RICO Commerce Clause The First Circuit Extends Congressional Commerce Power to Encompass Noneconomic Criminal Conduct SMU Law Review Volume 61 | Issue 2 Article 9 2008 RICO Commerce Clause The First C[.]
of low-intensity supervision based on risk of serious offending, because there may be public and political anxiety about reducing criminal justice intervention to adjudicated offenders. Thus, for low-intensity probation to maintain credibility, it is arguably more sensible to demonstrate that few serious offenders slipped through the net than to show how many non-serious offenders had their supervision requirements reduced. From the model standpoint, we must ensure a high positive predictive value, which indicates the proportion of predicted low-risk offenders who were actually low risk, and high specificity (proportion of serious offenders who received a non-low risk prediction). Large values for these two measures indicate a low rate of false positives (predicted low- risk offenders who commit serious crimes). Conversely, we expect to see lower sensitivity and lower negative predictive values, because the sample contains many false negatives. Most non-low risk probationers do not go on to be serious offenders in the two-year follow-up. Serious offenses are rare events in our sample, and non-low risk offenders are not necessarily high risk. 9 Low values on these two measures are more acceptable because there is no harm when an offense is not committed, regardless of the risk prediction. However, we must also keep the purpose of the model in mind: the diversion of a majority of offenders in APPD’s caseload to low-intensity supervision. If sensitivity is too low (too few non-serious offenders received low-risk predictions), that goal will not be fulfilled.
Within this context, debates associated with human and civil rights often seem to descend into a zero-sum game where victims’ rights are seemingly only won at the expense of the rights of accused persons or prisoners (Williams 2005; Hall 2009). This binary positioning of perpetrators or prisoners versus victims is a powerful ideological move. It casts victims, and those accused or convicted of criminalconduct, as distinct, polarised opposites (Zedner 2004; Dignan 2005; Bednarova 2011). Further, by politicising the issue of victims’ versus ‘offenders’’ rights a clear delineation is drawn between those who are ‘deserving’ of legal protections and those who are not. Such delineations encourage narratives which construct the ‘criminal’ or the ‘prisoner’ as having actively forfeited their rights and are in keeping with discourses that define lawbreakers as ‘other’ (Drake 2012). Whilst such crude binary constructions have often appeared in media discourses in the wake of particularly violent or high-profile crimes, there has been an apparent increasing reliance on a zero-sum approach to victims’ and offenders’ rights in political rhetoric in Britain since the early 1990s (Sanders 2002).
fauna that occur in Caatinga, are threatened with extinction (Schober, 2012; Nascimento; Campos, 2011). The Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources – IBAMA, is one of the main agencies responsible for inspection of environmental crimes against the fauna in the northeastern semi-arid region. The law number 9.605/98 stablished in chapter V, section I, the criminalconduct related to human action on the fauna (BRASIL, 2016), to catch, to murder, to transport, to sell, to purchase, to use, to keep in captivity, to keep wild animals or products from them, without proper authorization, license or permission are some of the crimes that will result in penal and financial consequences to the responsible, generating an Environmental Notice of Violation – ENV, which may result in a fine or warning, and the animal or product of it will be apprehended (IBAMA, 2016). Studies in the brazilian semi-arid that investigate the relationship between man and wild fauna, estimating qualitative and quantitative aspects related to most impacted species and the types of environmental crimes, can be used specially to subsidize actions for conservation and awareness of scarce wildlife resources (ALVES et al., 2012). Through the exposed, this work proposed to investigate the way the human being relates to the wild fauna, through analysis of the Environmental Notices of Violation made in the apprehensions of animals realized by The Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources – IBAMA in the semi-arid of Bahia.
Available online: https://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/IJR/ P a g e | 2955 First, notions of equity and justice will be enhanced, since similar offenders will be treated in the same manner. Second,, since an insanity determination serves as a prerequisite to receiving an effective treatment as part of the sentence, more offenders in need of this treatment will be given the opportunity. The superior insanity standard that should be adopted is based on Oregon's GEI verdict. Determination of insanity under this standard asks whether "as a result of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminalconduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of the law". Under this insanity test, defendants would be found guilty of commission of the underlying crime except for insanity if they were unable to conform their conduct to the law (volitional impairment) or appreciate the criminality of their conduct (cognitive impairment) due to a mental illness or defect present at the time of the offense. By taking into account both the volitional and cognitive abilities of the offender, the GEI verdict avoids the flaws of exclusively cognitive or volitional insanity tests." The GEI verdict appropriately takes into consideration offenders with volitional incapacities that are amenable to treatment in mental health facilities" as well as offenders with cognitive incapacities.
Because it incorporated elements of “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine, the final Bloxom majority opinion failed to use the correct analysis in determining that McFarlin owed a personal duty. Limited liability should have been relegated to nothing more than a footnote to state that McFarlin’s personal conduct put him personally at risk based on Section 12:1320(D) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes and Canter. The true issue of the case is whether McFarlin is liable under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code for negligently hiring Horn. The operative questions should have been, first, whether McFarlin could reasonably have foreseen Horn’s actions when he was hired such that McFarlin owed a duty to Justin and his mother in this situation; and second, whether McFarlin’s hiring of Horn was a proximate (or legal) cause of the damages suffered by Justin and his mother.
7. This equation of status to conduct is not unique to gays and sodomy in the United States. The Japanese concentration camps in California resulted from this notion of status as conduct. Thus, the Court held that an inference of disloyalty was a legally permissible justification for imprisoning Japanese Americans and their descendants solely because of their national origin. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). Yet, as Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in Bowers, status alone is not proscribable. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)). The Robinson court found that status alone is not enough to convict someone without additional proof of illegal conduct. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (1962). The legal discrimination of homosexuality is illogical in light of the Robinson decision; it is status alone that disadvantages lesbians and gays and the Supreme Court clearly held that discriminating against someone due to their status is impermissible.
Industrial robots have been increasingly used for decades and the International Federation of Robotics predicts that 1.3 million more of such humanoids will be installed in factories across the globe between 2015 and 2018. While robots are deemed beneficial for industrial production, they pose a serious threat to our health and safety. Robots have killed many people and gravely injured numerous others in different countries. Policymakers around the world remain largely unmoved about resolving the uncertainty over the specificity of which persons should go on trial for such killings. This Article examines the principles of common law governing manslaughter by criminal negligence with particular reference to Australia; however, it will generally apply to other common law countries as well. It finds that while it would be theoretically possible to identify the potential accused of workplace deaths caused by robots, we consider that the common law identification doctrine in practice will be a bar to successful prosecutions against corporate employers given the specific complexities associated with the usage of industrial robots. This Article therefore submits a recommendation with justifications for dealing with this serious offence by enacting appropriate manslaughter law for the effective regulation of robot- provoked fatalities.
The U.S. copyright enforcement scheme has not accomplished its goals. It did not manage to reduce piracy rates over the years, and those rates have constantly grown. The possible reasons for the failure of these enforcement schemes are complex and cannot be accurately determined and measured. However, given the discussion in Part V, it seems that the reasons stem from the reality that the copyright provisions were not actually enforced or prosecuted to the same extent as civil enforcement measures. In fact, criminal enforcement was significantly lower. There are many reasons for the low enforcement level. In the case of the United States, we can point to the burdensome high costs of bringing suits as a restraint on enforcement. Additionally, some infringers are able to avoid detection through the use of developing technologies. Moreover, enforcement efforts have focused mainly upon large-scale commercial infringements without the intent to gain profits rather than the more common, small-scale, non- commercial infringement.