As noted above, such thinking was a minority view in the summer and autumn of 2005, and in turn, two movement conservatives made their way onto the bench. They are expected to contribute to the ideological advance of conservative principles, helping to secure GeorgeW. Bush’s place in his- tory. Of course, soon after Roberts and Alito took their seats, the president’s poll numbers declined further, ultimately reaching historic lows. In 2006, Democrats took back control of both houses of Congress for the first time since the “Republican Revolution of 1994,” and in 2008, Barack Obama easily defeated a Republican opponent handcuffed by voters’ negative atti- tudes toward the Bush administration. After John McCain’s defeat, talk of a Republican realignment was no longer heard. But conservatives know that their efforts to fill the Court with like-minded thinkers will have an enduring influence on constitutional law for years to come. Indeed, it may perhaps be one of the most significant legacies of the second Bush presidency.
GeorgeBush began his presidency doing all he could to erase the public’s memory of his predecessors’ environmental accomplishments. For example, EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman publicized the Admin- istration’s intention to reverse Clinton’s strict arsenic standards for drinking water, while Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman announced the modifi- cation of Clinton’s rule banning road development on over sixty million acres of national forests (Jehl 2001). President Bush lost on this one when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 ruling, indicated that a district court in Idaho “abused its discretion” in blocking the ruling that would prevent “logging, mining and oil drilling across 2 percent of the United States territory” (Jehl 2002). This, in effect, reinstated the Clinton Administration’s ban on road construction on 60 million acres of forest land. Another issue involved snowmobiles, with their excessive noise and pollution, allowed to come into the parks. Bill Clinton had proposed a total ban on snowmobiles by 2004 in Yellowstone National Park and Grand Teton National Park. GeorgeW. Bush said he would “limit” the number of snow- mobiles in Yellowstone and Grand Teton, but his “limit” was no limit at all, allowing up to 1,100 per day (Vig and Kraft 2006, 326-27).
What will become clear from the case studies is that, notwithstanding the pretensions of American policymakers, the record of the United States when it comes to promoting democracy abroad is not stellar. There must be serious doubts about the Reagan administration’s commitment to furthering democracy in Nicaragua, for its chosen method for doing so was to finance a group of anti-government rebels that engaged in acts of terrorism against Nicaraguan civilians. By the time Reagan departed the White House thousands of Nicaraguans had been killed as a result of the US- sponsored war, while the country’s economy and infrastructure had been devastated. The Reagan administration also strove to discredit elections held in Nicaragua in 1984. There was a good deal more truth to the Clinton administration’s claim to want to further democracy in Haiti, with President Clinton going so far as to dispatch US forces to remove that country’s military leader and reinstate the elected president. However, Clinton’s dealings with Haiti were heavily influenced by domestic politics, especially his relationship with Congress, and this, rather than promoting democracy, was the main factor governing policy. Democracy promotion in Haiti ultimately proved a failure, with human rights abuses, shambolic elections and political turmoil the order of the day as Clinton’s presidency wound down. Clinton’s successor as president, GeorgeW. Bush, invoked the goal of defending democracy in Colombia from the beginning, but his administration’s policy has been inconsistent. Although the Bush administration has supported free and fair elections in Colombia, and funded programmes aimed at strengthening political parties, NGOs, and furthering human rights, it has carried out other policies that call into question its dedication to Colombian democracy. For instance, the US has sought to downplay a scandal linking members of Colombia’s Congress with the far-right paramilitary organisation known as the AUC, despite the implications these revelations have for the legitimacy of Colombia’s political institutions.
Austria’s national television network broadcasted forty-three hours of sympathetic news coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Less than six months later, Austrian news media sneered at President GeorgeW. Bush for honoring victims of the attacks as part of the opening ceremonies of the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City as crude and arrogant. Austrians found neither case too extreme. With more than a century of drastic swings between high and low public opinion of the United States behind them, Austrians were well adapted to such pivotal shifts between the two. The anti-Americanism that thrived in Austria throughout Bush’s presidency was as high strung as the exhilaration that captured the small country when the young and liberal Barack Obama took the place of “the cowboy” in the White House in 2009.
When GeorgeW. Bush succeeded as the forty-third president on January 20, 2001 the international state of affairs was relatively serene. In December 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was formally enacted, which officially marked the collapse of a nation that for more than forty years had been the main enemy of the United States in the Cold War. Nonetheless, the Cold War and the combat against communism had provided the U.S. with “a common cause and shared framing that underpinned U.S. leadership of the West” (Buzan 1101). Consequently, the United States was left with neither a significant threat from abroad, nor a direction for their foreign policy. Haass acknowledges Bush “did not run for the office promising fundamental policy shifts, something that would have likely proven difficult given that the federal budget was in the black, the country relatively prosperous, and the world largely at peace” (168). Likewise, Leffler (2013) proclaims “Bush administration officials generally agree that foreign policy was not a top priority when they assumed office in January 2001” (192). Resultantly, the focus of U.S. foreign policy strategy remained on democratisation, market reform, integrating the region into the global economy, and preserving U.S. economic and political predominance (Dobson and Marsh 118).
This study is an attempt to understand the extent to which the “culture war” affected GeorgeW. Bush’s popularity and support in rural America. Using both aggregate level data from each county and individual level data from the American National Election Study, we present two important find- ings. First, we show that there are significant and substantive political divi- sions between rural and urban residents. Thus, consistent with other recent literature and contrary to Fiorina et al. (2005), we find at least some evi- dence of a polarized America. Second, and as importantly, we find that individual attitudes on gay marriage had a greater effect on support for Bush in rural communities than they did in urban communities during the 2004 election. Curiously, other issues such as tax cuts and the war in Iraq did not offer Bush any greater advantage in rural America, suggesting that cultural issues are important to understanding why Bush performed better among rural residents than he did among urban residents in 2004.
Political conflicts over these and other civil rights issues, of course, cannot easily be reduced to a simple story of struggle between the forces of light and darkness. Each took place in the context of changing historical circumstances, each reflected competing democratic visions, complex social and economic conditions, and the magnetic pull of deeply held cultural traditions. Recent scholarship on the issue of race and grassroots conserv- atism in the modern south, for example, has demonstrated that the historic shift in the political loyalties of white southern voters over the last forty years, in many ways, defies simple explanation (Kruse 2005; Lasiter 2006; Sokol 2006; Crespino 2007). At the same time, however, there can be little doubt that the conservative ascendancy was driven forward by persistent anti-civil rights policies and political campaigns that found endlessly crea- tive ways to stigmatize ongoing concerns for equality and human rights as un-American and threatening. The dismal civil rights records of the Reagan and first and second Bush presidencies are well documented. So, too, are the infamously divisive campaign tactics of the conservative era, including: the launching of Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign and his pledge to uphold states’ rights just outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi, a community made famous by a seminal event of the civil rights movement, the 1964 murders of Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman; George H.W. Bush’s notorious campaign in 1988 that aggressively exploited fears of African American criminals, attacked the American Civil Liberties Union as un-American, and whipped up popular opposition to recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the First Amendment, the Pledge of Allegiance and the burning of the American flag; and GeorgeW. Bush’s 2004 campaign, which pressed for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage while Republican-sponsored anti-gay rights initiatives in eleven states help stoke the turnout rate of social conservatives (Wilentz 2008; New York Times, November 4, 2004).
What is the legacy of the GeorgeW. Bush Administration regarding domestic policy agendas? The Bush presidency provides additional evidence that variation in the broader political environment contributes to similar variation in domestic policy agendas and their success. Bush offered more new and major policies during his first term in office, when he was also most successful. Although Bush’s total domestic policy agenda was largest during his first year of his second term, the cycle of increasing effectiveness did not correspond with a greater success rate. Instead, Bush’s top three domestic policy priorities reveal not only the importance of moving fast, but also the relevance of clear public support for the president’s policy position. Educa- tion policy was successful, in part, given public support for reform and Bush’s prioritization of the policy early in his term using a bipartisan stra- tegy. Social security reform arguably failed because the public did not sup- port the president’s policy solution, nor did he “hit the ground running” with a well-grounded and clear policy designed to generate legislative support. 9 Although Bush clearly moved fast, arriving in Washington armed with his own Texas faith-based initiative, public support was mixed on this priority and the president was ultimately unable to generate the level of congres- sional support needed for it to clear numerous legislative hurdles. The long- term utility of faith-based initiatives have further been called into question by the Supreme Court, which has left open the possibility for a state to prevent faith-based organizations from receiving state or federal funding even if these organizations finance only their non-religious services with public funds (Locke v. Davey 540 US 712 ).
I n times of war, the President of the United States has been granted many more powers than in times of peace. Given the substantial national security concerns in what has been characterized as a wartime period, President Bush has laid claims to presidential war powers just like every other president in the modern era. When analyzing the differences between the theoretical perspectives on the presidency and their subsequent practices, it has become blatantly apparent that President GeorgeW. Bush has had a personal impact on the practices of the executive branch. This development has dramatically expanded executive power beyond the tradition- al practices of the presidency, even with regards of claiming powers within the national security apparatus. While these new practices, instituted by the executive branch, have been presented to the public in the manner of national security, they have actually been to the detriment of the legislature, the judiciary, and the American people.
The three measurements show that soft power regarding the war on terrorism shifted throughout time and that there is a difference between Bush and Obama. Obama had more soft power regarding the war on terrorism than Bush did. Where Bush attempted to make his discourse more convincing and attractive and tried to create soft power, his discourse was not attractive and convincing for the German government to carry out the hoped behavioural outcome of allied support. His efforts within the first measurement were also not seen within the polls where the US and its president perceived negatively, and his discourse turned out to be neither attractive nor convincing. Although Obama made lesser use of the analysed factors for his discourse to be convincing and attractive, the other two measurements show his discourse about the war on terrorism was eventually more attractive and convincing. Germany joined an operation part of the foreign policy on the war on terrorism again and polls show that the US, the president, and Obama’s discourse were attractive and convincing for respondents in Germany and the UK. Where the soft power in general is seen as declining by scholars this thesis shows that soft power regarding the war on terrorism shifted throughout the years. Soft power indeed declined during the Bush presidency, but rose again during the Obama presidency in comparison to the Bush presidency.
The second general trend in Bush’s media strategy involved an extreme “short-term-itis” in news management. While presidents have long sought to win control of the news cycle, things have changed a great deal since win- ning the news cycle meant having a good night on the evening news. The modern 24/7 media management system, one peppered with friendly re- porters and harsh critics in the cable and online environments, tempt White House staffers to try to win the news cycle minute-by-minute. By failing to take more of a long-term perspective, the Bush administration has offered short-term goodies like tax cuts, but at devastating long-term costs to the national debt (Farnsworth 2009). The short-term gains of a “mission accomplished” moment come at the long term costs of an occupation of Iraq that turned out to be far worse than advertised, with many painful conse- quences. Along these same lines, Clinton’s short-term physical pleasures and the subsequent televised denials of his misbehavior cost him dearly during his year-long impeachment scandal (Berman 2001).
However, other directives concerning the war on terror were much more audacious and controversial. For example, journalists have claimed that Bush used a number of executive orders to facilitate secret military action against terrorists in foreign countries. According to Seymour Hersh, “The President has signed a series of findings and executive orders autho- rizing secret commando groups and other Special Forces units to conduct covert operations against suspected terrorist targets in as many as ten nations in the Middle East and South Asia” (Hersh 2005). Similarly, the New York Times reported in November 2008 that Bush promulgated a classified order in the spring of 2004, by which the U.S. military and C.I.A. carried out nearly a dozen attacks in Pakistan, Syria, and other countries (Schmitt and Mazzetti 2008b). And in September 2008, the New York Times reported that Bush secretly approved orders in July to allow U.S. Special Operations forces to conduct ground attacks within Pakistan, without first obtaining the approval of Pakistani authorities, who are ostensibly U.S. allies (Schmitt and Mazzetti 2008a). At present, these directives are very much shrouded in secrecy, and they may be firmly grounded in the president’s power as com- mander in chief and perhaps also in congressional authorization. But they are controversial both politically and constitutionally, and they invite un- savory comparisons with previous presidents’ secret military operations, such as Richard Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia and Ronald Reagan’s support of the Nicaraguan Contras.
Foreign assistance has a bad reputation within the Beltway and most U.S. citizens have very mistaken notions about how much foreign aid the United States provides. Undoubtedly, some of the hostility to U.S. foreign assistance arises from the way that it has been allocated in recent years- mainly to Israel and Egypt and much of it in the form of military and tied assistance. Public opinion polling, however, consistently finds the general public to be supportive of generous US foreign assistance. The GeorgeW. Bush administration’s rejection of Kofi Annan’s initiative at Monterey thus amounted to a classic volte-face. However the grudging acceptance by the Administration to increase U.S. foreign aid as part of a global strategy to alleviate the roots of terrorism may signal an impor tant departure. 9
In October 2000, just one month before the presidential elections in the United States, the USS Cole was the subject of a terrorist attack, killing 17 members of the crew and wounding another 39 men (Perl and O’Rourke, 2001). The ship was a navy vessel that was stationed in the harbour of Aden, a city in the south of Yemen (Martin, 2011). For a short while, attention was drawn to the county in the southwestern area of the Arabian Peninsula, as the city of Aden was its most important port. However, a few months after the attack GeorgeW. Bush started the first term of his presidency, and throughout the 8 years that followed Yemen would for a large part find itself in the background again when it came to U.S. foreign policy, in a large part due to the fact that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq took up all the attention of the Bush administration. Throughout his campaign, presidential candidate Barack Obama promised to take the U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq and bring them home (Jaffe, 2015). This would have allowed him more space to focus on other countries in the Middle East, if it were not for the fact that the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated to such an extent that extra troops were warranted to ensure stability (Laub, 2014). This meant that throughout the presidencies of both Bush and Obama, their foreign policies had a strong focus on the Middle East, but not necessarily on Yemen.
Among the explanations why G.W. Bush was re-elected in 2003, his determination to fight terrorists by bombing their hideouts and, to a large extent, by using the military by way of a solution not only to eradicate them but also to establish democratic regimes in the Middle East (what was called “nation building”), made him appear to be a man with the spirit of a leader, unyielding in his resolve, not afraid to fight, heaping scorn on the criticisms, even the international ones, maybe as the Winston Churchill that he cheered so much. He appeared as the man of the situation who goes out into the field, personally and physically involved in this war against terror. A picture which symbolizes particularly well this self-involvement combined with the strongest expression of war manliness is the one showing G.W. Bush in a flying suit getting out of a S-3B Viking, after having landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003. In the background, the grade and name of the pilot under the cockpit as it is usual in the US Navy, but unusual for a President of the USA: “GEORGEW. BUSH – COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.”
This study was aimed to the examination of the effect of tillage row spacing and bush spacing on the performance and components of Phaseou vulgaris var. (line: cos16). The investigation was conducted as cut terraces and in terms of complete random blocks in three replicates at Brujerd Agricultural Research and Natural Resources in the agricultural year 2009-2010. Here, the main terraces with three row spacing treatments (25, 50, & 75cm) and three density treatments of secondary terraces (30, 40, & 50 bushes/m 2 ) were respectively shown with symbols A1, A2, A3 and B1, B2, B3. Each experimental terrace included 7 lines with 6m length and one between 2 terraces was considered as non-tillage line. After soil test, the land under study was sowed and, after disk, loader and Farozni operation, the tillage was done on 10 th of May. The amount of fertilizer was applied based on soil test. To control weed, Terflan herbicide was used (2l/hec). In growth period, controlling peps was done again. At the time of harvest, the following qualities were considered: bush height, the number of secondary branches in a bush, husk length, number of husks in a bush, number of seeds in husk, biological performance, seed performance, and yield index. Test results showed that the difference between seed performance in hectare in row spacing and different bushes spacing was at %5 level of significance. And, maximum production in square area was gained at maximum spacing and the highest density (B3).