Secondly, the GC and ECJ have continuously contributed – through their high standard of judicial review of Commission’s decisions – to developing the legal criteria for the assessment of mergers in oligopolisticmarkets. In this connection, the review exercised by the EU judiciary in Kali & Salz, Airtours or Sony/BMG (Impala), although formally limited, as far as errors of assessment are concerned, by the Commission’s discretion with respect to assessments of an economic nature, did not fail to respond to the need for a more economic approach in merger cases. In this connection, the GC has in principle developed a whole new set of criteria for the assessment of the existence of collective dominance on the oligopolistic market following a merger 157 . This was possible thanks to a very specific judicial technique,
As a natural but not necessarily complete step to arrive at a conclusion as to whether Bayesian implementation is indispensable in oligopolisticmarkets, in what follows, we will consider implementation through Nash equilibrium, which is the most intensely used solution concept in the literature.
In each period’s report, firms only receive the following information for their competitors - price, dividends paid, sales volume, net profit, and IRR. As a consequence, firms are required to make their decisions in an environment marked by considerable uncertainty. After every four periods, additional year-end comparative data is provided. Therefore, while firms will react to limited competitor data (mainly price) after each quarter, the availability of information reported after each year typically results in broader reactions on the part of rivals. In a ten-period game, however, if a firm finds after the first four periods that it has not invested competitively, then it could lose significant ground in the market. Clearly, the game simulates the non-cooperative nature of oligopolisticmarkets.
In fact, market structures of exploitation patterns are often oligopolistic, i.e., there are several decision makers whose policies influence each other. So, game theoretical approaches are introduced into the discussion. According to the theory of continuous time models of Optimal Control, the appropriate analogue of differential games is used. Roughly, this is an extension of Optimal Control, when there is an exactly one decision maker, to the case of N (N>1) decision makers interacting with each other.
We analyzed …rms’ advertising strategies in a duopolistic market in which …rms can launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. We also studied the market and societal implications of the presence of both types of advertising in the market in comparison with markets in which one or both types of advertising are absent due, e.g., to legal restraints. We found that in equilibrium, …rms spend on both non-comparative and comparative ad- vertising. A central contribution of our analysis is that …rms’ advertising warfare intensi…es when …rms are able to launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. In particular, …rms spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative advertis- ing. Most importantly, the higher the competitive pressure (as measured by either the degree of product substitutability or the mode of market competition), the more biased towards com- parative advertising are the expenditures of the …rms. This …nding highlights that a more competitive market environment makes the aggressive comparative advertising strategy more attractive than the traditional self-promoting non-comparative one.
In this study we present a dynamic model of polluting oligopolists, where firms compete α & la Cournot. Former models of Cournot oligopolisticmarkets are static and with or without linear demand functions. The existing literature on such models of polluting oligopolists can be distinguished in two general categories, depending on the resulting strategies employed by the rivals. The first originates in Tsutsui and Mino (1990) who established non-linear rivals strategies in a linear quadratic setting and the second is the broad category that results in linear such strategies into the same dynamic setting (see Dockner and Long, 1993; Carlier, 2008). However all of the existing models focus on a linear demand function resulting in a linear quadratic differential game.
The literature on endogenous timing market games tries to identify factors that might lead to the endogenous emergence of sequential or simultaneous play in oligopolisticmarkets. The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stack- elberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in this literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction, but failed to ﬁ nd support for it. By contrast, the experiments ﬁ nd that simultaneous-move symmetric out- comes are modal. Santos-Pinto (2006) shows that inequity aversion is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games since it makes symmetric outcomes more attractive to players than asymmetric ones. Santos-Pinto (2007) studies the impact of preferences for reciprocity in the in ﬁ nitely repeated versions of the Cournot and Bertrand games. He ﬁ nds that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collu- sion in both types of games. Introducing preferences for reciprocity in the in- ﬁ nitely repeated Cournot game implies that the punishment outcome becomes a destructive reciprocity state whereas the collusive outcome becomes a con- structive reciprocity state. These two eﬀects imply that the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained in the inﬁnitely repeated Cournot game tends to be lower when ﬁrms have preferences for reciprocity than when ﬁrms only care about proﬁts. In the inﬁnitely repeated Bertrand game preferences for reciprocity do not alter the payoﬀ of the punishment outcome nor that of the one period deviation. However, they raise the payoﬀ of collusion when ﬁ rms perceptions of the fair market price are strictly below the monopoly price.
The model of  focuses on the interaction between gas stations and the diffusion of prices from one gas station to another in the territorial dimension. Many aspects of using the multi-agent approach to competition in oligopolisticmarkets were studied by [14-15]. The agent who makes the decision to change the price is a gas station and the influence of the gas station owner is absent. However, this approach is not universal. In some markets for petroleum products, in particular in the Ukrainian petroleum product market, prices for each of the gas stations are set by the owners of the networks. Prices can be the same at all gas stations or different, but at the same time during the change in prices observed their equal increase in absolute terms. This approach was implemented for the model of the phenomenon of asymmetry of retail prices and their prediction in the retail market of petroleum products in Ukraine . For these models, the main indicator, on the basis of which the conformity of the model with real data was checked, was determined by the average retail price. Such a model enables to reproduce the behaviour of retail networks, based on a comparison of the average price in the model and the average market price. However, the analysis of the behaviour of dynamics of price dispersion in this model was not foreseen. To show this phenomenon, the model has been refined. So let’s determine the main assumptions and simplifications that are put into the model:
Standard IO and antitrust literature, adopting partial equilibrium settings, has abstracted from general equilibrium feedbacks. This paper has overcome this limiting feature by using the GOLE approach. The theoretical contribution allows for obtaining new findings that can be summarized as follows. I have derived a link between the first moment of the distribution of firm heterogeneity (as measured by the within-sector variance of production costs) across sectors and wage rate, aggregate profits, and social welfare. On the one hand, the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity unambiguously and negatively affects the wage rate. On the other hand, the effect of the “average” on aggregate profits and social welfare has unexpectedly been ambiguous because it crucially depends on the nature of the technology distribution and demand parameters. Even though sharp policy prescriptions cannot be offered, implications of these results are manifold. The possibility of a negative link between (economy-wide) market concentrations and aggregate profits helps to explain unexpected findings in empirical research. In addition, the research outcomes mean that antitrust policies aiming to affect competition and market power within sectors, ought to be sophisticated, by considering not only the market structure of single sectors, but also its effects on the economy as a whole, via the general equilibrium feedbacks coming from labor market, and more in general from factor markets.
In the case of GEC, as Table 3.3 highlights, the reliance upon overseas markets was still more important. Heather has stated that overseas sales (from subsidiary plants located abroad) and exports from Britain accounted for 42% of turnover in 1953, up from 25% in 1938.77 This continued to rise and accounted for as much as 49.9% of all GEC sales in 1957. GEC was responsible for around 10% of all British exports in the electrical machinery category. Again, similarly to the other firms, some 70% of exports went to Commonwealth nations, in particular, with South Africa, India and Australia accounting for 35% of total overseas sales in 1953. Of the European economies only Portugal, Eire, Holland and Sweden were significant export markets for GEC in the early 1950s, but all these combined accounted for less than 9% of overseas sales. By 1965, however, a slight shift in the direction of exports had taken place, with 40% now going to India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.78 Rapid fluctuations in the direction of exports could take place in the short term. The main reason for this lies in the fact that British electrical exports were concentrated in the heavy plant and machinery end of the industry. As a result individual contracts such as Japan’s nuclear power plant contract with GEC in 1965, or the purchasing of military aircraft by the
could expand in time and place, for a board of directors as a separate organ of the corporation, and for a professionalization of the management function with discretionary space and fiduciary duties toward ‘the corporation ’ (Ciepley , 2013; Ghoshal , 2005; Johnson, 2010; Robé, 2011; Segrestin & Hatchuell, 2011; Perrow, 2002; Veldman, 2016a,b). Because the new corporate architecture allowed the appointment of professional managers , rather than the appointment of speci fic members of the shareholder pool, and because this architecture changed the focus for managerial duties toward ‘the corporation’ rather than to a particular subset of the shareholders , and thereby promised legal protection against expropriation by majority share - holders, this new architecture served shareholders in retail and minority positions particularly well (Chandler, 1997; Freeman et al., 2011; Lamoreaux, 1998). Moreover, the combination of limited liability and a move toward fully paid up shares – which changed the nature of the share into a definite right , rather than an object for future claims – disconnected investors from duties and liabilities arising from management and from future financial obligations (see Freeman et al., 2011; Horwitz, 1985; Ireland , 1999 ). As the combination of changes to the conceptualization of shares and shareholders eventually enabled full liquidity in share trading , the development of secondary markets for shares in public corporations further limited the risk exposure associated with shareholding by offering a quick exit route , while at the same time signif - icantly enhancing the earning potential of these shares (Ireland, 1999).
The logic for state monopoly of public utilities arises from increasing returns to scale and the concern that private business in these areas results in monopolistic exploitation of consumers. The state monopoly however is fraught with the danger of production inefficiency. In this backdrop, the market form of mixed oligopoly is contemplated in markets like health, education, electricity, gas, telecommunications etc, where public and private sector coexists. The private firms maximize profit but the public firm maximizes social welfare.
Multiple explanations have been advanced to explain how this increase in the unequal division of social wealth has taken place. One explanation focuses on a process of ‘financialization ’, viewed as ‘‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets , financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies ” (Epstein , 2005). In this account, financial companies capture an increasing share of overall profits, non-financial companies acquire an increasing share of profits out of financial activities , and incomes in the financial sector rise disproportionally (Dore, 2008; Krippner, 2005; Krippner, 2012; Lapavitsas , 2011). A second explanation has been provided in the form of a concentration of market share in firms with very high productivity per worker (Kristal , 2013). As Davis (2017) reports , ‘‘The firms that have gone public since 2000 rarely create employment at a large scale; the median firm to IPO after 2000 created just 51 jobs glob- ally.” As this picture is repeated across industries , including finance , inequality can be attributed to decreasing number of workers being engaged in ‘superstar’ firms that capture an increasing market share (Cohen, 2017; Davis, 2017; Autor,
In this paper we have set up a simple model where two countries of diﬀerent size compete for the location of an exogenously determined, but variable, number of profit- making firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this model, economic integration leads to a -shaped relationship between the degree of economic integration and the level of equilibrium taxes. A special feature of the model is that taxable location rents can arise even in an interior location equilibrium where firms are dispersed. At the same time national governments have the incentive to attract internationally mobile firms by means of subsidies in order to save on trade costs. These counteracting forces lead to non-monotonic eﬀects of economic integration, with tax rates and welfare first declining and then rising again as trade costs are continuously reduced.
“The Affordable Care Act ensures health plans offered in the individual and small group markets, both inside and outside of the Health Insurance Marketplace, offer a comprehensive package of items and services, known as essential health benefits. Essential health benefits must include items and services within at least the following 10 categories: ambulatory patient services; emergency services; hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; prescription drugs; rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory services; preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management; and pediatric services, including oral and vision care. Insurance policies must cover these benefits in order to be certified and offered in the Health Insurance Marketplace, and all Medicaid state plans must cover these services by 2014.” (https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-health-benefits/)
Another line of research has found that when ownership of the banking system of a host country is highly concentrated by external capital, the country can easily spread in the host economy. Thus it is likely that the financial problems in Japan during the eighties and nineties were transmitted through Japanese banks in mortgage markets in the United States.  y  Strong links through economies have increased the speed at which events can affect a market quickly to others. The risk of contagion takes place wherever and transmission mechanisms of the policies adopted by the shareholders, in response to shocks to their economies of origin or elsewhere who have made investments, are significant 
outcome—positive externalities linked to FDI are being internalized and the total allocation of investments is said to be more efficient than without INIs. But the majority of economists is rather skeptical toward subsidy competition. They claim that the increase in allocation efficiency is nowise guaranteed; INIs can per contra bring extensive distortions to various markets, and globally a race to the bottom in the form of constantly lower tax revenues and loosening of ecological standards— or impeding socially efficient tightening of these standards, which would follow otherwise—much like a threat to employees’ rights. 2
We note that for markets with long development times (e.g. due to R&D investments) or markets where newly and unexpected business opportunities have sprung up (like the Eastern European markets when unexpectedly the Berlin wall came down), potential entrants have to make decisions without knowing others’ choices, and therefore the simultaneous entry model and its unique symmetric equilibrium are particularly relevant. Compared to an asymmetric equilibrium, considering a symmetric entry equilibrium has the following additional advantages. First, given that we study the symmetric pricing equilibrium at the second stage, conceptually it is natural to study the symmetric entry equilibrium at the first stage too. After all, it is not clear why a potential entrant’s equilibrium strategy should be different from that of another. Second, there are cases where firms enter a market but fail to repay their entry costs and cases where no firm enters a profitable market. 3 One would argue that a mixed strategy entry equilibrium