My second argument refers to global justice, which is often muted in a highly individualistic conception of international humanrights. Yet, the current neoliberal order has prevented many vulnerable sectors from meaningfully articulating their claims for human dignity. Scandalous lev- els of material inequality and systematic identity-based discriminatory practices hinder the most vulnerable communities from engaging in meaningful political participation. This is why dis- courses about dignity and rights have to be juxtaposed with important questions of global justice. That political task requires rectification of historically constituted material injustices that occur within and between the Global North and South. Thus, procedural legitimacy for global humanrights construction is not enough; it has to be fundamentally supported by substantive material justice and a celebration of differences in terms of identity, still bound together through human dignity and rights (Benhabib, 2011; Fraser, 1995). For example, the Netherlands, a small European country that is often celebrated as a humanrights champion, demonstrates the fundamental prob- lems of myopically focusing on the civil and political rights problems of countries in the Global South. For sure, many non-Western countries struggle in upholding civil and political rights, but we also need to recognize the systematic failures of the Netherlands (and of other rich Western countries) in eradicating the terrible and enduring effects of colonialist projects in the past and of the powerful Dutch corporate conglomerates that still continue to exploit the material and human resources of the Global South. No wonder that Makau Mutua expresses his discontent with the self-congratulatory humanrights discourses that Western countries tell unto themselves, and he urges us to ‘construct a society free of the daily avalanche of cruelties and oppression’ and to aban- don ‘colonialist and exploitative doctrines, no matter their origins’ (Mutua, 2002: 157). For a truly just international system to emerge, we need to rethink the current rules of global governance by seriously considering global justice and fairness in various policy areas.
practical understanding of rights, as both disable the critical and emancipatory potential of humanrights. This insight is then developed throughout the core of the text, which looks at Amartya Sen’s account of humanrights and considers the difficulties and potentials of the emerging right to development. He praises Sen’s theory but uses it to highlight the difficulty a general theory of humanrights has in addressing the distinct forms of rightlessness and suffering experienced by the marginalised. Baxi’s consideration of the right to development is important and well executed, as he looks at the limited promise of national development as an emergent right in the postcolonial period, which was then undermined by a market-oriented understanding of rights fit for an age of neo-liberal globalisation, to set up his argument for a politics for development as a human right. This alternative right to humane development stretches the existing legal regime by demanding participation for affected people and a conception of crimes against development, which could be brought against multinational corporations, while acknowledging that such a right would challenge the dominant structures of the global economy. This leads into his wider conclusion that humanrights remain a contested project – made in part by and for powerful global actors, while also adapted and innovated by communities of resistance and struggle seeking to create wider solidarity and claim their dignity.
Undermining dignity and privacy in the Lower Omo Valley, Ethiopia The principle of basic humanrights includes an essential right to dignity and privacy. These rights are severely undermined when people and their homes are made into tourist attractions without their free, prior and informed consent and without any intention to make them rightful stakeholders in a profitable industry. For over 10 years the tourism industry and its clients have profited on the exploitation of the Mursi tribe of the Lower Omo Valley, Ethiopia (Steen: 2007). The images of the Mursi wearing iconic lip plates and colourful dresses are, without their consent, seen plastered all over vacation brochures (e.g. RealAdventures: 1998-2009) and circulated amongst tour agents. The Mursi are sold as exotic cultural commodities to be visited, looked at, and photographed and it is a profitable business; thousands of private pictures of Mursi woman, men and children are circulating on the web as tourists and photographers are quick with uploading their cultural trophies for
that the possession claim is made ‘in accordance with the law’ (that is, that all necessary procedural requirements have been met and the decision to seek possession has been lawfully taken) that eviction is in pursuit of a legitimate aim (for example, to protect the rights and freedoms of others to enjoy their homes without interference), and that eviction is a necessary and proportionate response to what the occupier has done or failed to do. The second and third of these factors essentially produce a balancing exercise between the humanrights of the particular tenant or occupier and the rights of others. Cases at the extremes are easy to identify and determine. A tenant is highly unlikely to be lawfully evicted for a minor
as a right not to die. Neither is it a right to have one’s life saved at all cost. A right to life may mean having a claim not to be killed, but even some killing is thought to be morally justifiable. So the right to life is more accurately characterized as giving the right-holder a claim not to be unjustifiably killed, and perhaps under certain conditions a claim to some life-preserving measures. While rights are often stated in lofty, abstract terms, the specific content of a right is given by its correlative duties. Pogge reminds us of this because many are quick to dismiss the possibility of a human right to subsistence on the grounds that humanrights cannot have as their correlates positive duties of provision. Pogge invites us to consider a conception of the human right to subsistence according to which its content is not necessarily the provision of access to basic necessities on the part of all those who are able to do so. In this respect, Pogge’s account of the human right to subsistence represents a deviation from the conventional interpretation. On Pogge’s account, the content of the human right to subsistence is more complicated than this. As we shall see shortly, this has to do with his emphasis on the institutional side of humanrights. Ultimately Pogge argues that we should interpret the human right to subsistence as a right not to have coercively imposed upon us any social institution under which we are foreseeably and avoidably subject to severe poverty. In what follows we shall take a closer look at what Pogge means by this and why he thinks we should endorse this account.
However it must be noted of that there is no contention of serious variety to this question of the need for effective global leadership to humanrights. September 2005 must be seen as a milestone in this direction because; the government of various countries in a historic declaration embraced the doctrine of responsibility to project people facing mass atrocities. Despite this, the usual political cowardice when it comes to military deployment to prevent mass murder accounts for some of the inaction bringing mass murders to justice, particularly in Uganda. Iraq has degenerated into massive sectarian bloodletting, while the countries like North Korea, Burma and Turkmenistan and the closed dictatorships persist in Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, In Syria also ruthless violence continues with no punishment for the violations of HumanRights.
The aim of the brief survey is to explore the human right awareness level of the post graduate students pursing value education course in the university. This research paper highlights and indicates the importance of knowledge about human values, humanrights and its awareness for promoting peaceful society. A standardised HumanRights Awareness Test by Vishal Sood and Arti Anand,(2012) was administered to understand the awareness level of seventy two post graduation students. Findings of the study revealed that humanrights awareness is needed and gender, place of residence and stream of study has no influence on humanrights awareness level.
principal of the link between education and humanrights. Meaning there by it provides for a right to education. It is a basic human right that should be enjoyed by everyone. It defines what education is ‘’ directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for humanrights and fundamental freedoms. ‘’The concept of human development and personality relates to maximization of full human potential to benefit not just individual but for whole society. Education is a significant investment for the development of whole country. It brings out the idea that human development happens only with the humanrights being realized, and societal development occurs because of respect of humanrights. Quality education based on humanrights approach means that rights are implemented throughout the whole education system.
[T]he general assumption [prior to the end of World War II] had been that, short of certain excesses, what a government did to its own people was, for the most part, its own business. In 1942, for example, a member of the British House of Commons characterized Adol[f] Hitler’s treatment of Jews of Allied nationality as a matter of international concern but characterized the treatment of Jews of Axis nationality as no one else’s business; it was a domestic matter. Since 1945, that conception has, for the most part, changed. The basic proposition of the contemporary international law of humanrights is that a government may no longer do anything simply because it is effective and promises to achieve its purpose or enhance its power vis-à-vis its own population as long as it is doing it only to its citizens and in its own territory. In order to qualify for the name of government, a government now has to meet certain standards, all of which involve restraints on the use of power: no torture, no brutalization; no seizure of property; no state terror; no discrimination on the basis of race,
The main observation in view is that the Act is primarily intended to fulfill the gaps and lacunas which were being faced by the security agencies for the detention of the suspects. All the excluded provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code deal with the rights of accused which may be exercised by him where no incriminating evidence is available against the accused and where the allegation levelled is baseless. But the application of these provisions including bail and acquittal are specifically been excluded from the jurisdiction of the court meaning thereby that even if the accused found innocent by the court during his trial he cannot be left after acceptance of bail and in the shape of his acquittal. In other words, the unlawful detentions without due process are intended to be made lawful through this Act. Hence, for the foregoing reasons the Ordinance appears to be against the spirit of the Fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan including the due process of law and the right of fair trial as well as against the Humanrights settled principles.
Kantian insight and offers an alternative that breaks free from politics. I suppose the reason for this narrowness of focus must be found in the emphasis on rights to our private space, which since Mill has become a central element of Western freedom. This makes the usual discourse of rights in the West less political than it is in places such as Iran or Russia. But a philosophy of humanrights cannot just have the ambition of commenting or organising or sorting out what liberals in the leading western societies happen to believe. It needs to deal with the challenge of their universal scope and reach. Such a philosophy must speak to Western liberals, but also to those that suffer under dictatorships and to those who stand outside the liberal tradition altogether and do not appear to share its values. Here lies the appeal of the Kantian argument about rights as elements of both political and international justice. These arguments, in my view, will remain Griffin’s main rival even after the arguments of this magisterial book are analysed and digested.
divergence: what registers as a common law right depends upon the cases that come before the courts (so, common law rights are well developed in relation to access to justice and procedural fairness, but less so in other areas), whilst the Charter is simultaneously less expansive than the Convention in its scope (being applicable only to action taken in the sphere of EU law), yet more expansive than the Convention in its coverage (with greater protections for certain social, economic and equality rights as well as for so called “third generation” rights such as those relating to data protection, bio-ethics and good administration). Multi-layered because the level and scope of rights protection varies significantly according to the distribution of power across the UK’s territorial constitution. Action taken at the level of the EU might engage and be limited by the general principles or by Charter rights; UK-level action might engage and be limited by the Charter rights (where that action takes place within the sphere of EU law), the Convention rights (given domestic effect by the HumanRights Act 1998 (HRA)) or common law rights; action by the devolved institutions might engage Charter rights and/or Convention rights directly by their incorporation into the devolution statutes, 2 as well as the Convention rights by virtue too of the HRA, or common law
Our increasingly globalized environment, typified by the significant role of transnational interactions, raises urgent concerns about the com- mission of grave transnational wrongs. Two main legal strategies— belong- ing, respectively, to public and private international law— offer important directions for addressing these urgent concerns. One strategy extends state obligations under humanrights law to some non-state actors; the other adapts traditional private international law doctrines, notably its public policy exception. Both strategies make important advances, yet both face significant difficulties, which are all fundamentally rooted in what we call “the missing link of privity”— namely, identifying the reason for impos- ing the burden of plaintiffs’ vertical rights on putative defendants. In this Article, we argue that the moral underpinnings of private law provide the relational key to this missing link. We claim that private law’s normative DNA is premised on a profound commitment to reciprocal respect to self- determination and substantive equality. Because this commitment is the jus gentium of our private laws, it can and should be understood as a mani- festation of our interpersonal humanrights, which should function both as a premise for criticizing domestic rules and as the foundation of aggrieved parties’ standing vis-`a-vis those who wronged them.
1* Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights (UDHR), adopted by the UN in 1948, states that : "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and right." In Article 2 it states that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language." However, these words proved, for women, to provide a false hope even when subsequent treaties were approved, such as the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (1966), which were intended to translate the UDHR into international humanrights law.
Abstract: Do public condemnations by the United Nations humanrights bodies lead to foreign direct investment (FDI) loss for abusive regimes? The HumanRights Commission and later Council (UNHRCC) are internationally legitimized tools where member states shame repressive regimes for humanrights violations in public resolutions. We argue that these resolutions can influence foreign investors in two main ways: (1) They signal that a state is an outcast, unable to secure alliances within the UN humanrights bodies that protect it from being publicly shamed, with negative consequences for investment attractiveness (‘outcast’ effect). (2) They signal that a state is one of the most rogue, severe humanrights violators because voting members of the UNHRCC may be aware of many humanrights violations, but they pass resolutions only in the harshest cases (‘bottleneck’ effect). Any MNC associated with such a country risks severe reputational damage. Results from a panel data analysis of 165 countries (1977-2013) confirm that UNHRCC condemnations deter FDI. This effect is amplified by media reporting of humanrights abuse, and stronger and more robust than a bad humanrights record of a state itself. NGO shaming and milder UNHRCC sanctions (which do not reach resolution stage) have less strong effects, although the result on NGO shaming is to be seen with caution due to a reduced sample size.
The general agreement that states are obligated to protect humanrights which could be threatened by the activities of TNCs faces serious challenges. The preliminary obligation rests on the territorially competent host states where the potential violations occur. Unfortunately, the power of TNCs coupled with the economic interests of host states make efficient humanrights protection almost impossible. Home state regulation could offer an alternative to host state regulation, however due to the twin corporate principles of limited liability and separate legal personality, state sovereignty and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, home state extraterritorial regulation has been ineffective. The US Alien Tort Claims Act which was considered the most powerful transnational litigation tool has been severely limited by the decision in Kiobel and preceding judgements. Although the EU Regulations have abrogated the doctrine of forum non conveniens, serious procedural impediments prevent victims from instituting actions in EU states. Besides, it cannot be the duty of a single national jurisdictions to solve problems that concern the entire international community. States are understandably reluctant to establish this kind of jurisdiction because of the fear of placing their TNCs on a competitive disadvantage in relation to the TNCs of other states. This further explains why home states are also unable to tackle the problem humanrights violation by TNCs. It is evident that the existing domestic mechanisms alone are incapable of controlling the conduct of TNCs. This has made the realization of the state’s duty to protect almost impossible. A viable option
meaning to such humanrights mechanisms as The HumanRights council, the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, The European Convention on HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Court of HumanRights, the European Framework Convention on National Minorities, the European Torture Convention etc.
Licensed under Creative Common Page 7 present a periodic reports on issue concern humanrights protection, which review both legislative and policies and make recommendation to States how to acquire success in compliance through humanrights obligations. The reporting process was designed as continuous process which can be readdressed at any time when there are lapses in the system, and this may lead to some changes at any time call for. States established the treaty body system to achieve their primary work aim. The States responsibility is to implement all necessary measures which can be of good help to individuals and ensuring their provisions of humanrights promotion and protection standard at the national level.
Quane  states that besides being considered indivis- ible and interdependent in what refers to implementation, it is important to understand that rights are also inter- dependent and indivisible in their content. For this, the author draws attention to the right to participation. Every- one can invoke direct participation in what refers to “ the right to effectively participate in public life ” , but the right to participation is embedded in several other rights, such as in HRWS, and is more generally represented in the covenants. Thus, for the author, the boundaries that existed between right contents were undone and instead, the degree of interdependence and indivisibility was broadened and no longer confined to a specific covenant, but reflected a trend of the international protection sys- tem of the process of interaction between humanrights.
National laws have long protected a number of humanrights that companies can affect, although such laws often do not explicitly refer to international instruments or humanrights. For instance, many countries’ national laws have long protected labor rights such as freedom from discrimination (banks have been sued for alleged discrimination in the provision of mortgages and loans) and the right to form trade unions and strike. These national laws often reflect the government’s commitment to the ILO’s treaties. Governments also regulate health, safety, and the environment through laws and regu- lations that in some instances reflect international law. Typically, national laws enable suits directly against companies for violations of labor, health, or safety regulations. As a result, companies have long conducted due diligence on and sought to comply with such laws. The UN Guiding Principles suggest that companies also should consider whether those national laws reflect international standards, and seek to meet the latter. National laws create causes of action against corporations for adverse humanrights impacts in other areas as well. For instance, the UK has defined corporate manslaugh- ter, thus protecting the right to life from infringement by corporate actors. 53 Indeed,