Since the US security involvement in the cross-Strait issue under the TRA is implicit and ambiguous rather than explicit and unequivocal, CCK’s administration needed to adjust itself to establish a flexible and workable national strategy in order to deal with this change and uncertainty. To pursue such a national strategy without American security assurances, Taipei’s national strategy during CCK’s regime had three distinct features. First, CCK’s administration downgraded the importance of the cross Strait issue within its national agenda. Instead of relentlessly preparing military readiness to exploit any opportunity to return to the mainland as his father Chiang Kai-shek had done, CCK transferred the nation’s strategic priority from the cross-Strait issue to domestic reforms, notably economic growth and political democratization, as the most important means of maintaining and justifying a continued Kuomintang (KMT) regime on Taiwan which was still confronted with the PRC’s sovereignty claim. Second, faced with Beijing’s political strategy of “One Country, Two Systems” as an attempt to impose its own terms in relation to any future cross-Strait reunification. CCK formulated his famous doctrine of the “Three Noes Policy” (sanbu zhengce) (no negotiation, no compromise and no contact) in the face of Beijing’s strategy of peaceful reunification. His “Three Noes” doctrine, a peace-centred strategy but one entailing no search for reconciliation with the Chinese communist regime, remained at the heart of Taiwan’s national grandstrategy until the end of his rule in 1988. Third, while facing the cessation of ROC-US diplomatic relations and the MDT, CCK’s administration had little choice but to continue to preserve the closest possible Taipei-Washington relations. The passage of the TRA, amidst Taipei’s strong lobbying, can be regarded as one of the most important strategic arrangements of CCK’s administration in its continued competition against the PRC. Nevertheless, for the first time since 1950, the ROC was by 1980 forced to encounter the PRC security threat alone without an explicit defence commitment from America, which at the same time hastened Taipei’s build-up of an autonomous defence capacity of its own.
In many ways, the EU is a mixture of material factors and ideational beliefs in foreign policy terms. The ideology of normative power Europe is one such prominent example of this. Indeed, the EU is nothing if not a normative as well as well as a partially conceived material project that is predicated on building a broader European peace project alongside broadly European economic material foundations. The normative power Europe concept is also an extremely useful analytical framework for analysis (Manners, 2002). Others go further claiming that the European Security Strategy (2003) has reset the European strategic mindset to go beyond traditional national and materially-based definitions of power towards an ideationally-defined conception of European security and also constructivist modes of analysis for this new Europe of ideas. Grandstrategy is a set of ideas and actions made up of political, economic, military and cultural bases that help to define foreign policy. EU GrandStrategy comprises aspects of physical security, economic statecraft and value projection (Smith, 2011, 150). In the end, the EU is a humanitarian actor that is guided by humanitarian considerations as well as geopolitics (Kreutz, 2015).
new one had not yet been born. See Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 276. The term as used here is taken from Mary Kaldor. She used it to refer to the 1990s as “an interregnum between global conflicts when utopian ideas . . . . . .seemed possible”: Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 149. It was picked up by Martin Jacques, who made the link between Kaldor’s usage and American grandstrategy: Martin Jacques, “The Interregnum,” London Review of Books, 5 February 2004, 8–9. See the following for studies which view the 1990s as an interregnum in terms of U.S. grandstrategy: John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992–2000 (London; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2009); Jeremi Suri, “American GrandStrategy from the Cold War’s End to 9/11,” Orbis, 53, no. 4 (2009): 611–27; Richard A. Melanson, American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush, 4th edn. (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 36; Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, Themes for the 21st Century (Cambridge; Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2004), 27. Charles Krauthammer, writing from a different political perspective, called the 1990s a “holiday from history”: Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest (2002), 5–17.
Castro’s grandstrategy can be assessed in terms of the four main strategic aims of the Cuban Revolution. First, the fledgling republic would have to break free of the traditional hegemonic relationship with the United States (US). Castro realized that in order to carry out his revolutionary struggle, he would have to ensure that Cuba’s basic security needs were fulfilled, a daunting task, considering its proximity to the US. With a reasonable sense of security achieved, Castro could then address his second strategic aim, one to which he would devote a large portion of his time and energy: the maintenance of the Revolution at home. Building his domestic political base and creating a stable platform from which to accomplish his foreign policy goals was important if he was to make Cuba a significant player on the world stage. The third major aim was to manage Cuba’s foreign relations in such a way as to achieve two related sub-aims: to protect himself against future aggression by the United States and, in doing so, to avoid relying so heavily upon another great power sponsor that he would have traded one hegemon for another. That is to say, Castro sought to avoid entering into another hegemonic relationship with a foreign power that would force him to act in their interest above the interests of Cuba. The fourth and final grand strategic aim of the revolution was the exportation of the Revolution to the rest of the world, particularly Latin America and Africa. If the Revolution could be exported to the rest of the Third World as a direct result of Castro’s action, he would gain credibility as an independent “pole” in the emerging multipolar ICM. This would strengthen Cuba’s position vis- à-vis the great powers and lend Castro greater legitimacy at home. 5
An EU grandstrategy must define Europe’s ambition as a global security actor, which can then inform a military or civil-military sub-strategy or “white book”. As Member States have but a single set of forces, the question is not what the ESDP level of ambition is and what that of NATO: the question is what the EU, as the political expression of Europe and as a comprehensive foreign policy actor, wants to contribute as a global security provider, regardless of whether a specific operation is undertaken under ESDP or NATO (or UN) command. It is in the EU therefore that Member States logically ought to take the primary polit- ical decision whether or not to act in a given situation. If their decision entails military action, the secondary step is to select the organization through which to act – NATO, ESDP, the UN, the OSCE, an ad hoc coalition – which will always be a tailored solution, in function of which partners want to go along and which organization is best suited for the case at hand. It is in the EU as well that Member States can build more deployable forces, by various forms of coop- eration and pooling between Europeans, and which will be available for all of the potential frameworks for operations.
The London School of Economics and Political Science The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus against Its Southern Rivals (1821 1833) Serkan Keçeci A dissertation submitted to the Depa[.]
maximal force should be used to achieve a narrowly defined political objective. However, in C. Gaceck's opinion, the desire to limit the costs of involvement could lead to multiple policy prescriptions. Primarily, the “gradualist” school reasons that force should be applied along a spectrum of vertical escalation involving the use of economic and political instruments of state - vitally directed at the economic and political bases of an opponent's power and typically manifesting itself via air raids or blockades (Gaceck,1994,50-110). Conversely, Gaceck points to a more Clausewitzian "All or Nothing" school that advocates the massive application of overwhelming military force to effectively limit liability temporally by ensuring the attainment of a rapid result. However, in my estimation, the distinction between gradualism and the “All or Nothing” approach is a suboptimal means of categorization. I theorize that all approaches taken within the context of a liberal strategic culture are effectively manifestations of the indirect limited liability approach. The central distinction is between an indirect approach at the grand strategic level and the indirect approach at the theatre/operational level (treated as a subcomponent of grandstrategy). For example, the “All or Nothing” strategies of the doctrine of massive retaliation as well as the Weinberger doctrine, amounted to a direct use of force at the theatre/low strategic level but were components of indirect strategies at the grand strategic level. They served the purpose of circumventing the possibility of U.S. involvement in a large-scale conventional engagement by posing an unacceptable risk of escalation. Integrated into broader strategies centred around utilizing non-military means like multilateral alliances, “regional policemen” and the threat of political subversion behind the Iron Curtain, they helped carry out containment at a minimal cost.
The crisis, the American pivot and the Arab Spring also lead to an even more basic conclusion: grandstrategy is necessary. The Arab Spring e.g. cannot be discussed only within the box of the ENP, because it might necessitate the decision to reallocate funds from other policies to the ENP, or to shift the focus of other policies (such as development) to the region. Furthermore, events in the real world don’t respect the confines of EU policies: developments in the ENP countries cannot be dissociated from what goes on in the Sahel, the Horn and the Gulf. All three factors have major implications for EU foreign policy overall and therefore demand a debate on strategy overall, rather than just a debate at the level of sub- strategies and individual policy areas.
In the last few years, China’s rise has certainly contributed to the onset of the perceived decline of the American-led, unipolar, post-Cold War international order. This dissertation deals with China’s ‘grandstrategy,’ or its international policy. The more China has grown, the more its grandstrategy has come into focus in policy-making and academic circles. ‘Peaceful Development’ has been the chosen course for China’s grandstrategy as it seeks to ascend the ranks of the great power circle to which it belonged for millennia until the ‘Century of Humiliation’ and its aftermath. In the recent past, however, China has become more assertive in its actions and has begun to pursue its goals more aggressively and less introspectively than before. This dissertation positions itself within the debate on the coherence of China’s grandstrategy that has resulted from these recent actions. Whereas most other explanations rely on power transition theory or other material explanations, this dissertation attempts to solve the puzzle innovatively through a cultural inquiry focusing on China’s preoccupation with gaining back the honor that it lost at the hands of the West and Japan during the ‘Century of Humiliation.’ In this endeavor, as with any scientific research, the aim is to be objective and systematic. This dissertation certainly does not represent an apologist effort to rectify China’s sometimes aggressive behavior. Rather, it seeks to present an explanation of China’s grandstrategy that makes sense to a Western audience, which may possibly help to avert a serious conflict in the future.
where China believes it stands in the global order in light of Donald Trump becoming the new US president. She outlines competing views in China and points out that all scholars want to “see the US-China relationship as the center of global power”. Chinese scholars, she notes, assume that the shifting global order, and the decline of the West (reinforced by Trump’s polices) works in China’s favour. But there is disagreement among Chinese scholars on the question of China’s position vis-à-vis the US and whether China is ready to partner with the US in a G2 world. Hart, however, also points out that the “American decline” rhetoric might fade if China meets severe economic or security challenges. Our authors have offered an insight into current thinking on some of China’s most important strategic approaches today. Their insights show that the concept of a grandstrategy is still very fluid in China and continues to develop. While it might be too simple to say that China will phrase its grandstrategy according to whatever the US is doing, the apparent decline of the US under Trump has triggered a renewed debate on China’s standing as a global power.
Realists and Liberal theories have also engaged with this material over the last decade. For example, Andrew Bacevich’s work on American Empire which is often cited in post 9/11 analysis is an attempt to explain American statecraft in the 1990s, and covers the early days of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Bacevich argues that the United States has had a clear and well-defined grandstrategy since the 1990s (Bacevich 2002: 3). Following the main principles of realism that states will at minimum seek their own preservation, and at maximum seek greater domination, Bacevich asserts that American grandstrategy is essentially to “preserve and, where feasible and conducive to US interest, to expand an American imperium” (Ibid). Bacevich claims that U.S. policy did not in fact change after 9/11 in terms of commitment to an ‘open world’; on the contrary, it “energized them to press on” (Ibid: 226). In representing all that is good in the world, ‘America the reluctant superpower’ was ‘forced’ to act in carrying on to spread liberalism (Ibid). Quoting Donald Rumsfeld, September 11th actually created the “kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the world” (Ibid: 227). The war on terror that Bush called for articulated something that had not been present since the collapse of the Soviet Union which was a readily identifiable enemy: “a compelling rationale for a sustained and proactive use of American power on a global scale justified as a necessary protective measure” (Ibid: 229). Bacevich’s analysis points to three important ways in which defining the war against terror as a war on behalf of freedom served the administration’s purposes. One was that it allowed Bush to claim American innocence; second was it allowed Bush to link this new war to great wars of the past in which great evils were defeated (i.e. fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism); and thirdly, it allowed Bush to remove the constrains on the use of force, and “Bush’s war on terror made it possible for policy- makers to reclaim the freedom of action provided by the Truman Doctrine” (Bacevich 2002: 230). Above all, September 11 th and Bush’s policies “reinforced the post-cold war consensus for maintaining unquestioned military superiority” (Ibid: 238).
The US will have to grant these pivotal states some leeway, and take into consideration their points of view and demands and involve them in discussions regarding grandstrategy. It is a triad “consisting of leaders and followers joined in a common purpose” (Chaleff 2003: 13). In the current distribution of power, middle powers have the opportunity to advance their political, economic and security goals. Classic top-down strategies may lead these states to feel disengaged from the leader and adopt deviant behaviour, even becoming swing states or worse, deviants. Followers should therefore be part of the strategic process, with responsibility in areas such as terrorism, maritime security, piracy, etc.: “Leadership is not defined by the
See for example: Colin Dueck, “Realism, Culture and GrandStrategy: Explaining America’s Peculiar Path to World Power,” Security Studies 14, no. 2, (2005): pp. 195-231; Shawn Brimley and Michelle Flournoy state that: “A new grandstrategy should therefore answer fundamental questions about ‘America’s core national interest’ and ‘the purpose of American power’.” Shawn Brimley and Michèle A. Flournoy, “Introduction,” in Finding Our Way: Debating American GrandStrategy, p. 5; Posen explains: “A grandstrategy is a nation state’s theory about how to produce security for itself.” Posen, Restraint, p. 1. Robert J. Art maintains: “A grandstrategy tells a nation’s leaders what goals they should aim for and how best they can use their country’s military power to attain these goals.” Art, A GrandStrategy for America, p. 1; Michael C. Desch sees grandstrategy as a more general concept addressing various issues concerning the strategic position of a state and its national interest: “Grandstrategy encompasses a wide variety of important questions. [...] What are a state’s strategic interests and how should it rank them in importance. [...] How should states reconcile limited national resources with competing external interests?” Michael C. Desch, “The Keys that lock up the World,” International Security 14, no. 1 (1989), p. 86; Avery Goldstein states: “It is labeled ‘grand’ because it refers to the guiding logic or overarching vision about how a country’s leaders combine a broad range of capabilities linked with military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to pursue international goals.” Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's GrandStrategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 19. In contemporary International Relations literature the definition of the term ‘grandstrategy’ generally follows the rationalist means-ends logic, while variations exist, most definitions stress the long-term planning of national security as the end, and military and economic power as the means of grandstrategy. For further definitions of grandstrategy and the equivalent term ‘grand design’, see among others John M. Collins, GrandStrategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973); and Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defence: America’s GrandStrategy,” International Security 15, no. 4 (1991): pp. 5-53.
Although the containment grandstrategy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War can hardly be compared to the current U.S. strategy towards Russia, there are some similarities. During the containment, the emphasis in relations with the Soviet Union shifted from idealism to cooperation as well. There were periods of more pragmatic cooperation with the Soviet Union, for example, détente – relaxation of hostilities during the Richard Nixon administration starting with 1968. This less militarised, more diplomatic version of containment attempted to engage the Soviet Union in order to create mutually beneficial “structure of peace” to the Cold War through negotiations on specific issues which led to the SALT I arms control treaty and the Helsinki Accords (Gaddis 2005, pp. 278, 287, 290). During the containment, there were also periods with emphasis on using idealist rhetoric against the Soviet Union. For example, the “ideological offensive” of Ronald Reagan starting from 1981 which abandoned more pragmatic cooperation with Soviet Union and embraced tough, idealistic rhetoric about democratic values, criticising human rights violations and lack of democracy in the Soviet Union (Gaddis 2005, pp. 351-354; Martel 2015, pp. 289, 294). There were similar patterns during the Bush and Obama administrations. This swinging pendulum from idealist to cooperation rhetoric was an important characteristic of the U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and still applies to U.S. strategy towards Russia. This pattern should not be forgotten by the countries on NATO’s eastern flank.
If we accept that Philip II did indeed have a 'GrandStrategy' (and this book adds heavy evidence suggesting that we should), then the reader also has to notice that Philip II 'failed to achieve most of his policy goals'. The Spanish king, who was personally blamed for many of these failures, sacrificed lives, resources and reputation to attempt to achieve his aims. He undoubtedly left his main concern, Spain, weaker than when he took office and he failed to inspire unquestioning obedience. This was not entirely his own fault - among other problems, the religious controversies of the later sixteenth century severely restricted his freedom to manoeuvre and his ability to compromise. Despite being flattered as the 'Largest Brain in the World', Parker makes a strong case that it would have taken a genius to cope with all the concerns that confronted the king. That said, some of his concerns were universal: for large parts of the reign the succession to Philip II was far from secure and, at a time when it was generally understood that the king (or queen) equalled the land and the land equalled the king, there would have been catastrophic changes if Philip had died without an obvious heir. He was not alone in having dynastic insecurities - in the period covered by the text Portugal lost their independence (to Spain); France was engaged in bitter civil war; Scotland likewise; and up until 1603, England was only ever one heartbeat away from disaster. The hopes and aspirations of a dynasty and a country all rested on the life-force of a single individual. Somewhat as a reaction to such mortality (and like in England) the populace began to ascribe to their monarch attributes and powers that went beyond the mortal.
This is germane for examining the failures made by senior leaders with respect to Military Assistance in Vietnam. This memorandum outlines the first recommendation by military leaders to the civilian, political leadership to formalize a Military Aid and Military Assistance program. The problem with the Joint Chiefs’ recommendation is that it lacked a connection to any political objective. Certainly, prevention of the spread of communism, the domino theory, is a political objective; however, the disconnect is that the Joint Chiefs, like many, had a monolithic view of Communism — that what was happening from a policy side in the Soviet Union was having a clear manifestation in Southeast Asia. Although there is little question that there was an inherent relationship, at this point there was poor connection to the underlying reasons of pursuit. Whereas in Russia, Communism came to fruition due to class and economic disconnects, in Southeast Asia there existed the belief that the Capitalist West intended colonial interests and prevention of local governance. In pursuit of GrandStrategy, there was the argument to contain the global spread of Communism; however, the advice of George Kennan to initially pursue the policy of containment where it was feasible had not been heeded. The Joint Chiefs were mindful, in the
Under it, all countries have one ultimate responsibility – to protect the individual human being, as described in the 2001 report The Responsibility to Protect by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This responsibility is at the very core of national sovereignty, and insists to all countries that violations and restrictions of elementary human rights are not a mere internal matter. By the same token, no country that wishes to preserve the cred- ibility of its human rights commitment can turn a blind eye to blatant violations of human rights, let alone to genocide. Based on this very fundamental conviction, and on the com- mon belief that democracy, the rule of law and good govern- ance constitute values that must be preserved and protected, a group of nations entered into a legally binding commitment of collective defence. This was known as the North Atlantic Treaty, and it established the NATO alliance in 14. This group of nations grew over time, and today NATO comprises some 26 democratic nations. It is this group of nations that we have in mind as a point of departure – though by no means as an end point – when we propose a common grandstrategy. The strategy we present is generic, and could be ap- plied by other organisations as well, and so it is a model not only for NATO.
In its purest essence the European Union (EU) is a political project with a commitment to reaching a finalité politique of a federal Europe. The paper focuses on EU GrandStrategy with special reference to defence co-operation in Europe in a transatlantic context. The paper analyses the prospects for an EU strategy in the defence field and also at ways to explain this usin g suitable theoretical lenses’ as frameworks for analysis including concepts drawn from the fields of comparative strategy and international relations. The EU is a political project and the paper will also ask how far the defence field is a necessary and contingent part of the drive towards political union in Europe and what this tells us about the prospects for an EU GrandStrategy in a transatlantic context. The paper will in particular focus on a series of case studies to analyse the prospects for a coherent EU politico-military culture, how such a culture operates and what it means for EU GrandStrategy in a transatlantic context. What does this tell us about the defence area in terms of strategy and also about the state of the European integration project itself?
A second threat to the rule of law arises from the malfunctioning of the management and application of justice. The basic form is the simple corruption of individual judges or magistrates to serve private interests. But in some countries this phenomenon has gone beyond occasional bribes to secure a favourable judgment. The infiltration of private interests into prosecutorial services has gone so far that criminal and other investigations can be directed at particular individuals, often those tasked with combating corruption. This problem, often called state capture, is fortunately limited to only a few member states. But corruption and other forms of private influence are more diffuse and even more difficult to measure, let alone combat. A key challenge for the EU will thus be to uphold the principle that the rule of law requires an independent and effective judiciary. This will be an uphill struggle. Improving the administration of justice in countries where it is mired in corruption or hobbled by mismanagement leading to excessively long proceedings should become a second leg of a rule of law strategy. Of course, the administration of justice remains an exclusive member state competence but peer pressure (for example an annual report on corruption and more publicity to scoreboard indicators) could be combined with offers of technical assistance from the Structural Reform Support Service.