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Games and Strategic Behavior

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

... non-atomic games is especially convenient because the inability of players to affect societal variables provides significant technical ...the strategic behavior desired to be ...

32

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

... non-atomic games is especially convenient because the inability of players to affect societal vari- ables provides significant technical ...the strategic behavior desired to be ...

29

Strategic behavior in non atomic games

Strategic behavior in non atomic games

... non-atomic games is especially convenient because the inability of players to affect societal vari- ables provides significant technical ...the strategic behavior desired to be ...

30

Games and Strategic Behavior. Chapter 9. Learning Objectives

Games and Strategic Behavior. Chapter 9. Learning Objectives

... • The prisoner’s dilemma is a game in which each player has a dominant strategy, and when each plays it, the resulting payoffs are smaller than if each had played a dominated strategy[r] ...

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Ellsberg games and the strategic use of ambiguity in normal and extensive form games

Ellsberg games and the strategic use of ambiguity in normal and extensive form games

... My doctoral thesis introduces such strategic use of ambiguity into games. Although game theory was invented to model conflicts of interest, so far the theory does not allow players to intentionally choose ...

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Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games

Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games

... individual behavior in strategic-form ...of strategic sophistication shown in strategic-form games, while controlling for social preferences and beliefs about the other ...

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Global Games with Strategic Substitutes

Global Games with Strategic Substitutes

... 1 Introduction In general, game-theoretic models are developed under the assumption that the ra- tional behavior of the players and the structure of the game are common knowledge. Since these assumptions might be ...

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Elections and strategic positioning games

Elections and strategic positioning games

... voting behavior of the electorate, and the strategic positioning behavior of ...voting behavior and strategic positioning behavior of ...

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The bargaining set in strategic market games

The bargaining set in strategic market games

... noncooperative behavior of individuals and we allow coordination of actions in a market ...in strategic market games Before defining cooperative equilibrium notions in the market game framework, one ...

11

Strategic delay and efficiency in global games

Strategic delay and efficiency in global games

... Equilibria such as this one may offend our aesthetic taste for simplicity, and they are cer- tainly tedious to compute; categorizing all the possibilities does not appear to be a practical option. Whether we can afford to ...

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Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

... coordination games, however, show clear patterns of ...coordination games with public and private information and find no significant difference in predictability of aggregate behavior, even though ...

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Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

... towards strategic uncertainty are closely related to risk ...coordination games are positively ...with strategic uncertainty in a similar way, which supports the view that subjective beliefs can be ...

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Unfakeable facial configurations affect strategic choices in trust games with or without information about past behavior

Unfakeable facial configurations affect strategic choices in trust games with or without information about past behavior

... Building on previous studies showing that appearance-based trustworthiness impressions influence cooperation, we examined whether unfakeable facial features perceived to indicate trustwor- thiness have an impact on ...

7

Unfakeable facial configurations affect strategic choices in trust games with or without information about past behavior

Unfakeable facial configurations affect strategic choices in trust games with or without information about past behavior

... trust games involving multiple interactions with the same trustee, participants dynamically tuned their investment strategies to favor partners who reciprocated their trust ...

6

Evolution and Walrasian Behavior in Market Games

Evolution and Walrasian Behavior in Market Games

... 4 Conclusion We studied the evolutionary stability of the Walrasian equilibrium in the con- text of the strategic market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). We introduced a strong version of evolutionary stable ...

17

Public Goods Games and Adoptery Behavior

Public Goods Games and Adoptery Behavior

... analysis based on formal economic models and the estimation of the parameters of those models. We let subjects make a series of ten decisions in one-shot games with independent variations of internal and external ...

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STRATEGIC GAMES ON DIGRAPHS

STRATEGIC GAMES ON DIGRAPHS

... We consider and investigate an original model of TSP motivated by applications — a synthesis of classical TSP and classical Transportation Problem. Algorithms based on Integer Programming cutting-plane methods and Branch ...

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Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

... The above definition of a game is very close but not iden- tical to the definition of a game frame in Pauly (2001; 2002) and the definition of a concurrent game structure, the se- mantics of ATL (Alur, Henzinger, and ...

8

Games of strategic complementarities: An application to bayesian games

Games of strategic complementarities: An application to bayesian games

... The last point is particularly relevant since coordination failures and multiple equilibria are typi- cal in the presence of complementarities. Bank or debt runs, currency crises, low activity equilibria, adoption ...

14

Coalitional and strategic market games

Coalitional and strategic market games

... A second possibility to model default is allowing the individuals to de- fault whenever they want to and introducing at the same time a default penalty if they do so. This concept was for example considered by Shubik and ...

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