distances

himself from Kant’s notion of it. Wolff seems to be cherry picking in Kant’s theory, whilst

simultaneously wanting to enjoy the authority that the Kantian title gives his argument.

Taking the critiques together, Wolff’s conception of autonomy is rendered inconsistent and

not Kantian. As it stands, his conception does not preclude the existence of an autonomous agent

that obeys the commands of an authority. Wolff claims that an agent remains autonomous whilst not

making the final decisions in her life, even when, in such a situation, the agent hands those

decisions over to an authority. Finally, without the backing of the Kantian label Wolff ascribes to

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§4 Raz's Personal Autonomy

I start this section with a consideration of Raz's conception of autonomy in more recent

work (The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception), after which I move to older

work (Morality of Freedom) in which autonomy is discussed more extensively. Next, I consider

some forms of criticisms which focus on Raz's conception of autonomy. All these steps lead to a

extensive formulation of Raz's conception of autonomy.

Before I do so, however, it is important to note that in opposition to Wolff’s moral

autono-my, Raz focusses on personal autonomy. These different adjectives point to a difference in the

func-tion of autonomy in the authors' theories. Wolff’s moral autonomy revolves around objectively

ra-tional, self-developed choices. For him, moral autonomy is necessary for an agent to be held

re-sponsible for her actions. From the obligation to be rere-sponsible, he infers the obligation to be

au-tonomous (Wolff, 1970: 8-9). Raz's personal autonomy is not as focussed on responsibility. Rather,

Raz describes personal autonomy as an ideal for guiding one’s own life. To him, it is a requirement

for individuals living a good life (Raz, 1986: 391).

§4.1 Personal Autonomy in The Problem of Authority

In The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, Raz's conception of

auton-omy seems to resemble Wolff’s at first. Equalizing autonauton-omy and independence, he describes

au-tonomy as the “general capacity to guide our conduct (and our life more broadly) by our own

judg-ment” (Raz, 2006: 1017). However, Raz emphasizes autonomy’s connection to an agent’s reasons

for action more explicitly than Wolff. For him, the capacity of autonomy allows agents to act in

ac-cordance with reasons that are applicable to them. This is due to the agents’ exercise of judgement.

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capac-ity of autonomy is due to the purpose it has. For Raz, that purpose is alignment with reason.

Ac-cording to him, autonomy means acting in accordance with the reasons as they apply to you. This

acting in accordance with the reasons has to be intentional. The capacity needed for this is the

com-bination of internal and external factors that make this possible for you (Raz, 2006: 1017).

Raz claims that an agent’s rational capacity to autonomy consists of the alignment of actions

with reasons applicable to them by reflecting on situations in the world and deciding how to

re-spond. He argues that autonomy has value due to the effect it has when successful: conformity to

applicable reasons. Forming and executing their own judgements, however, is not the only option

for agents to conform to reason. Instinctive or emotional, non-reflexive reactions can sometimes be

preferable to a lengthier process of reflection (Raz, 2006: 1017). For example, if there is a lion in

your hallway, quickly running away might be a more preferable reaction than standing around for a

while to consider possible reactions. Alternatively, for Raz, agents can sometimes conform better to

reason by obeying authority and basing their actions on the commands of the authority (Raz, 2006:

1017). The Problem of Authority gives some insights in Raz’s conception of autonomy, it is not

pos-sible to distinguish a careful explanation of it from this article.

§4.2 Personal Autonomy in Morality of Freedom

In Morality of Freedom, Raz discusses, amongst other things, the interplay between

authori-ty and autonomy. Raz argues that significantly autonomous agents make their own choices.

Howev-er, the act of agents choosing is not sufficient for autonomy. As described above, agents must act in

accordance to the reasons as they apply to the agent. Autonomous agents "adopt personal projects,

develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, through which their personal integrity

and sense of dignity and self-respect are made concrete” (Raz, 1986: 154). Raz describes such

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these, agents determine their own conception of a successful life, i.e., they determine what sort of

life they consider a life well lived (Raz, 1986: 154, 387). Being able to answer this question on

one’s own terms is a criterium of a good life according to Raz. Autonomy is not achieved through a

single choice, but can only be achieved by making successive choices throughout one’s life in order

to successfully pursue goals, projects and relationships that are chosen by the agent herself (Raz,

1986: 369-71).

To be sure, Raz does not take such self-determination as existing in a void. He argues

in-stead that people’s comprehensive goals are at least partially based on what he calls ‘social forms’.

For Raz, an agent can form “a comprehensive goal only if it is based on existing social forms, i.e.

on forms of behaviour which are in fact widely practised in his society” (Raz, 1986: 308). This is

not to say that agents can only copy the behaviour seen in their society. Rather, their goals will be

based on behaviour in a society, whether they are copied straightforwardly from, outright rejections

of or variations on perceived behaviour in their society (Raz, 1986: 309). Raz argues that only

through the connection of comprehensive goals to social forms, an agent can value such goals (Raz,

1986: 310).

Social forms, along with natural forces (like mountains, tsunami’s and rain), will at the same

time confront agents in such a way that they can never be wholly autonomous. Raz approaches

au-tonomy as an ideal that cannot be fully reached, as both natural and social forces will require some

compromises in agents’ choices and fulfillment of their goals. According to him, autonomy is

there-fore a matter of degree. An agent can be more or less autonomous, depending on her (history of)

decisions in regard to goals, pursuits and relations that she has chosen for herself as valuable (Raz,

1986: 154, 319, 371).

According to Raz, on top of an ideal one tries to achieve, autonomy is also a value that

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concep-tualization of either ideal or value. However, it can be inferred that the former conveys that

auton-omy is something to strive for, put differently, autonauton-omy is good for all. The latter conveys that

au-tonomy is the object of admiration and thus an ambition for individual (Raz, 1986: 369, 377).

For an agent to be autonomous, certain conditions must be met. Raz distinguishes three 12

such conditions: an agent must have “appropriate mental abilities, an adequate range of options, and

independence” to be able to be the author of her own life (Raz, 1986: 372). Concerning the first

condition, an agent’s ability to rationally formulate complex intentions and also plan according to

them, is essential here (Raz, 1986: 372-3). To achieve the former, an agent needs to have integrity:

an agent must be aware of both her available options and understand the influence these choices

might have on her life (Raz, 1989: 381-2). An agent must also be loyal to her goals: she has to both

identify with the choices she makes and commit to those choices. This does not mean that one can

never change one’s mind. However, the reason for changing one’s mind must not come from a

(mi-nor) setback in reaching one’s goal (Raz, 1986: 383). The condition of having mental abilities

en-sures that an agent is truly the agent of her own life, determining what motivates herself.

Raz's extensively explains the second condition of autonomy: the importance of an adequate

range of options to choose from. To illustrate this necessity, he gives two examples: the man in the

pit and the hounded woman. In the first example, a man has fallen in a pit and will never be able to

leave it. There is enough sustenance to survive without suffering, but he is unable to move around.

His choices are severely limited; he can decide when to sleep or eat, and “to scratch his left ear or

not” (Raz, 1986: 374). In the second example, the hounded woman can roam around freely over an

island. However, she is constantly pursued by a animal set to devour her. She must continuously use

Raz uses capacities for and conditions of autonomy interchangeably. Unless I am quoting him, I employ conditions

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all her energy, wit and resources to be able to escape it (Raz, 1986: 374). Both have some available

options to choose from but neither is autonomous.

In the case of the man in the pit, the effects of his choices on his life are inconsequential. In

the case of the hounded woman, it is the opposite; every choice she makes has far-reaching

conse-quences for her life. Neither have the possibility to use their mental ability to choose outside of the

confined conditions of their life. Raz, therefore, argues that an adequate range of options to choose

from must be a condition of autonomy, without specifying when a range is adequate, as this

de-pends on an agent’s context (Raz, 1986: 373-4).

For Raz, only when an agent has multiple valuable options to choose from, concerning

choices which can be consequential for the course of her life, but are not necessarily so, can she be

said to determine her life. Whilst both the man in the pit and the hounded woman act from reason

that are applicable to them, they have no control over their lives. Instead, an agent must have a

range of options to choose from and the choices must vary in the importance of their consequences.

Not every choice should affect her life path drastically, but not all choices must be trivial either

(Raz, 1986: 374). Rather, Raz argues that an agent has an adequate range of options that she can

choose from a range of options both for consequential long-term and non-consequential short-term

commitments or projects.

Raz claims that such a range requires multiple good options to choose from. One’s choices

must be free from worries about personal needs required for having a worthwhile life. On top of this

one’s choices must “not be dominated by the need to protect the life one has” (Raz, 1986: 376).

Pro-tecting the life one has implies a lack of freedom to choose from multiple good options, due to

ei-ther social or natural forces. An example of protecting the life one has, is an agent who has worked

all her life to become a house owner who, due to some bad luck, is now threatened by the mob.

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be able to live somewhere else and all her other needs are met, the life she has is under threat, as she

would not be able to buy another house. She has no good options to choose from.

Raz also emphasizes that options available are adequately varied. The range of options must

contain options that are truly different from each other (Raz, 1986: 153, 204). Since people’s goals,

pursuits and projects vary immensely and are not always compatible, the range of options available

should include options that are incommensurable to each other (Raz, 1986: 375, 396). Raz also

claims that amongst these varied options, some collective goods must be offered, as they are a

re-quirement for a good life. He describes collective goods as those goods provided for all in a society

whose benefits cannot be controlled by anyone other than a potential benefactor (Raz, 1986: 198,

206). An example he gives is the existence of homosexual marriage. He argues that this is a

collec-tive good, since such a marriage can only exist through the existence of a society and the benefits

are only distributed by those who benefit from its existence; nobody is forced to marry somebody of

the same sex (Raz, 1986: 203). An adequate range of options must therefore contain both truly

dif-ferent options and collective goods.

Another requirement for an adequate range of options is that the available options should

stimulate the pursuit of good. For Raz, a range of options is only valuable when it allows an agent

to choose between multiple options that facilitate an agent to maintain or bring about something of

value. Options that are morally bad cannot be erased from agents’ lives, he states, but they do not

have to be present in the range of options to ensure this condition of autonomy (Raz, 1986: 379-81).

It should be noticed as well that the condition of having an adequate range of options to choose

from should not be conceived as a singular choice, but rather as a succession of choices throughout

one’s life (Raz, 1986: 374n1). So, according to Raz, one of the conditions for an agent to be